MARCUS  AURELIUS 
•ANTONINUS* 


THE  ETHEL  CARR  PEACOCK 


MEMORIAL  COLLECTION 

Matris  amori  monumentum 


trinity  college  library 


DURHAM,  N.  C. 

1903 

Gift  of  Dr.  and  Mrs.  Dred  Peacock 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2016 


X 


https://archive.org/details/thoughtsofempero01marc_0 


I. 


it' - 


1 


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i 

■ 1 


THE  THOUGHTS 

OF 

THE  EMPEROR 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS 


llh 


THE  THOUGHTS 

^ % 

OF 

THE  EMPEROR 

Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus, 


TRANSLATED  BY  GEORGE  LONa 


PHILADELPHIA: 
HENRY  ALTEMUS. 


A.LTEMUS’  BOOKBINDERY, 
PHILADELPHIA. 


f 

'Sy-.b 

? 

CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Biographical  Sketch 9 

Philosophy  of  Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus  . 45 

The  Thoughts  . . - 99 

Index  of  Terms 305 

General  Index • 311 

Z5ZZlc 


PREFACE. 


I HAVE  carefully  revised  the  Life  and  Phil- 
osophy of  Antoninus,  in  which  I have  made  a 
few  corrections  and  added  a few  notes. 

I have  also  made  a few  alterations  in  the 
translation  where  I thought  I could  approach 
nearer  to  the  author’s  meaning;  and  I have 
added  a few  notes  and  references. 

There  still  remain  difficulties  which  I cannot 
remove,  because  the  text  is  sometimes  too  cor- 
rupt to  be  understood,  and  no  attempt  to  restore 
the  true  readings  could  be  successful. 

George  Long. 


BIOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 


OF 

MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 


M ANTONINUS  was  bom  at  Rome,  A.  d. 

. 1 2 1,  on  the  26th  of  April.  His  father, 
Annins  Vems,  died  while  he  was  praetor.  His 
mother  was  Domitia  Calvilla,  also  named  Lu- 
cilla.  The  Emperor  T.  Antoninus  Pius  mar- 
ried Annia  Galeria  Faustina,  the  sister  of  An- 
nins Vems,  and  was  consequently  the  uncle  of 
M.  Antoninus.  When  Hadrian  adopted  An- 
toninus Pius  and  declared  him  his  successor  in 
the  empire,  Antoninus  Pius  adopted  both  L. 
Ceionius  Commodus,  the  son  of  Aelius  Caesar, 
and  M.  Antoninus,  whose  original  name  was 
M.  Annius  Vems.  Antoninus  then  took  the 
name  of  M.  Aelius  AureHus  Verus,  to  which 
was  added  the  title  of  Caesar  in  A.  D.  139:  the 
name  Aelius  belonged  to  Hadrian’s  family,  and 
Anrelius  was  the  name  of  Antoninus  Pius. 
When  M.  Antoninus  became  Augustus,  he 
dropped  the  name  of  Vems  and  took  the  name 

(9) 


lo  asiograpbical  Sftetcb. 


of  Antoninus.  Accordingly  he  is  generally 
named  M.  Aurelius  Antoninus,  or  simply  M. 
Antoninus. 

The  youth  was  most  carefully  brought  up. 
He  thanks  the  gods  (i.  17)  that  he  had  good 
grandfathers,  good  parents,  a good  sister,  good 
teachers,  good  associates,  good  kinsmen  and 
friends,  nearly  everything  good.  He  had  the 
happy  fortune  to  witness  the  example  of  his 
uncle  and  adoptive  father  Antoninus  Pius,  and 
he  has  recorded  in  his  word  (i.  16;  vi.  30)  the 
virtues  of  the  excellent  man  and  prudent  ruler. 
Like  many  young  Romans  he  tried  his  hand  at 
poetry  and  studied  rhetoric.  Herodes  Atticus 
and  M.  Cornelius  Fronto  were  his  teachers  in 
eloquence.  There  are  extant  letters  between 
Fronto  and  Marcus,*  which  show  the  great  af- 
fection of  the  pupil  for  the  master,  and  the 
master’s  great  hopes  of  his  industrious  pupil. 
M.  Antoninus  mentions  Fronto  (i.  ii)  among 
those  to  whom  he  was  indebted  for  his  educa- 
tion. 

When  he  was  eleven  years  old,  he  assumed 
the  dress  of  philosophers,  something  plain  and 
coarse,  became  a hard  student,  and  lived  a most 
laborious,  abstemious  life,  even  so  far  as  to  in- 
jure his  health.  Finally,  he  abandoned  poetry 
and  rhetoric  for  philosophy,  and  he  attached 

* M.  Cornelii  Frontonis  Reliquiae,  Berlin,  1816. 
There  are  a few  letters  between  Fronto  and  Antoni- 
nus Pius. 


/Iftarcu0  Hurelius  2lnton{nus. 


II 


himself  to  the  sect  of  the  Stoics.  But  he  did 
not  neglect  the  study  of  law,  which  was  a use- 
ful preparation  for  the  high  place  which  he  was 
designed  to  fill.  His  teacher  was  L.  Volusianus 
Maecianus,  a distinguished  jurist.  We  must 
suppose  that  he  learned  the  Roman  discipline 
of  arms,  which  was  a necessary  part  of  the  edu- 
cation of  a man  who  afterwards  led  his  troops 
to  battle  against  a warlike  race. 

Antoninus  has  recorded  in  his  first  book  the 
names  of  his  teachers,  and  the  obligations  which 
he  owed  to  each  of  them.  The  way  in  which 
he  speaks  of  what  he  learned  from  them  might 
seem  to  savor  of  vanity  or  self-praise,  if  we  look 
carelessly  at  the  way  in  which  he  has  expressed 
himself;  but  if  any  one  draws  this  conclusion, 
he  will  be  mistaken.  Antoninus  means  to 
commemorate  the  merits  of  his  several  teachers, 
what  they  taught,  and  what  a pupil  might 
learn  from  them.  Besides,  this  book,  like  the 
eleven  other  books,  was  for  his  own  use ; and 
if  we  may  trust  the  note  at  the  end  of  the  first 
book,  it  was  written  during  one  of  M.  Anto- 
ninus’ campaigns  against  the  Quadi,  at  a time 
when  the  commemoration  of  the  virtues  of  his 
illustrious  teachers  might  remind  him  of  their 
lessons  and  the  practical  uses  which  he  might 
derive  from  them. 

Among  his  teachers  of  philosophy  was  Sextus 
of  Chaeroneia,  a grandson  of  Plutarch.  What 
he  learned  from  this  excellent  man  is  told  b}^ 
himself  (i.  9).  His  favorite  teacher  was  Q. 


12 


JSiOfltapbfcal  Sftetcb. 


Junius  Rusticus  (i.  7),  a philosopher,  and  also 
a man  of  practical  good  sense  in  public  affairs. 
Rusticus  was  the  adviser  of  Antoninus  after  he 
became  emperor.  Y oung  men  who  are  destined 
for  high  places  are  not  often  fortunate  in  those 
who  are  about  them,  their  companions  and 
teachers  ; and  I do  not  know  any  example  of  a 
young  prince  having  had  an  education  which 
can  be  compared  with  that  of  M.  Antoninus. 
Such  a body  of  teachers  distinguished  by  their 
acquirements  and  their  character  will  hardly  be 
collected  again  ; and  as  to  the  pupil,  we  have 
not  had  one  like  him  since. 

Hadrian  died  in  July  A.  D.  138,  and  was  suc- 
ceeded by  Antoninus  Pius.  M.  Antoninus 
married  Faustina,  his  cousin,  the  daughter  of 
Pius,  probably  about  A.  D.  146,  for  he  had  a 
daughter  born  in  147.  He  received  from  his 
adoptive  father  the  title  of  Caesar,  and  was  as- 
sociated with  him  in  the  administration  of  the 
state.  The  father  and  the  adopted  son  lived 
together  in  perfect  friendship  and  confidence. 
Antoninus  was  a dutiful  son,  and  the  emperor 
Pius  loved  and  esteemed  him. 

Antoninus  Pius  died  in  March,  A.  D.  16 1. 
The  Senate,  it  is  said,  urged  M.  Antoninus  to 
take  the  sole  administration  of  the  empire,  but 
he  associated  with  himself  the  other  adopted 
son  of  Pius,  ly.  Ceionius  Commodus,  who  is 
generally  called  I,.  Verus.  Thus  Rome  for  the 
first  time  had  two  emperors.  Verus  was  an  in- 
dolent man  of  pleasure,  and  unworthy  of  his 


/Biarcue  Bureltua  Bntoninue. 


13 


station.  Antoninus  however  bore  with  him, 
and  it  is  said  Verus  had  sense  enough  to  pay 
to  his  colleague  the  respect  due  to  his  charac- 
ter. A virtuous  emperor  and  a loose  partner 
lived  together  in  peace,  and  their  alliance  was 
strengthened  by  Antoninus  giving  to  Verus  for 
wife  his  daughter  Lucilla. 

The  reign  of  Antoninus  was  first  troubled  by 
a Parthian  war,  in  which  Verus  was  sent  to  com- 
mand; but  he  did  nothing,  and  the  success  that 
was  obtained  by  the  Romans  in  Armenia  and 
on  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris  was  due  to  his 
generals.  This  Parthian  war  ended  in  A.  D. 
165.  Aurelius  and  Verus  had  a triumph  (a.  d. 
166)  for  the  victories  in  the  East.  A pestilence 
followed,  which  carried  off  great  numbers  in 
Rome  and  Italy,  and  spread  to  the  west  of 
Europe. 

The  north  of  Italy  was  also  threatened  by  the 
rude  people  beyond  the  Alps,  from  the  borders 
of  Gallia  to  the  eastern  side  of  the  Hadriatic. 
These  barbarians  attempted  to  break  into  Italy, 
as  the  Germanic  nations  had  attempted  near 
three  hundred  years  before;  and  the  rest  of  the 
life  of  Antoninus,  with  some  inten^als,  was  em- 
ployed in  driving  back  the  invaders.  In  169 
Verus  suddenly  died,  and  Antoninus  adminis- 
tered the  state  alone. 

During  the  German  wars  Antoninus  resided 
for  three  years  on  the  Danube  at  Camuntum. 
The  Marcomanni  were  driven  out  of  Pannonia 
and  almost  destroyed  in  their  retreat  across  the 


14 


JSlograpbical  Sftetcb. 


Danube;  and  in  A.  d.  174  the  emperor  gained  a 
great  victory  over  the  Quadi. 

In  A.  D.  175,  Avidius  Cassius,  a brave  and 
skilful  Roman  commander  who  was  at  the  head 
of  the  troops  in  Asia,  revolted,  and  declared 
himself  Augustus.  But  Cassius  was  assassi- 
nated by  some  of  his  officers,  and  so  the  rebel- 
lion came  to  an  end.  Antoninus  showed  his 
humanity  by  his  treatment  of  the  family  and 
the  partisans  of  Cassius;  and  his  letter  to  the 
Senate,  in  which  he  recommends  mercy,  is  ex- 
tant. (Vulcatius,  Avidius  Cassius,  c.  12.) 

Antoninus  set  out  for  the  East  on  hearing  of 
Cassius’  revolt.  Though  he  appears  to  have 
returned  to  Rome  in  A.  D.  174,  he  went  back  to 
prosecute  the  war  against  the  Germans,  and  it 
is  probable  that  he  marched  direct  to  the  East 
from  the  German  war.  His  wife  Faustina,  who 
accompanied  him  into  Asia,  died  suddenly  at 
the  foot  of  the  Taurus,  to  the  great  grief  of  her 
husband.  Capitolinus,  who  has  written  the  life 
of  Antoninus,  and  also  Dion  Cassius,  accuses  the 
empress  of  scandalous  infidelity  to  her  husband, 
and  of  abominable  lewdness.  But  Capitolinus 
says  that  Antoninus  either  knew  it  not  or  pre- 
tended not  to  know  it.  Nothing  is  so  common 
as  such  malicious  reports  in  all  ages,  and  the 
history  of  imperial  Rome  is  full  of  them.  An- 
toninus loved  his  wife,  and  he  says  that  she 
was  “obedient,  affectionate,  and  simple.”  The 
same  scandal  had  been  spread  about  Faustina’s 
mother,  the  wife  of  Antoninus  Pius,  and  yet  he 


/Iftarcu0  Burelius  antoninus. 


15 


too  was  perfectly  satisfied  with  his  wife.  An- 
toninus Pius  says  after  her  death,  in  a letter  to 
Fronto,  that  he  would  rather  have  lived  in  exile 
with  his  wife  than  in  his  palace  at  Rome  with- 
out her.  There  are  not  many  men  who  w'ould 
give  their  wives  a better  character  than  these 
two  emperors.  Capitolinus  wrote  in  the  time 
of  Diocletian.  He  may  have  intended  to  tell 
the  truth,  but  he  is  a poor,  feeble  biographer. 
Dion  Cassius,  the  most  malignant  of  historians, 
always  reports,  and  perhaps  he  believed,  any 
scandal  against  anybody. 

Antoninus  continued  his  journey  to  Syria 
and  Egypt,  and  on  his  return  to  Italy  through 
Athens  he  was  initiated  into  the  Eleusinian 
mysteries.  It  was  the  practice  of  the  emperor 
to  conform  to  the  established  rites  of  the  age, 
and  to  perform  religious  ceremonies  with  due 
solemnity.  We  cannot  conclude  from  this  that 
he  was  a superstitious  man,  though  we  might 
perhaps  do  so  if  his  book  did  not  show  that 
he  was  not.  But  that  is  only  one  among  many 
instances  that  a ruler’s  public  acts  do  not  al- 
ways prove  his  real  opinions.  A prudent  gov- 
ernor will  not  roughly  oppose  even  the  super- 
stitions of  his  people  ; and  though  he  may  wish 
they  were  wiser,  he  will  know  that  he  cannot 
make  them  so  by  offending  their  prejudices. 

Antoninus  and  his  son  Commodus  entered 
Rome  in  triumph,  perhaps  for  some  German 
victories,  on  the  23d  of  December,  A.  D.  176. 
In  the  following  year  Commodus  was  associated 


i6 


JSlograpbical  Sftctcb. 


with  his  father  in  the  empire,  and  took  the 
name  of  Augustus.  This  year  A.  d.  177  is 
memorable  in  ecclesiastical  history.  Attains 
and  others  were  put  to  death  at  L,yon  for  their 
adherence  to  the  Christian  religion.  The  evi- 
dence of  this  persecution  is  a letter  preserved 
by  Eusebius  (E.  H.  v.  i ; printed  in  Routh’s 
Reliquiae  Sacrae,  vol.  i,  with  notes).  The 
letter  is  from  the  Christians  of  Vienna  and 
Eugdunum  in  Gallia  (Vienna  and  Lyon)  to 
their  Christian  brethren  in  Asia  and  Phrygia  ; 
and  it  is  preserved  perhaps  nearly  entire.  It 
contains  a very  particular  description  of  the 
tortures  inflicted  on  the  Christians  in  Gallia, 
and  it  states  that  while  the  persecution  was  go- 
ing on,  Attains,  a Christian  and  a Roman  citi- 
zen, was  loudly  demanded  by  the  populace  and 
brought  into  the  amphitheatre  ; but  the  gover- 
nor ordered  him  to  be  reserved,  with  the  rest 
who  were  in  prison,  until  he  had  received  in- 
structions from  the  emperor.  Many  had  been 
tortured  before  the  governor  thought  of  ap- 
plying to  Antoninus.  The  imperial  rescript, 
says  the  letter,  was  that  the  Christians  should 
be  punished,  but  if  they  would  deny  their 
faith,  they  must  be  released.  On  this  the 
work  began  again.  The  Christians  who  were 
Roman  citizens  were  beheaded  ; the  rest  were 
exposed  to  the  wild  beasts  in  the  amphithe- 
atre. Some  modern  writers  on  ecclesiastical 
history,  when  they  use  this  letter,  say  nothing 
of  the  wonderful  stories  of  the  martyrs’  suffer- 


flbarcus  aurclius  antoninus. 


17 


ings.  Sanctus,  as  the  letter  says,  was  burnt 
with  plates  of  hot  iron  till  his  body  was  one 
sore  and  had  lost  all  human  form  ; but  on  being 
put  to  the  rack  he  recovered  his  former  appear- 
ance under  the  torture,  which  was  thus  a cm-e 
instead  of  a punishment.  He  was  afterwards 
torn  by  beasts,  and  placed  on  an  iron  chair  and 
roasted.  He  died  at  last. 

The  letter  is  one  piece  of  evidence.  The 
writer,  whoever  he  was  that  wrote  in  the  name 
of  the  Gallic  Christians,  is- our  evidence  both 
for  the  ordinary  and  the  extraordinar}'  circum- 
stances of  the  story,  and  we  cannot  accept  his 
evidence  for  one  part  and  reject  the  other.  We 
often  receive  small  evidence  as  a proof  of  a 
thing  we  believe  to  be  within  the  limits  of 
probability  or  possibility,  and  we  reject  exactly 
the  same  evidence,  when  the  thing  to  which  it 
refers  appears  very  improbable  or  impossible. 
But  this  is  a false  method  of  inquiry,  though 
it  is  followed  by  some  modern  writers,  who  se- 
lect what  they  like  from  a story  and  reject  the 
rest  of  the  evidence;  or  if  they  do  not  reject 
it,  they  dishonestly  suppress  it.  A man  can 
only  act  consistently  by  accepting  all  this  letter 
or  rejecting  it  all,  and  we  cannot  blame  him  for 
either.  But  he  who  rejects  it  may  still  admit 
that  such  a letter  may  be  founded  on  real  facts; 
and  he  would  make  this  admission  as  the  most 
probable  way  of  accounting  for  the  existence  of 
the  letter;  but  if,  as  he  would  suppose,  the 
writer  has  stated  some  things  falsely,  he  can- 
2 


i8 


:©iogtapbical  Shctcb. 


not  tell  what  part  of  his  story  is  worthy  of 
credit. 

The  war  on  the  northern  frontier  appears  to 
have  been  uninterrupted  during  the  visit  of 
Antoninus  to  the  East,  and  on  his  return  the 
emperor  again  left  Rome  to  oppose  the  barba- 
rians. The  Germanic  people  were  defeated  in 
a great  battle  A.  d.  179.  During  this  campaign 
the  emperor  was  seized  with  some  contagious 
malady,  of  which  he  died  in  the  camp  at  Sir- 
mium  (Mitrovitz),  on  the  Save,  in  Rower  Pan- 
nonia,  but  at  Vindebona  (Vienna),  according  to 
other  authorities,  on  the  17th  of  March,  A.  D. 
180,  in  the  fift5^-ninth  year  of  his  age.  His  son 
Commodus  was  with  him.  The  body,  or  the 
ashes  probably,  of  the  emperor  were  carried  to 
Rome,  and  he  received  the  honor  of  deification. 
Those  who  could  afford  it  had  his  statue  or 
bust;  and  when  Capitolinus  wrote,  many  peo- 
ple still  had  statues  of  Antoninus  among  the 
Dei  Penates  or  household  deities.  He  was  in  a 
manner  made  a saint.  Commodus  erected  to 
the  memory  of  his  father  the  Antonine  column 
which  is  now  in  the  Piazza  Colonna  at  Rome. 
The  bassi  rilievi  which  are  placed  in  a spiral 
line  round  the  shaft  commemorate  the  victories 
of  Antoninus  over  the  Marcomanni  and  the 
Quadi,  and  the  miraculous  shower  of  rain 
which  refreshed  the  Roman  ’soldiers  and  dis- 
comfited their  enemies.  The  statue  of  Antoni- 
nus was  placed  on  the  capital  of  the  column, 
but  it  was  removed  at  some  time  tmknown,  and 


Marcus  aurelius  Bntontnus. 


19 


a bronze  statue  of  St.  Paul  was  put  in  the  place 
by  Pope  Sixtus  the  fifth. 

The  historical  evidence  for  the  times  of  An- 
toninus is  very  defective,  and  some  of  that 
which  remains  is  not  credible.  The  most  curi- 
ous is  the  story  about  the  miracle  which  hap- 
pened in  A.  D.  174,  during  the  war  with  the 
Quadi.  The  Roman  army  was  in  danger  of 
perishing  by  thirst,  but  a sudden  storm  drenched 
them  with  rain,  while  it  discharged  fire  and 
hail  on  their  enemies,  and  the  Romans  gained 
a great  victory.  All  the  authorities  which 
speak  of  the  battle  speak  also  of  the  miracle. 
The  Gentile  writers  assign  it  to  their  gods,  and 
the  Christians  to  the  intercession  of  the  Chris- 
tian legion  in  the  emperor’s  army.  To  confirm 
the  Christian  statement  it  is  added  that  the 
emperor  gave  the  title  of  Thundering  to  this 
legion;  but  Dacier  and  others,  who  m.aintain  the 
Christian  report  of  the  miracle,  admit  that  this 
title  of  Thundering  or  Lightning  was  not  given 
to  this  legion  because  the  Quadi  were  struck 
with  lightning,  but  because  there  was  a figure 
of  lightning  on  their  shields,  and  that  this  title 
of  the  legion  existed  in  the  time  of  Augustus. 

Scaliger  also  had  observed  that  the  legion  was 
called  Thundering  (/cfpawo^oAof,  or  Kepawo(p6pog') 
before  the  reigm  of  Antoninus.  We  learn  this 
from  Dion  Cassius  (Lib.  55,  c.  23,  and  the  note 
of  Reimarus),  who  enumerates  all  the  legions 
of  Augustus’  time.  The  name  Thundering  of 
Lightning  also  occurs  on  an  inscription  of  the 


20 


3Bioflrapbical  Sftctcb. 


reign  of  Trajan,  which  was  found  at  Trieste. 
Eusebius  (v.  5),  when  he  relates  the  miracle, 
quotes  Apolinarius,  bishop  of  Hierapolis,  as 
authority  for  this  name  being  given  to  the 
legion  Melitene  by  the  emperor  in  consequence 
of  the  success  which  he  obtained  through  their 
prayers;  from  which  we  may  estimate  the  value 
of  Apolinarius’  testimony.  Eusebius  does  not 
say  in  what  book  of  Apolinarius  the  statement 
occurs.  Dion  says  that  the  Thundering  legion 
was  stationed  in  Cappadocia  in  the  time  of 
Augustus.  Valesius  also  observes  that  in  the 
Notitia  of  the  Imperium  Romanum  there  is 
mentioned  under  the  commander  of  Armenia 
the  Praefectura  of  the  twelfth  legion  named 
“Thundering  Melitene;’’  and  this  position  in 
Armenia  will  agree  with  what  Dion  sa}^s  of  its 
position  in  Cappadocia.  Accordingly  Valesius 
concludes  that  Melitene  was  not  the  name  of 
the  legion,  but  of  the  town  in  which  it  was 
stationed.  Melitene  was  also  the  irame  of  the 
district  in  which  this  town  was  situated.  The 
legions  did  not,  he  says,  take  their  name  from 
the  place  where  they  were  on  duty,  but  from 
the  country  in  which  they  were  raised,  and 
therefore  what  Eusebius  says  about  the  Melitene 
does  not  seem  probable  to  him.  Yet  Valesius, 
on  the  authority  of  Apolinarius  and  Tertullian, 
believed  that  the  miracle  was  worked  through 
the  prayers  of  the  Christian  soldiers  in  the 
emperor’s  army.  Rufinus  does  not  give  the 
name  of  Melitene  to  this  legion,  says  Valesius, 


^arcu8  aurelius  anton'nus. 


21 


and  probably  he  purposely  omitted  it,  because 
he  knew  that  Melitene  was  the  name  of  a town 
in  Armenia  Minor,  where  the  legion  was  sta- 
tioned in  his  time. 

The  emperor,  it  is  said,  made  a report  of  his 
victory  to  the  Senate,  which  we  may  believe, 
for  such  was  the  practice;  but  we  do  not  know 
what  he  said  in  his  letter,  for  it  is  not  extant. 
Dacier  assumes  that  the  emperor’s  letter  was 
purposely  destroyed  by  the  Senate  or  the  enemies 
of  Christianity,  that  so  honorable  a te.stimony 
to  the  Christians  and  their  religion  might  not 
be  perpetuated.  The  critic  has  however  not 
seen  that  he  contradicts  him.self  when  he  tells 
us  the  purport  of  the  letter,  for  he  says  that  it 
was  destroyed,  and  even  Eusebius  could  not 
find  it.  But  there  does  exist  a letter  in  Greek 
addressed  by  Antoninus  to  the  Roman  people 
and  the  sacred  Senate  after  this  memorable 
victory.  It  is  sometimes  printed  after  Justin’s 
first  Apology,  but  it  is  totally  unconnected  with 
the  apologies.  This  letter  is  one  of  the  most 
stupid  forgeries  of  the  many  which  exist,  and 
it  cannot  be  possibly  founded  even  on  the  gen- 
uine report  of  Antoninus  to  the  Senate.  If  it 
were  genuine,  it  would  free  the  emperor  from 
the  charge  of  persecuting  men  because  they 
were  Christians,  for  he  says  in  this  false  letter 
that  if  a man  accuse  another  only  of  being  a 
Christian,  and  the  accused  confess,  and  there  is 
nothing  else  against  him,  he  must  be  set  free; 
with  this  monstrous  addition,  made  by  a man 


22 


asiograpbfcal  Sftctcb. 


inconceivably  ignorant,  that  the  informer  must 
be  burnt  alive.* 

During  the  time  of  Antoninus  Pius  and  Mar- 
cus Antoninus  there  appeared  the  first  Apology 
of  Justinus,  and  under  M.  Antoninus  the  Ora- 
tion of  Tatia:i  against  the  Greeks,  which  was  a 
fierce  attack  on  the  established  religions ; the 
address  of  Athenagoras  to  M.  Antoninus  on  be- 
half of  the  Christians,  and  the  Apology  of 
Melito,  bivShop  of  Sardes,  also  addressed  to  the 
emperor,  and  that  of  Apolinarius.  The  first 
Apology  of  Justinus  is  addressed  to  T.  Antoni- 
nus Pius  and  his  two  adopted  sons,  M.  Antoni- 
nus and  L.  Verus;  but  we  do  not  know  whether 
they  read  it.f  The  second  Apology  of  Justinus 
is  entitled  “to  the  Roman  Senate;’’  but  this 

* Eiisebius  (v.  5)  quotes  Tertullian’s  Apology  to  the 
Roman  Senate  in  confirmation  of  the  story.  Tertul- 
lian,  he  says,  writes  that  letters  of  the  emperor  were 
extant,  in  which  he  declares  that  his  army  was  saved 
by  the  prayers  of  the  Christians ; and  that  he  “threat- 
ened to  punish  with  death  those  who  ventured  to  ac- 
cuse us.”  It  is  possible  that  the  forged  letter  which 
is  now  extant  may  be  one  of  those  which  Tertullian 
had  seen,  for  he  uses  the  plural  number,  “letters.” 
A great  deal  has  been  written  about  this  miracle  of 
the  Thundering  Region,  and  more  than  is  worth  read- 
ing. There  is  a dissertation  on  this  supposed  miracle 
in  Moyle’s  Works,  London,  1726. 

fOrosius,  vii.  14,  says  that  Justinus  the  philosopher 
presented  to  Antonins  Pius  his  work  in  defence  of  the 
Christian  religion,  and  made  him  merciful  to  the 
Christians. 


fllbarcue  Surclius  :Hntonlnus. 


23 

superscription  is  from  some  cop3'ist.  In  the 
first  chapter  Justinus  addresses  the  Romans. 
In  the  second  chapter  he  speaks  of  an  affair 
that  had  recently  happened  in  the  time  of  M. 
Antoninus  and  L.  Verus,  as  it  seems;  and  he 
also  directly  addresses  the  emperor,  sajdng  of  a 
certain  woman,  “she  addressed  a petition  to 
thee,  the  emperor,  and  thou  didst  grant  the  peti- 
tion. ’ ’ In  other  passages  the  writer  addresses  the 
two  emperors,  from  Avhich  we  must  conclude  that 
the  Apology  was  directed  to  them.  Eusebius 
(E.  H.  iv.  18)  states  that  the  second  Apology 
AA'as  addressed  to  the  successor  of  Antoninus 
Pius,  and  he  names  him  Antoninus  Verus, 
meaning  M.  Antoninus.  In  one  passage  of  this 
second  Apolog}^  (c.  8),  Justinus,  or  the  writer, 
whoever  he  may  be,  saj's  that  even  men  who 
folloAved  the  Stoic  doctrines,  when  the}'  ordered 
their  lives  according  to  ethical  reason,  rvere 
hated  and  murdered,  such  as  Heraclitus,  Muso- 
nius  in  his  own  times,  and  others;  for  all  those 
who  in  any  way  labored  to  live  according  to 
reason  and  avoided  wickedness  were  alwaj'S 
hated;  and  this  was  the  effect  of  the  work  of 
daemons. 

Justinus  himself  is  said  to  have  been  put  to 
death  at  Rome,  because  he  refused  to  sacrifice 
to  the  gods.  It  cannot  have  been  in  the  reign 
of  Hadrian,  as  one  authority  states;  nor  in  the 
time  of  Antoninus  Pius,  if  the  second  Apology 
Avas  AA'ritten  in  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus;  and 
there  is  evidence  that  this  event  took  place 


24 


asfograpblcal  Sftetcb. 


under  M.  Antoninus  and  L,.  Verus,  when  Rusti- 
cus  was  praefect  of  the  city.* 

The  persecution  in  which  Polycarp  suffered 
at  Smyrna  belongs  to  the  time  of  M.  Antoni- 
nus. The  emdence  for  it  is  the  letter  of  the 
church  of  Smyrna  to  the  churches  of  Philome- 

*See  the  Martyriuni  Sanctorum  Justiiii,  &c.,  in  the 
works  of  Justinus,  ed.  Otto,  vol.  ii.  559.  “Junius 
Rusticus  Praefectus  Urbi  erat  sub  imperatoribus  M. 
Aurelio  et  L.  Vero,  id  quod  liquet  ex  Themistii  Orat. 
xxxiv  Dindorf.  p.  451,  et  ex  quodam  illorum  rescripto, 
Dig.  49.  I.  I,  ? 2 ” (Otto).  The  rescript  contains  the 
words  “Junium  Rusticum  amicum  nostrum  Prae- 
fectum  Urbi.’"  The  Martyrium  of  Justinus  and  others 
is  written  in  Geeek.  It  begins,  “ In  the  time  of  the 
wicked  defenders  of  idolatry  impious  edicts  were  pub- 
lished against  the  pious  Christians  both  in  cities  and 
country  places,  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  them 
to  make  offerings  to  vain  idols.  Accordingly  the  holy 
men  (Justinus,  Chariton,  a woman  Charito,  Paeon, 
Liberiaiius,  and  others)  were  brought  before  Rusticus, 
the  praefect  of  Rome.” 

The  Martyrium  gives  the  examination  of  the  ac. 
cused  by  Rusticus.  All  of  them  professed  to  be 
Christians.  Justinus  was  asked  if  he  expected  to  as- 
cend into  heaven  and  to  receive  a reward  for  his  suf- 
ferings, if  he  was  condemned  to  death.  He  answered 
that  he  did  not  expect : he  was  certain  of  it.  Finally, 
the  test  of  obedience  was  proposed  to  the  prisoners  ; 
they  were  required  to  sacrifice  to  the  gods.  All  re- 
fused, and  Rusticus  pronounced  the  sentence,  which 
was  that  those  who  refused  to  sacrifice  to  the  gods 
and  obey  the  emperor’s  order  should  be  whipped  and 
beheaded  according  to  the  law.  The  martyrs  were 
then  led  to  the  usual  place  of  execution  and  beheaded. 
Some  of  the  faithful  secretly  carried  off  the  bodies 
and  deposited  them  in  a fit  place. 


flbatcus  aurelius  Antoninus. 


25 


Hum  and  the  other  Christian  churches,  and  it 
is  preserved  by  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  15).  But 
the  critics  do  not  agree  about  the  time  of  Poly- 
carp’s death,  differing  in  the  two  extremes  to 
the  amount  of  twelve  years.  The  circumstances 
of  Polycarp’s  martyrdom  were  accompanied  by 
miracles,  one  of  which  Eusebius  (iv.  15)  has 
omitted,  but  it  appears  in  the  oldest  Latin  ver- 
sion of  the  letter,  which  Usher  published,  and 
it  is  supposed  that  this  version  was  made  not 
long  after  the  time  of  Eusebius.  The  notice  at 
the  end  of  the  letter  states  that  it  was  tran- 
scribed by  Caius  from  the  copy  of  Irenaeus,  the 
disciple  of  Poly  carp,  then  transcribed  by  Socra- 
tes at  Corinth;  “after  which  I Pionius  again 
wrote  it  out  from  the  copy  above  mentioned, 
having  searched  it  out  by  the  revelation  of 
Polycarp,  who  directed  me  to  it,’’  &c.  The 
story  of  Polycarp’s  martyrdom  is  embellished 
with  miraculous  circumstances  which  some 
modern  writers  on  ecclesiastical  history  take 
the  liberty  of  omitting.* 

In  order  to  form  a proper  notion  of  the  con- 

* Conyers  Middleton,  An  Inquiry  into  the  Miracu- 
lous Powers,  &c.  p.  126.  Middleton  says  that  Euse- 
bius omitted  to  mention  the  dove,  which  flew  out  of 
Polycarp’s  body,  and  Dodwell  and  Archbishop  Wake 
have  done  the  same.  Wake  says,  “I  am  so  little  a 
friend  to  such  miracles  that  I thought  it  better  with 
Eusebius  to  omit  that  circumstance  than  to  mention 
it  from  Bp.  Usher’s  Manuscript,”  which  manuscript 
however,  says  Middleton,  he  afterwards  declares  to  be 
so  well  attested  that  we  need  not  any  further  assur- 
ance of  the  truth  of  it. 


26 


asiograpbical  Sftetcb, 


dition  of  the  Christians  under  M.  Antoninus  we 
must  go  back  to  Trajan’s  time.  When  the 
younger  Pliny  was  governor  of  Bithynia,  the 
Christians  were  numerous  in  those  parts,  and 
the  worshipers  of  the  old  religion  were  falling 
off.  The  temples  were  deserted,  the  festivals 
neglected,  and  there  were  no  purchasers  of  vic- 
tims for  sacrifice.  Those  who  were  interested 
in  the  maintenance  of  the  old  religion  thus 
found  that  their  profits  were  in  danger.  Chris- 
tians of  both  sexes  and  all  ages  were  brought 
before  the  go^’ernor,  who  did  not  know  what  to 
do  with  them.  He  could  come  to  no  other  con- 
clusion than  this,  that  those  who  confessed  to  be 
Christians  and  persevered  in  their  religion 
ought  to  be  punished;  if  for  nothing  else,  for 
their  invincible  obstinancy.  He  found  no 
crimes  proved  against  the  Christians,  and  he 
could  only  characterize  their  religion  as  a de- 
praved and  extravagant  superstition,  which 
might  be  stopped  if  the  people  were  allowed 
the  opportunity  of  recanting.  Pliny  wrote  this 
in  a letter  to  Trajan  (Plinius,  Ep.  x.  97).  He 
asked  for  the  emperor’s  directions,  because  he 
did  not  know  what  to  do.  He  remarks  that  he 
had  never  been  engaged  in  judicial  inquiries 
about  the  Christians,  and  that  accordingly  he 
did  not  know  what  to  inquire  about,  or  how  far 
to  inquire  and  punish.  This  proves  that  it  was 
not  a new  thing  to  examine  into  a man’s  pro- 
fession of  Christianity  and  to  punish  him  for  it.* 

*Orosius  (vii.  12)  speaks  of  Trajan’s  persecution  of 


Marcus  2lureHus  Bntoninus. 


27 


Trajan’s  rescript  is  extant.  He  approved  of 
the  governor’s  judgment  in  the  matter,  but  he 
said  that  no  search  must  be  made  after  the 
Christians;  if  a man  was  charged  with  the  new 
religion  and  convicted,  he  must  not  be  pun- 
ished if  he  affinned  that  he  was  not  a Christian, 
and  confirmed  his  denial  b5^  showing  his  rever- 
ence to  the  heathen  gods.  He  added  that  no 
notice  must  be  taken  of  anon3'mous  informa- 
tions, for  such  things  were  of  bad  example. 
Trajan  was  a mild  and  sensible  man;  and  both 
motives  of  mercy  and  policy'  probabty  also  in- 
duced him  to  take  as  little  notice  of  the  Chris- 
tians as  he  could,  to  let  them  live  in  quiet  if  it 
were  possible.  Trajan’s  rescript  is  the  first 
legislative  act  of  the  head  of  the  Roman  state 
with  reference  to  Christianity,  which  is  known 
to  us.  It  does  not  appear  that  the  Christians 
were  further  disturbed  under  his  reign.  The 
martyrdom  of  Ignatius  by  the  order  of  Trajan 
himself  is  not  universally  admitted  to  be  an 
historical  fact.* 

the  Christians,  and  of  Pliny’s  application  to  him  hav- 
ing led  the  emperor  to  mitigate  his  severity.  The 
punishment  b}’  the  Mosaic  law  for  those  who  at- 
tempted to  seduce  the  Jews  to  follow  new  gods  was 
death.  If  a man  was  secretly  enticed  to  such  new 
worship,  he  must  kill  the  seducer,  even  if  the  seducer 
were  brother,  sou,  daughter,  wife,  or  friend.  (Dent, 
xiii. ) 

* The  Martyrium  Ignatii,  first  published  in  Latin  by 
Archbishop  Usher,  is  the  chief  evidence  for  the  cir- 
cumstances of  Ignatius’  death. 


28 


asfograpbical  Shetcb. 


In  the  time  of  Hadrian  it  was  no  longer  pos- 
sible for  the  Roman  government  to  overlook 
the  great  increase  of  the  Christians  and  the 
hostility  of  the  common  sort  to  them.  If  the 
governors  in  the  provinces  were  willing  to  let 
them  alone,  they  could  not  resist  the  fanaticism 
of  the  heathen  community,  who  looked  on  the 
Christians  as  atheists.  The  Jews  too,  who  were 
settled  all  over  the  Roman  Empire,  were  as 
hostile  to  the  Christians  as  the  Gentiles  were.* 
With  the  time  of  Hadrian  begin  the  Christian 
Apologies,  which  show  plainly  what  the  popu- 
lar feeling  towards  the  Christians  then  was. 
A rescript  of  Hadrian  to  Minucius  Fundanus, 
the  Proconsul  of  Asia,  which  stands  at  the  end 
of  Justin’s  first  Apology, f instructs  the  gover- 

* We  have  the  evidence  ofjustinus  (ad  Diognetum, 
c.  5)  to  this  effect;  “The  Christians  are  attacked  by 
the  Jews  as  if  they  were  men  of  a different  race,  and 
are  persecuted  by  the  Greeks;  and  those  who  hate 
them  cannot  give  the  reason  of  their  enmity.’’ 

t And  in  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  8,  9).  Orosius  (vii. 
13)  says  that  Hadrian  sent  this  rescript  to  Minucius 
Eundanus,  proconsul  of  Asia  after  being  instructed 
in  books  written  on  the  Christian  religion  by  Quad- 
ratus,  a disciple  of  the  Apostles,  and  Aristides,  an 
Athenian,  an  honest  and  wise  man,  and  Serenus 
Grauius.  In  the  Greek  test  of  Hadrian’s  rescript 
there  is  mentioned  Serenius  Granianus,  the  prede- 
cessor of  Minucius  Fundanus  in  the  government  of 
Asia. 

This  rescript  of  Hadrian  has  clearly  been  added  to 
the  Apology  by  some  editor.  The  Apology  ends  with 
the  words  : 6 (ptXov  tC>  Oeu,  tovto  yeveaOu 


fllbarcus  aurelius  Zlntonfnus. 


29 


nor  that  innocent  people  must  not  be  troubled, 
and  false  accusers  must  not  be  allowed  to  extort 
money  from  them;  the  charges  against  the 
Christians  must  be  made  in  due  form,  and  no 
attention  must  be  paid  to  popular  clamors; 
when  Christians  were  regularly  prosecuted  and 
convicted  of  illegal  acts,  they  must  be  punished 
according  to  their  deserts;  and  false  accusers 
also  must  be  punished.  Antoninus  Pius  is  said 
to  have  published  rescripts  to  the  same  effect. 
The  terms  of  Hadrian’s  rescript  seem  very 
favorable  to  the  Christians;  but  if  we  under- 
stand it  in  this  sense,  that  they  were  only  to  be 
punished  like  other  people  for  illegal  acts,  it 
would  have  had  no  meaning,  for  that  could 
have  been  done  without  asking  the  emperor’s 
advice.  The  real  purpose  of  the  rescript  is  that 
Christians  must  be  punished  if  they  persisted 
in  their  belief,  and  would  not  prove  their  re- 
nunciation of  it  by  acknowledging  the  heathen 
religion.  This  was  Trajan’s  rule,  and  we  have 
no  reason  for  supposing  that  Hadrian  granted 
more  to  the  Christians  than  Trajan  did.  There 
is  also  printed  at  the  end  of  Justin’s  first  Apol- 
ogy a rescript  of  Antoninus  Pius  to  the  Com- 
mune of  (rd  KOIVOV  Tfjq  'kaiaq),  and  it  is  also  ill 
Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  13).  The  date  of  the  re- 
script is  the  third  consulship  of  Antoninus 
Pius.*  The  rescript  declares  that  the  Chris- 

* Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  12),  after  giving  the  beginning 
of  Justinus’  first  Apology,  which  contains  the  address 


30 


JSiOQrapbical  Sftctcb. 


tians — for  they  are  meant,  though  the  name 
Christians  does  not  occur  in  the  rescript — were 
not  to  be  disturbed  unless  they  were  attempt- 
ing something  against  the  Roman  rule  ; and 
no  man  was  to  be  punished  simply  for  being  a 
Christian.  But  this  rescript  is  spurious.  Any 
mau  moderately  acquainted  with  Roman  his- 
tory will  see  by  the  style  and  tenor  that  it  is  a 
clumsy  forgery. 

In  the  time  of  M.  Antoninus  the  opposition 
between  the  old  and  the  new  belief  was  still 

to  T.  Autoniuus  and  liis  two  adopted  sons,  adds; 
‘‘The  same  emperor  being  addressed  by  other  breth- 
ren in  Asia,  honored  the  Commune  of  Asia  with  the 
following  rescript.”  This  rescript,  which  is  in  the 
next  chapter  of  Eusebius  (E.  H.  iv.  13)  is  in  the  sole 
name  of  Caesar  Marcus  Aurelius  Antoninus  Augustus 
Armenius,  though  Eusebius  had  just  before  said  that 
he  was  going  to  give  us  a rescript  of  Antoninus  Pius. 
There  are  some  material  variations  between  the  two 
copies  of  the  rescript  besides  the  difference  in  the 
title,  which  difference  makes  it  impossible  to  say 
whether  the  forger  intended  to  assign  this  rescript  to 
Pius  or  to  M.  Antoninus. 

The  author  of  the  Alexandrine  Chronicum  says  that 
Marcus,  being  moved  by  the  entreaties  of  Melito  and 
other  heads  of  the  church,  wrote  an  Epistle  to  the 
Commune  of  Asia  in  which  he  forbade  the  Christians 
to  be  troubled  on  account  of  their  religion.  Valesius 
supposes  this  to  be  the  letter  or  rescript  which  is  con- 
tained in  Eusebius  (iv.  13),  and  to  be  the  answer  to 
the  Apology  of  Melito,  of  which  I shall  soon  give  the 
substance.  But  Marcus  certainly  did  not  write  this 
letter  which  is  in  Eusebius,  and  w’e  know  not  what 
answer  he  made  to  Melito. 


fliiarcus  Burelius  Bntoninus. 


31 


stronger,  and  the  adherents  of  the  heathen 
religion  urged  those  in  authority  to  a more 
regular  resistance  to  the  invasions  of  the  Chris- 
tian faith.  Melito  in  his  Apology  to  M. 
Antoninus  represents  the  Christians  of  Asia  as 
persecuted  under  new  imperial  orders.  Shame- 
less informers,  he  says,  men  who  were  greedy 
after  the  property  of  others,  used  these  orders 
as  a means  of  robbing  those  who  were  doing 
no  harm.  He  doubts  if  a just  emperor  could 
have  ordered  anything  so  unjust;  and  if  the 
last  order  was  really  not  from  the  emperor,  the 
Christians  entreat  him  not  to  give  them  up  to 
their  enemies.*  We  conclude  from  this  that 

* Eusebius,  iv.  26;  and  Routh’s  Reliquiae  Sacrae, 
vol.  I,  and  the  notes.  The  interpretation  of  this  Frag- 
ment is  not  easy.  Mosheim  misunderstood  one  pas- 
sage so  far  as  to  affirm  that  Marcus  promised  rewards 
to  those  who  denounced  the  Christians  ; an  interpre- 
tation which  is  entirely  false.  Melito  calls  the  Chris- 
tian religion  “our  philosophy,”  which  began  among 
barbarians  (the  Jews),  and  flourished  among  the 
Roman  subjects  in  the  time  of  Augustus,  to  the  great 
advantage  of  the  empire,  for  from  that  time  the  power 
of  the  Romans  grew  great  and  glorious.  He  says 
that  the  emperor  has  and  will  have  as  the  successor 
to  Augustus’  power  the  good  wishes  of  men,  if  he  will 
protect  that  philosophy  which  grew  up  with  the  em- 
pire and  began  with  Augustus,  which  philosophy  the 
predecessors  of  Antoninus  honored  in  addition  to  the 
other  religions.  He  further  says  that  the  Christian 
religion  had  suffered  no  harm  since  the  time  of  Au- 
gustus, but  on  the  contrary  had  enjoyed  all  honor  and 
respect  that  any  man  could  desire.  Nero  and  Donii- 


32 


asioflrapbical  Sftctcb. 


there  were  at  least  imperial  rescripts  or  consti- 
tutions of  M.  Antoninus  which  were  made  the 
foundation  of  these  persecutions.  The  fact  of 
being  a Christian  was  now  a crime  and  pun- 
ished, unless  the  accused  denied  their  religion. 
Then  come  the  persecutions  at  Smyrna,  which 
some  modern  critics  place  in  A.  d.  167,  ten 

tian,  lie  says,  were  alone  persuaded  by  some  malicious 
men  to  calumniate  the  Christian  religion,  and  this 
was  the  origin  of  the  false  charges  against  the  Chris- 
tians. But  this  was  corrected  by  the  emperors  who 
immediately  preceded  Antoninus,  who  often  by  their 
rescripts  reproved  those  who  attempted  to  trouble  the 
Christians.  Hadrian,  Antoninus’  grandfather,  wrote 
to  many,  and  among  them  to  Fundanus,  the  governor 
of  Asia.  Antoninus  Pius,  when  Marcus  was  asso- 
ciated with  him  in  the  empire,  wrote  to  the  cities  that 
they  must  not  trouble  the  Christians  ; among  others, 
to  the  people  of  Larissa,  Thessalonica,  the  Athenians, 
and  all  the  Greeks.  Melito  concluded  thus;  “We 
are  persuaded  that  thou  who  hast  about  these  things 
the  same  mind  that  they  had,  nay  rather  one  much 
more  humane  and  philosophical,  wilt  do  all  that  we 
ask  thee.” — This  Apology  was  written  after  a.  d.  i6g, 
the  year  in  which  Verus  died,  for  it  speaks  of  Marcus 
only  and  his  son  Commodus.  According  to  Melito’s 
testimony,  Christians  had  only  been  punished  for 
their  religion  in  the  time  of  Nero  and  Domitian,  and 
the  persecutions  began  again  in  the  time  of  M. 
Antoninus,  and  were  founded  on  his  orders,  which 
were  abused,  as  he  seems  to  mean.  He  distinctly 
affirms  “ that  the  race  of  the  godly  is  now'  persecuted 
and  harassed  by  fresh  imperial  orders  in  Asia,  a thing 
which  had  never  happened  before.”  But  we  know 
that  all  this  is  not  true,  and  that  Christians  had  been 
punished  in  Trajan’s  time. 


fliatcus  aucelius  antonffttt^. 


33 


years  before  the  persecution  of  Lyon.  The 
governors  of  the  provinces  under  M.  Antoni- 
nus might  have  found  enough  even  in  Trajan’s 
rescript  to  warrant  them  in  punishing  Chris- 
tians, and  the  fanaticism  of  the  people  would 
drive  them  to  persecution,  even  if  they  were 
unwilling.  But  besides  the  fact  of  the  Chris- 
tians rejecting  all  the  heathen  ceremonies,  we 
must  not  forget  that  they  plainly  maintain  that 
all  the  heathen  religions  were  false.  The 
Christians  thus  declared  war  against  the  hea- 
then rites,  and  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  observe 
that  this  was  a declaration  of  hostility  against 
the  Roman  government,  which  tolerated  all  the 
various  forms  of  superstition  that  existed  in 
the  empire,  and  could  not  consistently  tolerate 
another  religion,  which  declared  that  all  the 
rest  were  false  and  all  the  splendid  ceremonies 
of  the  empire  only  a worship  of  devils. 

If  we  had  a true  ecclesiastical  history,  we 
should  know  how  the  Roman  emperors  at- 
tempted to  check  the  new  religion;  how  they 
enforced  their  principle  of  finally  punishing 
Christians,  simply  as  Christians,  which  Justin 
in  his  Apology  affirms  that  they  did,  and  I 
have  no  doubt  that  he  tells  the  truth;  how  far 
popular  clamor  and  riots  went  in  this  matter, 
and  how  far  many  fanatical  and  ignorant  Chris- 
tians— for  there  were  many  such — contributed 
to  excite  the  fanaticism  on  the  other  side  and 
to  embitter  the  quarrel  between  the  Roman 
government  and  the  new  religion.  Our  extant 
3 


34 


asioflrapbical  Sftetcb. 


ecclesiastical  histories  are  manifestl}"  falsified, 
and  what  truth  they  contain  is  grossly  exag- 
gerated; but  the  fact  is  certain  that  in  the  time 
of  M.  Antoninus  the  heathen  populations  were 
in  open  hostility  to  the  Christians,  and  that 
under  Antoninus’  rule  men  were  put  to  death 
because  they  were  Christians.  Eusebius,  in 
the  preface  to  his  fifth  book,  remarks  that  in 
the  seventeenth  year  of  Antoninus’  reign,  in 
some  parts  of  the  world,  the  persecution  of  the 
Christians  became  more  violent,  and  that  it 
proceeded  from  the  populace  in  the  cities;  and 
he  adds,  in  his  usual  style  of  exaggeration,  that 
we  may  infer  from  what  took  place  in  a single 
nation  that  myriads  of  martyrs  were  made  in 
the  habitable  earth.  The  nation  which  he 
alludes  to  is  Gallia;  and  he  then  proceeds  to 
give  the  letter  of  the  churches  of  Vienna  and 
Lugdunum.  It  is  probable  that  he  has  assiged 
the  true  cause  of  the  persecutions,  the  fanati- 
cism of  the  populace,  and  that  both  governors 
and  emperor  had  a great  deal  of  trouble  with 
these  disturbances.  How  far  Marcus  was  cog- 
nizant of  these  cruel  proceedings  we  do  not 
know,  for  the  historical  records  of  his  reign  are 
very  defective.  He  did  not  make  the  rule 
against  the  Christians,  for  Trajan  did  that;  and 
if  we  admit  that  he  would  have  been  willing 
to  let  the  Christians  alone,  we  cannot  affirm 
that  it  was  in  his  power,  for  it  would  be  a great 
mistake  to  suppose  that  Antoninus  had  the  un- 
limited authority  which  some  modern  sove-. 


Jiarcue  Bureltus  antonlnu0. 


35 


reigns  have  had.  His  power  was  limited  by- 
certain  constitutional  forms,  by  the  Senate,  and 
by  the  precedents  of  his  predecessors.  We 
cannot  admit  that  such  a man  was  an  active 
persecutor,  for  there  is  no  evidence  that  he 
was,*  though  it  is  certain  that  he  had  no  good 
opinion  of  the  Christians,  as  appears  from  his 
own  words. t But  he  knew  nothing  of  them 

* Except  that  of  Orosius  (vii.  15),  -who  says  that 
during  the  Parthian  -war  there  -were  grievous  perse- 
cutions of  the  Christians  in  Asia  and  Gallia  under  the 
orders  of  Marcus  (praecepto  ejus),  and  “many  -were 
crowned  with  the  martyrdom  of  saints.” 

t See  xi.  3.  The  emperor  probably  speaks  of  such 
fanatics  as  Clemens  (quoted  by  Gataker  on  this  pas- 
sage) mentions.  The  rational  Christians  admitted  no 
fellowship  with  them.  “Some  of  these  heretics,” 
says  Clemens,  “ show  their  impiety  and  cowardice  by 
loving  their  lives,  saying  that  the  knowledge  of  the 
really  existing  God  is  true  testimony  (martyrdom), 
but  that  a man  is  a self-murderer  who  bears  witness 
by  his  death.  We  also  blame  those  who  rush  ta 
death;  for  there  are  some,  not  of  us,  but  only  bearing 
the  same  name,  who  give  themselves  up.  We  say  of 
them  that  they  die  without  being  martyrs,  even  if  they 
are  publicly  punished;  and  they  give  themselves  up 
to  a death  which  avails  nothing,  as  the  Indian  Gym- 
nosophists  give  themselves  up  foolishly  to  fire.” 
Cave,  in  his  primitive  Christianity  (ii.  c.  7),  says  of 
the  Christians:  “They  did  flock  to  the  place  of  tor- 
ment faster  than  droves  of  beasts  that  are  driven  to 
the  shambles.  They  even  longed  to  be  in  the  arms 
of  suffering.  Ignatius,  though  then  in  his  journey  to 
Rome  in  order  to  his  execution,  yet  by  the  way  as  he 
went  could  not  but  vent  his  passionate  desire  of  it ; 


36 


aSiograpbical  Sftetcb. 


except  their  hostility  to  the  Roman  religion, 
and  he  probably  thought  that  they  were  dan- 
gerous to  the  state,  notwithstanding  the  pro- 
fessions, false  or  true,  of  some  of  the  Apologists. 
So  much  I have  said,  because  it  would  be  un- 
fair not  to  state  all  that  can  be  urged  against 
a man  whom  his  contemporaries  and  subse- 
quent ages  venerated  as  a model  of  virtue  and 
benevolence.  If  I admitted  the  genuineness  of 
some  documents,  he  would  be  altogether  clear 
from  the  charge  of  even  allowing  any  persecu- 
tions; but  as  I seek  the  truth  and  am  sure  that 
they  are  false,  I leave  him  to  bear  whatever 
blame  is  his  due.*  I add  that  it  is  quite  cer- 
tain that  Antoninus  did  not  derive  any  of  his 

‘ Oh  that  I might  come  to  those  wild  beasts  that  are 
prepared  for  me;  I heartily  wish  that  I may  presently 
meet  with  them;  I would  invite  and  encourage  them 
speedily  to  devour  me,  and  not  be  afraid  to  .set  upon 
me  as  they  have  been  to  others;  nay,  should  they  re- 
fuse it,  I would  even  force  them  to  it;’  ” and  more  to 
the  same  purpose  from  Eusebius.  Cave,  an  honest 
and  good  man,  says  all  this  in  praise  of  the  Christians; 
but  I think  that  he  mistook  the  matter.  We  admire 
a man  who  holds  to  his  principles  even  to  death;  but 
these  fanatical  Christians  are  the  Gymnosophists 
whom  Clemens  treats  with  disdain. 

* Dr.  F.  C.  Baur,  in  his  work  entitled  “ Das 
Christenthum  und  die  Christliche  Kirche  der  drei 
ersten  Jahrhunderte,  ” &c.,  has  examined  this  ques- 
tion with  great  good  sense  and  fairness,  and  I believe 
he  has  stated  the  truth  as  near  as  our  authorities  en- 
able us  to  reach  it. 


/Iftatcu5  aurellue  Bntonlnus. 


37 


ethical  principles  from  a religion  of  which  he 
knew  nothing.* 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Emperor’s  Re- 
flections— or  his  Meditations,  as  they  are  gen- 
erally named — is  a genuine  work.  In  the  first 
book  he  speaks  of  himself,  his  family,  and  his 
teachers;  and  in  other  books  he  mentions  him- 
self. Suidas  (v.  Map/cof)  notices  a work  of 
Antoninus  in  twelve  books,  which  he  names 
the  “conduct  of  his  own  life;’’  and  he  cites 
the  book  under  several  words  in  his  Dictionary, 
giving  the  emperor’s  name,  but  not  the  title 
of  the  work.  There  are  also  passages  cited  by 
Suidas  from  Antoninus  without  mention  of  the 
emperor’s  name.  The  true  title  of  the  work  is 
unknown.  Xy lander,  who  published  the  first 
edition  of  this  book  (Zurich,  1558.  8vo,  with  a 
Latin  version),  used  a manuscript  which  con- 
tained the  twelve  book^,  but  it  is  not  known 
where  the  manuscript  is  now.  The  only  other 
complete  manuscript  which  is  known  to  exist 
is  in  the  Vatican  library,  but  it  has  no  title 
and  no  inscriptions  of  the  several  books:  the 
eleventh  only  has  the  inscription,  yidpKov  av-oKpa- 
-opog  marked  with  an  asterisk.  The  other 
Vatican  manuscripts  and  the  three  Florentine 
contain  only  excerpts  from  the  emperor’s  book. 

* In  the  Digest,  48,  19,  30,  there  is  the  following  ex- 
cerpt from  Modestinus:  “ Si  quis  aliquid  fecerit,  quo 
leves  hominum  animi  superstitione  numinis  terreren- 
tur,  divus  Marcus  hujusmodi  homines  in  insulam  re- 
legari  rescripsit.” 


38 


asiogcapbical  Sftetcb. 


All  the  titles  of  the  excerpts  nearly  agree  with 
that  which  Xylander  prefixed  to  his  edition, 

MdpKov  'Avruvivov  AiiTOKparopog  tuv  etf  iavrbv  (iipTiia 

This  title  has  been  used  by  all  subsequent 
editors.  We  cannot  tell  whether  Antoninus 
divided  his  work  into  books  or  somebody  else 
did  it.  If  the  inscriptions  at  the  end  of  the 
first  and  second  books  are  genuine,  he  may 
have  made  the  division  himself. 

It  is  plain  that  the  emperor  wrote  down  his 
thoughts  or  reflections  as  the  occasions  arose; 
and  since  they  were  intended  for  his  own  use, 
it  is  no  improbable  conjecture  that  he  left  a 
complete  copy  behind  him  written  with  his 
own  hand;  for  it  is  not  likely  that  so  diligent 
a man  would  use  the  labor  of  a transcriber  for 
such  a purpose,  and  expose  his  most  secret 
thoughts  to  any  other  eye.  He  may  have  also 
intended  the  book  for  Ijis  son  Commodus,  who 
however  had  no  taste  for  his  father’s  philos- 
ophy. Some  careful  hand  preserved  the 
precious  volume;  and  a work  by  Antoninus  is 
mentioned  by  other  late  writers  besides  Suidas. 

Many  critics  have  labored  on  the  text  of 
Antoninus.  The  most  complete  edition  is  that 
by  Thomas  Gataker,  1652,  qto.  The  second 
edition  of  Gataker  was  superintended  by  George 
Stanhope,  1697,  There  is  also  an  edition 

of  1704.  Gataker  made  and  suggested  many 
good  corrections,  and  he  also  made  a new 
Latin  version,  which  is  not  a very  good  speci- 
men of  Latin,  but  it  generally  expresses  the 


^arcu0  aureliue  Bntoninus. 


39 


sense  of  the  original,  and  often  better  than 
some  of  the  more  recent  translations.  He 
added  in  the  margin  opposite  to  each  para- 
graph references  to  the  other  parallel  passages; 
and  he  wrote  a commentary,  one  of  the  most 
complete  that  has  been  written  on  any  ancient 
author.  This  commentary  contains  the  editor’s 
exposition  of  the  more  difficult  passages,  and 
quotations  from  all  the  Greek  and  Roman 
writers  for  the  illustration  of  the  text.  It  is  a 
w'onderful  monument  of  learning  and  labor, 
and  certainly  no  Englishman  has  yet  done 
anything  like  it.  At  the  end  of  his  preface 
the  editor  says  that  he  wrote  it  at  Rotherhithe 
near  Eondon,  in  a severe  winter,  when  he  was 
in  the  seventy-eighth  year  of  his  age,  1651 — a 
time  when  Milton,  Selden,  and  other  great 
men  of  the  Commonwealth  time  were  living; 
and  the  great  French  scholar  Saumaise  (Salma- 
sius),  with  whom  Ga taker  corresponded  and 
received  help  from  him  for  his  edition  of  An- 
toninus. The  Greek  test  has  also  been  edited 
by  J.  M.  Schultz,  Leipzig,  1802,  8vo;  and  by 
the  learned  Greek  Adamantinus  Corais,  Paris, 
1816,  8vo.  The  text  of  Schultz  was  repub- 
lished by  Tauchnitz,  1821. 

There  are  English,  German,  French,  Italian, 
and  Spanish  translations  of  M.  Antoninus,  and 
there  may  be  others.  I have  not  seen  all  the 
English  translations.  There  is  one  by  Jeremy 
Collier,  1702,  8vo,  a most  coarse  and  vulgar 
copy  of  the  original.  The  latest  French  trans- 


40 


:©iO0vapbical  Sftctcb. 


lation  by  Alexis  Pierron  in  the  collection  of 
Charpentier  is  better  than  Dacier’s,  which  has 
been  honored  with  an  Italian  version  (Udine, 
1772).  There  is  an  Italian  version  (1675), 
which  I have  not  seen.  It  is  by  a cardinal. 
“ A man  illustrious  in  the  church,  the  Cardinal 
Francis  Barberini  the  elder,  nephew  of  Pope 
Urban  VIII.,  occupied  the  last  years  of  his  life 
in  translating  into  his  native  language  the 
thoughts  of  the  Roman  emperor,  in  order  to 
diffuse  among  the  faithful  the  fertilizing  and 
vivifying  seeds.  He  dedicated  this  translation 
to  his  soul,  to  make  it,  as  he  says  in  his  ener- 
getic style,  redder  than  his  purple  at  the  sight 
of  the  virtues  of  this  Gentile”  (Pierron, 
Preface). 

I have  made  this  translation  at  intervals 
after  having  used  the  book  for  many  years.  It 
is  made  from  the  Greek,  but  I have  not  always 
followed  one  text;  and  I have  occasionally 
compared  other  versions  with  my  own.  I made 
this  translation  for  my  own  use,  because  I 
found  that  it  was  worth  the  labor;  but  it  may 
be  useful  to  others  also;  and  therefore  I deter- 
mined to  print  it.  As  the  original  is  some- 
times very  difficult  to  understand  and  still 
more  difficult  to  translate,  it  is  not  possible 
that  I have  always  avoided  error.  But  I be- 
lieve that  I have  not  often  missed  the  meaning, 
and  those  who  will  take  the  trouble  to  compare 
the  translation  with  the  original  should  not 
hastily  conclude  that  I am  wrong,  if  they  do 


/IBarcus  aurclius  Bntoninus. 


41 


not  agree  with  me.  Some  passages  do  give  the 
meaning,  though  at  first  sight  they  may  not 
appear  to  do  so;  and  when  I differ  from  the 
translators,  I think  that  in  some  places  they 
are  wrong,  and  in  other  places  I am  sure  that 
they  are.  I have  placed  in  some  passages  a 4-, 
which  indicates  corruption  in  the  text  or  great 
uncertainty  in  the  meaning.  I could  have 
made  the  language  more  easy  and  flowing,  but 
I have  preferred  a ruder  style  as  being  better 
suited  to  express  the  character  of  the  original; 
and  sometimes  the  obscurity  which  may  ap- 
pear in  the  version  is  a fair  copy  of  the  obscur- 
ity of  the  Greek.  If  I should  ever  revise  this 
version,  I would  gladly  make  use  of  any  cor- 
rections which  may  be  suggested.  I have 
added  an  index  of  some  of  the  Greek  terms 
with  the  corresponding  English.  If  I have 
not  given  the  best  w’ords  for  the  Greek,  I have 
done  the  best  that  I could;  and  in  the  text  I 
have  always  given  the  same  translation  of  the 
same  word. 

The  last  reflection  of  the  Stoic  philosophy 
that  I have  observed  is  in  Simplicius’  Com- 
mentary on  the  Enchiridion  of  Epictetus. 
Simplicius  was  not  a Christian,  and  such  a man 
was  not  likely  to  be  converted  at  a time  when 
Christianity  was  grossly  corrupted.  But  he 
was  a really  religious  man,  and  he  concludes 
his  commentary  with  a prayer  to  the  Deity- 
which  no  Christian  could  improve.  From  the 
time  of  Zeno  to  Simplicius,  a period  of  about 


42 


:©io0rapbical  Sftetcb. 


nine  hundred  years,  the  Stoic  philosophy 
formed  the  characters  of  some  of  the  best  and 
greatest  men.  Finally  it  became  extinct,  and 
we  hear  no  more  of  it  till  the  revival  of  letters 
in  Italy.  Angelo  Poliziano  met  with  two  very 
inaccurate  and  incomplete  manuscripts  of 
Epictetus’  Enchiridion,  which  he  translated 
into  Latin  and  dedicated  to  his  great  patron 
Lorenzo  de’  Medici,  in  whose  collection  he  had 
found  the  book.  Poliziano’s  version  was 
printed  in  the  first  Bale  edition  of  the  Enchir- 
idion, A.  D.  1531  (apud  And.  Cratandrum). 
Poliziano  recommends  the  Enchiridion  to- 
Lorenzo  as  a work  well  suited  to  his  temper, 
and  useful  in  the  difficulties  by  which  he  was 
surrounded. 

Epictetus  and  Antoninus  have  had  readers 
ever  since  they  were  first  printed.  The  little 
book  of  Antoninus  has  been  the  companion  of 
some  great  men.  Machiavelli’s  Art  of  War 
and  Marcus  Antoninus  were  the  two  books 
which  were  used  when  he  was  a young  man  by 
Captain  John  Smith,  and  he  could  not  have 
found  two  writers  better  fitted  to  form  the  char- 
acter of  a soldier  and  a man.  Smith  is  almost 
unknown  and  forgotten  in  England,  his  native 
country,  but  not  in  America,  where  he  saved 
the  young  colony  of  Virginia.  He  was  great 
in  his  heroic  mind  and  his  deeds  in  arms,  but 
greater  still  in  the  nobleness  of  his  character. 
For  a man’s  greatness  lies  not  in  wealth  and 
station,  as  the  vulgar  believe,  nor  yet  in  his 


jiftarcus  aureliu6  Hntonfnue. 


43 


intellectual  capacity,  which  is  often  associated 
with  the  meanest  moral  character,  the  most  ab- 
ject servility  to  those  in  high  places,  and  arro- 
gance to  the  poor  and  lowly;  but  a man’s  true 
greatness  lies  in  the  consciousness  of  an  honest 
purpose  in  life,  founded  on  a just  estimate  of 
himself  and  everything  else,  on  frequent  self- 
examination,  and  a steady  obedience  to  the  rule 
which  he  knows  to  be  right,  without  troubling 
himself,  as  the  emperor  says  he  should  not, 
about  what  others  may  think  or  say,  or  whether 
they  do  or  do  not  do  that  which  he  thinks  and 
says  and  does. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


OF 

MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY 


OF 

MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 


IT  has  been  said  that  the  Stoic  philosophy 
first  showed  its  real  value  when  it  passed 
from  Greece  to  Rome.  The  doctrines  of  Zeno 
and  his  successors  were  well  suited  to  the  grav- 
ity and  practical  good  sense  of  the  Romans; 
and  even  in  the  Republican  period  we  have  an 
example  of  a man,  M.  Cato  Uticensis,  who 
lived  the  life  of  a Stoic  and  died  consistently 
with  the  opinions  which  he  professed.  He  was 
a man,  says  Cicero,  who  embraced  the  Stoic 
philosophy  from  conviction;  not  for  the  purpose 
of  vain  discussion,  as  most  did,  but  in  order  to 
make  his  life  conformable  to  the  Stoic  precepts. 
In  the  wretched  times . from  the  death  of 
.4pgustus  to  the  murder  of  Domitian,  there 
was  nothing  but  the  Stoic  philosophy  which 
could  console  and  support  the  followers  of  the 
old  religion  under  imperial  tyranny  and  amidst 
universal  corruption.  There  were  even  then 
(47) 


48 


IPbtlosopbg. 


noble  minds  that,  could  dare  and  endure, 
sustained  by  a good  conscience  and  an  elevated 
idea  of  the  purposes  of  man’s  existence.  Such 
were  Paetus  Thrasae,  Helvidius  Priscus,  Cor- 
nutus,  C.  Musonius  Rufus,*  and  the  poets 
Persius  and  Juvenal,  whose  energetic  language 
and  manly  thoughts  may  be  as  instructive  to 
us  now  as  they  might  have  been  to  their  con- 
temporaries. Persius  died  under  Nero’s  bloody 
reign;  but  Juvenal  had  the  good  fortune  to 
survive  the  tyrant  Domitian  and  to  see  the 
better  times  of  Nerva,  Trajan,  and  Hadrian. t 
His  best  precepts  are  derived  from  the  Stoic 
school,  and  they  are  enforced  in  his  finest  verses 
by  the  unrivalled  vigor  of  the  Ratin  language. 

The  best  two  expounders  of  the  later  Stoical 
philosophy  were  a Greek  slave  and  a Roman 
emperor.  Epictetus,  a Phrygian  Greek,  was 

* I have  omitted  Seneca,  Nero’s  preceptor.  He  was 
in  a sense  a Stoic,  and  he  has  said  many  good  things 
in  a very  tine  way.  There  is  a judgment  of  Gellius 
(xii.  2.)  on  Seneca,  or  rather  a statement  of  what 
some  people  thought  of  his  philosophy,  and  it  is  not 
favorable.  His  writings  and  his  life  must  be  taken 
together,  and  I have  nothing  more  to  say  of  him  here. 
The  reader  will  find  a notice  of  Seneca  and  his  phil- 
osophy in  “Seekers  after  God,”  by  the  Rev.  F.  W. 
Farrar.  Macmillan  and  Co. 

t Ribbeck  has  labored  to  prove  that  those  Satires, 
which  contain  philosophical  precepts,  are  not  the 
work  of  the  real,  but  of  a false  Juvenal,  a Declamator. 
Still  the  verses  exist,  and  were  written  by  somebody 
who  was  acquainted  with  the  Stoic  doctrines. 


flBarcu6  Hurelfue  Bntonfnus. 


49 


brought  to  Rome,  we  know  not  how,  but  he 
was  there  the  slave  and  afterwards  the  freed- 
man  of  an  unworthy  master,  Kpaphroditus 
by  name,  himself  a freedman  and  a favorite 
of  Nero.  Epictetus  may  have  been  a hearer 
of  C.  Musonius  Rufus,  while  he  was  still  a 
slave,  but  he  could  hardly  have  been  a teacher 
before  he  was  made  free.  He  was  one  of  the 
philosophers^ whouj„X)omitian’s  order  banished 
from  Rome.  He  retired  to  Nicopolis  in  Epi- 
rus, and  he  may  have  died  there.  Like  other 
great  teachers  he  wrote  nothing,  and  we  are 
indebted  to  his  grateful  pupil  Arrian  for  what 
we  have  of  Epictetus’  discourses.  Arrian  wrote 
eight  books  of  the  discourses  of  Epictetus,  of 
which  only  four  remain  and  some  fragments. 
We  have  also  from  Arrian’s  hand  the  small 
Enchiridion  or  Manual  of  the  chief  precepts  of 
Epictetus.  This  is  a valuable  commentary  on 
the  Enchiridion  by  Simplicius,  who  lived  in 
the  time  of  the  emperor  Justinian.* 

Antoninus  in  his  first  book  (i.  7),  in  which 
he  gratefully  commemorates  his  obligations  to 
his  teachers,  says  that  he  was  made  acquainted 
by  Junius  Rusticus  with  the  discourses  of 
Epictetus,  whom  he  mentions  also  in  other 
passages  (iv.  41;  xi.  34,  36).  Indeed,  the  doc- 
trines of  Epictetus  and  Antoninus  are  the  same, 

* There  is  a complete  edition  of  Arrian’s  Epictetus 
■with  the  commentary  of  Simplicius  by  J.  Schweig- 
haeuser,  6 vols.  8vo.  1799,  1800.  There  is  also  an 
English  translation  of  Epictetus  b}'  Mrs.  Carter. 

4 


Pbtlosopbi?. 


and  Epictetus  is  the  best  authority  for  the  ex- 
planation of  the  philosophical  language  of  An- 
toninus and  the  exposition  of  his  opinions. 
But  the  method  of  the  two  philosophers  is  en- 
tirely different.  Epictetus  addressed  himself 
to  his  hearers  in  a continuous  discourse  and  in 
a familiar  and  simple  manner.  Antoninus 
wrote  down  his  reflections  for  his  own  use 
only,  in  short,  unconnected  paragraphs,  which 
are  often  obscure. 

The  Stoics  made  three  divisions  of  philoso- 
phy,— Physic  ((jtvaiKdv),  Ethic  (j’/6ik6v),  and  Eogic 
(?^oyiK6v)  (viii.  13).  This  division,  we  are  told 
by  Diogenes,  was  made  by  Zeno  of  Citium, 
the  founder  of  the  Stoic  sect,  and  by  Chrysip- 
pus;  but  these  philosophers  placed  the  three 
divisions  in  the  following  order,  — Logic, 
Physic,  Ethic.  It  appears,  however,  that  this 
division  was  made  before  Zeno’s  time,  and  ac- 
knowledged by  Plato,  as  Cicero  remarks  (Acad. 
Post.  i.  5).  Logic  is  not  synonymous  with 
our  term  lyOgic  in  the  narrower  sense  of  that 
w'ord. 

Cleanthes,  a Stoic,  snbdivided  the  three  di- 
visions, and  made  six, — Dialectic  and  Rhet- 
oric, comprised  in  Logic  ; Ethic  and  Politic ; 
Physic  and  Theology.  This  division  was 
merely  for  practical  nse,  for  all  Philosophy  is 
one.  Even  among  the  earliest  Stoics  Logic,  or 
Dialectic,  does  not  occupy  the  same  place  as  in 
Plato:  it  is  considered  only  as  an  instrument 
which  is  to  be  used  for  the  other  divisions  of 


Marcus  Burelius  Bntoninus. 


51 


Philosophy.  An  exposition  of  the  earlier 
Stoic  doctrines  and  of  their  modifications  would 
require  a volume.  My  object  is  to  explain 
only  the  opinions  of  Antoninus,  so  far  as  they 
can  be  collected  from  his  book. 

According  to  the  subdivision  of  Cleanthes, 
Physic  and  Theology  go  together,  or  the  study 
of  the  nature  of  Things,  and  the  study  of  the 
nature  of  the  Deit}q  so  far  as  man  can  under- 
stand the  Deity,  and  of  his  government  of  the 
universe.  This  division  or  subdivision  is  not 
formally  adopted  by  Antoninus,  for,  as  already 
observed,  there  is  no  method  in  his  book  ; but 
it  is  virtually  contained  in  it. 

Cleanthes  also  connects  Ethic  and  Politic,  or 
the  study  of  the  principles  of  morals  and  the 
study  of  the  constitution  of  civil  society;  and 
undoubtedly  he  did  well  in  subdividing  Ethic 
into  two  parts.  Ethic  in  the  narrower  sense  and 
Politic;  for  though  the  two  are  intimately  con- 
nected, they  are  also  very  distinct,  and  many 
questions  can  only  be  properly  discussed  by 
carefully  observing  the  distinction.  Antoninus 
does  not  treat  of  Politic.  His  subject  is  Ethic, 
and  Ethic  in  its  practical  application  to  his 
own  conduct  in  life  as  a man  and  as  a gover- 
nor. His  Ethic  is  founded  on  his  doctrines 
about  man’s  nature,  the  Universal  Nature,  and 
the  relation  of  everj'  man  to  everything  else. 
It  is  therefore  intimately  and  inseparably  con- 
nected with  Physic,  or  the  Nature  of  Things, 
and  with  Theology,  or  the  Nature  of  the  Deity. 


52 


IPbilosopbg. 


He  advises  us  to  examine  well  all  the  impres- 
sions on  our  minds  {^avraaiai)  and  to  form  a 
right  judgment  of  them,  to  make  just  conclu- 
sions, and  to  inquire  into  the  meanings  of 
words,  and  so  far  to  apply  Dialectic;  but  he 
has  no  attempt  at  an}^  exposition  of  Dialectic, 
and  his  philosophy  is  in  substance  purely 
moral  and  practical.  He  says  (viii.  13), 

‘ ‘ Constantly  and,  if  it  be  possible,  on  the  oc- 
casion of  every  impression  on  the  soul,*  apply 
to  it  the  principles  of  Physic,  of  Ethic,  and  of 
Dialectic:”  which  is  only  another  way  of  tell- 
ing us  to  examine  the  impression  in  every  pos- 
sible way.  In  another  passage  (iii.  ii)  he 
sa3's,  ‘ ‘ To  the  aids  which  have  been  men- 
tioned, let  this  one  still  be  added:  make  for 
thyself  a definition  or  description  of  the  object 
(76  (pavraa-dv)  which  is  presented  to  thee,  so  as 
to  see  distinctly  what  kind  of  a thing  it  is  in 
its  substance,  in  its  nudity,  in  its  complete  en- 
tirety, and  tell  thyself  its  proper  name,  and  the 
names  of  the  things  of  which  it  has  been  com- 

The  original  is  knl  TTaorj^  pavractag.  We  have  no 
word  w'hich  expresses  pavrama,  for  it  is  not  only  the 
sensuous  appearance  which  comes  from  an  external 
object,  which  object  is  called  to  (pavraardv^  but  it  is 
also  the  thought  or  feeling  or  opinion  which  is  pro- 
duced even  when  there  is  no  corresponding  external 
object  before  us.  Accordingly  everjdhing  which 
moves  the  soul  is  pavraa-dv,  and  produces  a tpavraaia. 

In  this  extract  Antoninus  says  (pvacoAoyelv^  TTaOoXoyeiv, 
(haP^KTiKEveudac.  I have  translated  naOoXoyelv  by  using 
the  word  Moral  (Ethic),  and  that  is  the  meaning  here. 


Marcus  Burelius  Bntoninus. 


53 


pounded,  and  into  which  it  will  be  resolved.” 
Such  an  examination  implies  a use  of  Dialectic, 
which  Antoninus  accordingly  employed  as  a 
means  toward  establishing  his  Physical,  Theo- 
logical, and  Ethical  principles. 

There  are  several  expositions  of  the  Physical, 
Theological,  and  Ethical  principles,  which  are 
contained  in  the  work  of  Antoninus;  and  more 
expositions  than  I have  read.  Ritter  (Ge- 
schichte  der  Philosophie,  iv.  241),  after  explain- 
ing the  doctrines  of  Epictetus,  treats  very 
briefly  and  insufiiciently  those  of  Antoninus. 
But  he  refers  to  a short  essay,  in  which  the 
work  is  done  better.*  There  is  also  an  essay 
on  the  Philosophical  Principles  of  M.  Aurelius 
Antoninus  by  J.  M.  Schultz,  placed  at  the  end 
of  his  German  translation  of  Antoninus  (Schles- 
wig, 1799).  With  the  assistance  of  these  two 
useful  essays  and  his  own  diligent  study,  a man 
may  form  a sufficient  notion  of  the  principles 
of  Antoninus;  but  he  will  find  it  more  difficult 
to  expound  them  to  others.  Besides  the  want 
of  arrangement  in  the  original  and  of  connec- 
tion among  the  numerous  paragraphs,  the 
corruption  of  the  text,  the  obscurity  of  the  lan- 
guage and  the  style,  and  sometimes  perhaps 
the  confusion  in  the  writer’s  own  ideas — besides 
all  this,  there  is  occasionally  an  apparent  con- 

* De  Marco  Aurelio  Antonino  ...  ex  ipsius  Cotn- 
mentariis.  Scriptio  Philologica.  lustituit  Nicolaus 
Bachius,  Bipsiae,  1826. 


54 


ff»bllosopbB. 


tradiction  in  the  emperor’s  thoughts,  as  if  his 
principles  were  sometimes  unsettled,  as  if  doubt 
sometimes  clouded  his  mind.  A man  who  leads 
a life  of  tranquillity  and  reflection,  who  is  not 
disturbed  at  home  and  meddles  not  with  the 
affairs  of  the  world,  may  keep  his  mind  at  ease 
and  his  thoughts  in  one  even  course.  But 
such  a man  has  not  been  tried.  All  his  Ethical 
philosophy  and  his  passive  virtue  might  turn 
out  to  be  idle  words,  if  he  were  once  exposed 
to  the  rude  realities  of  human  existence.  Fine 
thoughts  and  moral  dissertations  from  men  who 
have  not  worked  and  suffered  may  be  read, 
but  they  will  be  forgotten.  No  religion,  no 
Ethical  philosophy  is  worth  anything,  if  the 
teacher  has  not  lived  the  “ life  of  an  apostle,” 
and  been  ready  to  die  ‘ ‘ the  death  of  a martyr.  ’ ’ 
“Not  in  passivity  (the  passive  effects)  but  in 
activity  He  the  evil  and  the  good  of  the  rational 
social  animal,  just  as  his  virtue  and  his  vice  lie 
not  in  passivity,  but  in  activity”  (ix.  i6).  The 
emperor  Antoninus  was  a practical  moralist. 
From  his  youth  he  followed  a laborious  disci- 
pline, and  though  his  high  station  placed  him 
above  all  want  or  the  fear  of  it,  he  lived  as  fru- 
g'ally  and  temperately  as  the  poorest  philospher. 
Epictetus  wanted  little,  and  it  seems  that  he 
always  had  the  little  that  he  wanted  and  he 
was  content  with  it,  as  he  had  been  with 
his  servile  station!  But  Antoninus  after  his 
accession  to  the  empire  sat  on  an  uneasy 
seat.  He  had  the  administration  of  an  em- 


flRarcua  2lurelius  antonlnue. 


55 


pire  whicli  extended  from  the  Euphrates  to 
the  Atlantic,  from  the  cold anountains  of  Scot- 
land to  the  hot  sands  of  Africa;  and  we  may 
imagine,  though  we  cannot  know  it  by  expe- 
rience, what  must  be  the  trials,  the  troubles, 
the  anxiety,  and  the  sorrows  of  him  who  has 
the  world’s  business  on  his  hands,  with  the 
wish  to  do  the  best  that  he  can,  and  the  cer- 
tain knowledge  that  he  can  do  very  little  of 
the  good  which  he  wishes. 

In  the  midst  of  war,  pestilence,  conspiracy, 
general  corruption,  and  with  the  weight  of  so 
unwieldy  an  empire  upon  him,  we  may  easily 
comprehend  that  Antoninus  often  had  need  of 
all  his  fortitude  to  support  him.  The  best  and 
the  bravest  men  have  moments  of  doubt  and 
of  weakness;  but  if  they  are  the  best  and  the 
bravest,  they  rise  again  from  their  depression 
by  recurring  to  first  principles,  as  Antoninus 
does.  The  emperor  says  that  life  is  smoke,  a 
vapor,  and  St.  James  in  his  Epistle  is  of  the 
same  mind;  that  the  world  is  full  of  envious, 
jealous,  malignant  people,  and  a man  might 
be  well  content  to  get  out  of  it.  He  has 
doubts  perhaps  sometimes  even  about  that  to 
which  he  holds  most  firmly.  There  are  only 
a few  passages  of  this  kind,  but  they  are  evi- 
dence of  the  struggles  which  even  the  noblest 
of  the  sons  of  men  had  to  maintain  against  the 
hard  realities  of  his  daily  life.  A poor  remark 
it  is  which  I have  seen  somewhere,  and  made 
in  a disparaging  way,  that  the  emperor’s  re- 


56 


IPbtlosopbB. 


flections  show  that  he  had  need  of  consolation 
and  comfort  in  life,  and  even  to  prepare  him  to 
meet  his  death.  True  that  he  did  need  comfort 
and  support,  and  we  see  how  he  found  it.  He 
constantly  recurs  to  his  fundamental  principle 
that  the  universe  is  wisely  ordered,  that  every 
man  is  a part  of  it  and  must  conform  to  that 
order  which  he  cannot  change,  that  whatever 
the  Deity  has  done  is  good,  that  all  mankind 
are  a man’s  brethren,  that  he  must  love  and 
cherish  them  and  try  to  make  them  better, 
even  those  who  would  do  him  harm.  This  is 
his  conclusion  (ii.  17):  “What  then  is  that 
which  is  able  to  conduct  a man  ? One  thing 
and  only  one.  Philosophy.  But  this  consists 
in  keeping  the  divinity  within  a man  free  from 
violence  and  unharmed,  superior  to  pains  and 
pleasures,  doing  nothing  without  a purpose 
nor  yet  falsely  and  with  hypocrisy,  not  feeling 
the  need  of  another  man’s  doing  or  not  doing 
anything;  and  besides,  accepting  all  that  hap- 
pens and  all  that  is  allotted,  as  coming  from 
thence,  wherever  it  is,  from  whence  he  himseP 
came;  and  finally  waiting  for  death  with  a 
cheerful  mind  as  being  nothing  else  than  a dis- 
solution of  the  elements  of  which  every  living 
being  is  compounded.  But  if  there  is  no  harm 
to  the  elements  themselves  in  each  continually 
changing  into  another,  why  should  a man 
have  any  apprehension  about  the  change  and 
dissolution  of  all  the  elements  [himself]?  for  it 
is  according  to  nature;  and  nothing  is  evil  that 
is  according  to  nature.’’ 


Marcus  Hucellue  antoninus. 


57 


The  Physic  of  Antoninus  is  the  knowledge 
of  the  Nature  of  the  Universe,  of  its  govern- 
ment, and  of  the  relation  of  man’s  nature  to 
both.  He  names  the  universe  (Jj  tov  oXuv  ovaia, 
vi.  i),*  “the  universal  substance,’’  and  he 
adds  that  ‘ ‘ reason  ’ ’ (Myoc)  governs  the  uni- 
verse. He  also  (vi.  9)  uses  the  terms  ‘ ‘ uni- 
versal nature  ’ ’ or  “ nature  of  the  universe.  ’ ’ 
He  (vi.  25)  calls  the  universe  “ the  one  and  all, 
which  we  name  Cosmos  or  Order’’  {Kdojxog). 
If  he  ever  seems  to  use  these  general  terms  as 
significant  of  the  All,  of  all  that  man  can  in 
any  way  conceive  to  exist,  he  still  on  other  oc- 
casions plainly  distinguishes  between  Matter, 

* As  to  the  word  ovaia,  the  reader  ma}'  see  the  Index. 
I add  here  a few  examples  of  the  use  of  the  word ; 
Antoninus  has  (v.  24),  y avfnraaa  ovaia,  “the  universal 
substance.”  He  says  (xii.  30  and  iv.  40),  “there  is 
one  common  substance”  {ovaia),  distributed  among 
countless  bodies.  In  Stobaeus  (tom.  i.  lib.  i,  tit.  14) 
there  is  this  definition,  ovaiav  Si  <paaiv  tCiv  ovtuv  d-dvruv 
ryrv  nparyv  vkqv.  In  viii.  ii,  Antoninus  speaks  of  to 
ovaiaSeg  koX  vIikov,  “the  substantial  and  the  material ; ” 
and  (vii.  10)  he  says  that  “ ever}dhing  material” 
{iwXov)  disappears  in  the  substance  of  the  whole  (r?) 
TG)v  bluv  ovaia).  The  ovaia  is  the  generic  name  of  that 
existence  which  we  assume  as  the  highest  or  ultimate, 
because  we  conceive  no  existence  which  can  be  co- 
ordinated with  it  and  none  above  it.  It  is  the  phil- 
osopher’s “substance:”  it  is  the  ultimate  expression 
for  that  which  we  conceive  or  suppose  to  be  the  basis, 
the  being  of  a thing.  “From  the  Divine,  which  is 
substance  in  itself,  or  the  only  and  sole  substance,  all 
and  everything  that  is  created  exists”  (Swedenborg, 
Angelic  Wisdom,  198). 


58 


IPbilosopb?. 


Material  things  {v'kri,  v7uk6v),  and  Cause,  Origin, 
Reason  (aiWa,  alnCidt^,  This  is  conform- 

able to  Zeno’s  doctrine  that  there  are  two  orig- 
inal principles  (apxai)  of  all  things,  that  which 
acts  (to  TToiovv)  and  that  which  is  acted  upon  (rd 
Trdaxov).  That  which  is  acted  on  is  the  fonu- 
less  matter  (h?i?i) : that  which  acts  is  the  reason 
(?6yoc),  God,  who  is  eternal  and  operates 

* I remark,  in  order  to  anticipate  any  misappre- 
hension, that  all  these  general  terms  involve  a contra- 
diction. The  “one  and  all,”  and  the  like,  and  “the 
whole,” imply  limitation.  “ One ” is  limited;  “all”  is 
limited;  the  “whole”  is  limited.  We  cannot  help  it. 
We  cannot  find  words  to  express  that  which  we  cannot 
fully  conceive.  The  addition  of  “ absolute  ” or  any 
other  such  word  does  not  mend  the  matter.  Even  the 
word  God  is  used  by  most  people,  often  unconsciously’-, 
in  such  a way  that  limitation  is  implied,  and  yet  at  the 
same  time  words  are  added  which  are  intended  to  deny 
limitation.  A Christian  martyr,  when  he  was  asked 
what  God  was,  is  said  to  have  answered  that  God  has 
no  name  like  a man;  and  Justin  says  the  same  (Apol. 
ii.  6),  “the  names  Father,  God,  Creator,  Ford,  and 
Master  are  not  names,  but  appellations  derived  from 
benefactions  and  acts.”  (Compare  Seneca,  De  Beuef. 
iv.  8.)  We  can  conceive  the  existence  of  a thing,  or 
rather  we  may  have  the  idea  of  an  existence,  without 
an  adequate  notion  of  it,  “adequate”  meaning  co- 
extensive and  coequal  with  the  thing.  We  have  a 
notion  of  limited  space  derived  from  the  dimensions 
of  what  we  call  a material  thing,  though  of  space  ab- 
solute, if  I may  use  the  term,  we  have  no  notion  at 
all;  and  of  infinite  space  the  notion  is  the  same — no 
notion  at  all;  and  yet  we  conceive  it  in  a sense, 
though  1 know  not  how,  and  we  believe  that  space  is 
infinite,  and  W’e  cannot  conceive  it  to  be  finite. 


/Iftarcus  Burelius  Bntoninus. 


59 


througli  all  matter,  and  produces  all  things. 
So  Antoninus  (v.  32)  speaks  of  the  reason 
(Myog)  which  pervades  all  substance  (omla),  and 
through  all  time  by  fixed  periods  (revolutions) 
administers  the  universe  (-6  ttov).  God  is  eter- 
nal, and  Matter  is  eternal.  It  is  God  who 
gives  form  to  matter,  but  he  is  not  said  to  have 
created  matter.  According  to  this  view,  which 
is  as  old  as  Anaxagoras,  God  and  matter  exist 
independently,  but  God  governs  matter.  This 
doctrine  is  simply  the  expression  of  the  fact  of 
the  existence  both  of  matter  and  of  God.  The 
Stoics  did  not  perplex  themselves  wim  uhe  in- 
soluble question  of  the  origin  and  nature  of 
matter.*  Antoninus  also  assumes  a beginning 

*The  notions  of  mattei  and  of  space  are  insepar- 
able. We  derive  the  notion  of  space  from  matter  and 
form.  But  we  have  no  adequate  conception  either  of 
matter  or  space.  Matter  in  its  ultimate  resolution  is 
as  unintelligible  as  what  men  call  mind,  spirit,  or  by 
whatever  other  name  they  may  express  the  power 
which  makes  itself  known  by  acts.  Anaxagoras  laid 
down  the  distinction  between  intelligence  iwiif)  and 
matter,  and  he  said  that  intelligence  impressed  motion 
on  matter,  and  so  separated  the  elements  of  matter 
and  gave  them  order;  but  he  probably  only  assumed 
a beginning,  as  Simplicius  says,  as  a foundation  of 
his  philosophical  teaching.  Empedocles  said,  “The 
universe  always  existed.”  He  had  no  idea  of  what  is 
called  creation.  Ocellus  Lucanus  (i,  ^ 2)  maintained 
that  the  Universe  (ro  7rav)  was  imperishable  and  un- 
created. Consequently  it  is  eternal.  He  admitted 
the  existence  of  God;  but  his  theology  would  require 
some  discussion.  On  the  contrary,  the  Brachmans, 


6o 


IPbtlosopbis. 


of  things,  as  we  now  know  them;  but  his  lan- 
guage is  sometimes  very  obscure.  I have  en- 
deavored to  explain  the  meaning  of  one  difficult 
passage  (vii.  75,  and  the  note). 

Matter  consists  of  elemental  parts  (aroixeia) 
of  which  all  material  objects  are*  made.  But 
nothing  is  permanent  in  form.  The  nature  of 
the  universe,  according  to  Antoninus’  expres- 
sion (iv.  36),  “loves  nothing  so  much  as  to 
change  the  things  which  are,  and  to  make  new 
things  like  them.  For  everything  that  exists 
is  in  a manner  the  seed  of  that  which  will  be. 
But  thou  art  thinking  only”of  seeds  which  are 
cast  into  the  earth  or  into  a womb  : but  this  is 
a very  vulgar  notion.’’  All  things  then  are  in 
a constant  flux  and  change;  some  things  are 
lissolved  into  the  elements,  others  come  in 
their  places  ; and  so  the  ‘ ‘ whole  universe  con- 
tinues ever  young  and  perfect’’  (xii.  23). 

Antoninus  has  some  obscure  expressions 
about  what  he  calls  ‘ ‘ seminal  principles  ’ ’ (<77rep- 
jiaTiKol  Myoc) . He  opposes  them  to  the  Epicu- 
rean atoms  (vi.  24),  and  consequently  his 

according  to  Strabo  (p.  713,  ed.  Cas.),  taught  that  the 
universe  -was  created  and  perishable;  and  the  creator 
and  administrator  of  it  pervades  the  whole.  The 
author  of  the  book  of  Solomon’s  Wisdom  says  (xi. 
17)  : “ Thy  Almighty  hand  made  the  world  of  matter 
without  form,”  which  may  mean  that  matter  existed 
already. 

The  common  Greek  word  which  we  translate 
‘‘matter  ” is  vlr].  It  is  the  stuff  that  things  are  made 
of. 


/Diarcus  Hurelius  antonlnue. 


6r 


‘ ‘ seminal  principles  ’ ’ are  not  material  atoms 
which  wander  about  at  hazard,  and  combine 
nobody  knows  how.  In  one  passage  (iv.  21) 
he  speaks  of  living  principles,  souls  (ipvxal} 
after  the  dissolution  of  their  bodies  being  re- 
ceived into  the  ‘ ‘ seminal  principle  of  the  uni- 
verse.” Schultz  thinks  that  by  “seminal 
principles  Antoninus  means  the  relations  of  the 
various  elemental  principles,  which  relations 
are  determined  by  the  Deity  and  by  which 
alone  the  production  of  organized  beings  is 
possible.”  This  may  be  the  meaning;  but  if 
it  is,  nothing  of  any  value  can  be  derived  from 
it.*  Antoninus  often  uses  the  word  ‘ ‘ Nature  ’ ’ 
{(pvmg),  and  we  must  attempt  to  fix  its  meaning. 
The  simple  etymological  sense  of  <]wGig  is  “pro- 
duction,” the  birth  of  what  we  call  Things. 
The  Romans  used  Natura,  which  also  means 
“birth”  originally.  But  neither  the  Greeks 
nor  the  Romans  stuck  to  this  simple  meaning, 
nor  do  we.  Antoninus  says  (x.  6)  : “ Whether 
the  universe  is  [a  concourse  of]  atoms  or 
Nature  [is  a system],  let  this  first  be  estab- 

*Justin  (Apol.  ii.  8)  has  the  words  Kara  OKepfiariKov 
\6yov  pepog,  where  he  is  speaking  of  the  Stoics ; but  he 
uses  this  expression  in  a peculiar  sense  (note  ii). 
The  early  Christian  writers  were  familiar  with  the 
Stoic  terms,  and  their  writings  show  that  the  contest 
was  begun  between  the  Christian  expositors  and  the 
Greek  philosophy.  Rven  in  the  second  Epistle  of  St. 
Peter  (ii.  i,  v.  4)  we  find  a Stoic  expression,  Iva  dia 
TovTuv  yevrjads  de'iag  Koivuvot  <pvaeug. 


62 


B^b^lo6opb2. 


lished,  that  I am  a part  of  the  whole  which  is 
governed  by  nature.  ’ ’ Here  it  might  seem  as 
if  nature  were  personified  and  viewed  as  an 
active,  eflScient  power ; as  something  which,  if 
not  independent  of  the  Deity,  acts  by  a power 
which  is  given  to  it  by  the  Deity.  Such,  if  I 
understand  the  expression  right,  is  the  way  in 
which  the  word  Nature  is  often  used  now, 
though  it  is  plain  that  many  writers  use  the 
word  without  fixing  any  exact  meaning  to  it. 
It  is  the  same  with  the  expres.sion  Laws  of 
Nature,  which  some  writers  may  use  in  an  in- 
telligible sense,  but  others  as  clearly  use  in  no 
definite  sense  at  all.  There  is  no  meaning  in  this 
word  Nature,  except  that  which  Bishop  Butler 
assigns  to  it,  when  he  says,  ‘ ‘ The  only  distinct 
meaning  of  that  word  Natural  is  Stated,  Fixed, 
or  Settled  ; since  what  is  natural  as  much  re- 
quires and  presupposes  an  intelligent  agent  to 
render  it  so,  i.  e.  to  effect  it  continually  or  at 
stated  times,  as  what  is  supernatural  or  mirac- 
ulous does  to  effect  it  at  once.”  This  is 
Plato’s  meaning  (De  Leg.,  iv.  715)  when  he 
says  that  God  holds  the  beginning  and  end 
and  middle  of  all  that  exists,  and  proceeds 
straight  on  his  course,  making  his  circuit  ac- 
cording to  nature  (that  is  by  a fixed  order)  ; and 
he  is  continually  accompanied  by  justice,  who 
punishes  those  who  deviate  from  the  divine 
law,  that  is,  from  the  order  or  course  which 
God  observes. 

When  we  look  at  the  motions  of  the  planets. 


Marcus  aurelius  Bntoninua. 


63 


the  action  of  what  w^e  call  gravitation,  the  ele- 
mental combination  of  unorganized  bodies  and 
their  resolution,  the  production  of  plants  and 
of  living  bodies,  their  generation,  growth,  and 
their  dissolution,  which  we  call  their  death,  we 
observe  a regular  sequence  of  phenomena, 
which  within  the  limits  of  experience  present 
and  past,  so  far  as  we  know  the  past,  is  fixed 
and  invariable.  But  if  this  is  not  so,  if  the 
order  and  sequence  of  phenomena,  as  known  to 
us,  are  subject  to  change  in  the  course  of  an 
infinite  progression, — and  such  change  is  con- 
ceivable,— we  have  not  discovered,  nor  shall  we 
ever  discover,  the  whole  of  the  order  and  se- 
quence of  phenomena,  in  which  sequence  there 
may  be  involved  according  to  its  very  nature, 
that  is,  according  to  its  fixed  order,  some  vari- 
ation of  what  we  now  call  the  Order  or  Nature 
of  Things.  It  is  also  conceivable  that  such 
changes  have  taken  place, — changes  in  the 
order  of  things,  as  we  are  compelled  by  the  im- 
perfection of  language  to  call  them,  but  which 
are  no  changes;  and  further  it  is  certain  that 
our  knowledge  of  the  true  sequence  of  all  actual 
phenomena,  as  for  instance  the  phenomena  of 
generation,  growth,  and  dissolution,  is  and 
ever  must  be  imperfect. 

We  do  not  fare  much  better  when  we  speak 
of  Causes  and  Effects  than  when  we  speak  of 
Nature.  For  the  practical  purposes  of  life  we 
may  use  the  terms  cause  and  effect  conveni- 
ently, and  w'e  may  fix  a distinct  meaning  to 


64 


lPbtl09opbi2. 


them,  distinct  enough  at  least  to  prevent  all 
misunderstanding.  But  the  case  is  different 
when  we  speak  of  causes  and  effects  as  of 
Things.  All  that  we  know  is  phenomena,  as 
the  Greeks  called  them,  or  appearances  which 
follow  one  another  in  a regular  order,  as  we 
conceive  it,  so  that  if  some  one  phenomenon 
should  fail  in  the  series,  we  conceive  that  there 
must  either  be  an  interruption  of  the  series,  or 
that  something  else  will  appear  after  the  phe- 
nomenon which  has  failed  to  appear,  and  will 
occupy  the  vacant  place;  and  so  the  series  in 
its  progression  maj^  be  modified  or  totally 
changed.  Cause  and  effect  then  mean  nothing 
in  the  .sequence  of  natural  phenomena  beyond 
what  I have  said;  and  the  real  cause,  or  the 
transcendent  cause,  as  some  would  call  it,  of 
each  successive  phenomenon  is  in  that  which 
is  the  cause  of  all  things  which  are,  which  have 
been,  and  which  will  be  forever.  Thus  the 
word  Creation  may  have  a real  sense  if  we 
consider  it  as  the  first,  if  we  can  conceive  a 
first,  in  the  present  order  of  natural  phenom- 
ena; but  in  the  vulgar  sense  a creation  of  all 
things  at  a certain  time,  followed  by  a quies- 
cence of  the  first  cause  and  an  abandonment 
of  all  sequences  of  Phenomena  to  the  laws  of 
Nature,  or  to  the  other  words  that  people  may 
use,  is  absolutely  absurd.* 

*Time  and  space  are  the  conditions  of  our  thought ; 
but  time  infinite  and  space  infinite  cannot  be  objects 


/Iliarcus  aureltus  Bntonfnus.  65 


Now,  though  there  is  great  difficulty  in  un- 
derstanding all  the  passages  of  Antoninus,  in 
which  he  speaks  of  Nature,  of  the  changes  of 
things  and  of  the  economy  of  the  universe,  I 
am  convinced  that  his  sense  of  Nature  and 
Natural  is  the  same  as  that  which  I have 
stated ; and  as  he  was  a man  who  knew  how  to 
use  words  in  a clear  way  and  with  strict  con- 
sistency, we  ought  to  assume,  even  if  his  mean- 
ing in  some  passages  is  doubtful,  that  his  view 
of  Nature  was  in  harmony  with  his  fixed  be- 
lief in  the  all-pervading,  ever  present,  and 
ever  active  energy  of  God.  (ii.  4;  iv.  40;  x.  i; 
vi.  40;  and  other  passages.  Compare  Seneca, 
De  Benef.,  iv.  7.  Swedenborg,  Angelic  Wis- 
dom, 3497357-) 

There  is  much  in  Antoninus  that  is  hard  to 
understand,  and  it  might  be  said  that  he  did 
not  fully  comprehend  all  that  he  wrote;  which 
would  however  be  in  no  way  remarkable,  for 

of  thought,  except  in  a very  imperfect  way.  Time 
and  space  must  not  in  any  way  be  thought  of  when 
we  think  of  the  Deity.  Swedenborg  says,  “The 
natural  man  may  believe  that  he  would  have  no 
thought,  if  the  ideas  of  time,  of  space,  and  of  things 
material  were  taken  away ; for  upon  those  is  founded 
all  the  thought  that  man  has.  But  let  him  know  that 
the  thoughts  are  limited  and  confined  in  proportion 
as  they  partake  of  time,  of  space,  and  of  what  is  ma- 
terial ; and  that  they  are  not  limited  and  are  extended, 
in  proportion  as  they  do  not  partake  of  those  things  ; 
since  the  mind  is  so  far  elevated  above  the  things  cor- 
poreal and  worldly”  (Concerning  Heaven  and  Hell, 
169). 


5 


66 


IPbUosopb^. 


it  happens  now  that  a man  may  write  what 
neither  he  nor  an3^body  can  understand.  An- 
toninus tells  us  (xii.  lo)  to  look  at  things  and 
see  what  they  are,  resolving  them  into  the 
material  (iA;?),  the  casual  (alnov),  and  the  rela- 
tion {ava<popa),  or  the  purpose,  by  which  he 
seems  to  mean  something  in  the  nature  of  what 
we  call  effect,  or  end.  The  word  Cause  ( aiTta) 
is  the  difficulty.  There  is  the  same  word  in 
the  Sanscrit  (/letu ) ; and  the  subtle  philosophers 
of  India  and  of  Greece,  and  the  less  subtle 
philosophers  of  modern  times,  have  all  used 
this  word,  or  an  equivalent  word,  in  a vague 
way.  Yet  the  confusion  sometimes  may  be  in 
the  inevitable  ambiguity  of  language  rather 
than  in  the  mind  of  the  writer,  for  I cannot  think 
that  some  of  the  wisest  of  men  did  not  know 
what  they  intended  to  say.  When  Antoninus 
says  (iv.  36),  “that  everything  that  exists  is  in 
a manner  the  seed  of  that  which  will  be,”  he 
might  be  supposed  to  say  what  some  of  the  In- 
dian philosophers  have  said,  and  thus  a pro- 
found truth  might  be  converted  into  a gross 
absurdity.  But  he  says,  “in  a manner,”  and 
in  a manner  he  said  true ; and  in  another  man- 
ner, if  you  mistake  his  meaning,  he  said  false. 
When  Plato  said,  “ Nothing  ever  is,  but  is  al- 
ways becoming”  (ael  yiyverai),  he  delivered  a 
text,  out  of  which  we  may  derive  something  ; 
for  he  destroys  by  it  not  all  practical,  but  all 
speculative  notions  of  cause  and  effect.  The 
whole  series  of  things,  as  they  appear  to  us, 


/Dbarcus  aurelius  Hntoninus. 


67 


must  be  contemplated  in  time,  that  is  in  suc- 
cession, and  we  conceive  or  suppose  inter\^als 
between  one  state  of  things  and  another  state 
of  things,  so  that  there  is  priority  and  sequence, 
and  interval,  and  Being,  and  a ceasing  to  Be, 
and  beginning  and  ending.  But  there  is  noth- 
ing of  the  kind  in  the  Nature  of  Things.  It  is 
an  everlasting  continuity  (iv.  45 ; vii.  75). 
When  Antoninus  speaks  of  generation  (x.  26), 
he  speaks  of  one  cause  {alria)  acting,  and  then 
another  cause  taking  up  the  work,  which  the 
former  left  in  a certain  state,  and  so  on ; and 
we  might  perhaps  conceive  that  he  had  some 
notion  like  what  has  been  called  “ the  self- 
evolving  power  of  nature;”  a fine  phrase  in- 
deed, the  full  import  of  which  I believe  that 
the  writer  of  it  did  not  see,  and  thus  he  laid 
himself  open  to  the  imputation  of  being  a fol- 
lower of  one  of  the  Hindu  sects,  which  makes 
all  things  come  by  evolution  out  of  nature  or 
matter,  or  out  of  something  which  takes  the 
place  of  Deity,  but  is  not  Deity.  I would  have 
all  men  think  as  they  please,  or  as  they  can, 
and  I only  claim  the  same  freedom  which  I 
give.  When  a man  writes  anything,  we  may 
fairly  try  to  find  out  all  that  his  words  must 
mean,  even  if  the  result  is  that  they  mean  what 
he  did  not  mean  ; and  if  we  find  this  contradic- 
tion, it  is  not  our  fault,  but  his  misfortune. 
Now  Antoninus  is  perhaps  somewhat  in  this 
condition  in  what  he  says  (x.  26),  though  he 
speaks  at  the  end  of  the  paragraph  of  the 


68 


IPbllosopbB. 


power  which  acts,  unseen  by  the  eyes,  but  still 
no  less  clearly.  But  whether  in  this  passage 
(x.  26)  he  means  that  the  power  is  conceived 
to  be  in  the  different  successive  causes  ( alrtai^y 
or  in  something  else,  nobody  can  tell.  From 
other  passages,  however,  I do  collect  that  his 
notion  of  the  phenomena  of  the  universe  is  what 
I have  stated.  The  Deity  works  unseen,  if  we 
may  use  such  language,  and  perhaps  I may,  as 
Job  did,  or  he  who  wrote  the  book  of  Job. 
“In  him  we  live  and  move  and  are,’’  said  St. 
Paul  to  the  Athenians ; and  to  show  his  hearers 
that  this  was  no  new  doctrine,  he  quoted  the 
Greek  poets.  One  of  these  poets  was  the  Stoic 
Cleanthes,  whose  noble  hymn  to  Zeus,  or  God, 
is  an  elevated  expression  of  devotion  and  phi- 
losophy. It  deprives  Nature  of  her  power,  and 
puts  her  under  the  immediate  government  of 
the  Deity. 

“Thee  all  this  heaven,  which  whirls  around  the  earth, 
Obeys,  and  willing  follows  where  thou  leadest. 
Without  thee,  God,  nothing  is  done  on  earth. 

Nor  in  the  ethereal  realms,  nor  in  the  sea. 

Save  what  the  wicked  through  their  folly  do.” 

Antoninus’  conviction  of  the  existence  of  a 
divine  power  and  government  was  founded  on 
his  p>erception  of  the  order  of  the  universe. 
Like  Socrates  (Xen.  Mem.,  iv.  3,  13,  etc.)  he 
says  that  though  we  cannot  see  the  forms  of 
divine  powers,  we  know  that  they  exist  because 
we  see  their  works. 


^arcu0  Hurelius  Hntonlnu0. 


69 


“To  those  who  ask,  Where  hast  thou  seen 
the  gods,  or  how  dost  thou  comprehend  that 
they  exist  and  so  worshipest  them  ? I answer, 
in  the  first  place,  that  they  may  be  seen  even 
with  the  eyes;  in  the  second  place,  neither 
have  I seen  my  own  soul,  and  yet  I honor  it. 
Thus  then  with  respect  to  the  gods,  from  what 
I constantly  experience  of  their  power,  from 
this  I comprehend  that  they  exist,  and  I ven- 
erate them.”  (xii.  28,  and  the  note.  Comp. 
Aristotle  de  Mundo,  c.  6;  Xen.  Mem.  i.  4,  9; 
Cicero,  Tuscul.  i.  28,  29;  St.  Paul’s  Epistle  to 
the  Romans,  i.  19,  20;  and  Montaigne’s  Apol- 
ogy for  Raimond  de  Sebonde,  ii.  c.  12.)  This 
is  a very  old  argument,  which  has  always  had 
great  weight  with  most  people,  and  has  ap- 
peared sufficient.  It  does  not  acquire  the  least 
additional  strength  by  being  developed  in  a 
learned  treatise.  It  is  as  intelligible  in  its 
simple  enunciation  as  it  can  be  made.  If  it  is 
rejected,  there  is  no  arguing  with  him  who  re- 
jects it:  and  if  it  is  worked  out  into  innumer- 
able particulars,  the  value  of  the  evidence 
runs  the  risk  of  being  buried  under  a mass  of 
words. 

Man  being  conscious  that  he  is  a spiritual 
power,  or  that  he  has  such  a power,  in  what- 
ever way  he  conceives  that  he  has  it — for  I 
wish  simply  to  state  a fact — from  this  power 
which  he  has  in  himself,  he  is  led,  as  Antoni- 
nus says,  to  believe  that  there  is  a greater 
power,  which,  as  the  old  Stoics  tell  us,  per- 


70 


IPbflosopbB. 


vades  the  whole  universe  as  the  intellect* 
(voi'c)  pervades  man.  (Compare  Epictetus’  Dis- 
courses, i.  14;  and  Voltaire  a Mad^  Necker, 
vol.  Ixvii.,  p.  278,  ed.  Lequien.) 

have  always  translated  the  word  voi'c,  “intelli- 
gence” or  “intellect.”  It  appears  to  be  the  word 
used  by  the  oldest  Greek  philosophers  to  express  the 
notion  of  “ intelligence  ” as  opposed  to  the  notion  of 
“matter.”  I have  always  translated  the  word  ^6yoc 
by  “reason,”  and  Aoywdf  by  the  word  “rational,”  or 
perhaps  sometimes  “ reasonable,”  as  I have  translated 
voepdg  by  the  word  “intellectual.”  Every  man  who 
has  thought  and  has  read  any  philosophical  writings 
knows  the  difficulty  of  finding  words  to  express  cer- 
tain notions,  how  imperfectly  words  express  these 
notions,  and  how  carelessly  the  words  are  often  used. 
The  various  senses  of  the  word  Hdyof  are  enough  to 
perplex  any  man.  Our  translators  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment (St.  John,  c.  I.)  have  simply  translated  <5  loyoc 
b}'  “the  word,”  as  the  Germans  translated  it  by  “das 
Wort;”  but  in  their  theological  writings  they  some- 
times retain  the  original  term  Logos.  The  Germans 
have  a term  Vernunft,  which  seems  to  come  nearest 
to  our  word  Reason,  or  the  necessary  and  absolute 
truths  which  we  cannot  conceive  as  being  other  than 
what  they  are.  Such  are  what  some  people  have 
called  the  laws  of  thought,  the  conceptions  of  space 
and  of  time,  and  axioms  or  first  principles,  which 
need  no  proof  and  cannot  be  proved  or  denied.  Ac- 
cordingly the  Germans  can  say,  “ Gott  ist  die  hochste 
Vernunft,”  the  Supreme  Reason.  The  Germans  have 
also  a word  Verstand,  which  seems  to  represent  our 
word  “understanding,”  “ intelligence,”  “ intellect,” 
not  as  a thing  absolute  which  exists  by  itself,  but  as  a 
thing  connected  with  an  individual  being,  as  a man. 
Accordingl}-  it  is  the  capacity  of  receiving  impressions 


/Hbarcus  Burelius  Bntoninus. 


71 


God  exists  then,  but  what  do  we  know  of 
his  nature  ? Antoninus  says  that  the  soul  of 
manj.s  an  efdux  from  the  divinity.  We  have 
bodies’ like  animals,  but  we  have  reason,  in- 
telligence, as  the  gods.  Animals  have  life 
(ijjvxn),  and  what  we  call  instincts  or  natural 
principles  of  action:  but  the  rational  animal 
man  alone  has  a rational,  intelligent  soul 
{ijvxv  loytKT],  voepa).  Autoniiius-  insists  on  this 

(Vorstelluugen,  (pavraniai),  and  forming  from  them 
distinct  ideas  (Begriffe),  and  perceiving  differences. 
I do  not  think  that  these  remarks  will  help  the  reader 
to  the  understanding  of  Antoninus,  or  his  use  of  the 
words  roi'f  and  Adyof.  The  emperor’s  meaning  must 
be  got  from  his  own  words,  and  if  it  does  not  agree 
altogether  with  modern  notions,  it  is  not  our  business 
to  force  it  into  agreement,  but  simply  to  find  out  what 
his  meaning  is,  if  we  can. 

Justinus  (ad  Diognetum,  c.  vii.)  says  that  the  om- 
nipotent, all-creating,  and  invisible  God  has  fixed 
truth  and  the  holy,  incomprehensible  Logos  in  men’s 
hearts  ; and  this  Logos  is  the  architect  and  creator  of 
the  Universe.  In  the  first  Apology  (c.  xxxii.),  he 
says  that  the  seed  (urrippa)  from  God  is  the  Logos, 
which  dwells  in  those  who  believe  in  God.  So  it  ap- 
pears that  according  to  Jnstinus  the  Logos  is  only  in 
such  believers.  In  the  second  Apology  (c.  viii.)  he 
speaks  of  the  .seed  of  the  Logos  being  implanted  in 
all  mankind  ; but  those  who  order  their  lives  accord- 
ing to  Logos,  such  as  the  Stoics,  have  only  a portion 
of  the  Logos  {Kara  a-eppariKov  Myov  pepog),  and  have 
not  the  knowledge  and  contemplation  of  the  entire 
Logos,  which  is  Christ.  Swedenborg’s  remarks  (An- 
gelic Wisdom,  240)  are  worth  comparing  with  Justi- 
nus. The  modern  philosopher  in  substance  agrees 
with  the  ancient ; but  he  is  more  precise. 


72 


ff>bllosopbg. 


continuallj^;  God  is  iu  man,*  and  so  we  must 
constantl}^  attend  to  the  divinity  within  us, 
for  it  is  onl3^  in  this  way  that  we  can  have  any 
knowledge  of  the  nature  of  God.  The  human 
soul  is  in  a sense  a portion  of  the  divinity,  and 
the  soul  alone  has  any  communication  with 
the  Deity;  for  as  he  says  (xii.  2):  “With  his 
intellectual  part  alone  God  touches  the  intelli- 
gence onljr  which  has  flowed  and  been  derived 
from  himself  into  these  bodies.’’  In  fact  he 
says  that  .which  is  hidden  within  a man  is  life, 
that  is,  the  man  himself.  All  the  rest  is 
vesture,  covering,  organs,  instrument,  which 
the  living  man,  the  realf  man,  uses  for  the 

*Conip.  Ep.  to  the  Corinthians,  i.  3,  17,  and  James 
iv.  8,  “ Drawuigh  to  God  and  he  will  draw  nigh  to 
you.” 

jThis  is  also  Swedenborg’s  doctrine  of  the  soul. 
“ As  to  what  concerns  the  soul,  of  which  it  is  said  that 
it  shall  live  after  death,  it  is  nothing  else  but  the  man 
himself,  who  lives  in  the  body,  that  is,  the  interior 
man,  who  by  the  body  acts  in  the  world  and  from 
whom  the  bod}'  itself  lives”  (quoted  by  Clissold,  p. 
456  of  “The  Practical  Nature  of  the  Theological 
Writings  of  Emanuel  Swedenborg,  in  a Letter  to  the 
Archbishop  of  Dublin  (Whately),”  second  edition, 
1859 ! 3,  book  which  theologians  might  read  with 
profit).  This  is  an  old  doctrine  of  the  soul,  which 
has  been  often  proclaimed,  but  never  better  expressed 
than  by  the  “ Auctor  de  Mundo,”  c.  6,  quoted  by 
Gataker  in  his  “Antoninus,”  p.  436.  “The  soul  by 
which  we  live  and  have  cities  and  houses  is  invisible, 
but  it  is  seen  by  its  works  ; for  the  whole  method  of 
life  has  been  devised  by  it  and  ordered,  and  by  it  is 


Jftarcus  2luceUu8  Bntonfnue, 


73 


purpose  of  his  present  existence.  The  air  is 
universally  diffused  for  him  who  is  able  to  re- 
spire; and  so  for  him  who  is  willing  to  partake 
of  it  the  intelligent  power,  which  holds  within 
it  all  things,  is  diffused  as  wide  and  free  as  the 
air  (viii.  54).  It  is  by  living  a divine  life  that 
man  approaches  to  a knowledge  of  the  divin- 
ity.^ It  is  by  following  the  divinity  within, 

beld  together.  In  like  manner  we  must  think  also 
about  the  Deity,  who  in  power  is  most  mighty,  in 
beauty  most  comely,  in  life  immortal,  and  in  virtue 
supreme  : wherefpre  though  he  is  invisible  to  human 
nature,  he  is  seen  by  his  very  works.”  Other  pas- 
sages to  the  same  purpose  are  quoted  by  Gataker  (p. 
382).  Bishop  Butler  has  the  same  as  to  the  soul : 
“Upon  the  whole,  then,  our  organs  of  sense  and  our 
limbs  are  certainly  instruments,  which  the  living 
persons,  ourselves,  make  use  of  to  perceive  and  move 
with.”  If  this  is  not  plain  enough,  he  also  says:  “It 
follows  that  our  organized  bodies  are  no  more  our- 
selves, or  part  of  ourselves,  than  any  other  matter 
around  us.”  (Compare  Anton,  s.  38). 

*The  reader  may  consult  Discourse  V.,  “ Of  the  ex- 
istence and  nature  of  God,”  in  John  Smith’s  “Select 
Discourses.”  He  has  prefixed  as  a text  to  this  Dis- 
course, the  striking  passage  of  Agapetus,  Paraenes. 
§ 3:  “He  who  knows  himself  will  know  God  ; and  he 
who  knows  God  will  be  made  like  to  God  ; and  he 
will  be  made  like  to  God,  who  has  become  worthy 
God;  and  he  becomes  worthy  of  God,  who  does  noth- 
ing unworthy  of  God,  but  thinks  the  things  that  are 
Bis,  and  speaks  what  he  thinks,  and  does  what  he 
speaks.”  I suppose  that  the  old  sa}dng,  “ Know  thy- 
self,” which  is  attributed  to  Socrates  and  others,  had 
a larger  meaning  than  the  narrow  sense  which  is  gen- 


74 


f>bil06opbT3. 


6atiiuv  or  ^£0f,  as  Antoninus  calls  it,  that  man 
comes  nearest  to  the  Deity,  the  supreme  good; 
for  man  can  never  attain  to  perfect  agreement 
with  his  internal  guide  (to  yye/xoiHKdv) . “Live 
with  the  gods.  And  he  does  live  with  the 
gods  who  constantly  shows  to  them  that  his 
own  soul  is  satisfied  with  that  which  is  assigned 
to  him,  and  that  it  does  all  the  daemon  (Mfiuv) 
wishes,  which  Zeus  hath  given  to  every  man 
for  his  guardian  and  guide,  a portion  of  him- 
self And  this  daemon  is  every  man’s  under- 
standing and  reason  ’’  (v.  27). 

There  is  in  man,  that  is  in  the  reason,  the 
intelligence,  a superior  faculty  which  if  it  is- 
exercised  rules  all  the  rest.  This  is  the  ruling 
faculty  (to  ’^yejj.ovmdv') , which  Cicero  (De  Natura 
Deorum,  ii.  ii)  renders  by  the  Latin  word 
Principatus,  “ to  which  nothing  can  or  ought 
to  be  superior.’’  Antoninus  often  uses  this 
term  and  others  which  are  equivalent.  He 
names  it  (vii.  64)  “the  governing  intelli- 
gence. ’ ’ The  governing  faculty  is  the  master 
of  the  soul  (v.  26).  A man  must  reverence 
only  his  ruling  faculty  and  the  divinity  within 
him.  As  we  must  reverence  that  which  is 
supreme  in  the  universe,  so  we  must  reverence 
that  which  is  supreme  in  ourselves;  and  this  is 
that  which  is  of  like  kind  with  that  which  is 
supreme  in  the  universe  (v.  21).  So,  as 

erally  given  to  it.  (Agapetus,  eel.  Stephan.  Schon- 
ing,  Franeker,  1608.  This  volume  contains  also  the 
Paraeneses  of  iSfilus.) 


Marcus  Burelius  Bntoninus. 


75 


Plotinus  says,  the  soul  of  man  can  only  know 
the  divine  so  far  as  it  knows  itself.  In  one 
passage  (xi.  19)  Antoninus  speaks  of  a man’s 
condemnation  of  himself  when  the  diviner  part 
within  him  has  been  overpowered  and  yields 
to  the  less  honorable  and  to  the  perishable 
part,  the  body,  and  its  gross  pleasures.  In  a 
word,  the  views  of  Antoninus  on  this  matter, 
however  his  expressions  may  vary,  are  ex- 
actly what  Bishop  Butler  expresses  when  he 
speaks  of  ‘ ‘ the  natural  supremacy  of  reflection 
or  conscience,”  of  the  faculty  ‘‘  which  surve}-s, 
approves,  or  disapproves  the  several  affections 
of  our  mind  and  actions  of  our  lives.  ’ ’ 

Much  matter  might  be  collected  from  Anto- 
ninus on  the  notion  of  the  Universe  being  one 
animated  Being.  But  all  that  he  says  amounts 
to  no  more,  as  Schultz  remarks,  than  this : the 
soul  of  man  is  most  intimately  united  to  his 
body,  and  together  they  make  one  animal, 
which  we  call  man ; so  the  Deity  is  most  inti- 
mately united  to  the  world,  or  the  material 
universe,  and  together  they  form  one  whole. 
But  Antoninus  did  not  view  God  and  the  ma- 
terial universe  as  the  same,  any  more  than  he 
viewed  the  body  and  soul  of  man  as  one.  An- 
toninus has  no  speculations  on  the  absolute 
nature  of  the  Deity.  It  was  not  his  fashion  to 
waste  his  time  on  what  man  cannot  under- 
stand.* He  was  satisfled  that  God  exists,  that 

* “God,  who  is  infinitely  be}-ond  the  reach  of  our 


76 


IPbilosopb^. 


he  governs  all  things,  that  man  can  only  have 
an  imperfect  knowledge  of  his  nature,  and  he 
must  attain  this  imperfect  knowledge  by  rever- 
encing the  divinity  which  is  within  him,  and 
keeping  it  pure. 

From  all  that  has  been  said,  it  follows  that 
the  universe  is  administered  by  the  Providence 
of  God  (■n-povota),  and  that  all  things  are  wisely 
ordered.  There  are  passages  in  which  Anto- 
ninus expresses  doubts,  or  states  different  pos- 
sible theories  of  the  constitution  and  govern- 
ment of  the  universe ; but  he  always  recurs  to 
his  fundamental  principle,  that  if  we  admit  the 
existence  of  a deity,  we  must  also  admit  that 
he  orders  all  things  wisely  and  well  (iv.  27; 
vi.  I ; ix.  28;  xii.  5;  and  many  other  passages). 
Epictetus  says  (i.  6)  that  we  can  discern  the 
providence  which  rules  the  world,  if  we  possess 
two  things, — the  power  of  seeing  all  that  hap- 
pens with  respect  to  each  thing,  and  a grateful 
disposition. 

But  if  all  things  are  wisely  ordered,  how  is 
the  world  so  full  of  what  we  call  evil,  physical 
and  moral?  If  instead  of  saying  that  there  is 
evil  in  the  world,  we  use  the  expression  which 
I have  used,  “what  we  call  evil,’’  we  have 
partly  anticipated  the  emperor’s  answer.  We 
see  and  feel  and  know  imperfectly  very  few 
things  in  the  few  years  that  we  live,  and  all  the 
knowledge  and  all  the  experience  of  all  the  hu- 

uarrow  capacities”  (Locke,  Essay  concerning  the 
Human  Understanding,  ii.  chap.  17). 


flRatcus  aurellue  antonfnus. 


77 


man  race  is  positive  ignorance  of  the  whole, 
which  is  infinite.  Now,  as  our  reason  teaches 
us  that  everything  is  in  some  way  related  to 
and  connected  wdth  every  other  thing,  all 
notion  of  evil  as  being  in  the  universe  of  things 
is  a contradiction  ; for  if  the  whole  comes  from 
and  is  governed  by  an  intelligent  being,  it  is 
impossible  to  conceive  anything  in  it  which 
tends  to  the  evil  or  destruction  of  the  whole 
(viii.  55 ; x.  6).  Everything  is  in  constant 
mutation,  and  yet  the  whole  subsists;  we 
might  imagine  the  solar  system  resolved  into 
its  elemental  parts,  and  yet  the  whole  would 
still  subsist  “ever  young  and  perfect.’’ 

All  things,  all  forms,  are  dissolved,  and  new 
forms  appear.  All  living  things  undergo  the 
change  which  we  call  death.  If  we  call  death 
an  evil,  then  all  change  is  an  evil.  Living  be- 
ings also  suffer  pain,  and  man  suffers  most  of 
all,  for  he  suffers  both  in  and  by  his  body  and 
by  his  intelligent  part.  Men  suffer  also  from 
one  another,  and  perhaps  the  largest  part  of 
human  suffering  comes  to  man  from  those 
whom  he  calls  his  brothers.  Antoninus  says 
(viii.  55),  “Generally,  wickedness  does  no 
harm  at  all  to  the  universe;  and  particularly, 
the  wickedness  [of  one  man]  does  no  harm  to 
another.  It  is  only  harmful  to  him  who  has 
it  in  his  power  to  be  released  from  it  as  soon  as 
he  shall  choose.’’  The  first  part  of  this  is  per- 
fectly consistent  with  the  doctrine  that  the 
whole  can  sustain  no  evil  or  harm.  The  sec- 


78 


pbiloBopbig. 


ond  part  must  be  explained  by  the  Stoic  prin- 
ciple that  there  is  no  evil  in  anything  which  is 
not  in  our  power.  What  wrong  we  suffer  from 
another  is  his  evil,  not  ours.  But  this  is  an 
admission  that  there  is  evil  in  a sort,  for  he 
who  does  wrong  does  evil,  and  if  others  can 
endure  the  wrong,  still  there  is  evil  in  the 
wrong-doer.  Antoninus  (xi.  i8)  gives  many 
excellent  precepts  with  respect  to  wrongs  and 
injuries,  and  his  precepts  are  practical.  He 
teaches  us  to  bear  w'hat  we  cannot  avoid,  and 
his  lessons  may  be  just  as  useful  to  him  who 
denies  the  being  and  the  government  of  God 
as  to  him  who  believes  in  both.  There  is  no 
direct  answer  in  Antoninus  to  the  objections 
which  may  be  made  to  the  existence  and  provi- 
dence of  God  because  of  the  moral  disorder  and 
suffering  which  are  in  the  world,  except  this 
answer  which  he  makes  in  reply  to  the  suppo- 
sition that  even  the  best  men  may  be  extin- 
guished by  death.  He  says  if  it  is  so,  we  may 
be  sure  that  if  it  ought  to  have  been  otherwise, 
the  gods  would  have  ordered  it  otherwise  (xii. 
5).  His  conviction  of  the  wisdom  which  we 
may  observe  in  the  government  of  the  world  is 
too  strong  to  be  disturbed  by  any  apparent  ir- 
regularities in  the  order  of  things.  That  these 
disorders  exist  is  a fact,  and  those  who  would 
conclude  from  them  against  the  being  and  gov- 
ernment of  God  conclude  too  hastily.  We  all 
admit  that  there  is  an  order  in  the  material 
world,  a Nature,  in  the  sense  in  which  that  word 


/iBarcits  Bureliua  Bntonmua. 


79 


has  been  explained,  a constitution  {KaramEwf)^ 
what  we  call  a system,  a relation  of  parts  to 
one  another  and  a fitness  of  the  whole  for  some- 
thing. So  in  the  constitution  of  plants  and  of 
animals  there  is  an  order,  a fitness  for  some  end. 
Sometimes  the  order,  as  we  conceive  it,  is  in- 
terrupted, and  the  end,  as  we  conceive  it,  is  not 
attained.  The  seed,  the  plant,  or  the  animal 
sometimes  perishes  before  it  has  passed  through 
all  its  changes  and  done  all  its  uses.  It  is  ac- 
cording to  Nature,  that  is  a fixed  order,  for 
some  to  perish  early  and  for  others  to  do  all 
their  uses  and  leave  successors  to  take  their 
place.  So  man  has  a corporeal  and  intellectual 
and  moral  constitution  fit  for  certain  uses,  and 
on  the  whole  man  performs  these  uses,  dies, 
and  leaves  other  men  in  his  place.  So  society 
exists,  and  a social  state  is  manifestly  the 
natural  state  of  man— the  state  for  which  his 
uature  fits  him,  and  society  amidst  innumer- 
able irregularities  and  disorders  still  subsists; 
and  perhaps  we  may  say  that  the  history  of  the 
past  and  our  present  knowledge  give  us  a rea- 
sonable hope  that  its  disorders  will  diminish, 
and  that  order,  its  governing  principle,  may  be 
more  firmly  established.  As  order  then,  a fixed 
order,  we  may  say,  subject  to  deviations  real 
or  apparent,  must  be  admitted  to  exist  in  the 
whole  nature  of  things,  that  which  we  call  dis- 
order or  evil,  as  it  seems  to  us,  does  not  in  any 
way  alter  the  fact  of  the  general  constitution  of 
things  having  a nature  or  fixed  order.  No- 


8o 


lPbilo6opbs. 


body  will  conclude  from  the  existence  of  disor- 
der that  order  is  not  the  rule,  for  the  existence 
of  order  both  physical  and  moral  is  proved  by 
daily  experience  and  all  past  experience.  We 
cannot  conceive  how  the  order  of  the  universe 
is  maintained:  we  cannot  even  conceive  how 
our  own  life  from  day  to  day  is  continued,  nor 
how  we  perform  the  simplest  movements  of  the 
body,  nor  how  we  grow  and  think  and  act, 
though  we  know  many  of  the  conditions  which 
are  necessary  for  all  these  functions.  Know- 
ing nothing  then  of  the  unseen  power  which 
acts  in  ourselves  except  by  what  is  done,  we 
know  nothing  of  the  power  which  acts  through 
what  we  call  all  time  and  all  space;  but  seeing 
that  there  is  a nature  or  fixed  order  in  all  things 
known  to  us,  it  is  conformable  to  the  nature  of 
our  minds  to  believe  that  this  universal  Nature 
has  a cause  which  operates  continually,  and 
that  we  are  totally  unable  to  speculate  on  the 
reason  of  any  of  those  disorders  or  evils  which 
we  perceive.  This  I believe  is  the  answer 
which  may  be  collected  from  all  that  Antoni- 
nus has  said.* 

The  origin  of  evil  is  an  old  question.  Achil- 

* Cleanthes  says  in  his  Hymn  : — 

“ For  all  things  good  and  bad  to  One  thou  formest, 

So  that  One  everlasting  reason  governs  all.” 

See  Bishop  Butler’s  Sermons.  Sermon  XV.,  “ Upoit 
the  Ignorance  of  Man.” 


/IC>arcu6  Burclius  Bntonfnue. 


8i 


les  tells  Priam  (Iliad,  24,  527)  that  Zeus  has 
two  casks,  one  filled  with  good  things,  and  the 
other  with  bad,  and  that  he  gives  to  men  out 
of  each  according  to  his  pleasure;  and  so  w^e 
must  be  content,  for  we  cannot  alter  the  will  of 
Zeus.  One  of  the  Greek  commentators  asks 
how  must  we  reconcile  this  doctrine  with  what 
we  find  in  the  first  book  of  the  Odyssey,  where 
the  king  of  the  gods  says.  Men  say  that  evil 
comes  to  them  from  us,  but  they  bring  it  on 
themselves  through  their  own  folly.  The  an- 
swer is  plain  enough  even  to  the  Greek  com- 
mentator. The  poets  make  both  Achilles  and 
Zeus  speak  appropriately  to  their  several  char- 
acters. Indeed,  Zeus  says  plainly  that  men  do 
attribute  their  sufferings  to  their  gods,  but  they 
do  it  falsely,  for  they  are  the  cause  of  their  own 
sorrows. 

Epictetus  in  his  Enchiridion  (c.  27)  makes 
short  work  of  the  question  of  evil.  He  says, 
“As  a mark  is  not  set  up  for  the  purpose  of 
missing  it,  so  neither  does  the  nature  of  evil  ex- 
ist in  the  universe.’’  This  will  appear  obscure 
enough  to  those  who  are  not  acquainted  with 
Epictetus,  but  he  always  knows  what  he  is 
talking  about.  We  do  not  set  up  a mark  in 
order  to  miss  it,  though  we  may  miss  it.  God, 
whose  existence  Epictetus  assumes,  has  not 
ordered  all  things  so  that  his  purpose  shall  fail. 
Whatever  there  may  be  of  what  we  call  evil, 
the  nature  of  evil,  as  he  expresses  it,  does  not 
exist,;  that  is,  evil  is  not  a part  of  the  constitu- 
6 


82 


IPbilosopbg. 


tiou  or  nature  of  things.  If  there  were  a prin- 
ciple of  evil  (apAv)  in  the  constitution  of  things, 
evil  would  no  longer  be  evil,  as  Simplicius 
argues,  but  evil  would  be  good.  Simplicius 
(c.  34,  [27])  has  a long  and  curious  discourse 
on  this  text  of  Epictetus,  and  it  is  amusing 
and  instructive. 

One  passage  more  will  conclude  this  matter. 
It  contains  all  that  the  emperor  could  say  (ii. 
ii):  “To  go  from  among  men,  if  there  are 
gods,  is  not  a thing  to  be  afraid  of,  for  the  gods 
will  not  involve  thee  in  evil;  but  if  indeed  they 
do  not  exist,  or  if  they  have  no  concern  about 
human  affairs,  what  is  it  to  me  to  live  in  a uni- 
verse devoid  of  gods  or  devoid  of  providence  ? 
But  in  truth  they  do  exist,  and  they  do  care  for 
human  things,  and  they  have  put  all  the  means 
in  man’s  power  to  enable  him  not  to  fall  into 
real  evils.  And  as  to  the  rest,  if  there  was  any- 
thing evil,  they  would  have  provided  for  this 
also,  that  it  should  be  altogether  in  a man’s 
power  not  to  fall  into  it.  But  that  which  does 
not  make  a man  worse,  how  can  it  make  a 
man’s  life  worse?  But  neither  through  igno- 
rance, nor  having  the  knowledge  but  not  the 
power  to  guard  against  or  correct  these  things, 
is  it  possible  that  the  nature  of  the  universe 
has  overlooked  them;  nor  is  it  possible  that  it 
has  made  so  great  a mistake,  either  through 
want  of  power  or  want  of  .skill,  that  good  and 
evil  should  happen  indiscriminately  to  the  good 
and  the  bad.  But  death  certainly  and  life, 


/Ibarcus  2lureI(U5  Bntonfnus. 


83 


honor  and  dishonor,  pain  and  pleasure,  all 
these  things  equally  happen  to  good  and  bad 
men,  being  things  which  make  us  neither  better 
nor  worse.  Therefore  they  are  neither  good 
nor  evil.” 

The  Ethical  part  of  Antoninus’  Philosophy 
follows  from  his  general  principles.  The  end 
of  all  his  philosophy  is  to  live  conformably  to 
Nature,  both  a man’s  own  nature  and  the  nature 
of  the  universe.  Bishop  Butler  has  explained 
what  the  Greek  philosophers  meant  when  they 
spoke  of  living  according  to  Nature,  aud  he  says 
that  when  it  is  explained,  as  he  has  explained  it 
and  as  they  understood  it,  it  is  ‘ ‘ a manner  of 
speaking  not  loose  and  undeterminate,  but 
clear  and  distinct,  strictly  just  and  true.”  To 
live  according  to  Nature  is  to  live  according  to 
a man’s  whole  nature,  not  according  to  a part 
of  it,  and  to  reverence  the  divinity  within  him 
as  the  governor  of  all  his  actions.  ‘ ‘ To  the 
rational  animal  the  same  act  is  according  to 
nature  and  according  to  reason”^  (vii.  ii). 
That  which  is  done  contrarj^  to  reason  is  also 
an  act  contrary  to  nature,  to  the  whole  nature, 
though  it  is  certainly  confonnable  to  some 
part  of  man’s  nature,  or  it  could  not  be  done. 
Man  is  made  for  action,  not  for  idleness  or 
pleasure.  As  plants  and  animals  do  the  uses 
of  their  nature,  so  man  must  do  his  (v.  i). 

* This  is  what  Juveual  means  when  he  says  (xiv. 

321) — 

“Nunquam  aliud  Natura  aliud  Sapieutia  dicit.” 


84 


IPbilosopbg. 


Man  must  also  live  conformably  to  the  uni- 
versal nature,  conformably  to  the  nature  of  all 
things  of  which  he  is  one;  and  as  a citizen  of  a 
political  community  he  must  direct  his  life  and 
actions  with  reference  to  those  among  whom, 
among  other  purposes,  he  lives.*  A man  must 
not  retire  into  solitude  and  cut  himself  off  from 
his  fellow-men.  He  must  be  ever  active  to  do 
his  part  in  the  great  whole.  All  men  are  his 
kin,  not  only  in  blood,  but  still  more  by  par- 
ticipating in  the  same  intelligence  and  by  be- 
ing a portion  of  the  same  divinity.  A man 
cannot  really  be  injured  by  his  brethren,  for 
no  act  of  theirs  can  make  him  bad,  and  he 
must  not  be  angry  with  them  nor  hate  them: 
“For  we  are  made  for  co-operation,  like  feet, 
like  hands,  like  eyelids,  like  the  rows  of  the 
upper  and  lower  teeth.  To  act  against  one 
another  then  is  contrary  to  nature;  and  it  is 
acting  against  one  another  to  be  vexed  and  to 
turn  away”  (ii.  i). 

Further  he  says:  “Take  pleasure  in  one 
thing  and  rest  in  it  in  passing  from  one  social 
act  to  another  social  act,,  thinking  of  God” 
(vi.  7).  Again:  “Tove  mankind.  Follow 
God”  (vii.  31).  It  is  the  characteristic  of  the 
rational  soul  for  a man  to  love  his  neighbor 
(xi.  i).  Antoninus  teaches  in  various  passages 
the  forgiveness  of  injuries,  and  we  know  that 
he  also  practised  what  he  taught.  Bishop 


*See  viii.  52;  and  Persius  iii.  66 


^ibatcus  :aureliu6  IHntontnus. 


85 


Butler  remarks  that  “this  divine  precept  to 
forgive  injuries  and  to  love  our  enemies,  though 
to  be  met  with  in  Gentile  moralists,  yet  is  in  a 
peculiar  sense  a precept  of  Christianity,  as  our 
Saviour  has  insisted  more  upon  it  than  on  any 
other  single  virtue.  ’ ’ The  practice  of  this  pre- 
cept is  the  most  difficult  of  all  virtues.  Anto- 
ninus often  enforces  it  and  gives  us  aid  towards 
following  it.  When  we  are  injured,  we  feel 
anger  and  resentment,  and  the  feeling  is  nat- 
ural, just,  and  useful  for  the  conservation  of 
society.  It  is  useful  that  wrong-doers  should 
feel  the  natural  consequences  of  their  actions, 
among  which  is  the  disapprobation  of  society 
and  the  resentment  of  him  who  is  wronged. 
But  revenge,  in  the  proper  sense  of  that  word, 
must  not  be  practised.  “The  best  way  of 
avenging  thyself,”  says  the  emperor,  “is  not 
to  become  like  the  wrong-doer.  ’ ’ It  is  plain 
by  this  that  he  does  not  mean  that  we  should 
in  any  case  practise  revenge;  but  he  says  to 
those  who  talk  of  revenging  wrongs.  Be  not  like 
him  who  has  done  the  wrong.  Socrates  in  the 
Crito  (c.  10)  says  the  same  in  other  words,  and 
St.  Paul  (Ep.  to  the  Romans,  xii.  17).  “When 
a man  has  done  thee  any  wrong,  immediatel}^ 
consider  with  what  opinion  about  good  or  evil 
he  has  done  wrong.  For  when  thou  hast  seen 
this,  thou  wilt  pity  him  and  wilt  neither  won- 
der nor  be  angry  ’ ’ (vii.  26).  Antoninus  would 
not  deny  that  wrong  naturally  produces  the 
feeling  of  anger  and  resentment,  for  this  is  im- 


86 


IPbUoeopb^. 


plied  in  the  recommendation  to  reflect  on  the 
nature  of  the  man’s  mind  who  has  done  the 
wrong,  and  then  3mu  will  have  pit}^  instead  of 
resentment;  and  so  it  comes  to  the  same  as  St. 
Paul’s  advice  to  be  angry  and  sin  not;  which, 
as  Butler  well  explains  it,  is  not  a recommen- 
dation to  be  angry,  which  nobody  needs,  for 
anger  is  a natural  passion,  but  it  is  a warning 
against  allowing  anger  to  lead  us  into  sin.  In 
short  the  emperor’s  doctrine  about  wrongful 
acts  is  this;  wrong-doers  do  not  know  what 
good  and  bad  are:  the>'  offend  out  of  ignorance, 
and  in  the  sense  of  the  Stoics  this  is  true. 
Though  this  kind  of  ignorance  will  never  be 
admitted  as  a legal  excuse,  and  ought  not  to 
be  admitted  as  a full  excuse  in  any  way  by 
society,  there  may  be  grievous  injuries,  such 
as  it  is  in  a man’s  power  to  forgive  without 
harm  to  society;  and  if  he  forgives  because  he 
sees  that  his  enemies  know  not  what  they  do, 
he  is  acting  in  the  spirit  of  the  sublime  pra5?er, 
‘‘Father,  forgive  them,  for  they  know  not  what 
they  do.” 

The  emperor’s  moral  philosophy  was  not  a 
feeble,  harrow  system,  which  teaches  a man  to 
look  directly  to  his  own  happiness,  though  a 
man’s  happiness  or  tranquillity  is  indirectly 
promoted  by  living  as  he  ought  to  do.  A man 
must  live  conformably  to  the  universal  nature, 
which  means,  as  the  emperor  explains  it  in 
many  passages,  that  a man’s  actions  must  be 
conformable  to  his  true  relations  to  all  other 


Marcus  aucellus  Sntonlnus. 


87- 


human  beings,  both  as  a citizen  of  a political 
community  and  as  a member  of  the  whole 
human  family.  This  implies,  and  he  often  ex- 
presses it  in  the  most  forcible  language,  that  a 
man’s  words  and  actions,  so  far  as  thej"  affect 
others,  must  be  measured  by  a fixed  rule, 
which  is  their  consistency  with  the  conserva- 
tion and  the  interests  of  the  particular  society 
of  which  he  is  a member,  and  of  the  whole 
human  race.  To  live  conformably  to  such  a 
rule,  a man  must  use  his  rational  faculties  in 
order  to  discern  clearly  the  consequences  and 
full  effect  of  all  his  actions  and  of  the  actions 
of  others:  he  must  not  live  a life  of  contempla- 
tion and  reflection  only,  though  he  must  often 
retire  within  himself  to  calm  and  purify  his 
soul  by  thought,*  but  he  must  mingle  in  the 
work  of  man  and  be  a fellow  laborer  for  the 
general  good. 

A man  should  have  an  object  or  purpose  in 
life,  that  he  may  direct  all  his  energies  to  it ; 
of  course  a good  object  (ii.  7).  He  who  has  not 
one  object  or  purpose  of  life,  cannot  be  one  and 
the  same  all  through  his  life  (xi.  21).  Bacon 
has  a remark  to  the  same  effect,  on  the  best 
means  of  ‘ ‘ reducing  of  the  mind  unto  virtue 
and  good  estate ; which  is,  the  electing  and 
propounding  unto  a man’s  self  good  and  virtu- 
ous ends  of  his  life,  such  as  may  be  in  a reas- 
onable sort  within  his  compass  to  attain.  ’ ’ He 

*Utnemo  iu  sese  tentatdescendere,  nemo. — Persius, 
iv-.  21. 


•88 


IPbilosopbs. 


is  a happy  man  who  has  been  wise  enough  to 
do  this  when  he  was  3"oung  and  has  had  the  op- 
portunities; but  the  emperor  seeing  well  that  a 
man  cannot  always  be  so  wise  in  his  3'outh, 
encourages  himself  to  do  it  when  he  can,  and 
not  to  let  life  slip  away  before  he  has  begun. 
He  who  can  propose  to  himself  good  and  virtu- 
ous ends  of  life,  and  be  true  to  them,  cannot 
fail  to  live  conformably  to  his  own  interest  and 
the  universal  interest,  for  in  the  nature  of 
things  they  are  one.  If  a thing  is  not  good  for 
the  hive,  it  is  not  good  for  the  bee  (vi.  54). 

One  passage  may  end  this  matter.  “ If  the 
gods  have  determined  about  me  and  about  the 
things  which  must  happen  to  me,  they 
have  determined  well,  for  it  is  not  easy  even  to 
imagine  a deity  without  forethought;  and  as 
to  doing  me  harm,  why  should  they  have  any 
desire  towards  that  ? For  what  advantage 
would  result  to  them  from  this  or  to  the  whole, 
which  is  the  special  object  of  their  providence  ? 
But  if  they  have  not  determined  about  me  in- 
dividually, they  have  certainlj^  determined 
about  the  whole  at  least;  and  the  things  which 
happen  b}^  way  of  sequence  in  this  general  ar- 
rangement I ought  to  accept  Avith  pleasure  and 
to  be  content  wdth  them.  But  if  they  deter- 
mine about  nothing — which  it  is  wicked  to  be- 
lie\"e,  or  if  we  do  belie\"e  it,  let  us  neither  sac- 
rifice nor  pra}^  nor  swear  bj"  them,  nor  do 
anything  else  which  we  do  as  if  the  gods  were 
present  and  Ih^ed  with  us;  but  if  howe\'er  the 


Marcus  ZlureUue  Hntoninue. 


89 


gods  determine  about  none  of  the  things  which 
concern  us,  I am  able  to  determine  about  my- 
self, and  I can  inquire  about  that  which  is 
useful;  and  that  is  useful  to  every  man  which 
is  conformable  to  his  own  constitution  (KaraaKev^) 
and  nature.  But  my  nature  is  rational  and 
social;  and  my  city  and  country,  so  far  as  I am 
Antoninus,  is  Rome;  but  so  far  as  I am  a man, 
it  is  the  world.  The  things  then  which  are 
useful  to  these  cities  are  alone  useful  to  me’  ’ 
<vi.  44). 

It  would  be  tedious,  and  it  is  not  necessary, 
to  state  the  emperor’s  opinions  on  all  the  ways 
in  which  a mau  may  profitably  use  his  under- 
standing towards  perfecting  himself  in  practical 
virtue.  The  passages  to  this  purpose  are  in  all 
parts  of  his  book,  but  as  they  are  in  no  order 
or  connection,  a man  must  use  the  book  a long 
time  before  he  will  find  out  all  that  is  in  it. 
A few  words  may  be  added  here.  If  we  ana- 
lyze all  other  things,  we  find  how  insufficient 
they  are  for  human  life,  and  how  truly  worth- 
less many  of  them  are.  Virtue  alone  is  indi- 
visible, one,  and  perfectly  satisfying.  The 
notion  of  Virtue  cannot  be  considered  vague  or 
unsettled,  because  a man  may  find  it  difficult 
to  explain  the  notion  full}^  to  himself,  or  to  ex- 
pound it  to  others  in  such  a way  as  to  prevent 
cavilling.  Virtue  is  a whole,  and  no  more 
consists  of  parts  than  man’s  intelligence  does; 
and  yet  we  speak  of  various  intellectual  facul- 
ties as  a convenient  way  of  expressing  the  var- 


go 


lPbU090pbT5. 


ious  powers  which  man’s  intellect  shows  by 
his  works.  In  the  same  way  we  may  speak  of 
varioirs  virtues  or  parts  of  virtue,  in  a practical 
sense,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  what  partic- 
ular virtues  we  ought  to  practice  in  order  to 
he  exercise  of  the  whole  of  virtue,  that  is,  as 
man's  nature  is  capable  of 

The  prime  principle  in  man’s  constitution  is 
social.  The  next  in  order  is  not  to  yield  to  the 
persuasions  of  the  body,  when  they  are  not 
conformable  to  the  rational  principle,  which 
must  govern.  The  third  is  freedom  from  error 
and  from  deception.  “ Tet  then  the  ruling 
principle  holding  fast  to  these  things  go  straight 
on,  and  it  has  what  is  its  own  ” (vii.  55).  The 
emperor  selects  justice  as  the  virtue  which  is 
the  basis  of  all  the  rest  (x.  ii),  and  this  had 
been  said  long  before  his  time. 

It  is  true  that  all  people  have  some  notion  of 
what  is  meant  by  justice  as  a disposition  of  the 
mind,  and  some  notion  about  acting  in  con- 
formity to  this  disposition  ; but  experience 
shows  that  men’s  notions  about  justice  are  as 
confused  as  their  actions  are  inconsistent  with 
the  true  notion  of  justice.  The  emperor’s 
notion  of  justice  is  clear  enough,  but  not  prac- 
tical enough  for  all  mankind.  ‘ ‘ Let  there  be 
freedom  from  perturbations  with  respect  to  the 
things  which  come  from  the  external  cause ; 
and  let  there  be  justice  in  the  things  done  by 
virtue  of  the  internal  cause,  that  is,  let  there  be 
movement  and  action  terminating  in  this,  in 


/ilbarcus  aurelius  Hntonmus. 


91 


social  acts,  for  this  is  according  to  thy  nature” 
(ix.  31).  In  another  place  (ix.  i)  he  saj^s  that 
” he  who  acts  unjustly  acts  impiously,”  which 
follows  of  course  from  all  that  he  says  in  various 
places.  He  insists  on  the  practice  of  truth  as  a 
virtue  and  as  a means  to  virtue,  which  no  doubt 
it  is : for  Ij'ing  even  in  indifferent  things  Aveak- 
ens  the  understanding ; and  lying  maliciously 
is  as  great  a moral  offense  as  a man  can  be 
guilty  of,  viewed  both  as  showing  an  habitual 
disposition,  and  viewed  with  respect  to  conse- 
quences. He  couples  the  notion  of  justice  with 
action.  A man  must  not  pride  himself  on  hav- 
ing some  fine  notion  of  justice  in  his  head,  but 
he  must  exhibit  his  justice  in  act,  like  St. 
James’  notion  of  faith.  But  this  is  enough. 

The  Stoics,  and  Antoninus  among  them,  call 
some  things  beautiful  (kuM)  and  some  ugly 
{awxpa),  and  as  they  are  beautiful  so  they  are 
good,  and  as  they  are  ugly  so  they  are  evil,  or 
bad  (ii.  i).  All  these  things,  go'od  and  evil, 
are  in  our  power,  absolutely,  some  of  the  stricter 
Stoics  would  saj^ ; in  a manner  only,  as  those 
who  would  not  depart  altogether  from  common 
sense  would  say  ; practically  they  are  to  a great 
degree  in  the  power  of  some  persons  and  in 
some  circumstances,  but  in  a small  degree  only 
in  other  persons  and  in  other  circumstances. 
The  Stoics  maintain  man’s  free  will  as  to  the 
things  which  are  in  his  power ; for  as  to  the 
things  which  are  out  of  his  power,  free  will  ter- 
minating in  action  is  of  course  excluded  by  the 


92 


IPbUogopbg. 


very  terms  of  the  expression.  I hardl}^  know 
if  we  can  discover  exactly  Antoninus’  notion  of 
the  free  will  of  man,  nor  is  the  question  worth 
the  inquiry.  What  he  does  mean  and  does  say 
is  intelligible.  All  the  things  which  are  not  in 
our  power  (aTrpoa'ipeTa)  are  indifferent : they  are 
neither  good  nor  bad,  morally.  Such  are  life, 
health,  wealth,  power,  disease,  poverty,  and 
death.  Life  and  death  are  all  men’s  portion. 
Health,  wealth,  power,  disease,  and  poverty 
happen  to  men,  indifferently  to  the  good  and  to 
the  bad ; to  those  who  live  according  to  nature 
and  to  those  who  do  not.*  “ Life,”  says  the 
emperor,  ‘‘is  a warfare  and  a stranger’s  so- 
journ, and  after  fame  is  oblivion”  (ii.  17). 
After  speaking  of  those  men  who  have  dis- 
turbed the  world  and  then  died,  and  of  the 
death  of  philosophers  such  as  Heraclitus  and 
Democritus,  who  was  destroyed  by  lice,  and  of 
Socrates  whom  other  lice  (his  enemies)  de- 
stroyed, he*  says  : ‘‘What  means  all  this? 
Thou  hast  embarked,  thou  hast  made  the  voy- 

* “All  events  come  alike  to  all:  there  is  one  event 
to  the  righteous  and  to  the  wicked:  to  the  good  and 
to  the  clean  and  to  the  unclean,”  &c.  ( Ecclesiastes, 
ix.  V.  2);  and  (v.  3),  “This  is  an  evil  among  all 
things  that  are  done  under  the  sun,  that  there  is  one 
event  unto  all.”  In  what  sense  “ evil  ” is  meant  here 
seems  rather  doubtful.  There  is  no  doubt  about  the 
emperor’s  meaning.  Compare  Epictetus,  Enchiridion, 
c.  i.,  &c. ; and  the  doctrine  of  the  Brachmans  (Strabo 
p.  713,  ed.  Cas. ) : ayadov  <5f  ^ kmov  prjdiv  etvai  ruv 
avpPaivovTOiv  avdpunotg. 


/Iftarcus  Zlurellus  Hntoninue. 


93 


age,  thou  art  come  to  shore ; get  out.  If  in- 
deed to  another  life,  there  is  no  want  of  gods, 
not  even  there.  But  if  to  a state  without  sen- 
sation, thou  wilt  cease  to  be  held  by  pains  and 
pleasures,  and  to  be  a slave  to  the  vessel  which 
is  as  much  inferior  as  that  which  serves  it  is 
superior : for  the  one  is  intelligence  and  Deity; 
the  other  is  earth  and  corruption”  (hi.  3). 
It  is  not  death  that  a man  should  fear,  but  he 
should  fear  never  beginning  to  live  according 
to  nature  (xii.  i).  Every  man  should  live  in 
such  a way  as  to  discharge  his  duty,  and  to 
trouble  himself  about  nothing  else.  He  should 
live  such  a life  that  he  shall  always  be  ready 
for  death,  and  shall  depart  content  when  the 
summons  comes.  For  what  is  death?  ‘‘A 
cessation  of  the  impressions  through  the  senses, 
and  of  the  pulling  of  the  strings  which  move 
the  appetites,  and  of  the  discursive  movements 
of  the  thoughts,  and  of  the  service  to  the 
flesh”  (vi.  28).  Death  is  such  as  generation 
is,  a mystery  of  nature  (iv.  5).  In  another 
passage,  the  exact  meaning  of  which  is  per- 
haps doubtful  (ix.  3),  he  speaks  of  the  child 
which  leaves  the  womb,  and  so  he  says  the 
soul  at  death  leaves  its  envelope.  As  the 
child  is  born  or  comes  into  life  by  leaving  the 
womb,  so  the  soul  ma3’-  on  leaving  the 
body  pass  into  another  existence  which  is  per- 
fect. I am  not  sure  if  this  is  the  emperor’s 
meaning.  Butler  compares  it  with  a passage 
in  Strabo  (p.  713)  about  the  Brachmans’  notion 


94 


IPbllosopbs. 


of  death  being  the  birth  into  real  life  and  a 
happy  life,  to  those  who  have  philosophized ; 
and  he  thinks  Antoninus  may  allude  to  this 
opinion.* 

Antoninus’  opinion  of  a future  life  is  no- 
where clearly  expre.ssed.  His  doctrine  of  the 
nature  of  the  soul  of  necessity  implies  that  it 
does  not  perish  absolutely,  for  a portion  of  the 
divinity  cannot  perish.  The  opinion  is  at  least 
as  old  as  the  time  of  Epicharmus  and  Euripi- 
des; what  comes  from  earth  goes  back  to  earth, 
and  what  conies  from  heaven,  the  divinity,  re- 
turns to  him  who  gave  it.  But  I find  nothing 
clear  in  Antoninus  as  to  the  notion  of  the  man 
existing  after  death  so  as  to  be  conscious  of  his 
sameness  with  that  soul  which  occupied  his 
vessel  of  clay.  He  seems  to  be  perplexed  on 
this  matter,  and  finally  to  have  rested  in  this, 
that  God  or  the  gods  will  do  whatever  is  best, 
and  consistent  with  the  university  of  things. 

Nor,  I think,  does  he  speak  conclusively  on 
another  Stoic  doctrine,  which  some  Stoics  prac- 

* Seneca  (Ep.  102)  has  the  same,  whether  an  ex- 
pression of  his  own  opinion,  or.  merely  a fine  saying 
of  others  employed  to  embellish  his  writings,  I know 
not.  After  speaking  of  the  child  being  prepared  in 
the  womb  to  live  this  life,  he  adds,  “Sic  per  hoc 
spatium,  quod  ab  infantia  patet  in  senectutem,  in 
ahum  naturae  sumimur  partum.  Alia  origo  nos  ex- 
pectat,  alius  rerum  status.”  See  Ecclesiastes,  xii.  7; 
and  Lucan,  i.  457: — 

“ Longae,  canitis  si  cognita,  vitae 
Mors  media  est.” 


Marcus  Hurelius  antoninus. 


95 


tised, — the  anticipating  the  regular  course  of 
nature  a man’s  own  act.  The  reader  will 
find  some  passages  in  which  this  is  touched  on, 
and  he  may  make  of  them  what  he  can.  But 
there  are  passages  in  which  the  emperor  en- 
courages himself  to  wait  for  the  end  patiently 
and  with  tranquillity;  and  certainly  it  is  con- 
sistent with  all  his  best  teaching  that  a man 
should  bear  all  that  falls  to  his  lot  and  do  use- 
ful acts  as  he  lives.  He  should  not  therefore 
abridge  the  time  of  his  usefulness  by  his  own 
act.  Whether  he  contemplates  any  possible 
cases  in  Avhich  a man  should  die  by  his  own 
hand,  I cannot  tell;  and  the  matter  is  not  worth 
a curious  inquiry,  for  I believe  it  would  not 
lead  to  any  certain  result  as  to  his  opinion  on 
this  point.  I do  not  think  that  Antoninus, 
who  never  mentions  Seneca,  though  he  must 
have  known  all  about  him,  would  have  agreed 
with  Seneca  when  he  gives  as  a reason  for  sui- 
cide, that  the  eternal  law,  Avhatever  he  means, 
has  made  nothing  better  for  us  than  this,  that 
it  has  given  us  only  one  way  of  entering  into 
life  and  many  ways  of  going  out  of  it.  The 
AA'ays  of  going  out  indeed  are  man5^  and  that  is 
a good  reason  for  a man  taking  care  of  him- 
self.* 

Happiness  was  not  the  direct  object  of  a 
Stoic’s  life.  There  is  no  rule  of  life  contained 
in  the  precept  that  a man  should  pursue  his 

*See  Plinius  H.  N.  ii.,  c.  7;  Seneca,  De  Provid.  c. 
6.;  and  Ep.  70;  “ Nihil  melius  aeterna  lex,”  &.c. 


96 


IPbUosopbs. 


own  happiness.  Many  men  think  that  they 
are  seeking  happiness  when  they  are  only  seek- 
ing the  gratification  of  some  particular  pas.sion, 
the  strongest  that  they  have.  The  end  of  a 
man  is,  as  already  explained,  to  live  conform- 
ably to  nature,  and  he  will  thus  obtain  happi- 
ness, tranquillity  of  mind,  and  contentment 
(hi.  12;  viii.  I,  and  other  places).  As  a 
means  of  living  conformably  to  nature  he  must 
study  the  four  chief  virtues,  each  of  which  has 
its  proper  sphere:  wisdom,  or  the  knowledge 
of  good  and  evil;  justice,  or  the  giving  to  every 
man  his  due;  fortitude,  or  the  enduring  of  labor 
and  pain;  and  temperance,  which  is  moderation 
in  all  things.  By  thus  living  conformably  to 
nature  the  Stoic  obtained  all  that  he  wished  or 
expected.  His  reward  was  in  his  virtuous  life, 
and  he  was  satisfied  with  that.  Some  Greek 
poet  long  ago  wrote:— 

“ For  virtue  only  of  all  liuman  things 
Takes  her  reward  not  from  the  hands  of  others. 
Virtue  herself  rewards  the  toils  of  virtue.” 

Some  of  the  Stoics  indeed  expressed  them- 
selves in  very  arrogant,  absurd  terms,  about 
the  wise  man’s  self-sufficiency;  they  elevated 
him  to  the  rank  of  a deity.*  But  these  were 

*J.  Smith  in  his  Select  Discourses  on  “the  Excel- 
lency and  Nobleness  of  True  Religion  ” (c.  vi.)  has  re- 
marked on  this  Stoical  arrogance.  He  finds  it  in 
Seneca  and  others.  In  Seneca  certainly,  and  perhaps 
something  of  it  in  Epictetus;  but  it  is  not  in  Antoni- 
nus. 


flbarcu6  Hureliu0  antonfnus. 


97 


only  talkers  and  lecturers,  such  as  those  in  all 
ages  who  utter  fine  words,  know  little  of  human 
affairs,  and  care  only  for  notoriety.  Epictetus 
and  Antoninus  both  by  precept  and  example 
labored  to  improve  themselves  and  others;  and 
if  we  discover  imperfections  in  their  teaching, 
we  must  still  honor  these  great  men  who  at- 
tempted to  show  that  there  is  in  man’s  nature 
and  in  the  constitution  of  things  sufficient 
reason  for  living  a virtuous  life.  It  is  difficult 
enough  to  live  as  we  ought  to  live,  difficult 
even  for  any  man  to  live  in  such  a way  as  to 
satisfy  himself,  if  he  exercises  only  in  a moder- 
ate degree  the  power  of  reflecting  upon  and  re- 
viewing his  own  conduct;  and  if  all  men  cannot 
be  brought  to  the  same  opinions  in  morals  and 
religion,  it  is  at  least  worth  while  to  give  them 
good  reasons  for  as  much  as  they  can  be  per- 
suaded to  accept. 


7 


THE  THOUGHTS 

OF 


MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 


THE  THOUGHTS 


OF 

MARCUS  AURELIUS  ANTONINUS. 


I. 

From  my  grandfather  Verus*  [I  learned] 
good  morals  and  the  government  of  my 
temper. 

2.  From  the  reputation  and  remembrance  of 
my  father,  t modesty  and  a manly  character. 

* Annius  Verus  was  his  grandfather’s  name.  There 
is  no  verb  in  this  section  connected  with  the  word 
“from,”  nor  in  the  following  sections  of  this  book; 
and  it  is  not  quite  certain  what  verb  should  be  sup- 
plied. What  I have  added  may  express  the  meaning 
here,  though  there  are  sections  which  it  will  not  fit. 
If  he  does  not  mean  to  say  that  he  learned  all  these 
good  things  from  the  several  persons  whom  he  men- 
tions, he  means  that  he  observed  certain  good  quali- 
ties in  them,  or  received  certain  benefits  from  them, 
and  it  is  implied  that  he  was  the  better  for  it,  or  at 
least  might  have  been  for  it  would  be  a mistake  to 
understand  Marcus  as  saying  that  he  possessed  all  the 
virtues  which  he  observed  in  his  kinsmen  and  teachers. 

t His  father’s  name  was  Annius  Verus. 

(lOl) 


lo2 


trbougbts, 


[Book  I. 


3.  From  my  mother,*  piety  and  beneficence, 
and  abstinence,  not  only  from  evil  deeds,  but 
even  from  evil  thoughts;  and  further,  sim- 
plicity in  my  way  of  living,  far  removed  from 
the  habits  of  the  rich. 

4.  From  my  great-grandfather, f not  to  have 
frequented  public  schools,  and  to  have  had 
good  teachers  at  home,  and  to  know  that  on 
such  things  a man  should  spend  liberally. 

5.  From  my  governor,  to  be  neither  of  the 
green  nor  of  the  blue  party  at  the  games  in  the 
Circus,  nor  a partisan  either  of  the  Parmular- 
ius  or  the  Scutarius  at  the  gladiators’  fights  ; 
from  him  too  I learned  endurance  of  labor,  and 
to  want  little,  and  to  work  with  my  own 
hands,  and  not  to  meddle  with  other  people’s 
affairs,  and  not  to  be  ready  to  listen  to  slander. 

6.  From  Diognetus,J  not  to  busy  myself 

*His  mother  was  Domitia  Calvilla,  named  also 
Lucilla. 

t Perhaps  his  mother’s  grandfather,  Catilius  Severus. 

f In  the  works  of  Justimis  there  is  printed  a letter 
to  one  Diognetus,  whom  the  writer  names  “most  ex- 
cellent.” He  was  a Gentile,  but  he  wished  very  much 
to  know  what  the  religion  of  the  Christians  was,  what 
God  they  worshipped,  and  how  this  worship  made 
them  despise  the  world  and  death,  and  neither  believe 
in  the  gods  of  the  Greeks  nor  observe  the  superstition 
of  the  Jews;  and  what  was  this  love  to  one  another 
which  they  had,  and  why  this  new  kind  of  religion 
was  introduced  now  and  not  before.  My  friend  Mr. 
Jenkins,  rector  of  kyminge  in  Kent,  has  suggested  to 
me  that  this  Diognetus  may  have  been  the  tutor  of 
M.  Antoninus. 


Book!.]  /Iliarcus  BureHus  Bntonlnu0. 


103 


abautiriiiing  things-,  and  not  to  give  credit  to 
what  was  said  by  miracle-workers  and  jugglers 
about  incantations  and  the  driving  away  of 
daemons  and  such  things  ; and  not  to  breed 
quails  [for  fighting],  nor  to  give  myself  up 
passionately  to  such  things;  and  to  endure 
freedom  of  speech;  and  to  have  become  inti- 
mate with  philosophy;  and  to  have  been  a 
hearer,  first  of  Bacchius,  then  of  Tandasis  and 
Marcianus;  and  to  have  written  dialogues  in 
my  5'outh;  and  to  have  desired  a plank  bed 
and  skin,  and  whatever  else  of  the  kind  be- 
longs to  the  Grecian  discipline. 

7.  From  Rusticus''^  I received  the  impres- 
sion that  my  charaeter  required  improvement 
and  discipline;  and  from  him  I learned  not  to 
be  led  astray  to  sophistic  emulation,  nor  to 
writing  on  speculative  matters,  nor  to  deliver- 
ing little  hortatory  orations,  nor  to  showing 
myself  off  as  a man  who  practises  much  dis- 
cipline, or  does  benevolent  acts  in  order  to 
make  a display;  and  to  abstain  from  rhetoric, 
and  poetr}^  and  fine  writing;  and  not  to  walk 
about  in  the  house  in  my  outdoor  dress,  nor  to 

* Q.  Junius  Rusticuswas  a Stoic  philosopher,  whom 
Antoninus  valued  highl}',  and  often  took  his  advice 
(Capitol.  Antonin,  hi). 

Antoninus  says,  roZf  '’Si-LK-rj-uoiQ  vTzoiivijfiaaiv,  which 
must  not  be  translated,  “ the  writings  of  Epictetus,” 
for  Epictetus  wrote  nothing.  His  pupil  Arrian,  who 
has  preserved  for  us  all  that  we  know  of  Epictetus, 
says,  ravra  e—etpadriv  v~ofiv?jfj.a~a  kjiavru  6ia(pv?A^ai 
£K£ivov  iiavoiaq  {Ep.  ad.  Cell.) 


104 


ITbougbts. 


[Book  L 


do  other  things  of  the  kind;  and  to  write  my 
letters  with  simplicit}^  like  the  letter  which 
Rusticus  wrote  from  Sinnessa  to  mj^  mother; 
and  with  respect  to  those  who  have  offended 
me  by  words,  or  done  me  wrong,  to  be  easily 
disposed  to  be  pacified  and  reconciled,  as  soon 
as  the}'  have  shown  a readiness  to  be  recon- 
ciled; and  to  read  carefully,  and  not  to  be 
satisfied  with  a superficial  understanding  of  a 
book;  nor  hastily  to  give  my  assent  to  those 
who  talk  overmuch;  and- 1 am  indebted  to  him 
for  being  acquainted  with  the  discourses  of 
Epictetus,  which  he  communicated  to  me  out 
of  his  own  collection. 

8.  .From  Apollonius*  I learned  freedom  of 
will  and  undeviating  steadiness  of  purpose; 
and  to  look  to  nothing  else,  not  even  for  a 
moment,  except  to  reason;  and  to  be  always 
the  same,  in  sharp  pains,  on  the  occasion  of 
the  loss  of  a child,  and  in  long  illness;  and  to 
see  clearly  in  a living  example  that  the  same 
man  can  be  both  most  resolute  and  yielding, 
and  not  peevish  in  giving  his  instruction;  and 
to  have  had  before  my  eyes  a man  who  clearly 
considered  his  experience  and  his  skill  in  ex- 
pounding philosophical  principles  as  the  small- 
est of  his  merits;  and  from  him  I learned  how 
to  receive  from  friends  what  are  esteemed 
favors,  without  being  either  humbled  by  them 
or  letting  them  pass  unnoticed. 

* Apollonius  of  Chalcis  came  to  Rome  in  the  time 
of  Pius  to  be  Marcus’  preceptor.  He  was  a rigid 
Stoic. 


Book  I.]  /iBarcus  Burelius  antonlnus. 


105 

9.  :^;om  Sextus,*  a benevolent  disposition, 
and_  the,  example  of  a family  governed  in  a 
fatherly  manner,  and  the  idea  of  living  con-' 
formablj"  to  nature;  and  gravity  without  affec- 
tation, and  to  look  carefully  after  the  interests 
of  friends,  and  to  tolerate  ignorant  persons, 
and  those  w^ho  form  opinions  without  consid- 
eration:+  he  had  the  power  of  readily  ac- 
commodating himself  to  all,  so  that  intercourse 
wdth  him  was  more  agreeable  than  any  flattery; 
and  at  the  same  time  he  was  most  highly  ven- 
erated by  those  who  associated  with  him;  and 
he  had  the  faculty  both  of  discovery  and  order- 
ing, in  an  intelligent  and  methodical  way,  the 
principles  necessar}^  for  life;  and  he  never 
showed  anger  or  any  other  passion,  but  was 
entirely  free  from  passion,  and  also  most  affec- 
tionate; and  he  could  express  approbation 
without  noisy  display,  and  he  possessed  much 
knowledge  without  ostentation. 

10.  From  Alexander t the  grammarian,  to 
refrain  from  fault-finding,  and  not  in  a reproach- 
ful way  to  chide  those  who  uttered  any  barbar- 
ous or  solecistic  or  strange-sounding  expression; 
but  dexterously  to  introduce  the  very  expres- 
sion w'hich  ought  to  have  been  used,  and  in  the 

* Sextus  of  Chaeronea,  a grandson  of  Plutarch,  or 
nephew,  as  some  say  ; but  more  probably  a grandson. 

t Alexanderwas  a Grammaticus,  anative  of  Phrygia. 
He  wrote  a commentary  on  Homer ; and  the  rhetori- 
cian Aristides  wrote  a panegyric  on  Alexander  in  a 
funeral  oration. 


io6 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  I. 


way  of  answer  or  giving  confirmation,  or  join- 
ing in  an  inquiry  about  the  thing  itself,  not 
about  the  word,  or  by  some  other  fit  sugges- 
tion. 

11.  From  Fronto*  I learned  to  observe  what 
envy  and  duplicity  and  hypocrisy  are  in  a ty- 
rant, and  that  generally  those  among  us  who 
are  called  Patricians  are  rather  deficient  in  pa- 
ternal affection. 

12.  From  Alexander  the  Platonic,  not  fre- 
quently nor  without  necessity  to  say  to  any  one, 
or  to  write  in  a letter,  that  I have  no  leisure; 
nor  continually  to  excuse  the  neglect  of  duties 
required  by  our  relation  to  those  witli  whom 
we  live,  by  alleging  urgent  occupations. 

13.  From  Catulus,t  not  to  be  indifferent 
when  a friend  finds  fault,  even  if  he  should  find 
fault  without  reason,  but  to  try  to  restore  him 
to  his  usual  disposition;  and  to  be  readj^  to 
speak  well  of  teachers,  as  it  is  reported  of 
Domitius  and  Athenodotus;  and  to  love  my 
children  trul}^ 

14.  From  my  brother  J Severus,  to  love  my 

*M.  Cornelius  Pronto  was  a rhetorician,  and  in 
great  favor  with  Marcus.  There  are  extant  various 
letters  between  Marcus  and  Pronto. 

t Cinna  Catulus,  a Stoic  philosopher. 

J The  word  brother  may  not  be  genuine.  Antoni- 
nus had  no  brother.  It  has  been  supposed  that  he 
may  mean  some  cousin.  Schultz  in  his  translation 
omits  “brother,”  and  sa}'S  that  this  Severus  is  prob- 
ably Claudius  Severus,  a peripatetic. 


Book!.]  j®arcu6  Bureliu0  Antoninus. 


107 


kin,  and  to  love  truth,  and  to  love  justice;  and 
through  him  I learned  to  know  Thrasea,  Hel- 
vidius,  Cato,  Dion,  Brutus;*  and  from  him  I 
received  the  idea  of  a polity  in  which  there  is 
the  same  law  for  all,  a polity  administered  with 
regard  to  equal  rights  and  equal  freedom  of 
speech,  and  the  idea  of  a kingly  government 
which  respects  most  of  all  the  freedom  of  the 
governed;  I learned  from  him  also  + consist- 
ency and  undeviating  steadiness  in  my  regard 
for  philosophy;  and  a disposition  to  do  good, 
and  to  give  to  others  readily,  and  to  cherish 
good  hopes,  and  to  believe  that  I am  loved  by 
my  friends;  and  in  him  I observed  no  conceal- 
ment of  his  opinions  with  respect  to  those 
whom  he  condemned,  and  that  his  friends  had 
no  need  to  conjecture  what  he  wished  or  did 
not  wish,  but  it  was  quite  plain. 

15.  From  Maximust  I learned  self-govern- 
ment, and  not  to  be  led  aside  by  an3dhing;  and 
cheerfulness  in  all  circumstances,  as  well  as  in 
illness;  and  a just  admixture  in  the  moral 
character  of  sweetness  and  dignity,  and  to  do 

*We  know,  from  Tacitus  [Annal.  xiii.,  xvi.  21; 
and  other  passages),  who  Thrasea  and  Helvidius 
were.  Plutarch  has  written  the  lives  of  the  two  Catos, 
and  of  Dion  and  Brutus.  Antoninus  probably  alludes 
to  Cato  of  Utica,  who  was  a Stoic. 

t Claudius  Maximus  was  a Stoic  philosopher,  who 
was  highly  esteemed  also  by  Antoninus  Pius,  Marcus’ 
predecessor.  The  character  of  Maximus  is  that  of  a 
perfect  man.  (See  viii.  25,) 


io8 


^Cbouflbts. 


[BookL 


what  was  set  before  me  without  complaining. 
I observ'ed  that  everybody  believed  that  he 
thought  as  he  spoke,  and  that  in  all  that  he 
did  he  never  had  any  bad  intention;  and  he 
never  showed  amazement  and  surprise,  and  was 
never  in  a hurry,  and  never  put  off  doing  a 
thing,  nor  was  perplexed  nor  dejected,  nor  did 
he  ever  laugh  to  disguise  his  vexation,  nor,  on 
the  other  hand,  was  he  ever  passionate  or  sus- 
picious. He  was  accustomed  to  do  acts  of 
beneficence,  and  was  ready  to  forgive,  and  was 
free  from  all  falsehood;  and  he  presented  the 
appearance  of  a man  who  could  not  be  diverted 
from  right,  rather  than  of  a man  who  had  been 
improved.  I observed,  too,  that  no  man  could 
ever  think  that  he  was  despised  by  Maximus, 
or  ever  venture  to  think  himself  a better  man. 
He  had  also  the  art  of  being  humorous  in  an 
agreeable  way.+ 

i6.  In  my  father^  I observed  mildness  of 
temper,  and  unchangeable  resolution  in  the 
things  which  he  had  determined  after  due  de- 
liberation; and  no  vain-glory  in  those  things 
which  men  call  honors;  and  a love  of  labor  and 
perseverance;  and  a readiness  to  listen  to  those 
who  had  anjdhing  to  propose  for  the  common 
weal;  and  undeviating  firmness  in  giving  to 
everj^  man  according  to  his  deserts;  and  a 
knowledge  derived  from  experience  of  the  oc- 

* He  means  his  adoptive  father,  his  predecessor,  the 
Emperor  Antoninus  Pius.  Compare  vi.  30. 


Book  I.]  ^ibarcue  BureUus  Bntonlnus. 


109 


casions  for  vigorous  action  and  for  remission. 
And  I observed  that  he  had  overcome  all  pas- 
sion for  boys;  and  he  considered  himself  no 
more  than  any  other  citizen;*  and  he  released 
his  friends  from  all  obligation  to  sup  with  him 
or  to  attend  him  of  necessity  when  he  went 
abroad,  and  those  who  had  failed  to  accompany 
him,  by  reason  of  any  urgent  circumstances, 
always  found  him  the  same.  I observed  too 
his  habit  of  careful  inquiry  in  all  matters  of  de- 
liberation, and  his  persistency,  and  that  he 
never  stopped  his  investigation  through  being 
satisfied  with  appearances  which  first  present 
themselves;  and  that  his  disposition  was  to 
keep  his  friends,  and  not  to  be  soon  tired  of 
them,  nor  yet  to  be  extravagant  in  his  affection; 
and  to  be  satisfied  on  all  occasions,  and  cheer- 
ful; and  to  foresee  things  a long  way  off,  and  to 
provide  for  the  smallest  without  display;  and  to 
check  immediately  popular  applause  and  all 
flattery;  and  to  be  ever  watchful  over  the 
things  which  were  necessary  for  the  administra- 
tion of  the  empire,  and  to  be  a good  manager 
of  the  expenditure,  and  patiently  to  endure  the 
blame  which  he  got  for  such  conduct;  and  he 
was  neither  superstitious  with  respect  to  the 
gods,  nor  did  he  court  men  b5"  gifts  or  by  trying 
to  please  them,  or  by  flattering  the  populace; 
but  he  showed  sobriety  in  all  things,  and  firm- 
ness, and  never  any  mean  thoughts  or  action, 

*He  uses  the  word  Koivovorifiocvv)).  See  Gataker’s 

note. 


no 


^Cbougbts. 


[Book  I 


nor  love  of  novelt}\  And  the  things  which 
conduce  in  any  way  to  the  commodity  of  life, 
and  of  which  fortune  gives  an  abundant  supply, 
he  used  without  arrogance  and  without  excusing 
himself;  so  that  when  he  had  them,  he  enjoyed 
them  without  affectation,  and  when  he  had 
them  not,  he  did  not  want  them.  No  one 
could  ever  say  of  him  that  he  was  either  a 
sophist  or  a [home-bred]  flippant  slave  or  a 
pedant;  but  every  one  acknowledged  him  to  be 
a man  ripe,  perfect,  above  flattery,  able  to  man- 
age his  own  and  other  men’s  affairs.  Besides 
this,  he  honored  those  who  were  true  philoso- 
phers, and  he  did  not  reproach  those  who  pre- 
tended to  be  philosophers,  nor  yet  was  he  easily 
led  by  them.  He  was  also  easy  in  conversation, 
and  he  made  himself  agreeable  without  any 
offensive  affectation.  He  took  a reasonable 
care  of  his  body’s  health,  not  as  one  who  was 
greatly  attached  to  life,  nor  out  of  regard  to 
personal  appearance,  nor  yet  in  a careless  way, 
but  so  that  through  his  own  attention  he  very 
seldom  stood  in  need  of  the  physician’s  art  or 
of  medicine  or  external  applications.  He  was 
most  ready  to  give  without  envy  to  those  who 
possessed  any  particular  faculty,  such  as  that 
of  eloquence  or  knowledge  of  the  law  or  of 
morals,  or  of  anything  else;  and  he  gave  them 
his  help,  that  each  might  enjoy  reputation  ac- 
cording to  his  deserts;  and  he  always  acted  con- 
formably to  the  institutions  of  his  country, 
without  showing  any  affectation  of  doing  so. 


Book  I.]  /iRarcus  Buceliu0  Britoninus. 


Ill 


Further,  he  was  not  fond  of  change  nor  un- 
steady, but  he  loved  to  stay  in  the  same  places, 
and  to  employ  himself  about  the  same  things; 
and  after  his  paroxysms  of  headache  he  came 
immediately  fresh  and  vigorous  to  his  usual 
occupations.  His  secrets  were  not  many,  but 
very  few  and  very  rare,  and  these  only  about 
public  matters;  and  he  showed  prudence  and 
economy  in  the  exhibition  of  the  public 
spectacles  and  the  construction  of  public  build- 
ings, his  donations  to  the  people,  and  in  such 
things,  for  he  was  a man  who  looked  to  what 
ought  to  be  done,  not  to  the  reputation  which 
is  got  by  a man’s  acts.  He  did  not  take  the 
bath  at  unseasonable  hours;  he  was  not  fond  of 
building  houses,  nor  curious  about  what  he 
ate,  nor  about  the  texture  and  color  of  his 
clothes,  nor  about  the  beauty  of  his  slaves.* 
His  dress  came  from  Lorium,  his  villa  on  the 
coast,  and  from  Fanuvium  generally. f We 
know  how  he  behaved  to  the  toll-collector  at 
Tusculum  who  asked  his  pardon;  and  such  was 
all  his  behavior.  There  was  in  him  nothing 
harsh,  nor  implacable,  nor  violent,  nor,  as  one 
may  say,  anything  ‘carried  to  the  sweating 
point;  but  he  examined  all  things  severally,  as 
if  he  had  abundance  of  time,  and  without  con- 

*T-his  passage  is  corrupt,  and  the  exact  meaning  is 
uncertain. 

t horium  was  a villa  on  the  coast  north  of  Rome, 
and  there  Antoninus  was  brought  up,  and  he  died 
there.  This  also  is  corrupt. 


II2 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  L 


fusion,  in  an  orderly  way,  vigorously  and  con- 
sistently. And  that  might  be  applied  to  him 
which  is  recorded  of  Socrates,*  that  he  was  able 
both  to  abstain  from,  and  to  enjoy,  those 
things  which  many  are  too  weak  to  abstain 
from,  and  cannot  enjoy  without  excess.  But 
to  be  strong  enough  both  to  bear  the  one  and 
to  be  sober  in  the  other  is  the  mark  of  a man 
who  has  a perfect  and  invincible  soul,  such  as 
he  showed  in  the  illness  of 'Maximus. 

17.  To  the  gods  I am  indebted  for  having 
good  grandfathers,  good  parents,  a good  sister, 
good  teachers,  good  associates,  good  kinsmen 
and  friends,  nearly  everything  good.  Further, 
I owe  it  to  the  gods  that  I was  not  hurried  into 
any  offence  against  any  of  them,  though  I had 
a disposition  which,  if  opportunity  had  offered, 
might  have  led  me  to  do  something  of  this 
kind  ; but,  through  their  favor,  there  never 
was  such  a concurrence  of  circumstances  as  put 
me  to  the  trial.  Further,  I am  thankful  to  the 
gods  that  I was  not  longer  brought  up  with  my 
grandfather’s  concubine,  and  that  I preserved 
the  flower  of  my  youth,  and  that  I did  not 
make  proof  of  my  virility  before  the  proper 
season,  but  even  deferred  the  time  ; that  I was 
subjected  to  a ruler  and  father  who  was  able  to 
take  away  all  pride  from  me,  and  to  bring  me 
to  the  knowledge  that  it  is  possible  for  a man 
to  live  in  a palace  without  wanting  either 


* Xenophon,  Memorab.  i.  3,  15. 


Book  I.]  ^arcu0  aureliue  antoninus. 


113 


guards  or  embroidered  dresses,  or  torches  and 
statues,  and  such-like  show ; but  that  it  is  in 
such  a man’s  power  to  bring  himself  very  near 
to  the  fashion  of  a private  person,  without  be- 
ing for  this  reason  either  meaner  in  thought, 
or  more  remiss  in  action,  with  respect  to  the 
things  which  must  be  done  for  the  public  in- 
terest in  a manner  that  befits  a ruler.  I thank 
the  gods  for  giving  me  such  a brother,*  who 
was  able  by  his  moral  character  to  rouse  me  to 
vigilance  over  myself,  and  who  at  the  same 
time  pleased  me  by  his  respect  and  affection  ; 
that  my  children  have  not  been  stupid  nor  de- 
formed in  body  ; that  I did  not  make  more  pro- 
ficiency^ in  rhetoric,  poetry,  and  the  other 
studies,  in  which  I should  perhaps  have  been 
completely  engaged,  if  I had  seen  that  I was 
making  progress  in  them ; that  I made  haste 
to  place  those  who  brought  me  up  in  the 
station  of  honor,  which  they  seemed  to  desire, 
without  putting  them  off  with  hope  of  my  do- 
ing it  some  other  time  after,  because  they 
were  then  still  young;  that  I knew  Apollonius, 
Rusticus,  Maximus ; that  I received  clear  and 
frequent  impressions  about  living  according  to 
nature,  and  what  kind  of  a life  that  is,  so  that, 
so  far  as  depended  on  the  gods,  and  their  gifts, 
and  help,  and  inspirations,  nothing  hindered 
me  from  forthwith  living  according  to  nature, 

*The  emperor  had  no  brother  except  L,.  Verus,  his 
brother  by  adoption. 

8 


tibougbte. 


[Book  I. 


though  I still  fall  short  of  it  through  my  owu 
fault,  aud  through  not  observing  the  admoni- 
tions of  the  gods,  and,  I may  almost  say,  their 
direct  instructions  ; that  my  body  has  held  out 
so  long  in  such  a kind  of  life ; that  I never 
touched  either  Benedicta  or  Theodotus,  aud 
that,  after  having  fallen  into  amatory  passions, 
I was  cured,  and,  though  I was  often  out  of 
humor  with  Rusticus,  I never  did  anything  of 
which  I had  occasion  to  repent;  that,  though 
it  was  my  mother’s  fate  to  die  jmung,  she 
spent  the  last  years  of  her  life  with  me  ; that, 
whenever  I wished  to  help  any  man  in  his 
need,  or  on  any  other  occasion,  I was  never 
told  that  I had  not  the  means  of  doing  it ; aud 
that  to  myself  the  same  necessity  never  hap- 
pened, to  receive  anything  from  another  ; that 
I have  such  a wife,*  so  obedient,  and  so  affec- 
tionate, and  so  simple  ; that  I had  abundance 
of  good  masters  for  my  children ; and  that 
remedies  have  been  shown  to  me  by  dreams, 
both  others,  and  against  bloodspitting  and 
giddiness  t . . . ; aud  that,  when  I had  an  in- 
clination to  philosophy,  I did  not  fall  into  the 
hands  of  any  sophist,  and  that  I did  not  waste 
my  time  on  writers  [of  histories],  or  in  the 
resolution  of  syllogisms,  or  occupy  myself 
about  the  investigation  of  appearances  in  the 
heavens ; for  all  these  things  require  the  help 
of  the  gods  and  fortune. 

* See  the  Life  of  Antonimis. 

t This  is  corrupt. 


Book  I.]  j^iRarcua  :aurellu6  Sntonlnus, 


115 


Among  the  Quadi  at  the  Granua.* 

*The  Quadi  lived  iu  the  southern  part  of  Bohemia 
and  Moravia  ; and  Antoninus  made  a campaign  against 
them.  (See  the  Granua  is  probably  the  river 

Graan,  which  flows  into  the  Danube. 

If  these  words  are  genuine,  Antoninus  may  have 
written  this  first  book  during  the  war  with  the  Quadi. 
In  the  first  edition  of  Antoninus,  and  in  the  older 
editions,  the  first  three  sections  of  the  second  book 
make  the  conclusion  of  the  first  book.  Gataker 
placed  them  at  the  beginning  of  the  second  book. 


ii6 


Q:bougbt6. 


[Book  II. 


II. 

Begin  the  morning  by  saying  to  thyself,  I 
shall  meet  with  the  busybody,  the  un- 
grateful, arrogant,  deceitful,  envious,  unsocial. 
All  these  things  happen  to  them  by  reason  of 
their  ignorance  of  what  is  good  and  evil.  But 
I who  have  seen  the  nature  of  the  good  that  it 
is  beautiful,  and  of  the  bad  that  it  is  ugly,  and 
the  nature  of  him  who  does  wrong,  that  it  is 
akin  to  me;  not  [only]  of  the  same  blood  or 
seed,  but  that  it  participates  in  [the  same]  in- 
telligence and  [the  same]  portion  of  the  divin- 
ity, I can  neither  be  injured  by  any  of  them, 
for  no  one  can  fix  on  me  what  is  ugly,  nor  can 
I be  angry  with  my  kinsman,  nor  hate  him. 
For  we  are  made  for  co-operation,  like  feet,  like 
hands,  like  eyelids,  like  the  rows  of  the  upper 
and  lower  teeth. To  act  against  one  another, 
then,  is  contrary  to  nature;  and  it  is  acting 
against  one  another  to  be  vexed  and  to  turn 
away. 

2.  Whatever  this  is  that  I am,-  it  is  a little 
flesh  and  breath,  and  the  ruling  part.  Throw 
away  thy  books;  no  longer  distract  thyself:  it 
is  not  allowed;  but  as  if  thou  wast  now  dying, 
despise  the  flesh;  it  is  blood  and  bones  and 


* Xenophon,  Mem.  ii.  3.  18. 


Book  II.]  ®qrcu6  Burelius  Bntonlnus. 


network,  a contexture  of  nerves,  veins,  and 
arteries.  See  the  breath  also,  w'hat  kind  of  a 
thing  it  is;  air,  and  not  always  the  same,  but 
every  moment  sent  out  and  again  sucked  in. 
The  third,  then,  is  the  ruling  part;  consider 
thus:  Thou  art  an  old  man;  no  longer  let  this 
be  a slave,  no  longer  be  pulled  by  the  strings 
like  a puppet  to  unsocial  movements,  no  longer 
be  either  dissatisfied  with  thy  present  lot,  or 
shrink  from  the  future. 

3.  All  that  is  from  the  gods  is  full  of  provi- 
dence. That  which  is  from  fortune  is  not  sep- 
arated from  nature  or  without  an  interweaving 
and  involution  with  the  things  which  are 
ordered  by  providence.  From  thence  all  things 
flow;  and  there  is  besides  uecessit}",  and  that 
which  is  for  the  advantage  of  the  whole  universe, 
of  which  thou  art  a part.  But  that  is  good  for 
every  part  of  nature  which  the  nature  of  the 
whole  brings,  and  what  serves  to  maintain  this 
nature.  Now  the  universe  is  preserved,  as  by 
the  changes  of  the  elements  so  by  the  changes 
of  things  compounded  of  the  elements.  Bet 
these  principles  be  enough  for  thee;  let  them 
always  be  fixed  opinions.  But  cast  away  the 
thirst  after  books,  that  thou  mayest  not  die 
murmuring,  but  cheerfully,  truly,  and  from  thy 
heart  thankful  to  the  gods. 

4.  Remember  how  long  thou  hast  been  put- 
ting off  these  things,  and  how  often  thou  hast 
received  an  opportunity  from  the  gods,  and  yet 
dost  not  use  it.  Thou  must  now  at  last  per- 


ii8 


tibougbts. 


[Book  II. 


ceive  of  what  universe  thou  art  a part,  and  of 
what  administrator  of  the  universe  th}^  exist- 
ence is  an  efflux,  and  that  a limit  of  time  is 
fixed  for  thee,  which  if  thou  dost  not  use  for 
clearing  away  the  clouds  from  thj'  mind,  it  will 
go  and  thou  wilt  go,  and  it  will  never  return. 

5.  Kvery^  moment  think  steadilj"  as  a Roman 
and  a man  to  do  what  thou  hast  in  hand  with 
perfect  and  simple  dignity,  and  feeling  of  af- 
fection, and  freedom,  and  justice,  and  to  give 
thyself  relief  from  all  other  thoughts.  And 
thou  wilt  give  thyself  relief  if  thou  doest  every 
act  of  th}"  life  as  if  it  were  the  last,  laying  aside 
all  carelessness  and  passionate  aversion  from 
the  commands  of  reason,  and  all  hj^pocrisy, 
and  self-love,  and  discontent  with  the  portion 
which  has  been  given  to  thee.  Thou  seest 
how  few  the  things  are,  the  which  if  a man 
lays  hold  of,  he  is  able  to  live  a life  which  flows 
in  quiet,  and  is  like  the  existence  of  the  gods; 
for  the  gods  on  their  part  will  require  nothing 
more  from  him  who  obsen^es  these  things. 

6.  Do  wrong"’''  to  thyself,  do  wrong  to  thy- 
self, my  soul;  but  thou  wilt  no  longer  have  the 
opportunity  of  honoring  thyself.  Every  man’s 
life  is  sufficient.  4-  But  thine  is  nearly  flnished, 
though  thy  soul  reverences  not  itself,  but  places 
thy  felicity  in  the  souls  of  others. 

7.  Do  the  things  external  which  fall  upon 

* Perhaps  it  should  be,  “thou  art  doing  violence  to 
thyself,”  vppiCei^,  not 


Book  II.]  /iftarcus  aurcllue  Bntoninus. 


iig 


thee  distract  thee  ? Give  thyself  time  to  learn 
something  new  and  good,  and  cease  to  be 
whirled  around.  But  then  thou  must  also 
avoid  being  carried  about  the  other  wa}-;  for 
those  too  are  triflers  who  have  wearied  them- 
selves in  life  by  their  activit^^  and  yet  have  no 
object  to  which  to  direct  every  movement,  and, 
in  a word,  all  their  thoughts. 

8.  Through  not  observing  what  is  in  th; 
mind  of  another  a man  has  seldom  been  seen 
to  be  unhappy;  but  those  who  do  not  observe 
the  movements  of  their  own  minds  must  of  ne- 
cessity be  unhappy. 

9.  This  thou  must  always  bear  in  mind, 
what  is  the  nature  of  the  whole,  and  what  is 
my  nature,  and  how  this  is  related  to  that,  and 
what  kind  of  a part  it  is  of  what  kind  of  a 
whole,  and  that  there  is  no  one  who  hinders 
thee  from  always  doing  and  saying  the  things 
which  are  according  to  the  nature  of  which 
thou  art  a part. 

10.  Theophrastus,  in  his  comparison  of  bad 
acts — such  a comparison  as  one  would  make  in 
accordance  with  the  common  notions  of  man- 
kind— says,  like  a true  philosopher,  that  the 
offenses  which  are  committed  through  desire  are 
more  blamable  than  those  which  are  committed 
through  anger.  For  he  who  is  excited  by 
anger  seems  to  turn  away  from  reason  v\^ith  a 
certain  pain  and  unconscious  contraction;  but 
he  who  offends  through  desire,  being  overpow- 
ered by  pleasure,  seems  to  be  in  a manner  more 


120 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  E 


intemperate  and  more  womanish  in  his  offences. 
Rightly,  then,  and  in  a way  worthy  of  phil- 
osoph}'-,  he  said  that  the  offence  which  is  com- 
mitted with  pleasure  is  more  blamable  than 
that  which  is  committed  with  pain;  and  on  the 
whole  the  one  is  more  like  a person  who  has 
been  first  wronged  and  through  pain  is  com- 
pelled to  be  angry,  but  the  other  is  moved  by 
his  own  impulse  to  do  wrong,  being  carried  to- 
wards doing  something  by  desire. 

II.  Since  it  is  possible*  that  thou  mayest 
depart  from  life  this  very  moment,  regulate  every 
act  and  thought  accordingly. f But  to  go  away 
from  among  men,  if  there  are  gods,  is  not  a 
thing  to  be  afraid  of,  for  the  gods  will  not  in- 
volve thee  in  evil;  but  if  indeed  they  do  not 
exist,  or  if  they  have  no  concern  about  human 
affairs,  what  is  it  to  me  to  live  in  a universe 
devoid  of  gods  or  devoid  of  providence  ? But 
in  truth  they  do  exist,  and  they  do  care  for 
human  things,  and  they  have  put  all  the  means 
in  man’s  power  to  enable  him  not  to  fall  into 
real  evils.  And  as  to  the  rest,  if  there  was  any- 
thing evil,  they  would  have  provided  for  this 
also,  that  it  should  be  altogether  in  a man’s 
power  not  to  fall  into  it.  Now  that  which  does 
not  make  a man  worse,  how  can  it  make  a man’s 
life  worse?  But  neither  through  ignorance,  nor 

* Or  it  may  mean,  “since  it  is  in  thy  power  to  de- 
part;’’ which  gives  a meaning  somewhat  different. 

t See  Cicero,  Tuscul.,  i.  49. 


Book  II]  /llbarcus  Hureltus  Bntoninug. 


121 


having  the  knowledge  but  not  the  power  to 
guard  against  or  correct  these  things,  is  it  pos- 
sible that  the  nature  of  the  universe  has  over- 
looked them;  nor  is  it  possible  that  it  has  made 
so  great  a mistake,  either  through  want  of’ 
power  or  want  of  skill,  that  good  and  evil 
should  happen  indiscriminately  to  the  good  and 
the  bad.  But  death  certainl}’,  and  life,  honor 
and  dishonor,  pain  and  pleasure, — all  these 
things  equally  happen  to  good  men  and  bad, 
being  things  which  make  us  neither  better  nor 
worse.  Therefore  they  are  neither  good  nor 
evil. 

12.  How  quickly  all  things  disappear, — in 
the  universe  the  bodies  themselves,  but  in  time 
the  remembrance  of  them.  What  is  the  nature 
of  all  sensible  things,  and  particularly  those 
which  attract  with  the  bait  of  pleasure  or  terrify 
by  pain,  or  are  noised  abroad  by  vapor}^  fame; 
how  worthless,  and  contemptible,  and  sordid, 
and  perishable,  and  dead  they  are,^ — all  this  it 
is  the  part  of  the  intellectual  faculty  to  observe. 
To  observe  too  who  these  are  whose  opinions 
and  voices  give  reputation;  what  death  is,  and 
the  fact  that,  if  a man  looks  at  it  in  itself,  and 
by  the  abstractive  power  of  reflection  resolves 
into  their  parts  all  the  things  which  present 
themselves  to  the  imagination  in  it,  he  will  then 
consider  it  to  be  nothing  else  than  an  operation 
of  nature;  and  if  any  one  is  afraid  of  an  opera- 
tion of  nature,  he  is  a child.  This,  however, 
is  not  only  an  operation  of  nature,  but  it  is  also 


122 


XTbougbts. 


[Book  II. 


a thing  which  conduces  to  the  purposes  of  na- 
ture. To  observe  too  how  man  comes  near  to  the 
Deit}^  and  by  what  part  of  him,  and  when  this 
part  of  man  is  so  disposed  + (vi.  28). 

13.  Nothing  is  more  wretched  than  a man 
who  traverses  everything  in  a round,  and  pries 
into  the  things  beneath  the  earth,  as  the  poet* 
says,  and  seeks  by  conjecture  what  is  in  the 
minds  of  his  neighbors,  without  perceiving 
that  it  is  sufficient  to  attend  to  the  daemon 
within  him,  and  to  reverence  it  sincerely.  And 
reverence  of  the  daemon  consists  in  keeping  it 
pure  from  passion  and  thoughtlessness,  and 
dissatisfaction  with  what  comes  from  gods  and 
men.  For  the  things  from  the  gods  merit 
veneration  for  their  excellence;  and  the  things 
from  men  should  be  dear  to  us  by  reason  of 
kinship;  and  sometimes  even,  in  a manner, 
they  move  our  pity  by  reason  of  men’s  igno- 
rance of  good  and  bad;  this  defect  being  not 
less  than  that  which  deprives  us  of  the  power 
of  distinguishing  things  that  are  white  and 
black. 

14.  Though  thou  shouldest  be  going  to  live 
three  thousand  years  and  as  many  times  ten 
thousand  years,  still  remember  that  no  man 
loses  any  other  life  than  this  which  he  now 
lives,  nor  lives  any  other  than  this  which  he 
now  loses.  The  longest  and  shortest  are  thus 
brought  to  the  same.  For  the  present  is  the. 

* Pindar,  in  the  Theaetetus  of  Plato.  See  xi.  i. 


Book  n.]  Marcus  Burelfus  Bntoninus. 


123 


same  to  all,  though  that  which  perish  is  uot 
the  same;+*  and  so  that  which  is  lost  appears 
to  be  a mere  moment.  -For  a man  cannot  lose 
either  the  past  or  the  future:  for  what  a man 
has  not,  how  can  an}’’  one  take  this  from  him? 
These  two  things  then  thou  must  bear  in  mind; 
the  one,  that  all  things  from  eternit}’  are  of 
like  forms  and  come  round  in  a circle,  and  that 
it  makes  no  difference  whether  a man  shall  see 
the  same  things  during  a hundred  3'ears,  or 
two  hundred,  or  an  infinite  time;  and  the  sec- 
ond, that  the  longest  liver  and  he  who  will  die 
soonest  lose  just  the  same.  For  the  present  is 
the  only  thing  of  which  a man  can  be  deprived, 
if  it  is  true  that  this  is  the  only  thing  which  he 
has,  and  that  a man  cannot  lose  a thing  if  he 
has  it  not. 

15.  Remember  that  all  is  opinion.  For  what 
was  said  by  the  Cynic  Monimus  is  manifest : 
and  manifest  too  is  the  use  of  what  was  said,  if 
a man  receives  what  may  be  got  out  of  it  as  far 
as  it  is  true. 

16.  The  soul  of  man  does  violence  to  itself, 
first  of  all,  when  it  becomes  an  abscess,  and,  as 
it  were,  a tumor  on  the  universe,  so  far  as  it 
can.  For  to  be  vexed  at  anything  which  hap- 
pens is  a separation  of  ourselves  from  nature, 
in  some  part  of  which  the  natures  of  all  other 
things  are  contained.  In  the  next  place,  the 
soul  does  violence  to  itself  when  it  turns  away 


See  Gataker’s  note. 


124 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  II. 


from  any  man,  or  even  moves  towards  him  with 
the  intention  of  injuring,  such  as  are  the  souls 
of  those  who  are  angry.  In  the  third  place, 
the  soul  does  violence  to  itself  when  it  is  over- 
powered by  plea.sure  or  by  pain.  Fourthly, 
when  it  plays  a part,  and  does  or  says  anything 
insincerely  and  untruly.  Fifthly,  when  it  al- 
lows any  act  of  its  own  and  any  movement  to 
be  without  an  aim,  and  does  anything  thought- 
lessly and  without  considering  what  it  is,  it 
being  right  that  even  the  smallest  things  be 
done  with  reference  to  an  end;  and  the  end  of 
rational  animals  is  to  follow  the  reason  and  the 
law  of  the  most  ancient  city  and  polity. 

17.  Of  human  life  the  time  is  a point,  and 
the  substance  is  in  a flux,  and  the  perception 
dull,  and  the  composition  of  the  whole  body 
subject  to  putrefaction,  and  the  soul  a whirl, 
and  fortune  hard  to  divine,  and  fame  a thing 
devoid  of  judgment.  And,  to  say  all  in  a word, 
everything  which  belongs  to  the  body  is  a 
stream,  and  what  belongs  to  the  soul  is  a dream 
and  vapor,  and  life  is  a warfare  and  a stranger’s 
sojourn,  and  after-fame  is  oblivion.  What  then 
is  that  which  is  able  to  conduct  a man  ? One 
thing,  and  only  one,  philosophy.  But  this 
consists  in  keeping  the  daemon  within  a man 
free  from  violence  and  unharmed,  superior  to 
pains  and  pleasures,  doing  nothing  without  a 
purpose,  nor  yet  falsely  and  with  hypocrisy, 
not  feeling  the  need  of  another  man’s  doing  or 
not  doing  anything;  and  besides,  accepting  all 


Book  II, ] /Barcus  aureHu6  lEntonfnus. 


125 


that  happens,  and  all  that  is  allotted,  as  com- 
ing from  thence,  wherever  it  is, 'from  whence-* 
he  himself  came;  and,  finally,  waiting  for  death' 
with  a cheerful  mind,  as  being  nothing  else 
than  a dissolution  of  the  elements  of  which 
every  living  being  is  compounded.  But  if  there 
is  no  harm  to  the  elements  themselves  in  each 
continnally  changing  into  another,  wh}^  should 
a man  have  any  apprehension  about  the  change 
and  dissolution  of  all  the  elements  ? For  it  is 
according  to  nature,  and  nothing  is  evil  which 
is  according  to  nature. 

This  in  Carnuntum.* 

* Carnuntum  was  a town  of  Pannonia,  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Danube,  about  thirty  miles  east  of  Vindo- 
bona  (Vienna).  Orosius  (vii.  15)  and  Eutropius  (viii. 
13)  say  that  Antoninus  remained  three  years  at  Car- 
nuatum  during  his  -war  with  the  Marcomanni. 


126 


^Tbougbte. 


[Book  III. 


III. 

WB  ought  to  consider  not  only  that  our  life 
is  daily  wasting  away  and  a smaller  part 
of  it  is  left,  but  another  thing  also  must  be 
taken  into  the  account,  that  if  a man  should 
live  longer,  it  is  quite  uncertain  whether  the  un- 
derstanding will  still  continue  sufficient  for  the 
comprehension  of  things,  and  retain  the  power 
of  contemplation  which  strives  to  acquire  the 
knowledge  of  the  divine  and  the  human.  For 
if  he  shall  begin  to  fall  into  dotage,  perspiration 
and  nutrition  and  imagination  and  appetite,  and 
whatever  else  there  is  of  the  kind,  will  not  fail; 
but  the  power  of  making  use  of  ourselves,  and 
filling  up  the  measure  of  our  duty,  and  clearly 
separating  all  appearances,  and  considering 
whether  a man  should  now  depart  from  life, 
and  whatever  else  of  the  kind  absolutely  re- 
quires a disciplined  reason, — all  this  is  already 
extinguished.  We  must  make  haste,  then,  not 
only  because  we  are  daily  nearer  to  death,  but 
also  because  the  conception  of  things  and  the 
understanding  of  them  cease  first. 

2.  We  ought  to  observe  also  that  even  the 
things  which  follow  after  the  things  which 
are  produced  according  to  nature  contain 
something  pleasing  and  attractive.  For  in- 
stance, when  bread  is  baked  some  parts  are 


Book  III.]  /iibarcus  Jlurelius  Hntoninus. 


127 


split  at  the  surface,  and  these  parts  which 
thus  open,  and  have  a certain  fashion  contrary 
to  the  purpose  of  the  baker’s  art,  are  beautiful  in 
a manner,  and  in  a peculiar  way  excite  a desire 
for  eating.  And  again,  figs,  wdien  they  are 
quite  ripe,  gape  open;  and  in  the  ripe  olives  the 
very  circumstance  of  their  being  near  to  rotten- 
ness adds  a peculiar  beauty  to  the  fruit.  And 
the  ears  of  corn  bending  down,  and  the  lion’s 
eyebrows,  and  the  foam  which  flows  from  the 
mouth  of  wild  boars,  and  many  other  things, — 
though  the}^  are  far  from  being  beautiful  if  a 
man  should  examine  them  severally, — still,  be- 
cause they  are  consequent  upon  the  things 
w'hich  are  formed  by  nature,  help  to  adorn 
them,  and  they  please  the  mind;  so  that  if  a 
man  should  have  a feeling  and  deeper  insight 
with  respect  to  the  things  which  are  produced 
in  the  universe,  there  is  hardly  one  of  those 
which  follow  by  way  of  consequence  which 
will  not  seem  to  him  to  be  in  a manner  dis- 
posed so  as  to  give  pleasure.  And  so  he  will 
see  even  the  real  gaping  jaws  of  wild  beasts 
with  no  less  pleasure  than  those  which  painters 
and  sculptors  show  by  imitation;  and  in  an  old 
woman  and  an  old  man  he  will  be  able  to  see  a 
certain  maturity  and  comeliness;  and  the  at* 
tractive  loveliness  of  young  persons  he  will  be 
able  to  look  on  with  chaste  eyes;  and  many 
such  things  wdll  present  themselves,  not  pleas- 
ing to  every  man,  but  to  him  only  who  has  be- 
come truly  familiar  with  Nature  and  her  works. 


128 


^Tbou(?bts. 


[Book  III. 


3.  Hippocrates,  after  curing  many  diseases, 
himself  fell  sick  and  died.  The  Chaldaei  fore- 
told the  deaths  of  nianj",  and  then  fate  caught 
them  too.  Alexander  and  Pompeius,  and 
Cains  Caesar,  after  so  often  completely  destroy- 
ing Avhole  cities,  and  in  battle  cutting  to  pieces 
many  ten  thousands  of  cavalry  and  infantry, 
themselves  too  at  last  departed  from  life. 
Heraclitus,  after  so  maii}^  speculations  on  the 
conflagration  of  the  universe,  was  filled  with 
water  internalh^  and  died  smeared  all  over  with 
mud.  And  lice  destroyed  Democritus;  and 
other  lice  killed  Socrates.  What  means  all 
this?  Thou  hast  embarked,  thou  ha,st  made 
the  vojmge,  thou  art  come  to  shore;  get  out. 
If  indeed  to  another  life,  there  is  no  want  of 
gods,  not  even  there;  but  if  to  a state  without 
sensation,  thou  wilt  cease  to  be  held  by  pains 
and  pleasures,  and  to  be  a slave  to  the  vessel, 
which  is  as  much  inferior  as  that  which  setwes 
it  is  superior :+  for  the  one  is  intelligence  and 
deity;  the  other  is  earth  and  corruption. 

4.  Do  not  Avaste  the  remainder  of  thy  life  in 
thoughts  about  others,  when  thou  dost  not 
refer  thy  thoughts  to  some  object  of  common 
utility.  For  thou  losest  the  opportunity  of 
doing  something  else  when  thou  hast  such 
thoughts  as  these, — What  is  such  a person 
doing,  and  why,  and  what  is  he  saying,  and 
what  is  he  thinking  of,  and  what  is  he  contriv- 
ing, and  whatever  else  of  the  kind  makes  us 
wander  away  from  the  observation  of  our  own 


Bookiii.j  ^arcu6  :aurelius  Bntoninus. 


129 


ruling  power.  We  ought  then  to  check  in  the 
series  of  our  thoughts  everything  that  is  with- 
out a purpose  and  useless,  but  most  of  all  the 
over-curious  feeling  and  the  malignant;  and  a 
man  should  use  himself  to  think  of  those 
things  only  about  which  if  one  should  sudden- 
ly ask,  What  hast  thou  now  in  thy  thoughts  ? 
with  perfect  openness  thou  mightest  immedi- 
ately answer.  This  or  That;  so  that  from  thy 
words  it  should  be  plain  that  everything  in 
thee  is  simple  and  benevolent,  and  such  as  be- 
fits a social  animal,  and  one  that  cares  not  for 
thoughts  about  pleasure  or  sensual  enjoyments 
at  all,  nor  has  any  rivalry  or  envy  and  sus- 
picion, or  anjdhing  else  for  which  thou  wouldst 
blush  if  thou  shouldst  say  that  thou  hadst  it  in 
thy  mind.  For  the  man  who  is  such,  and  no 
longer  dela5^s  being  among  the  number  of  the 
best,  is  like  a priest  and  minister  of  the  gods, 
using  too  the  [deity]  which  is  planted  within 
him,  which  makes  the  man  uncontaminated  by 
pleasure,  unharmed  by  any  pain,  untouched  by 
any  insult,  feeling  no  wrong,  a fighter  in  the 
noblest  fight,  one  who  cannot  be  overpowered 
by  any  passion,  dyed  deep  with  justice,  accept- 
ing with  all  his  soul  everjdhing  which  happens 
and  is  assigned  to  him  as  his  portion;  and  not 
often,  nor  yet  without  great  necessity  and 
for  the  general  interest,  imagining  what  an- 
other says,  or  does,  or  thinks.  For  it  is  only 
what  belongs  to  himself  that  he  makes  the 
matter  for  his  activity;  and  he  constantly 
9 


130 


c:bougbt6. 


[Book  III 


thinks  of  that  which  is  allotted  to  himself  out 
of  the  sum  total  of  things,  and  he  makes  his 
own  acts  fair,  and  he  is  persuaded  that  his  own 
portion  is  good.  For  the  lot  which  is  assigned 
to  each  man  is  carried  along  with  him  and 
carries  him  along  with  it.+  And  he  remem- 
bers also  that  every  rational  animal  is  his  kins- 
man, and  that  to  care  for  all  men  is  according 
to  man’s  nature  ; and  a man  should  hold  on  to 
the  opinion  not  of  all,  but  of  those  only  who 
confessedly  live  according  to  nature.  But  as  to 
those  who  live  not  so,  he  always  bears  in  mind 
what  kind  of  men  they  are  both  at  home  and 
from  home,  both  by  night  and  by  day,  and 
what  they  are,  and  with  what  men  they  live 
an  impure  life.  Accordingly,  he  does  not  value 
at  all  the  praise  which  comes  from  such  men, 
since  they  are  not  even  satisfied  with  them- 
seh^es. 

5.  Labor  not  unwillingly,  nor  without  regard 
to  the  common  interest,  nor  without  due  con- 
sideration, nor  with  distraction  ; nor  let  studied 
ornament  set  off  thy  thoughts,  and  be  not 
either  a man  of  many  words,  or  busy  about  too 
many  things.  And  further,  let  the  deity  which 
is  in  thee  be  the  guardian  of  a living  being, 
manly  and  of  ripe  age,  and  engaged  in  matter 
political,  and  a Roman,  and  a ruler,  who  has 
taken  his  post  like  a man  waiting  for  the  signal 
which  summons  him  from  life,  and  ready  to  go, 
having  need  neither  of  oath  nor  of  any  man’s 
testimony.  Be  cheerful  also,  and  seek  not  ex- 


Book  III.]  /iRarcus  Sucellus  Bntonlnus. 


131 

ternal  help  nor  the  tranquillity  which  others 
give.  A man  then  must  stand  erect,  not  be 
kept  erect  by  others. 

6.  If  thou  findest  in  human  life  anything 
better  than  justice,  truth,  temperance,  fortitude, 
and,  in  a word,  anything  better  than  thy  own 
mind’s  self-satisfaction  in  the  things  which  it 
enables  thee  to  do  according  to  right  reason, 
and  in  the  condition  that  is  assigned  to  thee 
without  thy  own  choice  ; if,  I say,  thou  seest 
anything  better  than  this,  turn  to  it  with  all 
thy  soul,  and  enjoy  that  which  thou  hast  found 
to  be  the  best.  But  if  nothing  appears  to  be 
better  than  the  Deity  which  is  planted  in  thee, 
wdiich  has  subjected  to  itself  all  thj^  appetites, 
and  carefull}"  examines  all  the  impressions,  and, 
as  Socrates  said,  has  detached  itself  from  the 
persuasions  of  sense,  and  has  submitted  itself 
to  the  gods,  and  cares  for  mankind;  if  thou 
findest  ever^dhing  else  smaller  and  of  less  value 
than  this,  give  place  to  nothing  else,  for  if  thou 
dost  once  diverge  and  incline  to  it,  thou  wilt 
no  longer  without  distraction  be  able  to  give 
the  preference  to  that  good  thing  which  is  thy 
proper  possession  and  thy  own ; for  it  is  not 
right  that  anything  of  any  other  kind,  such  as 
praise  from  the  many,  or  power,  or  enioyment 
of  pleasure,  should  come  into  competition  with 
that  which  is  rationally  and  politically  [or, 
practically]  good.  All  these  things,  even 
though  the}^  ma}'  seem  to  adapt  themselves 
‘"to  the  better  things]  in  a small  degree,  obtain 


c:bougbt6. 


[Book  III 


13? 

the  superiority  all  at  once,  and  carry  us  awa3^ 
But  do  thou,  I say,  simply  and  freely  choose 
the  better,  and  hold  to  it. — But  that  which  is 
useful  is  the  better. — Well,  then,  if  it  is  useful 
to  thee  as  a rational  being,  keep  to  it;  but  if  it 
is  only  useful  to  thee  as  an  animal,  say  so,  and 
maintain  thy  judgment  without  arrogance;  only 
take  care  that  thou  makest  the  inquiry-  by  a 
sure  method. 

7.  Never  value  anything  as  profitable  to  thy- 
self which  shall  compel  thee  to  break  thy  prom- 
ise, to  lose  thy  self-respect,  to  hate  any  man,  to 
suspect,  to  curse,  to  act  the  hypocrite,  to  desire 
anything  which  needs  walls  and  curtains:  for 
he  who  has  preferred  to  everything  else  his  own 
intelligence  and  daemon  and  the  worship  of  its 
excellence,  acts  no  tragic  part,  does  not  groan, 
will  not  need  either  solitude  or  much  company; 
and,  what  is  chief  of  all,  he  will  live  without 
either  pursuing  or  fl5dng  from  [death];*  but 
whether  for  a longer  or  a shorter  time  he  shall 
have  the  soul  enclosed  in  the  body,  he  cares 
not  at  all:  for  even  if  he  must  depart  immedi- 
ately, he  will  go  as  readily  as  if  he  were  going 
to  do  anything  el.se  which  can  be  done  with 
decency  and  order;  taking  care  of  this  only  all 
through  life,  that  his  thoughts  turn  not  away 
from  anything  which  belongs  to  an  intelligent 
animal  and  a member  of  a civil  community. 

8.  In  the  mind  of  one  who  is  chastened  and 


* Comp.  ix.  3. 


Book  III.]  Marcus  Surelius  Hntoninue. 


133 


purified  thou  wilt  find  no  corrupt  matter,  nor 
impurity,  nor  any  sore  skinned  over.  Nor  is 
his  life  incomplete  when  fate  overtakes  him,  as 
one  may  say  of  an  actor  who  leaves  the  stage 
before  ending  and  finishing  the  play.  Besides, 
there  is  in  him  nothing  servile,  nor  affected, 
nor  too  closely  bound  [to  other  things],  nor  yet 
detached*  [from  other  things],  nothing  worthy 
of  blame,  nothing  which  seeks  a hiding-place. 

9.  Reverence  the  faculty  which  produces 
opinion.  On  this  faculty  it  entirely  depends 
whether  there  shall  exist  in  thy  ruling  part  any 
opinion  inconsistent  with  nature  and  the  con- 
stitution of  the  rational  animal.  And  this 
faculty"  promises  freedom  from  hasty  judgment, 
and  friendship  towards  men,  and  obedience  to 
the  gods. 

10.  Throwing  away  then  all  things,  hold  to 
these  only  which  are  few;  and  besides,  bear  in 
mind  that  every  man  lives  only  this  present 
time,  which  is  an  indivisible  point,  and  that 
all  the  rest  of  his  life  is  either  past  or  it  is  un- 
certain. Short  then  is  the  time  which  every 
man  lives;  and  small  the  nook  of  the  earth 
where  he  lives;  and  short  too  the  longest  post- 
humous fame,  and  even  this  only  continued  by  a 
succession  of  poor  human  beings,  who  will  very 
soon  die,  and  who  know  not  even  themselves, 
much  less  him  who  died  long  ago. 

1 1 . To  the  aids  which  have  been  mentioned 

34. 


134 


^Tbougbte. 


[Book  III. 


let  this  one  still  be  added:  Make  for  tli3'self  a 
definition  or  description  of  the  thing  which  is 
presented  to  thee,  so  as  to  see  distinctl}^  what 
kind  of  a thing  it  is  in  its  substance,  in  its  nud- 
it}',  in  its  complete  entirety,  and  tell  thyself  its 
proper  name,  and  the  names  of  the  things  of 
which  it  has  been  compounded,  and  into  which 
it  will  be  resolved.  For  nothing  is  so  produc- 
tive of  elevation  of  mind  as  to  be  able  to  exam- 
ine methodically  and  truly  every  object  which 
is  presented  to  thee  in  life,  and  always  to  look 
at  things  so  as  to  see  at  the  same  time  what 
kind  of  universe  this  is,  and  what  kind  of  use 
everything  performs  in  it,  and  what,  value 
everything  has  with  reference  to  the  whole, 
and  what  with  reference  to  man,  who  is  a citi- 
zen of  the  highest  city,  of  which  all  other  cities 
are  like  families;  what  each  thing  is,  and  of 
what  it  is  composed,  and  how  long  it  is  the 
nature  of  this  thing  to  endure  which  now 
makes  an  impression  on  me,  and  what  virtue  I 
have  need  of  with  respect  to  it,  such  as  gentle- 
ness, manliness,  truth,  fidelity,  simplicity,  con- 
tentment, and  the  rest.  Wherefore,  on  every 
occasion  a man  should  say:  This  comes  from 
god;  and  this  is  according  to  the  apportion- 
ment + and  spinning  of  the  thread  of  destiny, 
and  such-like  coincidence  and  chance;  and  this 
is  from  one  of  the  same  stock,  and  a kinsman 
and  partner,  one  who  knows  not,  how^ever, 
what  is  according  to  his  nature.  But  I know; 
for  this  reason  I behave  towards  him  according 


Book  III.]  ^arcue  aureliue  2lntontmis. 


135 


to  the  natural  law  of  fellowship  with  benevo- 
lence and  justice.  At  the  same  time,  however, 
in  things  indifferent*  I attempt  to  ascertain 
the  value  of  each. 

12.  If  thou  workest  at  that  which  is  before 
thee,  following  right  reason  seriousl}^  vigor- 
ously, calmly,  without  allowing  anything  else 
to  distract  thee,  but  keeping  thy  divine  part 
pure,  as  if  thou  shouldst  be  bound  to  give  it 
back  immediately;  if  thou  boldest  to  this,  ex- 
pecting nothing,  fearing  nothing,  but  satisfied 
with  thy  present  activity  according  to  nature, 
and  with  heroic  truth  iu  every  word  and  sound 
which  thou  utterest,  thou  wilt  live  happy. 
And  there  is  no  man  who  is  able  to  prevent 

, this. 

13.  As  physicians  have  always  their  instru- 
ments and  knives  ready  for  cases  which  sud- 
denly require  their  skill,  so  do  thou  have  prin- 

^ciples  ready  for  the  understanding  of  tMligS  - 
divine  and iTuman , an d for  doing  everything, 
”even~the  -smallest,  wifh^a' recfolle'Ctlon  of 'the 
A)crrrd  which  unites  the, divine  and  human  to 
■bne'  another.  For  neither  wilt  thou  do  any- 
thing well  which  pertains  to  man  without  at 
the  same  time  having  a reference  to  things 
divine;  nor  the  contrary. 

14.  No  longer  wander  at  hazard  ; for  neither 
wilt  thou  read  thy  own  memoirs, f nor  the  acts 

* Est  et  horum  quae  media  appellamus  grande  dis- 
crimeii. — Seneca,  Ep.  82. 

I Wofivriiiara:  or  memoranda,  notes,  and  the  like. 
See  i.  17. 


^rbou0bt0. 


[Book  III. 


136 

of  the  ancient  Romans  and  Hellenes,  and  the 
selections  from  books  which  thou  wast  reserv- 
ing for  thy  old  age.*  Hasten  then  to  the  end 
which  thou  hast  before  thee,  and,  throwing 
away  idle  hopes,  come  to  thy  own  aid,  if  thou 
carest  at  all  for  thyself,  while  it  is  in  thy 
power. 

15.  They  know  not  how  many  things  are 
signified  by  the  words  stealing,  sowing,  buy- 
ing, keeping  quiet,  seeing  what  ought  to  be 
done ; for  this  is  not  effected  by  the  eyes,  but 
by  another  kind  of  vision. 

16.  Body,  soul,  intelligence:  to  the  body  be- 
long sensation,  to  the  soul  appetites,  to  the 
intelligence  principles.  To  receive  the  impres- 
sions of  forms  by  means  of  appearances  belongs 
even  to  animals ; to  be  pulled  by  the  stringsf 
of  desire  belongs  both  to  wild  beasts  and  to 
men  who  have  made  themselves  into  women, 
and  to  a Phalaris  and  a Nero  ; and  to  have  the 
intelligence  that  guides  to  the  things  which 
appear  * suitable  belongs  also  to  those  who  do 
not  believe  in  the  gods,  and  who  betray  their 
country,  and  do  their  impure  deeds  when  they 
have  shut  the  doors.  If  then  everything  else 

* Compare  Pronto,  ii.  9;  a letter  of  Marcus  to 
Pronto,  who  was  then  consul:  “ Peci  tamen  mihi  per 
hos  dies  excerpta  ex  libris  sexaginta  in  quinque 
tomis.”  But  he  says  some  of  them  were  small  books. 

t Compare  Plato,  De  Legibus,  i.  p.  6^,  bri  Tavra  to. 
vkdr]  etc.;  and  Antoninus,  ii.  2;  vii.  3;  xii.  19. 


Book  III.]  /iBarcus  Hurellus  antoninus. 


137 


is  common  to  all  that  I have  mentioned,  there 
remains  that  which  is  peculiar  to  the  good  man, 
to  be  pleased  and  content  with  what  happens, 
and  with  the  thread  which  is  spun  for  him  ; 
and  not  to  defile  the  divinity  which  is  planted 
in  his  breast,  nor  disturb  it  by  a crowd  of 
images,  but  to  preserve  it  tranquil,  following 
it  obediently  as  a god,  neither  saying  anything 
contrary  to  the  truth,  nor  doing  anything  con- 
trary to  justice.  And  if  all  men  refuse  to  be- 
lieve that  he  lives  a simple,  modest,  and  con- 
tented life,  he  is  neither  angry  with  any  of 
them,  nor  does  he  deviate  from  the  way  which 
leads  to  the  end  of  life,  to  which  a man  ought 
to  come  pure,  tranquil,  ready  to  depart,  and 
without  any  compulsion  perfectly  reconciled  to 
his  lot, 


^Ibou0bt0. 


[Book  I?. 


138 


IV. 

That  which  rules  within,  when  it  is  accord- 
ing to  nature,  is  so  affected  with  respect  to 
the  events  which  happened,  that  it  always  easily 
adapts  itself  to  that  which  is  possible  and  is 
presented  to  it.  For  it  requires  no  definite 
material,  but  it  moves  towards  its  purpose,* 
under  certain  conditions,  however;  and  it 
makes  a material  for  itself  out  of  that  which 
opposes  it,  as  fire  lays  hold  of  what  falls  into 
it,  by  which  a small  light  would  have  been  ex- 
tinguished; but  when  the  fire  is  strong,  it  soon 
appropriates  to  itself  the  matter  which  is  heaped 
on  it,  and  consumes  it,  and  rises  higher  by 
means  of  this  very  material. 

2.  ffet  no  act  be  done  without  a purpose,  nor 
otherwise  than  according  to  the  perfect  princi- 
ples of  art. 

3.  Men  seek  retreats  for  themselves,  houses 
in  the  country,  sea-shores,  and  mountains;  and 
thou  too  art  wont  to  desire  such  things  very 
much.  But  this  is  altogether  a mark  of  the 
most  common  sort  of  men,  for  it  is  in  thy 
power  whenever  thou  shalt  choose  to  retire 

* Trpof  rd  rjyovfieva,  literally  “towards  that  which 
leads.”  The  exact  translation  is  doubtful.  See 
Gataker’s  note. 


BooklY.]  /ibarcuB  Hurelius  SntomnuB. 


139 


into  tli5^self.  For  nowhere  either  with  more 
quiet  or  more  freedom  from  trouble  does  a man 
retire  than  into  his  own  soul,  particularly  when 
he  has  within  him  such  thoughts  that  by  look- 
ing into  them  he  is  immediately  in  perfect 
tranquillity;  and  I affirm  that  tranquillity  is 
nothing  else  than  the  good  ordering  of  the 
mind.  Constantly  then  give  to  thyself  this 
retreat,  and  renew  thyself;  and  let  thy  princi- 
ples be  brief  and  fundamental,  which,  as  soon 
as  thou  shalt  recur  to  them,  will  be  sufficient 
to  cleanse  the  soul  completely,  and  to  send 
thee  back  free  from  all  discontent  with  the 
things  to  which  thou  returnest.  For  with 
what  art  thou  discontented  ? With  the  badness 
of  men  ? Recall  to  thy  mind  this  conclusion, 
that  rational  animals  exist  for  one  another,  and 
that  to  endure  is  a part  of  justice,  and  that  men 
do  wrong  involuntarily;  and  consider  how  many 
already,  after  mutual  enmity,  suspicion,  hatred, 
and  fighting,  have  been  stretched  dead,  reduced 
to  ashes;  and  be  quiet  at  last. — But  perhaps 
thou  art  dissatisfied  with  that  which  is  as- 
signed to  thee  out  of  the  universe. — Recall  to 
thy  recollection  this  alternative;  either  there  is 
providence  or  atoms  [fortuitous  concurrence  of 
things];  or  remember  the  arguments  b}"  which 
it  has  been  proved  that  the  world  is  a kind  of 
political  community  [and  be  quiet  at  last]. — 
But  perhaps  corporeal  things  will  still  fasten 
upon  thee. — Consider  then  further  that  the 
mind  mingles  not  with  the  breath,  whether 


140 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  IT. 


moving  gently  or  violently,  when  it  has  once 
drawn  itself  apart  and  discovered  its  own 
power,  and  think  also  of  all  that  thou  hast 
heard  and  assented  to  about  pain  and  pleasure 
[and  be  quiet  at  last], — But  perhaps  the  desire 
of  the  thing  called  fame  will  torment  thee. — 
See  how  soon  everything  is  forgotten,  and  look 
at  the  chaos  of  infinite  time  on  each  side  of  [the 
present],  and  the  emptiness  of  applause,  and 
the  changeableness  and  want  of  judgment  in 
those  who  pretend  to  give  praise,  and  the  nar- 
rowness of  the  space  within  which  it  is  circum- 
scribed [and  be  quiet  at  last].  For  the  whole 
earth  is  a point,  and  how  small  a nook  in  it  is 
this  thy  dwelling,  and  how  few  are  there  in  it, 
and  what  kind  of  people  are  they  who  will 
praise  thee. 

This  then  remains  : Remember  to  retire  into 
this  little  territory  of  thy  own,*  and  above  all 
do  not  distract  or  strain  thyself,  but  be  free, 
and  look  at  things  as  a man,  as  a human  being, 
as  a citizen,  as  a mortal.  But  among  the 
things  readiest  to  thy  hand  to  which  thou  shalt 
turn,  let  there  be  these,  which  are  two.  One  is 
that  things  do  not  touch  the  soul,  for  they  are 
external  and  remain  immovable  ; but  our  per- 
turbations come  only  from  the  opinion  which  is 
within.  The  other  is  that  all  these  things, 
which  thou  seest,  change  immediately  and  will 
no  longer  be ; and  constantly  bear  in  mind  how 

* Tecum  babita,  uoris  quam  sit  tibi  curta  supellex. 
— Persins,  iv.  52. 


Book  IT.]  Marcus  aurcUue  Hntoninus. 


HI 

many  of  these  changes  thou  hast  already  wit- 
nessed. The  universe  is  transformation  : life  is 
opinion. 

4.  If  our  intellectual  part  is  common,  the 
reason  also,  in  respect  of  which  we  are  rational 
beings,  is  common : if  this  is  so,  common  also  is 
the  reason  which  commands  us  what  to  do,  and 
what  not  to  do ; if  this  is  so,  there  is  a common 
law  also ; if  this  is  so,  we  are  fellow-citizens ; if 
this  is  so,  we  are  members  of  some  political 
community ; if  this  is  so,  the  world  is  in  a man- 
ner a state.*  For  of  what  other  common  politi- 
cal community  will  any  one  say  that  the  whole 
human  race  are  members?  And  from  thence, 
from  this  common  political  community,  comes 
also  our  very  intellectual  faculty  and  reasoning 
faculty  and  our  capacity  for  law ; or  whence  do 
they  come  ? For  as  my  earthly  part  is  a por- 
tion given  to  me  from  certain  earth,  and  that 
which  is  watery  from  another  element,  and  that 
which  is  hot  and  fiery  from  some  peculiar 
source  (for  nothing  comes  out  of  that  which  is 
nothing,  as  nothing  also  returns  to  non-exist- 
ence), so  also  the  intellectual  part  comes  from 
some  source. 

5.  Death  is  such  as  generation  is,  a mystery 
of  nature;  composition  out  of  the  same  elements, 
and  a decomposition  into  the  same  ; and  al- 
together not  a thing  of  which  any  man  should 
be  ashamed,  for  it  is  not  contrary  to  [the  nature 


* Compare  Cicero  De  Legibus,  i.  7. 


142 


XTbougbts. 


[Book  IV. 


of]  a reasonable  animal,  and  not  contrary  to 
the  reason  of  our  constitution. 

6.  It  is  natural  that  these  things  should  be 
done  by  such  persons,  it  is  a matter  of  necessity; 
and  if  a man  will  not  have  it  so,  he  will  not 
allow  the  fig-tree  to  have  juice.  But  by  all 
means  bear  this  in  mind,  that  within  a very 
short  time  both  thou  and  he  will  be  dead  ; and 
soon  not  even  your  names  will  be  left  behind. 

7.  Take  away  thy  opinion,  and  then  there  is 
taken  away  the  complaint,  ‘ I have  been 
harmed.”  Take  away  the  complaint,  ” I have 
been  harmed,”  and  the  harm  is  taken  away. 

8.  That  which  does  not  make  a man  worse 
than  he  was,  also  does  not  make  his  life  worse, 
nor  does  it  harm  him  either  from  without  or 
from  within. 

9.  The  nature  of  that  which  is  [universally] 
u.seful  has  been  compelled  to  do  this. 

10.  Consider  that  everything  which  happens, 
happens  justly,  and  if  thou  observest  carefully, 
thou  wilt  find  it  to  be  so.  I do  not  say  only 
with  respect  to  the  continuity  of  the  series  of 
things,  but  with  respect  to  what  is  just,  and  as 
if  it  were  done  b)^  one  who  assigns  to  each 
thing  its  value.  Observe  then  as  thou  hast  be- 
gun ; and  whatever  thou  doest,  do  it  in  con- 
junction with  this,  the  being  good,  and  in  the 
sense  in  which  a man  is  properly  understood  to 
be  good.  Keep  to  this  in  every  action. 

1 1 . Do  not  have  such  an  opinion  of  things  as 
he  has  who  does  thee  wrong,  or  such  as  he 


Book  lY.]  /Dbarcus  :aurelius  antoninue. 


143 


wishes  thee  to  have,  but  look  at  them  as  they 
are  in  truth. 

12.  A man  should  always  have  these  two 
rules  in  readiness ; the  one  to  do  only  whatever 
the  reason  of  the  ruling  and  legislating  faculty 
may  suggest  for  the  use  of  men  ; the  other,  to 
change  thy  opinion,  if  there  is  any  one  at  hand 
who  sets  thee  right  and  moves  thee  from  any 
opinion.  But  this  change  of  opinion  must  pro- 
ceed only  from  a certain  persuasion,  as  of  what 
is  just  or  of  common  advantage,  and  the  like, 
not  because  it  appears  pleasant  or  brings  repu- 
tation. 

13.  Hast  thou  reason?  I have. — Why  then 
dost  not  thou  use  it?  For  if  this  does  its  own 
work,  what  else  dost  thou  wish  ? 

14.  Thou  hast  existed  as  a part.  Thou  shalt 
disappear  in  that  which  produced  thee;  but 
rather  thou  shalt  be  received  back  into  its  semi- 
nal principle  by  transmutation. 

15.  Many  grains  of  frankincense  on  the  same 
altar:  one  falls  before,  another  falls  after;  but 
it  makes  no  difference. 

16.  Within  ten  days  thou  wilt  seem  a god 
to  those  to  whom  thou  art  now  a beast  and  an 
ape,  if  thou  wilt  return  to  th}"  principles  and 
the  worship  of  reason. 

17.  Do  not  act  as  if  thou  wert  going  to  live 
ten  thousand  3^ears.  Death  hangs  over  thee. 
While  thou  livest,  while  it  is  in  thy  power,  be 
good. 

18.  How  much  trouble  he  avoids  who  does 


144 


^Cbouflbts. 


[Book  IV. 


not  look  to  see  what  his  neighbor  says  or  does 
or  thinks,  but  only  to  what  he  does  himself, 
that  it  may  be  just  and  pure ; or,  as  Agathon+ 
says,  look  not  round  at  the  depraved  morals  of 
others,  but  run  straight  along  the  line  without 
deviating  from  it. 

19.  He  who  has  a vehement  desire  for 
posthumous  fame  does  not  consider  that  every 
one  of  those  who  remember  him  will  himself 
also  die  very  soon;  then  again  also  they  who 
have  succeeded  them,  until  the  whole  remem- 
brance shall  have  been  extinguished  as  it  is 
transmitted  through  men  who  foolishly  admire 
and  perish.  But  suppose  that  those  wdro  will 
remember  are  even  immortal,  and  that  the  re- 
membrance will  be  immortal,  what  then  is  this 
to  thee  ? And  I say  not  what  is  it  to  the  dead, 
but  what  is  it  to  the  living  ? What  is  praise, 
except  + indeed  so  far  as  it  has+  a certain 
utility?  For  thou  now  rejectest  unseasonably 
the  gift  of  nature,  clinging  to  something  else 
. . . +. 

20.  Everything  which  is  in  any  way  beauti- 
ful is  beautiful  in  itself,  and  terminates  in  itself, 
not  having  praise  as  part  of  itself.  Neither 
worse  then  nor  better  is  a thing  made  by  being 
praised.  I affirm  this  also  of  the  things  which 
are  called  beautiful  by  the  vulgar,  for  example, 
material  things  and  works  of  art.  That  which 
is  really  beautiful  has  no  need  of  anjdhing; 
not  more  than  law,  not  more  than  truth,  not 
more  than  benevolence  or  modesty.  Which  of 


BooklY.]  /iBarcus  :aurcUu«  antonfnus. 


145 


these  things  is  beautiful  because  it  is  praised, 
or  spoiled  by  being  blamed  ? Is  such  a thing 
as  an  emerald  made  worse  than  it  was,  if  it  is 
not  praised?  or  gold,  ivory,  purple,  a lyre,  a 
little  knife,  a flower,  a shrub  ? 

21.  If  souls  continue  to  exist,  how  does  the 
air  contain  them  from  eternity  ? — But  how  does 
the  earth  contain  the  bodies  of  those  who  have 
been  buried  from  time  so  remote  ? For  as  here 
the  mutation  of  these  bodies  after  a certain  con- 
tinuance, whatever  it  may  be,  and  their  disso- 
lution, make  room  for  other  dead  bodies,  so  the 
souls  which  are  removed  into  the  air  after  sub- 
sisting for  some  time  are  transmuted  and 
diffused,  and  assume  a fiery  nature  b)^  being  re- 
ceived into  the  seminal  intelligence  of  the  uni- 
verse, and  in  this  way  make  room  for  the  fresh 
souls  which  come  to  dwell  there.  And  this  is 
the  answer  which  a man  might  give  on  the 
h}*pothesis  of  souls  continuing  to  exist.  But 
we  must  not  only  think  of  the  number  of 
bodies  which  are  thus  buried,  but  also  of  the 
number  of  animals  which  are  daily  eaten  by  us 
and  the  other  animals.  For  what  a number  is 
consumed,  and  thus  in  a manner  buried  in  the 
bodies  of  those  who  feed  on  them ! And  never- 
theless this  earth  receives  them  by  reason  of  the 
changes  [of  these  bodies]  into  blood,  and  the 
transformations  into  the  aerial  or  the  flery 
element. 

What  is  the  investigation  into  the  truth  in 
this  matter?  The  division  into  that  which 
10 


146 


^Cbougbts. 


[Book  IV. 


is  material  and  that  which  is  the  cause  of  form 
[the  formal],  (vii.  29.) 

22.  Do  not  be  whirled  about,  but  in  every 
movement  have  respect  to  justice,  and  on  the 
occa.sion  of  every  impression  maintain  the 
faculty  of  comprehension  [or  understanding], 

23.  Everything  harmonizes  with  me,  which 
is  harmonious  to  thee,  O Universe.  Nothing 
for  me  is  too  early  nor  too  late,  which  is  in  due 
time  for  thee.  Everything  is  fruit  to  me  which 
thy  seasons  bring,  O Nature  : from  thee  are  all 
things,  in  thee  are  all  things,  to  thee  all  things 
return.  The  poet  says.  Dear  city  of  Cecrops ; 
and  wilt  not  thou  say,  Dear  city  of  Zeus  ? 

24.  Occupy  thj^self  with  few  things,  says  the 
philosopher,  if  thou  wouldst  be  tranquil.— But 
consider  if  it  would  not  be  better  to  say.  Do 
what  is  necessary,  and  whatever  the  reason  of 
the  animal  which  is  naturally  social  requires, 
and  as  it  requires.  For  this  brings  not  only 
the  tranquillity  which  comes  from  doing  well, 
but  also  that  which  comes  from  doing  few 
things.  For  the  greatest  part  of  what  we  say 
and  do  being  unnece.ssary,  if  a man  takes  this 
away,  he  will  have  more  leisure  and  less  un- 
easiness. Accordingly,  on  ever}^  occasion  a 
man  should  ask  himself.  Is  this  one  of  the  un- 
necessary things?  Now  a man  should  take 
away  not  only  unnecessary  acts,  but  also  un- 
necessary thoughts,  for  thus  superfluous  acts 
will  not  follow  after. 

25.  Try  how  the  life  of  the  good  man  suits 


Book  IV.]  ^arcu8  aurelius  Hntoninua. 


147 


thee,  the  life  of  him  who  is  satisfied  with  his 
portion  out  of  the  whole,  and  satisfied  with  his 
own  just  acts  and  benevolent  disposition. 

26.  Hast  thou  seen  those  things  ? Look  also 
at  these.  Do  not  disturb  thyself.  Make  thy- 
self all  simplicity.  Does  any  one  do  wrong? 
It  is  to  himself  that  he  does  the  wrong.  Has 
anything  happened  to  thee?  Well ; out  of  the 
universe  from  the  beginning  everything  which 
happens  has  been  apportioned  and  spun  out  to 
thee.  In  a word,  thy  life  is  short.  Thou 
must  turn  to  profit  the  present  by  the  aid  of 
reason  and  justice.  Be  sober  in  thy  relaxa- 
tion. 

27.  Either  it  is  a well-arranged  universe^'  or 
a chaos  huddled  together,  but  still  a universe. 
But  can  a certain  order  subsist  in  thee,  and 
disorder  in  the  All  ? And  this  too  when  all 
things  are  so  separated  and  diffused  and  sym- 
pathetic. 

28.  A black  character,  a womanish  char- 
acter, a stubborn  character,  bestial,  childish, 
animal,  stupid,  counterfeit,  scurrilous,  fraudu- 
lent, tyrannical. 

29.  If  he  is  a stranger  to  the  universe  who 
does  not  know  what  is  in  it,  no  less  is  he  a 
stranger  who  does  not  know  what  is  going  on 
in  it.  He  is  a runaway,  who  flies  from  social 
reason  ; he  is  blind,  who  shuts  the  eyes  of  un- 

* Antoninus  here  uses  the  word  Kdcfiog  both  in  the 
sense  of  the  Universe  and  of  Order;  and  it  is  diiScult 
to  express  his  meaning. 


148 


?Tbou0bt0. 


[Book  IV. 


derstanding  ; he  is  poor,  who  has  need  of  an- 
other, and  has  not  from  himself  all  things 
which  are  useful  for  life.  He  is  an  abscess  on 
the  universe  who  withdraws  and  separates 
himself  from  the  reason  of  our  common  nature 
through  being  displeased  with  the  things 
which  happen,  for  the  same  nature  produces 
this,  and  has  produced  thee  too : he  is  a piece 
rent  asunder  from  the  state,  who  tears  his  own 
soul  from  that  of  reasonable  animals,  which  is 
one. 

30.  The  one  is  a philosopher  without  a tunic, 
and  the  other  without  a book;  here  is  another 
half  naked:  Bread  I have  not,  he  sa3^s,  and  I 
abide  by  reason — and  I do  not  get  the  means 
of  living  out  of  my  learning,-!-  and  I abide  [by 
my  reason], 

31.  Love  the  art,  poor  as  it  may  be,  which 
thou  hast  learned,  and  be  content  with  it;  and 
pass  through  the  rest  of  life  like  one  who  has 
intrusted  to  the  gods  with  his  whole  soul  all 
that  he  has,  making  thyself  neither  the  tyrant 
nor  the  slave  of  any  man. 

32.  Consider,  for  example,  the  times  of  Ves- 
pasian. Thou  wilt  see  all  these  things,  people 
marrying,  bringing  up  children,  sick,  dying, 
warring,  feasting,  trafficking,  cultivating  the 
ground,  flattering,  obstinately  arrogant,  suspect- 
ing, plotting,  wishing  for  some  to  die,  grumbling 
about  the  present,  loving,  heaping  up  treas- 
ure, de.siring  consulship,  kingly  power.  Well, 
then,  that  life  of  the.se  people  no  longer  exists 


Book  IV.]  Marcus  aurelius  antoninus. 


149 


at  all.  Again,  remove  to  the  times  of  Trajan. 
Again,  all  is  the  same.  Their  life  too  is  gone. 
In  like  manner  view  also  the  other  epochs  of 
time  and  of  whole  nations,  and  see  how  many- 
after  great  efforts  soon  fell  and  were  resolved 
into  the  elements.  But  chiefly  thou  shouldst 
think  of  those  whom  thou  hast  thyself  known 
distracting  themselves  about  idle  things,  ne- 
glecting to  do  what  was  in  accordance  with  their 
proper  constitution,  and  to  hold  firmly  to  this 
and  to  be  content  with  it.  And  herein  it  is 
necessary  to  remember  that  the  attention  given 
to  everything  has  its  proper  value  and  propor- 
tion. For  thus  thou  wilt  not  be  dissatisfied,  if 
thou  appliest  thyself  to  smaller  matters  no  fur- 
ther than  is  fit. 

33.  The  words  which  were  formerly  familiar 
are  now  antiquated:  so  also  the  names  of  those 
who  were  famed  of  old,  are  now  in  a manner 
antiquated,  Camillus,  Caeso,  Volesus,  Leon- 
natus,  and  a little  after  also  Scipio  and  Cato, 
then  Augu-stus,  then  also  Hadrianus  and  An- 
toninus. For  all  things  soon  pass  away  and  be- 
come a mere  tale,  and  complete  oblivion  soon 
buries  them.  And  I sa}^  this  of  those  who  have 
shone  in  a wondrous  way.  For  the  rest,  as 
soon  as  they  have  breathed  out  their  breath 
they  are  gone,  and  no  man  speaks  of  them. 
And,  to  conclude  the  matter,  what  is  even  an 
eternal  remembrance  ? A mere  nothing.  What 
then  is  that  about  which  we  ought  to  employ 
our  serious  pains?  This  one  thing,  thoughts 


O:bou0bt6. 


[Book  IT. 


150 

just,  and  acts  social,  and  words  which  never 
lie,  and  a disposition  which  gladly  accepts  all 
that  happens,  as  necessary,  as  usual,  as  flowing 
from  a principle  and  source  of  the  same  kind. 

34.  Willingly  give  thyself  up  to  Clotho  [one 
of  the  fates] , allowing  her  to  spin  thy  thread  + 
into  whatever  things  she  pleases. 

35.  Everything  is  only  for  a day,  both  that 
which  remembers  and  that  which  is  remem- 
bered. 

36.  Observe  constantly  that  all  things  take 
place  by  change,  and  accustom  thyself  to  con- 
sider that  the  nature  of  the  universe  loves  noth- 
ing so  much  as  to  change  the  things  which  are 
and  to  make  new  things  like  them.  For 
everything  that  exists  is  in  a manner  the  seed 
of  that  which  will  be.  But  thou  art  thinking 
only  of  seeds  which  are  cast  into  the  earth  or 
into  a womb:  but  this  is  a very  vulgar  notion. 

37.  Thou  wilt  soon  die,  and  thou  art  not  yet 
simple,  nor  free  from  perturbations,  nor  with- 
out suspicion  of  being  hurt  by  external  things, 
nor  kindly  disposed  towards  all;  nor  dost  thou 
yet  place  wisdom  only  in  acting  justly. 

38.  Examine  men’s  ruling  principles,  even 
those  of  the  wise,  what  kind  of  things  they 
avoid,  and  what  kind  they  pursue. 

39.  What  is  evil  to  thee  does  not  subsist  in 
the  ruling  principle  of  another;  nor  yet  in  any 
turning  and  mutation  of  thy  corporeal  cover- 
ing. Where  is  it  then  ? It  is  in  that  part  of 
thee  in  which  subsists  the  power  of  forming 


Book  IV.]  Marcus  Hurcliue  Bntoninue. 


151 

opinions  about  evils.  Let  this  power  then  not 
form  [such]  opinions,  and  all  is  well.  And  if 
that  which  is  nearest  to  it,  the  poor  body,  is 
cut,  burnt,  filled  with  matter  and  rottenness, 
nevertheless  let  the  part  which  forms  opinions 
about  these  things  be  quiet;  that  is,  let  it 
judge  that  nothing  is  either  bad  or  good  which 
can  happen  equally  to  the  bad  man  and  the 
good.  For  that  which  happens  equally  to  him 
who  lives  contrary  to  nature  and  to  him  who 
lives  according  to  nature,  is  neither  according 
to  nature  nor  contrary  to  nature. 

40.  Constantly  regard  the  universe  as  one 
living  being,  having  one  substance  and  one 
soul ; and  observ^e  how  all  things  have  reference 
to  one  perception,  the  perception  of  this  one 
living- being;  and  how  all  things  act  with  one 
movement;  and  how  all  things  are  the  co- 
operating causes  of  all  things  which  exist; 
observe  too  the  continuous  spinning  of  the 
thread  and  the  contexture  of  the  web. 

41.  Thou  art  a little  soul  bearing  about  a 
corpse,  as  Epictetus  used  to  say  (i.  c.  19). 

42.  It  is  no  evil  for  things  to  undergo  change, 
and  no  good  for  things  to  subsist  in  conse- 
quence of  change. 

43.  Time  is  like  a river  made  up  of  the 
events  which  happen,  and  a violent  stream;  for 
as  soon  as  a thing  has  been  seen,  it  is  carried 
away,  and  another  comes  in  its  place,  and  this 
will  be  carried  away  too. 

44.  Everything  which  happens  is  as  familiar 


152 


Cbouflbte. 


[Book  IV. 


and  well  known  as  the  rose  in  spring  and  the 
fruit  in  summer;  for  such  is  disease,  and  death, 
and  calumny,  and  treachery,  and  whatever  else 
delights  fools  or  vexes  them. 

45.  In  the  series  of  things,  those  which  follow 
are  always  aptly  fitted  to  those  which  have 
gone  before:  for  this  series  is  not  like  a mere 
enumeration  of  disjointed  things,  which  has 
only  a necessary  sequence,  but  it  is  a rational 
connection:  and  as  all  existing  things  are  ar- 
ranged together  harmoniously,  so  the  things 
which  come  into  existence  exhibit  no  mere  suc- 
cession, but  a certain  wonderful  relationship 
(vi.  38;  vii.  9;  vii,  75,  note). 

46.  Always  remember  the  sa5dng  of  Hera- 
clitus, that  the  death  of  earth  is  to  become 
water,  and  the  death  of  water  is  to  become  air, 
and  the  death  of  air  is  to  become  fire,  and  re- 
versely. And  think  too  of  him  who  forgets 
whither  the  way  leads,  and  that  men  quarrel 
with  that  with  which  they  are  most  constantly 
in  communion,  the  reason  which  governs  the 
universe;  and  the  things  which  they  daily  meet 
with  seem  to  them  strange:  and  consider  that  we 
ought  not  to  act  and  speak  as  if  we  were  asleep, 
for  even  in  sleep  we  seem  to  act  and  speak; 
and  that  + we  ought  not,  like  children  who 
learn  from  their  parents,  simply  to  act  and  speak 
as  we  have  been  taught. + 

47.  If  any  god  told  thee  that  thou  shalt  die 
to-morrow,  or  certainly  on  the  day  after  to-mor- 
row, thou  wouldst  not  care  much  whether  it 


Book  IV.]  jfflSaccus  aureUus  Bntoninus. 


153 


was  on  the  third  day  or  on  the  morrow,  unless 
thou  wast  in  the  highest  degree  mean-spirited; 
for  how  small  is  the  difference ! So  think  it  no 
great  thing  to  die  after  as  many  years  as  thou 
canst  name  rather  than  to-morrow. 

48.  Think  continually  how  many  physicians 
are  dead  after  often  contracting  their  eyebrows 
over  the  sick;  and  how  many  astrologers  after 
predicting  with  great  pretensions  the  deaths  of 
others;  and  how  many  philosophers  after  end- 
less discourses  on  death  or  immortality;  how 
many  heroes  after  killing  thousands;  and  how 
many  t3^rants  who  have  used  their  power  over 
men’s  lives  with  terrible  insolence,  as  if  they 
were  immortal;  and  how  many  cities  are  entirelj" 
dead,  so  to  speak,  Helice^  and  Pompeii  and 
Herculaneum,  and  others  innumerable.  Add  to 
the  reckoning  all  whom  thou  hast  known,  one 
after  another.  One  man  after  burying  another 
has  been  laid  out  dead,  and  another  buries 
him;  and  all  this  in  a short  time.  To  conclude, 
always  observe  how  ephemeral  and  worthless 
human  things  are,  and  what  was  yesterday  a 
little  mucus,  to-morrow  will  be  a mummy  or 
ashes.  Pass  then  through  this  little  space  of 
time  conformably  to  nature,  and  end  thy  jour- 
ney in  content,  as  an  olive  falls  off  when  it  is 
ripe,  blessing  nature  who  produced  it,  and 
thanking  the  tree  on  which  it  grew. 

* Ovid,  Met.  xv.  293: — 

“Si  quaeras  Helicen  et  Burin  Achaidas  urbes, 
Invenies  sub  aquis.  ’ ’ 


154 


?Tbou0bts. 


[Book  I?. 


49.  Be  like  the  promontory  against  which 
the  waves  continually  break,  but  it  stands  firm 
and  tames  the  fury  of  the  water  around  it. 

Unhappy  am  I becau.se  this  has  happened  to 
me  ? Not  so,  but  happy  am  I,  though  this  has 
happened  to  me,  because  I continue  free  from 
pain,  neither  crushed  by  the  present  nor  fear- 
ing the  future.  For  such  a thing  as  this  might 
have  happened  to  every  man;  but  every  man 
would  not  have  continued  free  from  pain  on 
such  an  occasion.  Why  then  is  that  rather  a 
misfortune  than  this  a good  fortune  ? And  dost 
thou  in  all  cases  call  that  a man’s  misfortune 
which  is  not  a deviation  from  man’s  nature? 
And  does  a thing  seem  to  thee  to  be  a deviation 
from  man’s  nature,  when  it  is  not  contrary  to 
the  will  of  man’s  nature  ? Well,  thou  knowest 
the  will  of  nature.  Will  then  this  which  has 
happened  prevent  thee  from  being  just,  mag- 
nanimous, temperate,  prudent,  secure  against 
inconsiderate  opinions  and  falsehood;  will  it 
prevent  thee  from  having  modesty,  freedom, 
and  everything  else,  by  the  presence  of  which 
man’s  nature  obtains  all  that  is  its  own  ? Re- 
member too  on  every  occasion  which  leads  thee 
to  vexation  to  apply  this  principle;  not  that 
this  is  a misfortune,  but  that  to  bear  it  nobly  is 
good  fortune. 

50.  It  is  a vulgar,  but  still  a useful  help 
towards  contempt  of  death,  to  pass  in  review 
those  who  have  tenaciously  stuck  to  life. 
What  more  then  have  they  gained  than  those 


Book  IV.]  Marcus  Aurelius  antonfnus. 


155 


Avho  have  died  early  ? Certainly  they  lie  in 
their  tombs  somewhere  at  last,  Cadicianus, 
Fabius,  Julianus,  Lepidus,  or  any  one  else  like 
them,  who  ha-s^e  carried  out  many  to  be  buried, 
and  then  were  carried  out  themselves.  Alto- 
gether the  interval  is  small  [between  birth  and 
death]  ; and  consider  with  how  much  trouble, 
and  in  company  with  what  sort  of  people,  and 
in  what  a feeble  bod}^,  this  interval  is  labor- 
iously passed.  Do  not  then  consider  life  a 
thing  of  any  value.  + For  look  to  the  im- 
mensity of  time  behind  thee,  and  to  the  time 
which  is  before  thee,  another  boundless  space. 
In  this  infinity  then  what  is  the  difference  be- 
tween him  who  lives  three  days  and  him  who 
lives  three  generations  ?* 

51.  Always  run  to  the  short  waj^;  and  the 
short  way  is  the  natural:  accordingly  say  and 
do  everything  in  conformity  with  the  soundest 
reason.  For  such  a purpose  frees  a man  from 
trouble,  + and  warfare,  and  all  artifice  and 
ostentatious  display. 

* An  allusion  to  Homer’s  Nestor,  who  was  living  at 
the  war  of  Troy  among  the  third  generation,  like  old 
Parr  with  his  hundred  and  fifty-two  years,  and  some 
others  in  modern  times  who  have  beaten  Parr  by 
twenty  or  thirty  years  if  it  is  true;  and  yet  they  died 
at  last.  The  word  is  rpi-yepr/viov  in  Antoninus.  Nestor 
is  named  rpcyepuv  by  some  writers;  but  here  perhaps 
theie  is  an  allusion  to  Homer’s  Tep^vioc  iTzno-a  'SeaTa^. 


156 


^bougbte. 


[BootV. 


V. 

IN  the  morning  when  thou  risest  unwillingly, 
let  this  thought  be  present, — I am  rising  to 
the  work  of  a human  being.  Why  then  am  I 
dissatisfied  if  I am  going  to  do  the  things  for 
which  I exist  and  for  which  I was  brought  into 
the  world  ? Or  have  I been  made  for  this,  to 
lie  in  the  bed-clothes  and  keep  myself  warm  ? 
— But  this  is  more  pleasant. — Dost  thou  exist 
then  to  take  thy  pleasure,  and  not  at  all  for 
action  or  exertion  ? Dost  thou  not  see  the  little 
plants,  the  little  birds,  the  ants,  the  spiders, 
the  bees  working  together  to  put  in  order  their 
several  parts  of  the  universe  ? And  art  thou 
unwilling  to  do  the  work  of  a human  being, 
and  dost  thou  not  make  haste  to  do  that  which 
is  according  to  thy  nature  ? But  it  is  necessary 
to  take  rest  also. — It  is  necessary.  However, 
Nature  has  fixed  bounds  to  this  too:  she  has 
fixed  bounds  to  eating  and  drinking,  and  yet 
thou  goest  beyond  these  bounds,  beyond  what 
is  .sufficient;  yet  in  thy  acts  it  is  not  so,  but 
thou  stoppest  short  of  what  thou  canst  do.  So 
thou  lovest  not  thyself,  for  if  thou  didst,  thou 
wouldst  love  thy  nature  and  her  will.  But 
those  who  love  their  several  arts  exhaust 
themselves  in  working  at  them  unwashed  and 


BookV.]  fllbarcus  aurclius  antonfnue. 


157 


without  food;  but  thou  valuest  thy  own  nature 
less  than  the  turner  values  the  turning  art,  or 
the  dancer  the  dancing  art,  or  the  lover  of 
money  values  his  money,  or  the  vain-glorious 
man  his  little  glory.  And  such  men,  when 
they  have  a violent  affection  to  a thing,  choose 
neither  to  eat  nor  to  sleep  rather  than  to  perfect 
the  things  which  they  care  for.  But  are  the 
acts  which  concern  society  more  vile  in  thy 
eyes  and  less  worthy  of  thy  labor  ? 

2.  How  easy  it  is  to  repel  and  to  wipe  away 
every  impression  which  is  troublesome  or  un- 
suitable, and  immediately  to  be  in  all  tran- 
quillity. 

3.  Judge  every  word  and  deed  which  are  ac- 
cording to  nature  to  be  fit  for  thee;  and  be  not 
diverted  by  the  blame  which  follows  from  any 
people,  nor  by  their  words,  but  if  a thing  is 
good  to  be  done  or  said,  do  not  consider  it  un- 
worthy of  thee.  For  those  persons  have  their 
peculiar  leading  principle  and  follow  their  pe- 
culiar movement;  which  things  do  not  thou 
regard,  but  go  straight  on,  following  thy  own 
nature  and  the  common  nature;  and  the  way 
of  both  is  one. 

4.  I go  through  the  things  which  happen  ac- 
cording to  nature  until  I shall  fall  and  rest, 
breathing  out  my  breath  into  that  element  out 
of  which  I daily  draw  it  in,  and  falling  upon 
that  earth  out  of  which  my  father  collected  the 
seed,  and  my  mother  the  blood,  and  my  nurse 
the  milk;  out  of  which  during  so  many  years 


158 


tlbouflbts. 


[Book  V. 


I have  been  supplied  with  food  and  drink; 
which  bears  me  when  I tread  on  it  and  abuse 
it  for  so  many  purposes. 

5.  Thou  sayest,  Men  cannot  admire  the 
sharpness  of  thy  wits. — Be  it  so  : but  there  are 
many  other  things  of  which  thou  canst  not 
say,  I am  not  formed  from  them  by  nature. 
Show  those  qualities  then  which  are  altogether 
in  thy  power,  sincerity,  gravity,  endurance  of 
labor,  aversion  to  pleasure,  contentment  with 
thy  portion  and  with  few  things,  benevolence, 
frankness,  no  love  of  superfluity,  freedom  from 
trifling,  magnanimity.  Dost  thou  not  see  how 
many  qualities  thou  art  immediately  able  to 
exhibit,  in  which  there  is  no  excuse  of  natural 
incapacity  and  unfitness,  and  yet  thou  still  re- 
mainest  voluntarily  below  the  mark  ? or  art 
thou  compelled  through  being  defectively  fur- 
nished by  nature  to  murmur,  and  to  be  stingy, 
and  to  flatter,  and  to  find  fault  with  thy  poor 
body,  and  to  try  to  please  men,  and  to  make 
great  display,  and  to  be  so  restless  in  thy 
mind  ? No,  by  the  gods  ; but  thou  mightest 
have  been  delivered  from  these  things  long 
ago.  Only  if  in  truth  thou  canst  be  charged 
with  being  rather  slow  and  dull  of  comprehen- 
sion, thou  must  exert  thy.self  about  this  also, 
not  neglecting  it  nor  yet  taking  pleasure  in  thy 
dullness. 

6.  One  man,  when  he  has  done  a service  to 
another,  is  ready  to  set  it  down  to  his  account 
as  a favor  conferred.  Another  is  not  ready  to 


BookV.]  Marcus  SurcHua  Antoninus. 


159 


do  this,  but  still  in  his  own  mind  he  thinks  of 
the  man  as  his  debtor,  and  he  knows  what  he 
has  done.  A third  in  a manner  does  not  even 
know  what  he  has  done,  but  he  is  like  a vine 
which  has  produced  grapes,  and  seeks  for  no- 
thing more  after  it  has  once  produced  its 
proper  fruit.  As  a horse  when  he  has  run,  a 
dog  when  he  has  tackled  the  game,  a bee  when 
it  has  made  the  honey,  so  a man  when  he  has 
done  a good  act  does  not  call  out  for  others  to 
come  and  see,  but  he  goes  on  to  another  act, 
as  a vine  goes  on  to  produce  again  the  grapes 
in  season. — Must  a man  then  be  one  of  these, 
who  in  a manner  act  thus  without  rbserving 
it? — Yes. —But  this  ver>'  thing  is  necessary, 
the  observation  of  what  a man  is  doing  ; for,  it 
may  be  said,  it  is  characteristic  of  the  .social 
animal  to  perceive  that  he  is  working  in  a 
social  manner,  and  indeed  to  wish  that  his 
social  partner  also  shonld  perceive  it. — It  is 
true  that  thou  sayest,  but  thou  dost  not  rightly 
understand  what  is  now  said  : and  for  this 
reason  thou  wilt  become  one  of  those  of  whom 
I spoke  before,  for  even  they  are  misled  b}"  a 
certain  show  of  reason.  But  if  thou  wilt 
choose  to  understand  the  meaning  of  what  is 
said,  do  not  fear  that  for  this  reason  thou  wilt 
omit  any  social  act. 

7.  A prayer  of  the  Athenians:  Rain,  rain,  O 
dear  Zeus,  down  on  the  ploughed  fields  of  the 
Athenians  and  on  the  plains. — In  truth  we 
ought  not  to  pray  at  all,  or  we  ought  to  pray 
in  this  simple  and  noble  fashion. 


i6o 


JCboufibts. 


[fiook  V. 


8.  Just  as  we  must  understand  when  it  is 
said,  That  Aesculapius  prescribed  to  this  man 
horse-exercise,  or  bathing  in  cold  water,  or  go- 
ing without  shoes,  so  we  must  understand  it 
when  it  is  said.  That  the  nature  of  the  universe 
prescribed  to  this  man  disease,  or  mutilation, 
or  loss,  or  anything  else  of  the  kind.  For  in 
the  first  case  Prescribed  means  something  like 
this:  he  prescribed  this  for  this  man  as  a 
thing  adapted  to  procure  health;  and  in  the 
second  case  it  means.  That  which  happens  * to 
[or  suits]  every  man  is  fixed  in  a manner  for 
him  suitably  to  his  destiny.  For  this  is  what 
we  mean  when  we  say  that  things  are  suitable 
to  us,  as  the  workmen  say  of  squared  stones  in 
walls  or  the  pyramids,  that  they  are  suitable, 
when  they  fit  them  to  one  another  in  some  kind 
of  connection.  For  there  is  altogether  one  fit- 
ness [harmony].  And  as  the  universe  is  made 
up  out  of  all  bodies  to  be  such  a body  as  it  is, 
so  out  of  all  existing  causes  necessity  [destiny] 
is  made  up  to  be  such  a cause  as  it  is.  And 
even  those  who  are  completely  ignorant  under- 
stand what  I mean;  for  they  say.  It  [necessity, 
destiny]  brought  this  to  such  a person. — This 
then  was  brought  and  this  was  prescribed  to 
him.  I,et  us  then  receive  these  things,  as  well 
as  those  which  Aesculapius  prescribes.  Many 
as  a matter  of  course  even  among  his  prescrip- 
tions are  disagreeable,  but  we  accept  them  in 

* In  this  section  there  is  a play  on  the  meaning  of 
cvuQa'iveiv. 


Book  Y.]  Marcus  Surelfus  antoninu6. 


i6i 


the  hope  of  health.  Let  the  perfecting  and 
accomplishment  of  the  things  which  the  com- 
mon nature  judges  to  be  good,  be  judged  by 
thee  to  be  of  the  same  kind  as  thy  health. 
And  so  accept  everything  which  happens,  even 
if  it  seem  disagreeable,  because  it  leads  to  this, 
to  the  health  of  the  universe  and  to  the  pros- 
perity and  felicity  of  Zeus  [the  universe].  For 
he  would  not  have  brought  on  any  man  what 
he  has  brought,  if  it  were  not  useful  for  the 
whole.  Neither  does  the  nature  of  anything, 
whatever  it  may  be,  cause  anything  which  is 
not  suitable  to  that  which  is  directed  by  it. 
For  two  reasons  then  it  is  right  to  be  content 
with  that  which  happens  to  thee;  the  one,  be- 
cause it  was  done  for  thee  and  prescribed  for 
thee,  and  in  a manner  had  reference  to  thee, 
originally  from  the  most  ancient  causes  spun 
with  thy  destiny;  and  the  other,  because  even, 
that  which  comes  severally  to  ever}^  man  is  to 
the  power  which  administers  the  universe  a 
cause  of  felicity  and  perfection,  nay  even  of  its 
very  continuance.  For  the  integrity  of  the 
whole  is  mutilated,  if  thou  cuttest  off  anything 
whatever  from  the  conjunction  and  the  contin- 
uity either  of  the  parts  or  of  the  causes.  And 
thou  dost  cut  off,  as  far  as  it  is  in  thy  power, 
when  thou  art  dissatisfied,  and  in  a manner 
triest  to  put  anything  out  of  the  way. 

9.  Be  not  disgusted,  nor  discouraged,  nor 
dissatisfied,  if  thou  dost  not  succeed  in  doing 
everything  according  to  right  principles,  but 

II 


i62 


^Cbougbts. 


[Book  V. 


when  thou  hast  failed,  return  back  again,  and 
be  content  if  the  greater  part  of  what  thou 
doest  is  consistent  with  man’s  nature,  and  love 
this  to  which  thou  returnest;  and  do  not  return 
to  philosophy  as  if  she  were  a master,  but  act 
like  those  who  have  sore  eyes  and  apply  a bit 
of  sponge  and  egg,  or  as  another  applies  a 
plaster,  or  drenching  with  water.  For  thus 
thou  wilt  not  fail  to  + obey  reason,  and  thou 
wilt  repose  in  it.  And  remember  that  philos- 
ophy requires  only  things  which  thy  nature  re- 
quires; but  thou  wouldst  have  something  else 
which  is  not  according  to  nature. — It  may  be 
objected.  Why,  what  is  more  agreeable  than 
this  [which  I am  doing]?  But  is  not  this  the 
very  reason  why  pleasure  deceives  us  ? And 
consider  if  magnanimity,  freedom,  simplicity, 
equanimity,  piety,  are  not  more  agreeable. 
For  what  is  more  agreeable  than  wisdom  itself, 
when  thou  thinkest  of  the  security  and  the 
happy  course  of  all  things  which  depend  on  the 
faculty  of  understanding  and  knowledge  ? 

lo.  Things  are  in  such  a kind  of  envelop- 
ment that  they  have  seemed  to  philosophers, 
not  a few  nor  those  common  philosophers,  alto- 
gether unintelligible;  nay  even  to  the  Stoics 
themselves  they  seem  difficult  to  understand. 
And  all  our  assent  is  changeable;  for  where  is 
the  man  who  never  changes?  Carry  thy 
thoughts  then  to  the  objects  themselves,  and 
consider  how  short-lived  they  are  and  worth- 
less, and  that  they  may  be  in  the  possession  of 


BookV.]  Marcus  aurellue  Jlntomnus.  163 

a filthy  wretch  or  a whore  or  a robber.  Then 
turn  to  the  morals  of  those  who  live  with  thee, 
and  it  is  hardly  possible  to  endure  even  the 
most  agreeable  of  them,  to  say  nothing  of  a man 
being  hardly  able  to  endure  himself  In  such 
darkness  then  and  dirt,  and  in  so  constant  a 
flux  both  of  substance  and  of  time,  and  of 
motion  and  of  things  moved,  what  there  is 
worth  being  highly  prized,  or  even  an  object 
of  serious  pursuit,  I cannot  imagine.  But  on 
the  contrary  it  is  a man’s  duty  to  comfort  him- 
self, and  to  wait  for  the  natural  dissolution,  and 
not  to  be  vexed  at  the  delay,  but  to  rest  in 
these  principles  only:  the  one,  that  nothing 
will  happen  to  me  which  is  not  conformable  to 
the  nature  of  the  universe;  and  the  other,  that 
it  is  in  my  power  never  to  act  contrary  to  my 
god  and  daemon:  for  there  is  no  man  who  will 
compel  me  to  this. 

11.  About  what  am  I now  employing  my 
own  soul  ? On  every  occasion  I must  ask  my- 
self this  question,  and  inquire.  What  have  I 
now  in  this  part  of  me  which  they  call  the  rul- 
ing principle?  and  whose  soul  have  I now, — 
that  of  a child,  or  of  a young  man,  or  of  a 
feeble  woman,  or  of  a tyrant,  or  of  a domestic 
animal,  or  of  a wild  beast? 

12.  What  kind  of  things  those  are  which  ap- 
pear good  to  the  many,  we  may  learn  even 
from  this.  For  if  any  man  should  conceive 
certain  things  as  being  really  good,  such  as 
prudence,  temperance,  justice,  fortitude,  he 


164 


u:bougbts. 


[Book  Y. 


would  not  after  having  first  conceived  these 
endure  to  listen  to  anythingd-  which  should 
not  be  in  harmony  with  what  is  really  good.+ 
But  if  a man  has  first  conceived  as  good  the 
things  which  appear  to  the  many  to  be  good, 
he  will  listen  and  readily  receive  as  very  appli- 
cable that  which  was  said  by  the  comic  writer. 
+TI1US  even  the  many  perceive  the  difference. -h 
For  were  it  not  so,  this  saying  would  not  offend 
and  would  not  be  rejected  [in  the  first  case], 
while  we  receive  it  when  it  is  said  of  wealth, 
and  of  the  means  which  further  luxury  and 
fame,  as  said  fitly  and  wittily.  Go  on  then 
and  ask  if  we  should  value  and  think  those 
things  to  be  good,  to  which  after  their  first 
conception  in  the  mind  the  words  of  the  comic 
writer  might  be  aptly  applied, — that  he  who 
has  them,  through  pure  abundance  has  not  a 
place  to  ease  himself  in. 

13.  I am  composed  of  the  formal  and  the 
material ; and  neither  of  them  will  perish  into 
non-existence,  as  neither  of  them  came  into  ex- 
istence out  of  non-existence.  Every  part  of  me 
then  will  be  reduced  by  change  into  some  part 
of  the  universe,  and  that  again  will  change 
into  another  part  of  the  universe,  and  so  0!i  for- 
ever. And  by  consequence  of  such  a change  I 
too  exist,  and  those  who  begot  me,  and  so  on 
forever  in  the  other  direction.  For  nothing 
hinders  us  from  saying  so,  even  if  the  universe 
is  administered  according  to  definite  periods 
[of  revolution]. 


BookV.]  fliiarcus  BureUus  Bntoninus. 


165 


14.  Reason  and  the  reasoning  art  [philoso- 
phy] are  powers  which  are  sufficient  for  them- 
selves and  for  their  own  works.  They  move 
then  from  a first  principle  which  is  their  own, 
and  they  make  their  way  to  the  end  which  is 
proposed  to  them ; and  this  is  the  reason  why 
such  acts  are  named  Catorthoseis  or  right  acts, 
w'hich  word  signifies  that  they  proceed  by  the 
right  road. 

15.  None  of  these  things  ought  to  be  called  a 
man’s,  which  do  not  belong  to  a man,  as  man. 
They  are  not  required  of  a man,  nor  does 
man’s  nature  promise  them,  nor  are  they  the 
means  of  man’s  nature  attaining  its  end. 
Neither  then  does  the  end  of  man  lie  in  these 
things,  nor  yet  that  which  aids  to  the  accom- 
plishment of  this  end,  and  that  which  aids  to- 
ward this  end  is  that  which  is  good.  Besides, 
if  any  of  these  things  did  belong  to  man,  it 
would  not  be  right  for  a man  to  despise  them  and 
to  set  himself  against  them  ; nor  would  a man 
be  worthy  of  praise  who  showed  that  he  did 
not  want  these  things,  nor  would  he  who 
stinted  himself  in  any  of  them  be  good,  if  in- 
deed these  things  were  good.  But  now  the 
more  of  these  things  a man  deprives  himself  of, 
or  of  other  things  like  them,  or  even  when  he 
is  deprived  of  any  of  them,  the  more  patiently 
he  endures  the  loss,  just  in  the  same  degree  he 
is  a better  man. 

16.  Such  as  are  thy  habitual  thoughts,  such 
also  will  be  the  character  of  thy  mind;  for  the 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  V. 


1 66 


soul  is  dyed  by  the  thoughts.  Dye  it  then 
with  a continuous  series  of  such  thoughts  as 
these:  for  instance,  that  where  a man  can  live, 
there  he  can  also  live  well.  But  he  must  live 
in  a palace;  well  then,  he  can  also  live  well  in 
a palace.  And  again,  consider  that  for  what- 
ever purpose  each  thing  has  been  constituted, 
for  this  it  has  been  constituted,  and  towards 
this  it  is  carried ; and  its  end  is  in  that  towards 
which  it  is  carried;  and  where  the  end  is,  there 
also  is  the  advantage  and  the  good  of  each 
thing.  Now  the  good  for  the  reasonable  ani- 
mal is  society ; for  that  we  are  made  for  society 
has  been  shown  above.*  Is  it  not  plain  that 
the  inferior  exists  for  the  sake  of  the  superior  ? 
But  the  things  which  have  life  are  superior  to 
those  which  have  not  life,  and  of  those  which 
have  life  the  superior  are  those  which  have 
reason. 

17.  To  seek  what  is  impossible  is  madness: 
and  it  is  impossible  that  the  bad  should  not  do 
something  of  this  kind. 

18.  Nothing  happens  to  any  man  which  he 
is  not  formed  by  nature  to  bear.  The  same 
things  happen  to  another,  and  either  because 
he  does  not  see  that  they  have  happened,  or 
because  he  would  show  a great  spirit,  he  is 
firm  and  remains  unharmed.  It  is  a shame 
then  that  ignorance  and  conceit  should  be 
stronger  than  wisdom. 

19.  Things  themselves  touch  not  the  soul, 

*ii.  I. 


Book?.]  Marcus  Burelius  Bntoninus. 


167 


not  in  the  least  degree;  nor  have  they  ad- 
mission to  the  soul,  nor  can  they  turn  or  move 
the  soul;  but  the  soul  turns  and  moves  itself 
alone,  and  whatever  judgments  it  maj'  think 
proper  to  make,  such  it  makes  for  itself  the 
things  which  present  themselves  to  it. 

20.  In  one  respect  man  is  the  nearest  thing 
to  me,  so  far  as  I must  do  good  to  men  and  en- 
dure them.  But  so  far  as  some  men  -make 
themselves  obstacles  to  my  proper  acts,  man 
becomes  to  me  one  of  the  things  which  are  in- 
different, 110  less  than  the  sun  or  wind  or  a wild 
beast.  Now  it  is  true  that  these  may  impede 
my  action,  but  they  are  no  impediments  to  my 
affects  and  disposition,  which  have  the  power 
of  acting  conditionally  and  changing:  for  the 
mind  converts  and  changes  every  hindrance  to 
its  activity  into  an  aid;  and  so  that  which  is  a 
hindrance  is  made  a furtherance  to  an  act;  and 
that  which  is  an  obstacle  on  the  road  helps  us 
on  this  road. 

21.  Reverence  that  which  is  best  in  the  uni- 
verse; and  this  is  that  which  makes  use  of  all 
things  and  directs  all  things.  i\.nd  in  like 
manner  also  reverence  that  which  is  best  in 
thyself;  and  this  is  of  the  same  kind  as  that. 
For  in  thyself  also,  that  which  makes  use  of 
everything  else  is  this,  and  thj^  life  is  directed 
by  this. 

22.  That  which  does  no  harm  to  the  state, 
does  no  harm  to  the  citizen.  In  the  case  of 
every  appearance  of  harm  apply  this  rule:  if 


i68 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  Y. 


the  state  is  not  harmed  by  this,  neither  am  I 
harmed.  But  if  the  state  is  harmed,  thou  must 
not  be  angry  with  him  who  does  harm  to  the 
state.  Show  him  where  his  error  is. 

23.  Often  think  of  the  rapidity  with  which 
things  pass  by  and  disappear,  both  the  things 
which  are  and  the  things  which  are  produced. 
For  substance  is  like  a river  in  a continual 
flow,  and  the  activities  of  things  are  in  con- 
stant change,  and  the  causes  work  in  infinite 
varieties;  and  there  is  hardly  anything  which 
stands  still.  And  consider  this  which  is  near 
to  thee,  this  boundless  abyss  of  the  past  and  of 
the  future  in  which  all  things  disappear.  How 
then  is  he  not  a fool  who  is  puffed  up  with 
such  things  or  plagued  about  them  and  makes 
himself  miserable?  for  they  vex  him  only  for  a 
time,  and  a short  time. 

24.  Think  of  the  universal  substance,  of 
which  thou  hast  a very  small  portion;  and 
of  universal  time,  of  which  a short  and  indivis- 
ible interval  has  been  assigned  to  thee;  and  of 
that  which  is  fixed  by  destiny,  and  how  small 
a part  of  it  thou  art. 

25.  Does  another  do  me  wrong?  Let  him 
look  to  it.  He  has  his  own  disposition,  his 
own  activity-  I now  have  what  the  universal 
nature  now  wills  tne  to  have;  and  I do  what 
my  nature  now  wills  me  to  do. 

26.  Let  the  part  of  thy  soul  which  leads  and 
governs  be  undisturbed  by  the  movements  in 
the  flesh,  whether  of  pleasure  or  of  pain;  and 


Book¥.]  Marcus  Hurelius  Bntontnue.  169 

let  it  not  unite  with  them,  but  let  it  circum- 
scribe itself  and  limit  those  affects  to  their 
parts.  But  w’hen  these  affects  rise  up  to  the 
mind  by  virtue  of  that  other  sympathy  that 
naturally  exists  in  a body  which  is  all  one, 
then  thou  must  not  strive  to  resist  the  sensa- 
tion, for  it  is  natural:  but  let  not  the  ruling  part 
of  itself  add  to  the  sensation  the  opinion  that 
it  is  either  good  or  bad. 

27.  Live  with  the  gods.  And  he  does  live 
with  the  gods  who  constantly  shows  to  them 
that  his  own  soul  is  satisfied  with  that  which 
is  assigned  to  him,  and  that  it  does  all  that  the 
daemon  washes,  which  Zeus  hath  given  to 
every"  man  for  his  guardian  and  guide,  a portion 
of  himself  And  this  is  every"  man’s  under- 
standing and  reason. 

28.  Art  thou  angry  with  him  whose  armpits 
stink  ? art  thou  angry  with  him  whose  mouth 
smells  foul?  What  good  w'ill  this  anger  do 
thee?  He  has  such  a mouth,  he  has  such  arm- 
pits:  it  is  necessary,  that  such  an  emanation 
must  come  from  such  things:  but  the  man  has 
reason,  it  w"ili  be  said,  and  he  is  able,  if  he 
takes  pains,  to  discover  wherein  he  offends;  I 
wish  thee  well  of  thy  discovery.  Well  then, 
and  thou  hast  reason:  by  thy  rational  faculty 
stir  up  his  rational  faculty;  show  him  his  error, 
admonish  him.  For  if  he  listens,  thou  wilt 
cure  him,  and  there  is  no  need  of  anger. 
[+  Neither  tragic  actor  nor  whore. +]* 

*This  is  imperfect  or  corrupt,  or  both.  There  is 


XTbouabte. 


[Book  T. 


170 

29.  As  thou  intendest  to  live  when  thou  art 
gone  out,  . . . so  it  is  in  thy  power  to  live 
here.  But  if  men  do  not  permit  thee,  then  get 
away  out  of  life,  yet  so  as  if  thou  wert  suffering 
no  harm.  The  house  is  smoky,  and  I quit  it.* 
Why  dost  thou  think  that  this  is  any  trouble  ? 
But  so  long  as  nothing  of  the  kind  drives  me 
out,  I remain,  am  free,  and  no  man  shall  hin- 
der me  from  doing  what  I choose;  and  I choose 
to  do  what  is  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
rational  and  social  animal. 

30.  The  intelligence  of  the  universe  is  social. 
Accordingly  it  has  made  the  inferior  things  for 
the  sake  of  the  superior,  and  it  has  fitted  the 
superior  to  one  another.  Thou  seest  how  it 
has  subordinated,  co-ordinated,  and  assigned  to 
everything  its  proper  portion,  and  has  brought 
together  into  concord  with  one  another  the 
things  which  are  the  best. 

31.  How  hast  thou  behaved  hitherto  to  the 
gods,  thy  parents,  brethren,  children,  teachers, 
to  those  who  looked  after  thy  infancy,  to  thy 
friends,  kinsfolk,  to  thy  slaves?  Consider  if 
thou  hast  hitherto  behaved  to  all  in  such  a way 
that  this  may  be  said  of  thee, — 

“Never  has  wronged  a man  in  deed  or  word.” 

also  something  wrong  or  incomplete  in  the  beginning 
of  S.  29,  where  he  says  ojc  i^eWuv  Siavo^,  which 
Gataker  translates  “as  if  thou  wast  about  to  quit 
life;”  but  we  cannot  translate  l^eWuv  in  that  way. 
Other  translations  are  not  much  more  satisfactory.  I 
have  translated  it  literally  and  left  it  imperfect. 

* Epictetus,  i.  25,  18. 


Book¥.]  /Hbarcu6  Burelius  Bntonfnus. 


And  call  to  recollection  both  how  many  things 
thou  hast  passed  through,  and  how  many 
things  thou  hast  been  able  to  endure,  and  that 
the  history  of  thy  life  is  now  complete  and  th}^ 
service  is  ended;  and  how  many  beautiful 
things  thou  hast  seen;  and  how  many  pleasures 
and  pains  thou  hast  despised;  and  how  many 
things  called  honorable  thou  hast  spurned; 
and  to  how  many  ill-minded  folks  thou  hast 
shown  a kind  disposition. 

32.  Why  do  unskilled  and  ignorant  souls 
disturb  him  who  has  skill  and  knowledge? 
What  soul  then  has  skill  and  knowledge? 
That  which  knows  beginning  and  end,  and 
knows  the  reason  which  pervades  all  substance, 
and  though  all  time  by  fixed  periods  [revolu- 
tions] administers  the  universe. 

33.  Soon,  verj"  soon,  thou  wilt  be  ashes,  or 
a skeleton,  and  either  a name  or  not  even  a 
name ; but  name  is  sound  and  echo.  And  the 
things  which  are  much  valued  in  life  are  empty 
and  rotten  and  trifling,  and  [like]  little  dogs 
biting  one  another,  and  little  children  quarrel- 
ing, laughing,  and  then  straightway  weeping. 
But  fidelity  and  modest}^  and  justice  and  truth 
are  fled 

Up  to  Olympus  from  the  wide-spread  earth. 

Hesiod,  Works,  etc.  v.  197. 

What  then  is  there  which  still  detains  thee 
here,  if  the  objects  of  sense  are  easil}^  changed 
and  never  stand  still,  and  the  organs  of  per- 


172 


ITbougbte. 


[Book  V. 


ception  are  dull  and  easily  receive  false  im- 
pressions, and  the  poor  soul  itself  is  an  exha- 
lation from  blood  ? But  to  have  good  repute 
amid  such  a world  as  this  is  an  empty  thing. 
Why  then  dost  thou  not  wait  in  tranquillity 
for  thy  end,  whether  it  is  extinction  or  removal 
to  another  state?  And  until  that  time  comes, 
what  is  sufficient?  Why,  what  else  than  to 
venerate  the  gods  and  bless  them,  and  to  do 
good  to  men,  and  to  practise  tolerance  and 
self-restraint ; * but  as  to  everjdhing  which  is 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  poor  flesh  and  breath, 
to  remember  that  this  is  neither  thine  nor  in 
thy  power. 

34.  Thou  canst  pass  thy  life  in  an  equable 
flow  of  happiness,  if  thou  canst  go  by  the  right 
way,  and  think  and  act  in  the  right  way. 
These  two  things  are  common  both  to  the  soul 
of  God  and  to  the  soul  of  man,  and  to  the  soul 
of  every  rational  being : not  to  be  hindered  by 
another ; and  to  hold  good  to  consist  in  the 
disposition  to  justice  and  the  practice  of  it, 
and  in  this  to  let  thy  desire  find  its  termina- 
tion. 

35.  If  this  is  neither  my  own  badness,  nor 
an  effect  of  my  own  badness,  and  the  common 
weal  is  not  injured,  why  am  I troubled  about 
it,  and  what  is  the  harm  to  the  common  weal? 

*This  is  the  Stoic  precept  avizoy  koI  aT^exov.  The 
first  part  teaches  us  to  be  content  with  men  and  things 
as  they  are.  The  second  part  teaches  us  the  virtue  of 
self  restraint,  or  the  govermnent  of  our  passions. 


Book  V.]  /iBarcuB  Hutelius  Antoninus. 


173 


36.  Do  not  be  carried  along  inconsiderately 
by  the  appearance  of  things,  but  give  help  [to 
all]  according  to  thy  ability  and  their  fitness ; 
and  if  they  should  have  sustained  loss  in  mat- 
ters which  are  indifferent,  do  not  imagine  this 
to  be  a damage ; for  it  is  a bad  habit.  But  as 
the  old  man,  when  he  w'ent  away,  asked  back 
his  foster-child’s  top,  remembering  that  it  was 
a top,  so  do  thou  in  this  case  also. 

When  thou  art  calling  out  on  the  Rostra, 
hast  thou  forgotten,  man,  what  these  things 
are? — Yes;  but  they  are  objects  of  great  con- 
cern to  these  people — wilt  thou  too  then  be 
made  a fool  for  these  things?  I was  once  a 
fortunate  man,  but  I lost  it,  I know  not  how. — 
But  fortunate  means  that  a man  has  assigned 
to  himself  a good  fortune  : and  a good  fortune 
is  good  disposition  of  the  soul,  good  emotions, 
good  actions.* 

*This  section  is  unintelligible.  Many  of  the  words 
may  be  corrupt,  and  the  general  purport  of  the  section 
cannot  be  discovered.  Perhaps  several  things  have 
been  improperly  joined  in  one  section.  I have  trans- 
lated it  nearly  literally.  Different  translators  give 
the  section  a different  turn,  and  the  critics  have  tried 
to  mend  what  they  cannot  understand. 


174 


?Tbougbt0. 


[Book  71. 


VI. 

The  substance  of  the  universe  is  obedient 
and  compliant;  and  the  reason  which 
governs  it  has  in  itself  no  cause  for  doing  evil, 
for  it  has  no  malice,  nor  does  it  do  evil  to  any- 
thing, nor  is  anything  harmed  b5^  it.  But  all 
things  are  made  and  perfected  according  to  this 
reason. 

2.  Let  it  make  no  difference  to  thee  whether 
thou  art  cold  or  warm,  if  thou  art  doing  thy 
duty;  and  whether  thou  art  drowsy  or  satis- 
fied with  sleep;  and  whether  ill-spoken  of  or 
praised;  and  whether  dying  or  doing  some- 
thing else.  For  it  is  one  of  the  acts  of  life, 
this  act  by  which  we  die;  it  is  sufficient  then 
in  this  act  also  to  do  well  what  we  have  in 
hand  (vi.  22,  28). 

3.  Look  within.  Let  neither  the  peculiar 
quality  of  anything  nor  its  value  escape  thee. 

4.  All  existing  things  soon  change,  and 
they  will  either  be  reduced  to  vapor,  if  indeed 
all  substance  is  one,  or  they  will  be  dispersed. 

5.  The  reason  which  governs  knows  what 
its  own  disposition  is,  and  what  it  does,  and 
on  what  material  it  works. 

6.  The  best  way  of  avenging  thyself  is  not 
to  become  like  [the  wrong-doer]. 


Book¥L]  Marcus  Burelius  Bntoninus. 


175 


7.  Take  pleasure  in  one  thing  and  rest  in  it, 
in  passing  from  one  social  act  to  another  social 
act,  thinking  of  God. 

8.  The  ruling  principle  is  that  which  rouses 
and  turns  itself,  and  while  it  makes  itself  such 
as  it  is  and  such  as  it  wills  to  be,  it  also  makes 
everything  which  happens  appear  to  itself  to 
be  such  as  it  wills. 

g.  In  conformity  to  the  nature  of  the  uni- 
verse ever}’  single  thing  is  accomplished;  for 
certainly  it  is  not  in  conformity  to  any  other 
nature  that  each  thing  is  accomplished,  either 
a nature  which  externally  comprehends  this,  or 
a nature  which  is  comprehended  within  this 
nature,  or  a nature  external  and  independent 
of  this  (xi.  i;  vi.  40;  viii.  50). 

10.  The  universe  is  either  a confusion,  and 
a mutual  involution  of  things,  and  a dispersion, 
or  it  is  unity  and  order  and  providence.  If 
then  it  is  the  former,  why  do  I desire  to  tarry 
in  a fortuitous  combination  of  things  and  such 
a disorder  ? and  why  do  I care  about  anything 
else  than  how  I shall  at  last  become  earth  ? 
and  why  am  I disturbed,  for  the  dispersion  of 
ni}'  elements  will  happen  whatever  I do  ? But 
if  the  other  supposition  is  true,  I venerate,  and 
I am  firm,  and  I trust  in  him  who  governs 
(iv.  27). 

11.  When  thou  hast  been  compelled  b}"  cir- 
cumstances to  be  disturbed  in  a manner, 
quickly  return  to  th}’self,  and  do  not  continue 
out  of  tune  longer  than  the  compulsion  lasts; 


176 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  VI. 


for  thou  wilt  have  more  mastery  over  the  har- 
mony by  continually  recurring  to  it. 

12.  If  thou  hadst  a step-mother  and  a mother 
at  the  same  time,  thou  wouldst  be  dutiful  to 
thy  step-mother,  but  still  thou  wouldst  con- 
stantly return  to  thy  mother.  Let  the  court 
and  philosophy  now  be  to  thee  step-mother  and 
mother:  return  to  philosophy  frequently  and 
repose  in  her,  through  whom  what  thou  meet- 
est  with  in  the  court  appears  to  thee  tolerable, 
and  thou  appearest  tolerable  in  the  court. 

13.  When  we  have  meat  before  us  and  such 
eatables,  we  receive  the  impression  that  this  is 
the  dead  body  of  a fish,  and  this  the  dead  body 
of  a bird  or  of  a pig;  and  again,  that  this  Faler- 
nian  is  only  a little  grape-juice,  and  this  purple 
robe  some  sheep’s  wool  dyed  with  the  blood  of 
a shell-fish:  such  then  are  these  impressions, 
and  they  reach  the  things  themselves  and  pene- 
trate them,  and  so  we  see  what  kind  of  things 
they  are.  Just  in  the  same  way  ought  we  to 
act  all  through  life,  and  where  there  are  things 
which  appear  most  worthy  of  our  approbation, 
we  ought  to  lay  them  bare  and  look  at  their 
worthlessness  and  strip  them  of  all  the  words 
by  which  they  are  exalted.  For  outward  show 
is  a wonderful  perverter  of  the  reason,  and 
when  thou  art  most  sure  that  thou  art  em- 
ployed about  things  worth  thy  pains,  it  is  then 
that  it  cheats  thee  most.  Consider  then  what 
Crates  says  of  Xenocrates  himself. 

14.  Most  of  the  things  which  the  multitude 


Book¥l.]  Marcus  Sutelius  Antoninus. 


177 


admire  are  referred  to  objects  of  the  most  gen- 
eral kind,  those  which  are  held  together  by 
cohesion  or  natural  organization,  such  as 
stones,  wood,  fig-trees,  vines,  olives.  But 
those  which  are  admired  by  men,  who  are  a 
little  more  reasonable,  are  referred  to  the  things 
which  are  held  together  by  a living  principle, 
as  flocks,  herds.  Those  which  are  admired  by 
men  who  are  still  more  instnicted  are  the 
things  which  are  held  together  by  a rational 
soul,  not  however  a universal  soul,  but  rational 
so  far  as  it  is  a soul  skilled  in  some  art,  or  ex- 
pert in  some  other  way,  or  simply  rational  so 
far  as  it  possesses  a number  of  slaves.  But  he 
who  values  a rational  soul,  a soul  universal  and 
fitted  for  political  life,  regards  nothing  else  ex- 
cept this;  and  above  all  things  he  keeps  his 
soul  in  a condition  and  in  an  activit3"  conform- 
able to  rea.son  and  social  life,  and  he  co-oper- 
ates to  this  end  with  those  who  are  of  the  same 
kind  as  himself 

15.  Some  things  are  hurrjdng  into  existence, 
and  others  are  hurrying  out  of  it;  and  of  that 
which  is  coming  into  existence  part  is  already 
extinguished.  Motions  and  changes  are  con- 
tinually renewing  the  world,  just  as  the  unin- 
terrupted course  of  time  is  alwaj's  renewing- 
the  infinite  duration  of  ages.  In  this  flowing 
stream  then,  on  which  there  is  no  abiding, 
what  is  there  of  the  things  which  hurr\'  by  on 
which  a man  would  set  a high  price  ? It 
would  be  just  as  if  a man  should  fall  in  love 
12 


178 


^Tbougbte. 


[Book  ¥1. 


with  one  of  the  sparrows  which  fly  by,  but  it 
has  already  passed  out  of  sight.  Something 
of  this  kind  is  the  very  life  of  every  man,  like 
the  exhalation  of  the  blood  and  the  respiration 
of  the  air.  For  such  as  it  is  to  have  once 
drawn  in  the  air  and  to  have  given  it  back, 
w'hich  we  do  every  moment,  just  the  same  is  it 
with  the  whole  respiratory  power,  which  thou 
didst  receive  at  thy  birth  yesterday  and  the 
day  before,  to  give  it  back  to  the  element  from 
which  thou  didst  first  draw  it. 

1 6.  Neither  is  transpiration,  as  in  plants,  a 
thing  to  be  valued,  nor  respiration,  as  in 
domesticated  animals  and  wild  beasts,  nor  the 
receiving  of  impressions  by  the  appearances  of 
things,  nor  being  moved  by  desires  as  puppets 
by  strings,  nor  assembling  in  herds,  nor  being 
nourished  by  food ; for  this  is  just  like  the  act 
of  separating  and  parting  with  the  u.seless  part 
of  our  food.  What  then  is  worth  being  valued  ? 
To  be  received  with  clapping  of  hands?  No. 
Neither  must  we  value  the  clapping  of  tongues ; 
for  the  praise  which  comes  from  the  many  is  a 
clapping  of  tongues.  Suppose  then  that  thou 
ha.st  given  up  this  worthless  thing  called  fame, 
what  remains  that  is  worth  valuing?  This,  in 
my  opinion : to  move  thyself  and  to  restrain 
thyself  in  confonnit}"  to  thy  proper  constitu- 
tion, to  which  end  both  all  employments  and 
arts  lead.  For  every  art  aims  at  this,  that  the 
thing  w'hich  has  been  made  should  be  adapted 
to  the  work  for  w^hich  it  has  been  made ; and 


Book  Tl.]  Marcus  aurelius  antoninus. 


both  the  vine-planter  who  looks  after  the  vine, 
and  the  horse-breaker,  and  he  who  trains  th« 
dog,  seek  this  end.  But  the  education  and  the 
teaching  of  youth  aim  at  something.  In  thi? 
then  is  the  value  of  the  education  and  the 
teaching.  And  if  this  is  well,  thou  wilt  not 
.seek  anything  else.  Wilt  thou  not  cease  te 
value  many  other  things  too?  Then  thou  wilt 
be  neither  free,  nor  sufficient  for  thy  own  hap- 
piness, nor  without  passion.  For  of  necessity 
thou  must  be  envious,  jealous,  and  suspicious 
of  those  who  can  take  away  those  things,  and 
plot  against  those  who  have  that  which  is 
valued  by  thee.  Of  necessity  a man  must  be 
altogether  in  a state  of  perturbation  who  wants 
any  of  these  things ; and  besides,  he  must  often 
find  fault  with  the  gods.  But  to  reverence 
and  honor  thy  own  mind  will  make  thee  con- 
tent with  thyself,  and  in  harmony  with  society, 
and  in  agreement  with  the  gods,  that  is,  prais- 
ing all  that  they  give  and  have  ordered. 

17.  Above,  below,  all  around  are  the  move- 
ments of  the  elements.  But  the  motion  of 
virtue  is  in  none  of  these : it  is  something 
more  divine,  and  advancing  by  a way  hardly 
observed,  it  goes  happily  on  its  road. 

18.  How  strangely  men  act ! They  will  not 
praise  those  who  are  living  at  the  same  time 
and  living  with  themselves ; but  to  be  them- 
selves praised  by  posterity,  by  those  whom 
they  have  never  seen  nor  ever  will  see,  this  they 
set  much  value  on.  But  this  is  very  much  the 


i8o 


ZTbouflbtg. 


[Book  VL 


same  as  if  thou  shouldst  be  grieved  because 
those  who  have  lived  before  thee  did  not  praise 
thee. 

19.  If  a thing  is  difficult  to  be  accomplished 
by  thyself,  do  not  think  that  it  is  impossible 
for  man : but  if  anything  is  possible  for  man 
and  conformable  to  his  nature,  think  that  this 
can  be  attained  by  thyself  too. 

20.  In  the  gymnastic  exercises  suppose  that 
a man  has  torn  thee  with  his  nails,  and  by 
dashing  against  thy  head  has  inflicted  a wound. 
Well,  we  neither  show  any  signs  of  vexation, 
nor  are  we  offended,  nor  do  we  suspect  him 
afterwards  as  a treacherous  fellow ; and  yet  we 
are  on  our  guard  against  him,  not  however  as 
an  enemy,  nor  yet  with  suspicion,  but  we 
quietly  get  out  of  his  way.  Something  like 
this  let  thy  behavior  be  in  all  the  other  parts 
of  life ; let  us  overlook  many  things  in  those 
who  are  like  antagonists  in  the  gymnasium. 
For  it  is  in  our  power,  as  I said,  to  get  out  of 
the  way,  and  to  have  no  suspicion  nor  hatred. 

21.  If  any  man  is  able  to  convince  me  and 
show  me  that  I do  not  think  cr  act  right,  I 
will  gladly  change ; for  I seek  the  truth,  by 
which  no  man  was  ever  injured.  But  he  is 
injured  who  abides  in  his  error  and  ignorance. 

22.  I do  my  duty : other  things  trouble  me 
not ; for  they  are  either  things  without  life,  or 
things  without  reason,  or  things  that  have 
rambled  and  know  not  the  way. 

23.  As  to  the  animals  which  have  no  reason, 


Book  Yi.]  rtSarcus  Burelius  Hntoninus. 


i8i 


and  generally  all  things  and  objects,  do  thou, 
since  thou  hast  reason  and  they  have  none, 
make  use  of  them  with  a generous  and  liberal 
spirit.  But  towards  human  beings,  as  they 
have  reason,  behave  in  a social  spirit.  And 
on  all  occasions  call  on  the  gods,  and  do  not 
perplex  thyself  about  the  length  of  time  in 
which  thou  shalt  do  this  ; for  even  three  hours 
so  spent  are  suflScient. 

24.  Alexander  the  Macedonian  and  his  groom 
by  death  were  brought  to  the  same  state ; for 
either  they  were  received  among  the  same 
seminal  principles  of  the  universe,  or  they  were 
alike  dispersed  among  the  atoms. 

25.  Consider  how  many  things  in  the  same 
indivisible  time  take  place  in  each  of  us, — 
things  which  concern  the  body  and  things 
which  concern  the  soul : and  so  thou  wilt  not 
wonder  if  many  more  things,  or  rather  all 
things  which  come  into  existence  in  that  which 
is  the  one  and  all,  which  we  call  Cosmos,  exist 
in  it  at  the  same  time. 

26.  If  any  man  should  propose  to  thee  the 
question,  how  the  name  Antoninus  is  written, 
wouldst  thou  with  a straining  of  the  voice  utter 
each  letter  ? What  then  if  they  grow  angry, 
wilt  thou  be  angry  too?  Wilt  thou  not  go  on 
with  composure  and  number  every  letter  ? Just 
so  then  in  this  life  also  remember  that  every 
duty  is  made  up  of  certain  parts.  These  it  is 
thy  duty  to  observe,  and  without  being  dis- 
turbed or  showing  anger  towards  those  wb« 


i82 


tTbougbts. 


[Book  VI. 


are  angty  with  thee,  to  go  on  th}^  way  and  fin- 
ish that  which  is  set  before  thee. 

27.  How  cruel  it  is  not  to  allow  men  to  strive 
dfter  the  things  which  appear  to  them  to  be 
suitable  to  their  nature  and  profitable!  And 
yet  in  a manner  thou  dost  not  allow  them  to  do 
this,  when  thou  art  vexed  because  they  do 
wrong.  For  they  are  certainly  moved  towards 
things  because  they  suppose  them  to  be  suit- 
able to  their  nature  and  profitable  to  them. 
But  it  is  not  so.  Teach  them  then,  and  show 
them  without  being  angry. 

28.  Death  is  a cessation  of  the  impressions 
through  the  senses,  and  of  the  pulling  of  the 
strings  which  move  the  appetites,  and  of  the 
discursive  movements  of  the  thoughts,  and  of 
the  service  to  the  flesh  (ii.  12). 

29.  It  is  a shame  for  the  soul  to  be  first  to 
give  way  in  this  life,  when  thy  body  does  not 
give  way. 

30.  Take  care  that  thou  art  not  made  into  a 
Caesar,  that  thou  art  not  dyed  with  this  dye; 
for  such  things  happen.  Keep  thyself  then 
simple,  good,  pure,  serious,  free  from  affecta- 
tion, a friend  of  justice,  a worshipper  of  the 
gods,  kind,  affectionate,  strenuous  in  all  proper 
acts.  Strive  to  continue  to  be  such  as  philoso- 
phy wished  to  make  thee.  Reverence  the  gods, 
and  help  men.  Short  is  life.  There  is  only 
one  fruit  of  this  terrene  life — a pious  disposi- 
tion and  social  acts.  Do  everything  as  a dis- 
ciple of  Antoninus.  Remember  his  constancy 


Book  Ml]  /Iftarcus  Burelius  Bntontnus. 


183 


in  every  act  which  was  conformable  to  reason, 
and  his  evenness  in  all  things,  and  his  piety, 
and  the  serenity  of  his  countenance,  and  his 
sweetness,  and  his  disregard  of  empty  fame, 
and  his  efforts  to  understand  things;  and  how 
he  would  never  let  anything  pass  without  hav- 
ing first  most  carefully  examined  it  and  clearly 
understood  it;  and  how  he  bore  with  those  who 
blamed  him  unjustly  without  blaming  them  in 
return;  how  he  did  nothing  in  a hurry;  and 
how  he  listened  not  to  calumnies,  and  how  ex- 
act an  examiner  of  manners  and  actions  he  was; 
and  not  given  to  reproach  people,  nor  timid, 
nor  suspicious,  nor  a sophist;  and  with  how 
little  he  was  satisfied,  such  as  lodging,  bed, 
dress,  food,  servants;  and  how  laborious  and 
patient;  and  how  he  was  able  on  account  of 
his  sparing  diet  to  hold  out  to  the  evening,  not 
even  requiring  to  relieve  himself  by  any  evacu- 
ations except  at  the  usual  hour;  and  his  firm- 
ness and  uniformity  in  his  friendships;  and  how 
he  tolerated  freedom  of  speech  in  those  who 
opposed  his  opinions;  and  the  pleasure  that  he 
had  when  any  man  showed  him  an3'thing  beb 
ter;  and  how  religious  he  was  without  super- 
stition. Imitate  all  this,  that  thou  mayest 
have  as  good  a conscience,  when  thy  last  hour 
comes,  as  he  had  (i.  16). 

31.  Return  to  thy  sober  senses  and  call  thy- 
self back;  and  when  thou  hast  roused  th^-self 
from  sleep  and  hast  perceiv^ed  that  the}'  were 
only  dreams  which  troubled  thee,  now  in  thy 


184 


Cbougbte. 


[Book  VI. 


waking  hours  look  at  these  [the  things  about 
thee]  as  thou  didst  look  at  those  [the  dreams]. 

32.  I consist  of  a little  body  and  a soul. 
Now  to  this  little  body  all  things  are  indiffer- 
ent, for  it  is  not  able  to  perceive  differences. 
But  to  the  understanding  those  things  only  are 
indifferent  which  are  not  the  works  of  its  own 
activity.  But  whatever  things  are  the  works 
of  its  own  activity,  all  these  are  in  its  power. 
And  of  these  however  only  those  which  are 
done  with  reference  to  the  present;  for  as  to 
the  future  and  the  past  activities  of  the  mind, 
even  these  are  for  the  present  indifferent. 

33.  Neither  the  labor  which  the  hand  does 
nor  that  of  the  foot  is  contrary  to  nature,  so 
long  as  the  foot  does  the  foot’s  work  and  the 
hand  the  hand’s.  So  then  neither  to  a man  as 
a man  is  his  labor  contrary  to  nature,  so  long 
as  it  does  the  things  of  a man.  But  if  the 
labor  is  not  contrary  to  his  nature,  neither  is  it 
an  evil  to  him. 

34.  How  many  pleasures  have  been  en- 
joyed by  robbers,  patricides,  tyrants. 

35.  Dost  thou  not  see  how  the  handicrafts- 
men accommodate  themselves  up  to  a certain 
point  to  those  who  are  not  skilled  in  their 
craft — nevertheless  they  cling  to  the  reason 
[the  principles]  of  their  art,  and  do  not  endure 
to  depart  from  it?  Is  it  not  strange  if  the 
architect  and  the  physician  shall  have  more  re- 
spect to  the  reason  [the  principles]  of  their 
own  arts  than  man  to  his  own  reason,  which  is 
common  to  him  and  the  gods  ? 


Book  YL]  j®arcu0  Aurelius  antoninus. 


185 


36.  Asia,  Europe,  are  corners  of  the  uni- 
verse; all  the  sea  a drop  in  the  universe; 
Athos  a little  clod  of  the  universe:  all  the 
present  time  is  a point  in  eternity.  All  things 
are  little,  changeable,  perishable.  All  things 
come  from  thence,  from  that  universal  ruling 
power,  either  directly  proceeding  or  by  way  of 
sequence.  And  accordingly  the  lion’s  gaping 
jaws,  and  that  which  is  poisonous,  and  every 
harmful  thing,  as  a thorn,  as  mud,  are  after- 
products of  the  grand  and  beautiful.  Do  not 
then  imagine  that  they  are  of  another  kind 
from  that  which  thou  dost  venerate,  but  form 
a just  opinion  of  the  source  of  all  (vii.  75). 

37.  He  who  has  seen  present  things  has 
seen  all,  both  everything  which  has  taken 
place  from  all  eternity  and  everything  which 
will  be  for  time  without  end;  for  all  things  are 
of  one  kin  and  of  one  form. 

38.  Frequently  consider  the  connection  of  all 
things  in  the  universe  and  their  relation  to  one 
another.  For  in  a manner  all  things  are  im- 
plicated with  one  another,  and  all  in  this  way 
are  friendly  to  one  another;  for  one  thing 
comes  in  order  after  another,  and  this  is  by 
virtue  of  the  + active  movement  and  mutual 
conspiration  and  the  unity  of  the  substance 
(ix.  i). 

39.  Adapt  thyself  to  the  things  with  which 
thy  lot  has  been  cast:  and  the  men  among 
whom  thou  hast  received  thy  portion,  love 
them,  but  do  it  truly  [sincerely]. 


G:boUgbt0. 


[Book  ?I. 


1 86 


40.  Every  instrument,  tool,  vessel,  if  it  does 
that  for  which  it  has  been  made,  is  well,  and 
yet  he  who  made  it  is  not  there.  But  in  the 
things  which  are  held  together  by  nature  there 
is  within,  and  there  abides  in  them  the  power 
which  made  them;  wherefore  the  more  is  it  fit 
to  reverence  this  power,  and  to  think,  that,  if 
thou  dost  live  and  act  according  to  its  will, 
everything  in  thee  is  in  conformity  to  intelli- 
gence. And  thus  also  in  the  universe  the 
things  which  belong  to  it  are  in  conformity  to 
intelligence. 

41.  Whatever  of  the  things  which  are  not 
within  thy  power  thou  shalt  suppose  to  be 
good  for  thee  or  evil,  it  must  of  necessity  be 
that,  if  such  a bad  thing  befall  thee,  or  the  loss 
of  such  a good  thing,  thou  wilt  not  blame  the 
gods,  and  hate  men  too,  those  who  are  the  cause 
of  the  misfortune  or  the  loss,  or  those  who  are 
suspected  of  being  likely  to  be  the  cause;  and 
indeed  we  do  much  injustice  because  we  make 
a difference  between  these  things  [because  we 
do  not  regard  these  things  as  indifferent 4].* 
But  if  we  judge  only  those  things  which  are  in 
our  power  to  be  good  or  bad,  there  remains  no 
reason  either  for  finding  fault  with  God  or 
standing  in  a hostile  attitude  to  man.f 

* Gataker  translates  this  "because  we  strive  to  get 
these  things,”  comparing  the  use  of  diaifitpeadai  in  v.  i, 
and  X.  27,  and  ix.  38,  where  it  appears  that  his  refer- 
ence should  be  xi.  10.  He  may  be  right  in  his  inter- 
pretation, but  I doubt. 

t Cicero,  De  Natnra  Deorum.  iii.  32. 


Book  VI.]  flibarcus  BurcHus  Bntonlnus. 


187 


42.  We  are  all  working  together  to  one  end, 
some  with  knowledge  and  design,  and  others 
without  knowing  what  they  do;  as  men  also 
when  they  are  asleep,  of  whom  it  is  Heraclitus, 
I think,  who  says  that  they  are  laborers  and 
co-operators  in  the  things  which  take  place  in 
the  universe.  But  men  co-operate  after  differ- 
ent fashions:  and  even  those  co-operate  abun 
dantly,  who  find  fault  with  what  happens  and 
those  who  try  to  oppose  it  and  to  hinder  it;  for 
the  universe  had  need  even  of  such  men  as 
these.  It  remains  then  for  thee  to  understand 
among  what  kind  of  workmen  thou  placest  thy- 
self; for  he  who  rules  all  things  will  certainly 
make  a right  use  of  thee,  and  he  will  receive 
thee  among  some  part  of  the  co-operators  and 
of  those  whose  labors  conduce  to  one  end. 
But  be  not  thou  such  a part  as  the  mean  and 
ridiculous  verse  in  the  play,  which  Chrysippus 
speaks  of.* 

43.  Does  the  sun  undertake  to  do  the  work 
of  the  rain,  or  Aesculapius  the  work  of  the 
Fruit-bearer  [the  earth]  ? And  how  is  it  with 
respect  to  each  of  the  stars — are  they  not  differ- 
ent and  yet  they  work  together  to  the  same 
end? 

44.  If  the  gods  have  determined  about  me 
and  about  the  things  which  must  happen  to 
me,  they  have  determined  well,  for  it  is  not 
easy  even  to  imagine  a deity  without  fore- 
thought; and  as  to  doing  me  harm,  why  should 

* Plntarch,  adversus  Stoicos,  c.  14. 


i88 


^Tbou0bt6. 


[Book  TL 


they  have  any  desire  towards  that  ? for  what 
advantage  wonld  result  to  them  from  this  or  to 
the  whole,  which  is  the  special  object  of  their 
providence  ? But  if  they  have  not  determined 
about  me  individually,  they  have  certainly  de- 
termined about  the  whole  at  least,  and  the 
things  which  happen  by  way  of  sequence  in 
this  general  arrangement  I ought  to  accept 
with  pleasure  and  to  be  content  with  them. 
But  if  they  determine  about  nothing, — which 
it  is  wicked  to  believe,  or  if  we  do  believe  it, 
let  us  neither  sacrifice  nor  pray  nor  swear  by 
them,  nor  do  anything  else  which  we  do  as  if 
the  gods  were  present  and  lived  with  us, — but 
if  however  the  gods  determine  about  none  of 
the  things  which  concern  us,  I am  able  to  de- 
termine about  myself,  and  I can  inquire  about 
that  which  is  useful;  and  that  is  useful  to 
every  man  which  is  conformable  to  his  own 
constitution  and  nature.  But  my  nature  is 
rational  and  social;  and  my  city  and  country,  so 
far  as  I am  Antoninus,  is  Rome,  but  so  far  as 
I am  a man,  it  is  the  world.  The  things  then 
which  are  useful  to  these  cities  are  alone  use- 
ful to  me. 

45.  Whatever  happens  to  every  man,  this  is 
for  the  interest  of  the  universal:  this  might  be 
sufficient.  But  further  thou  wilt  observe  this 
also  as  a general  truth,  if  thou  dost  observe, 
that  whatever  is  profitable  to  any  man  is  prof- 
itable also  to  other  men.  But  let  the  word 
profitable  be  taken  here  in  the  common  sense 


BookTi.]  Marcus  Sutelius  Bntoninus.  189 

as  said  of  things  of  the  middle  kind  [neither 
good  nor  bad]. 

46.  As  it  happens  to  thee  in  the  amphitheatre 
and  such  places,  that  the  continual  sight  of 
the  same  things,  and  the  uniformity,  make  the 
spectacle  wearisome,  so  it  is  in  the  whole  of 
life;  for  all  things  above,  below,  are  the  same 
and  from  the  same.  How  long  then  ? 

47.  Think  continually  that  all  kinds  of  men 
and  all  kinds  of  pursuits  and  of  all  nations  are 
dead,  so  that  thy  thoughts  come  down  even  to 
Philistion  and  Phoebus  and  Origaniou.  Now 
turn  thy  thoughts  to  the  other  kinds  [of  men]. 
To  that  place  then  we  must  remove,  where 
there  are  so  many  great  orators,  and  so  many 
noble  philosophers,  Heraclitus,  Pythagoras, 
Socrates;  so  many  heroes  of  former  days,  and 
so  many  generals  after  them,  and  tyrants;  be- 
sides these,  Eudoxus,  Hipparchus,  Archimedes, 
and  other  men  of  acute  natural  talents,  great 
minds,  lovers  of  labor,  versatile,  confident, 
mockers  even  of  the  perishable  and  ephemeral 
life  of  man,  as  Menippus  and  such  as  are  like 
him.  As  to  all  these  consider  that  they  have 
long  been  in  the  dust.  What  harm  then  is  this 
to  them;  and  what  to  those  whose  names  are 
altogether  unknown  ? One  thing  here  is  worth 
a great  deal,  to  pass  thy  life  in  truth  and  just- 
ice, with  a benevolent  disposition  even  to  liars 
and  unjust  men. 

48.  When  thou  wishest  to  delight  thj^self, 
think  of  the  virtues  of  those  who  live  with 


?Tbou0bt0. 


[Book  VI. 


190 


thee;  for  instance,  the  activity  of  one,  and  the 
modesty  of  another,  and  the  liberality  of  a 
third,  and  some  other  good  quality  of  a fourth. 
For  nothing  delights  so  much  as  the  examples 
of  the  virtues,  when  they  are  exhibited  in  the 
morals  of  those  who  live  with  us  and  present 
themselves  in  abundance,  as  far  as  is  possible. 
Wherefore  we  must  keep  them  before  us. 

49.  Thou  art  not  dissatisfied,  I suppose,  be- 
cause thou  weighest  only  so  many  litrae  and 
not  three  hundred.  Be  not  dissatisfied  then 
that  thou  must  live  only  so  many  years  and 
not  more ; for  as  thou  art  satisfied  with  the 
amount  of  substance  which  has  been  assigned 
to  thee,  so  be  content  with  the  time. 

50.  Tet  us  try  to  persuade  them  [men]. 
But  act  even  against  their  will,  when  the 
principles  of  j ustice  lead  that  way.  If  however 
any  man  by  using  force  stands  in  thy  way,  be- 
take thyself  to  contentment  and  tranquillity, 
and  at  the  same  time  employ  the  hindrance 
towards  the  exercise  of  some  other  virtue;  and 
remember  that  thy  attempt  was  with  a reser- 
vation [conditionally],  that  thou  didst  not  de- 
sire to  do  impossibilities.  What  then  didst 
thou  desire? — Some  such  effort  as  this. — But 
thou  attainest  thy  object,  if  the  things  to  which 
thou  wast  moved  are  [not]  accomplished.  + 

51.  He  who  loves  fame  considers  another 
man’s  activity  to  be  his  own  good;  and  he  who 
loves  pleasure,  his  own  sensations ; but  he 
who  has  understanding  considers  his  own  acts 
to  be  his  own  good. 


Book  VI.]  ^ftarcu0  Sutelius  antonlnus. 


igi 

52.  It  is  in  our  power  to  have  no  opinion 
about  a thing,  and  not  to  be  disturbed  in  our 
soul ; for  things  themselves  have  no  natural 
power  to  form  our  j udgments. 

53.  Accustom  thyself  to  attend  carefull}"  to 
w^hat  is  said  by  another,  and  as  much  as  it  is 
possible,  be  in  the  speaker’s  mind. 

54.  That  which  is  not  good  for  the  swarm, 
neither  is  it  good  for  the  bee. 

55.  If  sailors  abused  the  helmsman,  or  the 
sick  the  doctor,  would  they  listen  to  anybody 
else  ? or  how  could  the  helmsman  secure  the 
safety  of  those  in  the  ship,  or  the  doctor  the 
health  of  those  whom  he  attends? 

56.  How  many  together  with  whom  I came 
into  the  world  are  already  gone  out  of  it. 

57.  To  the  jaundiced  honey  tastes  bitter, 
and  to  those  bitten  by  mad  dogs  water  causes 
fear ; and  to  little  children  the  ball  is  a fine 
thing.  Why  then  am  I angrj’?  Dost  thou 
think  that  a false  opinion  has  less  power  than 
the  bile  in  the  jaundiced  or  the  poison  in  him 
who  is  bitten  by  a mad  dog? 

58.  No  man  will  hinder  thee  from  living  ac- 
cording to  the  reason  of  thy  own  nature : noth- 
ing will  happen  to  thee  contrary  to  the  reason 
of  the  universal  nature. 

59.  What  kind  of  people  are  those  whom 
men  wish  to  please,  and  for  what  objects,  and 
by  what  kind  of  acts?  How  soon  will  time 
cover  all  things,  and  how  many  it  has  covered 
already. 


192 


^boudbts. 


[Book  Vn. 


VII. 

WHAT  is  badness?  It  is  that  which  thou 
hast  often  seen.  And  on  the  occasion  of 
everything  which  happens  keep  this  in  mind, 
that  it  is  that  which  thou  hast  often  seen. 
Everywhere  up  and  down  thou  wilt  find  the 
same  things,  with  which  the  old  histories  are 
filled,  those  of  the  middle  ages  and  those  of 
our  own  day  ; with  which  cities  and  houses 
are  filled  now.  There  is  nothing  new : all 
things  are  both  familiar  and  short-lived. 

2.  How  can  our  principles  become  dead,  un- 
less the  impressions  [thoughts]  which  corre- 
spond to  them  are  extinguished  ? But  it  is  in 
thy  power  continuously  to  fan  these  thoughts 
into  a flame.  I can  have  that  opinion  about 
anything  which  I ought  to  have.  If  I can, 
why  am  I disturbed?  The  things  which  are 
external  to  my  mind  have  no  relation  at  all  to 
my  mind. — Eet  this  be  the  state  of  thy  affects, 
and  thou  standest  erect.  To  recover  thy  life  is 
in  thy  power.  Look  at  things  again  as  thou 
didst  use  to  look  at  them  ; for  in  this  consists 
the  recovery  of  thy  life. 

3.  The  idle  business  of  show,  plays  on  the 
stage,  flocks  of  sheep,  herds,  exercises  with 
•spears,  a bone  cast  to  little  dogs,  a bit  of  bread 


Book  m]  /nbarcus  aurellua  Bntonlnus. 


193 


into  fishponds,  laborings  of  ants  and  burden- 
carrying, runnings  about  of  frightened  little 
mice,  puppets  pulled  by  strings — [all  alike]. 
It  is  thy  duty  then  in  the  midst  of  such  things 
to  show  good  humor  and  not  a proud  air;  to 
understand  however  that  every  man  is  worth 
just  so  much  as  the  things  are  worth  about 
which  he  busies  himself. 

4.  In  discourse  thou  must  attend  to  what  is 
said,  and  in  every  movement  thou  must  ob- 
serve what  is  doing.  And  in  the  one  thou 
shouldst  see  immediatel)^  to  what  end  it  refers, 
but  in  the  other  watch  carefully  what  is  the 
thing  signified. 

5.  Is  my  understanding  sufiicient  for  this  or 
not  ? If  it  is  sufiicient,  I use  it  for  the  work  as 
an  instrument  given  by  the  universal  nature. 
But  if  it  is  not  sufficient,  then  either  I retire 
from  the  work  and  give  way  to  him  who  is 
able  to  do  it  better,  unless  there  be  some  reason 
why  I ought  not  to  do  so;  or  I do  it  as  well  as 
I can,  taking  to  help  me  the  man  who  with  the 
aid  of  my  ruling  principle  can  do  what  is  now 
fit  and  useful  for  the  general  good.  For  what- 
soever either  by  myself  or  with  another  I can 
do,  ought  to  be  directed  to  this  only,  to  that 
which  is  useful  and  well  suited  to  society. 

6.  How  many  after  being  celebrated  by  fame 
have  been  given  up  to  oblivion ; and  how  many 
who  have  celebrated  the  fame  of  others  have 
long  been  dead. 

7.  Be  not  ashamed  to  be  helped;  for  it  is  thy 

13 


194 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  VII. 


business  to  do  thy  duty  like  a soldier  in  the 
assault  on  a town.  How  then,  if  being  lame 
thou  canst  not  mount  up  on  the  battlements 
alone,  but  with  the  help  of  another  it  is  pos- 
sible ? 

8.  Let  not  future  things  disturb  thee,  for 
thou  wilt  come  to  them,  if  it  shall  be  necessary, 
having  with  thee  the  same  reason  which  now 
thou  usest  for  present  things. 

9.  All  things  are  implicated  with  one  another, 
and  the  bond  is  holy;  and  there  is  hardly  any- 
thing unconnected  with  any  other  thing. 
For  things  have  been  co-ordinated,  and  they 
combine  to  form  the  same  universe  [order]. 
For  there  is  one  universe  made  up  of  all 
things,  and  one  god  who  pervades  all  things, 
and  one  substance,*  and  one  law,  [one]  com- 
mon reason  in  all  intelligent  animals,  and  one 
truth;  if  indeed  there  is  also  one  perfection  for 
all  animals  which  are  of  the  same  stock  and 
participate  in  the  reason. 

10.  Everything  material  soon  disappears  in 
the  substance  of  the  whole;  and  everything 
formal  [causal]  is  very  soon  taken  back  into 
the  universal  reason;  and  the  memory  of  every- 
thing is  very  soon  overwhelmed  in  time. 

11.  To  the  rational  animal  the  same  act  »s 
according  to  nature  and  according  to  reason. 

12.  Be  thou  erect,  or  be  made  erect  (iii.  5). 

13.  Just  as  it  is  with  the  members  in  those 
bodies  which  are  united  in  one,  so  it  is  with 

* “Oue  substance,”  p.  42,  note  i. 


BookYii,]  /liiarcue  BureHus  Bntoninue. 


195 


rational  beings  which  exist  separate,  for  they 
have  been  constituted  for  one  co-operation. 
And  the  perception  of  this  will  be  more  appar- 
ent to  thee  if  thou  often  sayest  to  thyself  that 
I am  a member  of  the  system  of  rational 

beings.  But  if  [using  the  letter  r]  thou  sayest 
that  thou  art  a part  [jiipog],  thou  dost  not  yet 
love  men  from  th}'  heart ; beneficence  does  not 
yet  delight  thee  for  its  own  sake  ; * thou  still 
doest  it  barely  as  a thing  of  propriety,  and  not 
yet  as  doing  good  to  thyself. 

14.  Let  there  fall  externally  what  will  on 
the  parts  which  can  feel  the  effects  of  this  fall. 
For  those  parts  which  have  felt  will  complain, 
if  they  choose.  But  I,  unless  I think  that 
what  has  happened  is  an  evil,  am  not  injured. 
And  it  is  in  my  power  not  to  think  so. 

15.  Whatever  any  one  does  or  says,  I must 
be  good  ; just  as  if  the  gold,  or  the  emerald,  or 
the  purple,  were  always  saying  this.  What- 
ever any  one  does  or  says,  I must  be  emerald 
and  keep  my  color. 

16.  The  ruling  faculty  does  not  disturb  it- 
self ; I mean,  does  not  frighten  itself  or  cause 
itself  pain.-f  But  if  any  one  else  can  frighten 
or  pain  it,  let  him  do  so.  For  the  faculty  it- 
self will  not  by  its  own  opinion  turn  itself  into 
such  wa5"S.  Let  the  body  itself  take  care,  if  it 
can,  that  it  suffer  nothing,  and  let  it  speak,  if 

*I  have  used  Gataker’s  conjecture  Kara?ir/KTCKog  in- 
stead of  the  common  reading  Kara?i.7/TrrcKoc  : compare 
iv.  20;  ix.  42. 


196 


^bougbts. 


[Book  VIL 


it  suffers.  But  the  soul  itself,  that  which  is 
subject  to  fear,  to  pain,  which  has  completely 
the  power  of  forming  an  opinion  about  these 
things,  will  suffer  nothing,  for  it  will  never 
deviate  + into  such  a judgment.  The  leading 
principle  in  itself  wants  nothing,  unless  it 
makes  a want  for  itself ; and  therefore  it  is 
both  free  from  perturbation  and  unimpeded,  if 
it  does  not  disturb  and  impede  itself. 

17.  Eudaemonia  [happiness]  is  a good 
daemon,  or  a good  thing.  What  then  art  thou 
doing  here,  O imagination  ? Go  away,  I en- 
treat thee  by  the  gods,  as  thou  didst  come,  for 
I want  thee  not.  But  thou  art  come  according 
to  thy  old  fashion.  I am  not  angry  with  thee : 
only  go  away. 

18.  Is  any  man  afraid  of  change?  Why, 
what  can  take  place  without  change  ? What 
then  is  more  pleasing  or  more  suitable  to  the 
universal  nature  ? And  canst  thou  take  a bath 
unless  the  wood  undergoes  a change?  and 
canst  thou  be  nourished,  unless  the  food  un- 
dergoes a change  ? And  can  anything  else 
that  is  useful  be  accomplished  without  change? 
Dost  thou  not  see  then  that  for  thyself  also  to 
change  is  just  the  same,  and  equally  necessary 
for  the  universal  nature  ? 

19.  Through  the  universal  substance  as 
through  a furious  torrent  all  bodies  are  carried, 
being  by  their  nature  united  with  and  co-oper- 
ating with  the  whole,  as  the  parts  of  our  body 
with  one  another.  How  many  a Chrysippus, 


Bookm]  /iiiarcus  BurcUus  Zlntonfnus. 


197 


how  many  a Socrates,  how  many  an  Epictetus 
has  time  already  swallowed  up  ! And  let  the 
same  thought  occur  to  thee  with  reference  to 
every  man  and  thing  (v.  23  ; vi.  15). 

20.  One  thing  only  troubles  me,  lest  I should 
do  something  which  the  constitution  of  man 
does  not  allow,  or  in  the  way  which  it  doe^ 
not  allow,  or  what  it  does  not  allow  now. 

21.  Near  is  thy  forgetfulness  of  all  things; 
and  near  the  forgetfulness  of  thee  bj  all. 

22.  It  is  peculiar  to  man  to  love  even  those 
who  do  wrong.  And  this  happens,  if  when 
they  do  wrong  it  occurs  to  thee  that  they  are 
kinsmen,  and  that  they  do  wrong  through 
ignorance  and  unintentionally,  and  that  soon 
both  of  you  will  die  ; and  above  all,  that  the 
wrong-doer  has  done  thee  no  harm,  for  he  has 
not  made  th}"  ruling  faculty  worse  than  it  was 
before. 

23.  The  universal  nature  out  of  the  universal 
substance,  as  if  it  were  wax,  now  moulds  a 
horse,  and  when  it  has  broken  this  up,  it  uses 
the  material  for  a tree,  then  for  a man,  then  for 
something  else ; and  each  of  these  things  sub- 
sists for  a very  short  time.  But  it  is  no  hard- 
ship for  the  vessel  to  be  broken  up,  just  as 
there  was  none  in  its  being  fastened  together 
(viii.  50). 

24.  A scowling  look  is  altogether  unnatural ; 
when  it  is  often  assumed,*  the  result  is  that  all 
comeliness  dies  away,  and  at  last  is  so  com- 

*This  is  corrupt. 


ITbougbts. 


[Book  VIL 


198 


pletely  extinguished  that  it  cannot  be  again 
lighted  up  at  all.  Try  to  conclude  from  this 
very  fact  that  it  is  contrary  to  reason.  For  if 
even  the  perception  of  doing  wrong  shall  de- 
part, what  reason  is  there  for  living  any 
longer  ? 

25.  Nature  which  governs  the  whole  will 
soon  change  all  things  thou  seest,  and  out  of 
their  substance  will  make  other  things,  and 
again  other  things  from  the  substance  of  them, 
in  order  that  the  world  may  be  ever  new  (xii. 

23)- 

26.  When  a man  has  done  thee  any  wrong, 
immediately  consider  with  what  opinion  about 
good  or  evil  he  has  done  wrong.  For  when 
thou  hast  seen  this,  thou  wilt  pity  him,  and 
wilt  neither  wonder  nor  be  angry.  For  either 
thou  thyself  thinkest  the  same  thing  to  be 
good  that  he  does,  or  another  thing  of  the  same 
kind.  It  is  thy  duty  then  to  pardon  him. 
But  if  thou  dost  not  think  such  things  to  be 
good  or  evil,  thou  wilt  more  readily  be  well 
disposed  to  him  who  is  in  error. 

27.  Think  not  so  much  of  what  thou  hast 
not  as  of  what  thou  hast : but  of  the  things 
which  thou  hast  select  the  best,  and  then  reflect 
how  eagerly  they  would  have  been  .sought,  if 
thou  hadst  them  not.  At  the  same  time,  how- 
ever, take  care  that  thou  dost  not  through  be- 
ing so  pleased  with  them  accustom  thyself  to 
overvalue  them,  so  as  to  be  disturbed  if  ever 
thou  shouldst  not  have  them. 


Book  m]  Marcus  aurellus  Antoninus. 


199 


28.  Retire  into  thyself.  The  rational  prin- 
ciple which  rules  has  this  nature,  that  it  is  con- 
tent with  itself  when  it  does  what  is  just,  and 
so  secures  tranquillity. 

29.  Wipe  out  the  imagination.  Stop  the 
pulling  of  the  strings.  Confine  thyself  to  the 
present.  Understand  well  what  happens  either 
to  thee  or  to  another.  Divide  and  distribute 
every  object  into  the  causal  [formal]  and  the 
material.  Think  of  thy  last  hour.  Ret  the 
wrong  which  is  done  by  a man  stay  there  where 
the  wrong  was  done  (viii.  29). 

30.  Direct  thy  attention  to  what  is  said. 
Let  thy  understanding  enter  into  the  things 
that  are  doing  and  the  things  which  do  them 
(vii.  4). 

31.  Adorn  thyself  with  simplicity  and 
modesty,  and  with  indifference  towards  the 
things  which  lie  between  virtue  and  vice. 
Love  riiankind.  Follow  God.  The  poet  says 
that  law  rules  all — + And  it  is  enough  to  re- 
member that  law  rules  all.+* 

32.  About  death  : whether  it  is  a dispersion, 
or  a resolution  into  atoms,  or  annihilation,  it  is 
either  extinction  or  change. 

33.  About  pain  : the  pain  which  is  intoler- 
able carries  us  off ; but  that  which  lasts  a long 
time  is  tolerable;  and  the  mind  maintains  its 
own  tranquillity  by  retiring  into  itself,  and 
the  ruling  faculty  is  not  made  worse.  But  the 

* The  end  of  this  section  is  unintelligible. 


200 


XTbouQbts. 


[Book  YU 


parts  which  are  harmed  by  pain,  let  them,  if 
thej^  can,  give  their  opinion  about  it. 

34.  About  fame : look  at  the  minds  [of 
those  who  seek  fame],  observe  what  they  are, 
and  what  kind  of  things  they  avoid,  and  what 
kind  of  things  they  pursue.  And  consider 
that  as  the  heaps  of  sand  piled  on  one  another 
hide  the  former  sands,  so  in  life  the  events 
which  go  before  are  soon  covered  by  those 
which  come  after. 

35.  From  Plato  :*  The  man  who  has  an  ele- 
vated mind  and  takes  a view  of  all  time  and 
of  all  substance,  dost  thou  suppose  it  possible 
for  him  to  think  that  human  life  is  anything 
great?  It  is  not  possible,  he  said. — Such  a 
man  then  will  think  that  death  also  is  no  evil. 
— Certainly  not. 

36.  From  Autisthenes : It  is  royal  to  do 
good  and  to  be  abused. 

37.  It  is  a base  thing  for  the  countenance  to 
be  obedient  and  to  regulate  and  compose  itself 
as  the  mind  commands,  and  for  the  mind  not 
to  be  regulated  and  composed  by  itself. 

38.  It  is  not  right  to  vex  ourselves  at  things. 
For  they  care  nought  about  it.f 

39.  To  the  immortal  gods  and  us  give  joy. 

40.  Fife  must  be  reaped  like  the  ripe  ears  of 

corn. 

One  man  is  born ; another  dies.| 

* Plato,  Pol.  vi.  486. 

t From  the  Bellerophoii  of  Euripides. 

t From  the  Hypsipyle  of  Euripides.  Cicero  (Tuscul. 


BookYiL]  /Biarcue  aurcHus  Bntoninus. 


201 


41.  If  gods  care  not  for  me  and  my  children, 
There  is  a reason  for  it. 

42.  For  the  good  is  with  me,  and  the  just.* 

43.  No  joining  others  in  their  wailing,  no 

violent  emotion. 

44.  From  Plato  :f  But  I would  make  this 
man  a sufficient  answer,  which  is  this:  Thou 
sayest  not  well,  if  thou  thinkest  that  a man 
who  is  good  for  anything  at  all  ought  to  com- 
pute the  hazard  of  life  or  death,  and  should 
not  rather  look  to  this  only  in  all  that  he  does, 
whether  he  is  doing  what  is  just  or  unjust,  and 
the  works  of  a good  or  bad  man. 

45.  fFor  thus  it  is,  men  of  Athens,  in  truth: 
wherever  a man  has  placed  himself  thinking  it 
the  best  place  for  him,  or  has  been  placed  by  a 
commander,  there  in  my  opinion  he  ought  to 
stay  and  to  abide  the  hazard,  taking  nothing 
into  the  reckoning,  either  death  or  anything 
else,  before  the  baseness  [of  deserting  his 
post], 

46.  But,  my  good  friend,  reflect  whether 
that  which  is  noble  and  good  is  not  something 
different  from  saving  and  being  saved;  for+  as 
to  a man  living  such  or  such  a time,  at  least 
one  who  is  really  a man,  consider  if  this  is  not 

iii.  25)  has  translated  six  lines  from  Euripides,  and 
among  them  are  these  two  lines, — 

“ Reddenda  terrae  est  terra:  turn  vita  omnibus 
Metenda  ut  fruges;  Sic  jubet  necessitas.” 

* See  Aristophanes,  Acharnenses,  v.  661. 

f From  the  Apologia,  c.  16. 


202 


tTbougbts. 


[Book  Vn. 


a thing  to  be  dismissed  from  the  thoughts 
and  there  must  be  no  love  of  life : but  as  to 
these  matters  a man  must  intrust  them  to  the 
Deity  and  believe  what  the  women  say,  that 
no  man  can  escape  his  destiny,  the  next  in- 
quiry being  how  he  may  best  live  the  time  that 
he  has  to  live.* 

47.  Dook  round  at  the  courses  of  the  stars, 
as  if  thou  wert  going  along  with  them  ; and 
constantly  consider  the  changes  of  the  elements 
into  one  another,  for  such  thoughts  purge 
away  the  filth  of  the  terrene  life. 

48.  This  is  a fine  saying  of  Plato  :f  That  he 
who  is  discoursing  about  men  should  look  also 
at  earthly  things  as  if  he  viewed  them  from 
some  higher  place  ; should  look  at  them  in 
their  assemblies,  armies,  agricultural  labors, 
marriages,  treaties,  births,  deaths,  noise  of  the 
courts  of  justice,  desert  places,  various  nations 
of  barbarians,  feasts,  lamentations,  markets,  a 
mixture  of  all  things  and  an  orderly  combina- 
tion of  contraries. 

49.  Consider  the  past, — such  great  changes 
of  political  supremacies;  thou  mayest  foresee 
also  the  things  which  will  be.  For  they  wdll 

* Plato,  Gorgias,  c.  68  (512).  In  this  passage  the- 
text  of  Antoninus  has  iarcov,  which  is  perhaps  right; 
but  there  is  a difficulty  in  the  words  fif/  -yap  rovro  p.ev, 
TO  ^fjv  biTooovfifj  xp^'^ov  rdvyE  wf  a\rjdC>^  avdpa  eareov  eari, 
ml  oil,  &c.  The  conjecture  evureov  for  eareov  does  not 
mend  the  matter. 

t It  is  said  that  this  is  not  in  the  extant  writings  of 
Plato. 


Book  VII.]  Marcus  :aurclius  Bntoninus. 


203 


certainly  be  of  like  form,  and  it  is  not  possible 
that  they  should  deviate  from  the  order  of  the 
things  which  take  place  now;  accordinglj^  to 
have  contemplated  human  life  for  forty  years 
is  the  same  as  to  have  contemplated  it  for  ten 
thousand  years.  For  what  more  wilt  thou 
see? 

50.  That  which  has  grown  from  the  earth  to 

the  earth, 

But  that  which  has  sprung  from  heavenly 
seed. 

Back  to  the  heavenly  realms  returns.* 

This  is  either  a dissolution  of  the  mutual  in- 
volution of  the  atoms,  or  a similar  dispersion 
of  the  unsentient  elements. 

51.  With  food  and  drinks  and  cunning  magic 

arts 

Turning  the  channel’s  course  to  ’scape 
from  death. t 

The  breeze  which  heaven  has'sent 

We  must  endure,  and  toil  without  com- 
plaining. 

52.  Another  may  be  more  expert  in  casting 
his  opponent;  but  he  is  not  more  social,  nor 
more  modest,  nor  better  disciplined  to  meet  all 
that  happens,  nor  more  considerate  with  re- 
spect to  the  faults  of  his  neighbors. 

53.  Where  any  work  can  be  done  conform- 
ably to  the  reason  which  is  common  to  gods 

* From  the  Chrysippus  of  Euripides. 

t The  first  two  lines  are  from  the  Supplices  of 
Euripides,  v.  iiio. 


204 


ITbougbte. 


[Bookm 


and  men,  there  we  have  nothing  to  fear;  for 
where  we  are  able  to  get  profit  by  means  of  the 
activity  which  is  successful  and  proceeds  ac- 
cording to  our  constitution,  there  no  harm  is 
to  be  suspected. 

54.  Everywhere  and  at  all  times  it  is  in  thy 
power  piously  to  acquiesce  in  thy  present  con- 
dition, and  to  behave  justly  to  those  who  are 
about  thee,  and  to  exert  thy  skill  upon  thy 
present  thoughts,  that  nothing  shall  steal  into 
them  without  being  well  examined. 

55.  Do  not  look  around  thee  to  discover 
other  men’s  ruling  principles,  but  look  straight 
to  this,  to  what  nature  leads  thee,  both  the  uni- 
versal nature  through  the  things  which  happen 
to  thee,  and  thy  own  nature  through  the  acts 
which  must  be  done  by  thee.  But  every  being 
ought  to  do  that  which  is  according  to  its  con- 
stitution; and  all  other  things  have  been  con- 
stituted for  the  sake  of  rational  beings,  just  as 
among  irrational  things  the  inferior  for  the 
sake  of  the  superior,  but  the  rational  for  the 
sake  of  one  another. 

The  prime  principle  then  in  man’s  constitu- 
tion is  the  social.  And  the  second  is  not  to 
yield  to  the  persuasions  of  the  body, — for  it  is 
the  peculiar  office  of  the  rational  and  intelligent 
motion  to  circumscribe  itself,  and  never  to  be 
overpowered  either  by  the  motion  of  the  senses 
or  of  the  appetites,  for  both  are  animal;  but  the 
intelligent  motion  claims  superiority,  and  does 
not  permit  itself  to  be  overpowered  by  the 


Bookvn.]  Marcus  Hurelfus  Sntoninus. 


205 


others.  And  with  good  reason,  for  it  is  formed 
by  natnre  to  use  all  of  them.  The  third  thing 
in  the  rational  constitution  is  freedom  from 
error  and  from  deception.  L,et  then  the  ruling 
principle  holding  fast  to  these  things  go 
straight  on,  and  it  has  what  is  its  own. 

56.  Consider  thyself  to  be  dead,  and  to  have 
completed  thy  life  up  to  the  present  time ; and 
live  according  to  nature  the  remainder  which 
is  allowed  thee. 

57.  Love  that  only  which  happens  to  thee 
and  is  spun  with  the  thread  of  th}^  destiny. 
For  what  is  more  suitable  ? 

58.  In  everything  which  happens  keep  be- 
fore thy  eyes  those  to  whom  the  same  things 
happened,  and  how  they  were  vexed,  and 
treated  them  as  strange  things,  and  found 
fault  with  them  : and  now  where  are  they  ? 
Nowhere.  Wlty  then  dost  thou  too  choose  to 
act  in  the  same  way  ? and  wh}^  dost  thou  not 
leave  these  agitations  which  are  foreign  to 
nature  to  those  who  cause  them  and  those  who 
are  moved  by  them;  and  wh>^  art  thou  not  al- 
together intent  upon  the  right  way  of  making 
use  of  the  things  which  happen  to  thee  ? For 
then  thou  wilt  use  them  well,  and  they  will  be 
a material  for  thee  [to  work  on].  Onl}"  attend 
to  thyself,  and  resolve  to  be  a good  man  in  every 
act  which  thou  doest : and  remember  . . .* 

* This  section  is  obscure,  and  the  conclusion  is  so 
corrupt  that  it  is  impossible  to  give  any  probable 
meaning  to  it.  It  is  better  to  leave  it  as  it  is  than  to 
patch  it  up,  as  some  critics  and  translators  have  done 


2o6 


tIbougbt6. 


[Book  Vn. 


59.  Look  within.  Within  is  the  fountain  of 
good,  and  it  will  ever  bubble  up,  if  thou  wilt 
ever  dig. 

60.  The  body  ought  to  be  compact,  and  to 
show  no  irregularity  either  in  motion  or  atti- 
tude. For  what  the  mind  shows  in  the  face  by 
maintaining  in  it  the  expression  of  intelligence 
and  propriety,  that  ought  to  be  required  also 
in  the  whole  body.  But  all  these  things  should 
be  observed  without  affectation. 

61.  The  art  of  life  is  more  like  the  wrestler’s 
art  than  the  dancer’s,  in  respect  of  this,  that  it 
should  stand  ready  and  firm  to  meet  onsets 
which  are  sudden  and  unexpected. 

62.  Constantly  observe  who  those  are  whose 
approbation  thou  wishest  to  have,  and  what 
ruling  principles  they  possess.  For  then  thou 
wilt  neither  blame  those  who  offend  involun- 
tarily, nor  wilt  thou  want  their  approbation, 
if  thou  lookest  to  the  sources  of  their  opinions 
and  appetites. 

63.  Every  soul,  the  philosopher  says,  is  in- 
voluntarily deprived  of  truth;  consequently  in 
the  same  way  it  is  deprived  of  justice  and  tem- 
perance and  benevolence  and  everything  of  the 
kind.  It  is  most  necessary  to  bear  this  con- 
stantly in  mind,  for  thus  thou  wilt  be  more 
gentle  towards  all. 

64.  In  every  pain  let  this  thought  be  pres- 
ent, that  there  is  no  dishonor  in  it,  nor  does  it 
make  the  governing  intelligence  worse,  for  it 
does  not  damage  the  intelligence  either  so  far 


Eookvii.]  /Hbatcus  BureUus  Hntoninus. 


207 


as  the  intelligence  is  rational*  or  so  far  as  it  is 
social.  Indeed  in  the  case  of  most  pains  let 
this  remark  of  Epicurus  aid  thee,  that  pain 
is  neither  intolerable  nor  everlasting,  if  thou 
bearest  in  mind  that  it  has  its  limits,  and  if 
thou  addest  nothing  to  it  in  imagination:  and 
remember  this  too,  that  we  do  not  perceive 
that  many  things  which  are  disagreeable  to  us 
are  the  same  as  pain,  such  as  excessive  drow- 
siness, and  the  being  scorched  by  heat,  and 
the  having  no  appetite.  When  then  thou  art 
discontented  about  any  of  these  things,  say  to 
thyself  that  thou  art  yielding  to  pain. 

65.  Take  care  not  to  feel  towards  the  inhu- 
man as  they  feel  towards  men.f 

66.  How  do  we  know  if  Telauges  was  not 
superior  in  character  to  Socrates  ? For  it  is 
not  enough  that  Socrates  died  a more  noble 
death,  and  disputed  more  skilfully  with  the 
sophists,  and  passed  the  night  in  the  cold  with 
more  endurance,  and  that  when  he  was  bid  to 
arrest  LeonJ  of  Salamis,  he  considered  it  more 
noble  to  refuse,  and  that  he  walked  in  a swag- 

* The  text  has  v’kiKtj,  which  it  has  been  proposed  to 
alter  to  loytKy,  and  this  change  is  necessary.  We  shall 
then  have  in  this  section  loyiKrj  and  koivuvikt/  associated, 
as  we  have  in  s.  68  XoyiKfj  and  and  in  s.  72. 

fl  have  followed  Gataker’s  conjecture  ol  a-rra.vdpoTroi 
instead  of  the  MSS.  reading  oi  avdpunoi. 

j;  Leon  of  Salamis.  See  Plato,  Epist.  7;  Apolog.  c. 
20;  Epictetus,  iv.  i,  160;  iv.  7,  30. 


2o8 


tlbou0bt6. 


[Book  Vn. 


gering  way  in  the  streets* — though  as  to  this 
fact  one  may  have  great  doubts  if  it  was  true. 
But  we  ought  to  inquire  what  kind  of  a soul  it 
was  that  Socrates  possessed,  and  if  he  was  able 
to  be  content  with  being  just  towards  men  and 
pious  towards  the  gods,  neither  idly  vexed  on 
account  of  men’s  villainy,  nor  yet  making  him- 
self a slave  to  any  man’s  ignorance,  nor  receiv- 
ing as  strange  anything  that  fell  to  his  share 
out  of  the  universal,  nor  enduring  it  as  in- 
tolerable, nor  allowing  his  understanding  to 
sympathize  with  the  affects  of  the  miserable 
flesh. 

67.  Nature  has  not  so  mingled+  [the  intelli- 
gence] with  the  composition  of  the  body,  as 
not  to  have  allowed  thee  the  power  of  circum- 
scribing thyself  and  of  bringing  under  subjec- 
tion to  thyself  all  that  is  thy  own ; for  it  is 
very  possible  to  be  a divine  man  and  to  be 
recognized  as  such  by  no  one.  Always  bear 
this  in  mind  ; and  another  thing  too,  that  very 
little  indeed  is  necessary  for  living  a happy  life. 
And  because  thou  hast  despaired  of  becoming 
a dialectician  and  skilled  in  the  knowledge  of 
nature,  do  not  for  this  reason  renounce  the 
hope  of  being  both  free  and  modest,  and  social 
and  obedient  to  God. 

68.  It  is  in  thy  power  to  live  free  from  all 
compulsion  in  the  greatest  tranquillity  of  mind, 

* Aristophau.  Nub.  362.  ort  j3pevdvei  r’  iv  ralciv- 
b6olg  ml  rt)  bfdaXjui)  napa^aXksi. 


Book  YIL]  ynbarcus  BurcHus  Bntonlnus. 


209 


even  if  all  the  world  cry  out  against  thee  as 
much  as  they  choose,  and  even  if  wild  beasts 
tear  in  pieces  the  members  of  this  kneaded 
matter  which  has  grown  around  thee.  For 
what  hinders  the  mind  in  the  midst  of  all  this 
from  maintaining  itself  in  tranquillity  and  in  a 
just  judgment  of  all  surrounding  things  and 
in  a ready  use  of  the  objects  which  are  pre- 
sented to  it,  so  that  the  judgment  may  say  to 
the  thing  which  falls  under  its  observation  ; 
This  thou  art  in  substance  [reality],  though  in 
men’s  opinion  thou  mayest  appear  to  be  of  a 
different  kind  ; and  the  use  shall  say  to  that 
which  falls  under  the  hand  : Thou  art  the  thing 
that  I was  seeking  ; for  to  me  that  which  pre- 
sents itself  is  alwa5^s  a material  for  virtue  both 
rational  and  political,  and  in  a word,  for  the 
exercise  of  art,  which  belongs  to  man  or  God. 
For  everything  which  happens  has  a relation- 
ship either  to  God  or  man,  and  is  neither  new 
nor  difficult  to  handle,  but  usual  and  apt  mat- 
ter to  work  on. 

69.  The  perfection  of  moral  character  con- 
sists in  this,  in  passing  every  day  as  the  last, 
and  in  being  neither  violently  excited  nor 
torpid  nor  playing  the  hypocrite. 

70.  The  gods  who  are  immortal  are  not 
vexed  because  during  so  long  a time  they 
must  tolerate  continually  men  such  as  they  are 
and  so  many  of  them  bad  ; and  besides  this, 
they  also  take  care  of  them  in  all  ways.  But 
thou,  who  art  destined  to  end  so  soon,  art  thou 

14 


210 


^Tbougbte. 


[Book  VU. 


wearied  of  enduring  the  bad,  and  this  too  when 
thou  art  one  of  them  ? 

71.  It  is  a ridiculous  thing  for  a man  not  to 
fly  from  his  own  badness,  which  is  indeed  pos- 
sible, but  to  fly  from  other  men’s  badness, 
which  is  impossible. 

72.  Whatever  the  rational  and  political 
[social]  faculty  finds  to  be  neither  intelligent 
nor  social,  it  properly  j udges  to  be  inferior  to 
itself. 

73.  When  thou  hast  done  a good  act  and 
another  has  received  it,  why  dost  thou  still 
look  for  a third  thing  besides  these,  as  fools  do, 
either  to  have  the  reputation  of  having  done  a 
good  act  or  to  obtain  a return  ? 

74.  No  man  is  tired  of  receiving  what  is 
u.seful.  But  it  is  useful  to  act  according  to 
nature.  Do  not  then  be  tired  of  receiving 
what  is  useful  by  doing  it  to  others. 

75.  The  nature  of  the  All  moved  to  make 
the  universe.  But  now  either  everything  that 
takes  place  comes  by  way  of  consequence  or 
[continuity]  ; or  even  the  chief  things  towards 
which  the  ruling  power  of  the  universe  directs 
its  own  movement  are  governed  by  no  rational 
principle.  If  this  is  remembered,  it  will  make 
thee  more  tranquil  in  many  things  (vi.  44  ; 
ix.  28).* 

* It  is  not  easy  to  understand  this  section.  It  has 
been  suggested  that  there  is  some  error  in  ^ aXdyiara, 
&c.  Some  of  the  translators  have  made  nothing  of 
the  passage,  and  they  have  somewhat  perverted  the 


Book  VII.]  flbarcus  Burelius  Bntonfnus. 


21 1 


words.  The  first  proposition  is,  that  the  universe  was 
made  by  some  sufficient  power.  A beginning  of  the 
universe  is  assumed,  and  a power  which  framed  an 
order.  The  next  question  is.  How  are  things  pro- 
duced now?  Or,  in  other  words,  by  what  power  do 
forms  appear  in  continuous  succession  ? The  answer, 
according  to  Antoninus,  may  be  this:  It  is  by  virtue 
of  the  original  constitution  of  things  that  all  change 
and  succession  have  been  effected  and  are  effected. 
And  this  is  intelligible  in  a sense,  if  we  admit  that  the 
universe  is  always  one  and  the  same,  a continuity  of 
identity;  as  much  one  and  the  same  as  man  is  one 
and  the  same — which  he  believes  himself  to  be,  though 
he  also  believes,  and  cannot  help  believing,  that  both 
in  his  body  and  in  his  thoughts  there  is  change  and 
succession.  There  is  no  real  discontinuity  then  in 
the  universe;  and  if  we  say  that  there  was  an  order 
framed  in  the  beginning,  and  that  the  things  which 
are  now  produced  are  a consequence  of  a previous  ar- 
rangement, we  speak  of  things  as  we  are  compelled  to 
view  them,  as  forming  a series  of  succession,  just  as 
we  speak  of  the  changes  in  our  own  bodies  and  the 
sequence  of  our  own  thoughts.  But  as  there  are  no 
intervals,  not  even  intervals  infinitely  small,  between 
any  two  supposed  states  of  any  one  thing,  so  there  are 
no  intervals,  not  even  infinitely  small,  between  what 
we  call  one  thing  and  any  other  thing  which  we  speak 
of  as  immediately  preceding  or  following  it.  What 
we  call  time  is  an  idea  derived  from  our  notion  of  a 
succession  of  things  or  events,  an  idea  which  is  a part 
of  our  constitution,  but  not  an  idea  which  we  can  sup- 
pose to  belong  to  an  infinite  intelligence  and  power. 
The  conclusion  then  is  certain  that  the  present  and 
the  past,  the  production  of  present  things  and  the  sup- 
posed original  order,  out  of  which  we  say  that  present 
things  now  come,  are  one,  and  the  present  productive 
power  and  the  so-called  past  arrangement  are  only 
different  names  for  one  thing.  I suppose  theu  that 
Antoninus  wrote  here  as  people  sometimes  talk  now. 


212 


^Cbouflbte. 


[BonkTIL 


and  that  his  real  meaning  is  not  exactly  expressed  by 
his  words.  There  are  certainly  other  passages  from 
which  I think  that  we  may  collect  that  he  had  notions 
of  production  something  like  what  I have  expressed. 

We  now  come  to  the  alternate:  “or  even  the  chief 
things  . . . principle.”  I do  not  exactly  know  what 
he  means  by  ra  Kvpiurara,  “the  chief,”  or  “the  most 
excellent,”  or  whatever  it  is.  But  as  he  speaks  else- 
where of  inferior  and  superior  things,  and  of  the  infe- 
rior being  for  the  use  of  the  superior,  and  of  rational 
beings  being  the  highest,  he  may  here  mean  rational 
beings.  He  also  in  this  alternative  assumes  a govern- 
ing power  of  the  universe,  and  that  it  acts  by  directing 
its  power  towards  these  chief  objects,  or  making  its  spe- 
cial, proper  motion  towards  them.  And  here  he  uses 
the  noun  {oppr/)  “movement,”  which  contains  the 
same  notion  as  the  verb  {appy/ae)  “moved,”  which  he 
used  at  the  beginning  of  the  paragraph,  when  he  was 
speaking  of  the  making  of  the  universe.  If  we  do  not 
accept  the  first  hypothesis,  he  says,  we  must  take  the 
conclusion  of  the  second,  that  the  “chief  things,  to- 
wards which  the  ruling  power  of  the  universe  directs 
its  own  movement  are  governed  by  no  rational  prin- 
ciple.” The  meaning  then  is,  if  there  is  a meaning 
in  it,  that  though  there  is  a governing  power  which 
strives  to  give  effect  to  its  efforts,  we  must  conclude 
that  there  is  no  rational  direction  of  anything,  if  the 
power  which  first  made  the  universe  does  not  in  some 
way  govern  it  still.  Besides,  if  we  assume  that  any- 
thing is  now  produced  or  now  exists  without  the  ac- 
tion of  the  supreme  intelligence,  and  yet  that  this 
intelligence  makes  an  effort  to  act,  we  obtain  a con- 
clusion which  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  nature 
of  a supreme  power,  whose  existence  Antoninus  al- 
ways assumes.  The  tranquillity  that  a man  may  gain 
from  these  reflections  must  result  from  his  rejecting 
the  second  hypothesis  and  accepting  the  first — what- 
ever may  be  the  exact  sense  in  which  the  emperor  un- 
derstood the  first.  Or,  as  he  says  elsewhere,  if  there 


Book  VII.]  fliarcus  Burellus  Bntoninus. 


213 


is  no  Providence  which  governs  the  world,  man  has 
at  least  the  power  of  governing  himself  according  to 
the  constitution  of  his  nature;  and  so  he  may  be  tran- 
quil if  he  does  the  best  that  he  can. 

If  there  is  no  error  in  the  passage,  it  is  worth  the 
labor  to  discover  the  writer’s  exact  meaning — for  I 
think  that  he  had  a meaning,  though  people  may  not 
agree  what  it  was.  (Compare  ix.  28.)  If  I have 
rightly  explained  the  emperor’s  meaning  in  this  and 
other  passages,  he  has  touched  the  solution  of  a great 
question. 


214 


Cbouflbta. 


[Book  VIII. 


VIII. 

This  reflection  also  tends  to  the  removal  of 
the  desire  of  emptj^  fame,  that  it  is  no 
longer  in  thy  power  to  have  lived  the  whole  of 
thy  life,  or  at  least  thy  life  from  thy  youth  up- 
wards, like  a philosopher;  but  both  to  many 
others  and  to  thyself  it  is  plain  that  thou  art 
far  from  philosophy.  Thou  hast  fallen  into 
disorder  then,  so  that  it  is  no  longer  easy  for 
thee  to  get  the  reputation  of  a philosopher;  and 
thy  plan  of  life  also  opposes  it.  If  then  thou 
hast  truly  seen  where  the  matter  lies,  throw 
away  the  thought.  How  thou  shalt  seem  [to 
others],  and  be  content  if  thou  shalt  live  the 
rest  of  thy  life  in  such  wise  as  thy  nature  wills. 
Observe  then  what  it  wills,  and  let  nothing 
else  distract  thee;  for  thou  hast  had  experience 
of  many  wanderings  without  having  found  hap- 
piness anywhere, — not  in  syllogisms,  nor  in 
wealth,  nor  in  reputation,  nor  in  enjoyment, 
nor  anywhere.  Where  is  it  then?  In  doing 
what  man’s  nature  requires.  How  then  shall 
a man  do  this?  If  he  has  principles  from 
which  come  his  affects  and  his  acts.  What 
principles?  Those  which  relate  to  good  and 
bad:  the  belief  that  there  is  nothing  good  for 
man  which  does  not  make  him  just,  temperate, 


BookVni.]  flibarcus  aurcHue  Bntoninus. 


215 

manly,  free;  and  that  there  is  nothing  bad 
which  does  not  do  the  contrary  to  what  has 
been  mentioned. 

2.  On  the  occasion  of  every  act  ask  th5^self, 
How  is  this  with  respect  to  me  ? Shall  I repent 
of  it  ? A little  time  and  I am  dead,  and  all  is 
gone.  What  more  do  I seek,  if  what  I am 
now  doing  is  the  work  of  an  intelligent  living 
being,  and  a social  being,  and  one  who  is  under 
the  same  law  with  God  ? 

3.  Alexander  and  Caius*  and  Pompeius, 
what  are  they  in  comparison  with  Diogenes 
and  Heraclitus  and  Socrates  ? For  they  were 
acquainted  with  things,  and  their  causes 
[forms],  and  their  matter,  and  the  ruling  prin- 
ciples of  these  men  were  the  same  [or  conform- 
able to  their  pursuits].  But  as  to  the  others, 
how  many  things  had  they  to  care  for,  and  to 
how  many  things  were  they  slaves  ! 

4.  [Consider]  that  men  will  do  the  same 
things  nevertheless,  even  though  thou  shouldst 
burst. 

5.  This  is  the  chief  thing : Be  not  per- 
turbed, for  all  things  are  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  universal ; and  in  a little  time 
thou  wilt  be  nobody  and  nowhere,  like  Had- 
rianus  and  Augustus.  In  the  next  place,  hav- 
ing fixed  thy  eyes  steadily  on  thy  business,, 
look  at  it,  and  at  the  same  time  remembering 
that  it  is  thy  duty  to  be  a good  man,  and  what 

*Caius  is  C.  Julius  Caesar,  the  dictator;  and  Pompe- 
ius  is  Cn.  Pompeius,  named  Magnus. 


2i6 


C:bc»ugbt0. 


[Book  VIII. 


man’s  nature  demands,  do  that  without  turn- 
ing aside  ; and  speak  as  it  seems  to  thee  most 
just,  only  let  it  be  with  a good  disposition  and 
with  modesty  and  without  hypocrisy. 

6.  The  nature  of  the  universal  has  this  work 
to  do, — to  remove  to  that  place  the  things 
which  are  in  this,  to  change  them,  to  take, 
them  away  hence,  and  to  carry  them  there. 
All  things  are  change,  yet  we  need  not  fear 
anything  new.  All  things  are  familiar  [to  us] ; 
but  the  distribution  of  them  still  remains  the 
same. 

7.  Every  nature  is  contented  with  itself 
when  it  goes  on  its  way  well ; and  a rational 
nature  goes  on  its  way  well  when  in  its 
thoughts  it  assents  to  nothing  false  or  uncer- 
tain, and  when  it  directs  its  movements  to 
social  acts  only,  and  when  it  confines  its  desires 
and  aversions  to  the  things  which  are  in  its 
power,  and  when  it  is  satisfied  with  everything 
that  is  assigned  to  it  by  the  common  nature. 
For  of  this  common  nature  every  particular 
nature  is  a part,  as  the  nature  of  the  leaf  is  a 
part  of  the  nature  of  the  plant ; except  that  in 
the  plant  the  nature  of  the  leaf  is  part  of  a 
nature  which  has  not  perception  or  reason, 
and  is  subject  to  be  impeded  ; but  the  nature 
of  man  is  part  of  a nature  which  is  not  subject 
to  impediments,  and  is  intelligent  and  just, 
since  it  gives  to  everything  in  equal  portions 
and  according  to  its  worth,  times,  substance, 
cause  [form],  activity,  and  incident.  But  ex- 


Book  ¥lll,]  Marcus  Burelius  Bntoninus. 


217 


amine,  not  to  discover  that  any  one  thing 
compared  with  any  other  single  thing  is  equal 
in  all  respects,  but  by  taking  all  the  parts  to- 
gether of  one  thing  and  comparing  them  with 
all  the  parts  together  of  another. 

8.  Thou  hast  not  leisure  [or  ability]  to  read. 
But  thou  hast  leisure  [or  ability]  to  check  arro- 
gance: thou  hast  leisure  to  be  superior  to  pleas- 
ure and  pain:  thou  hast  leisure  to  be  superior 
to  love  of  fame,  and  not  to  be  vexed  at  stupid 
and  ungrateful  people,  nay  even  to  care  for 
them. 

9.  Let  no  man  any  longer  hear  thee  finding 
fault  with  the  court  life  or  with  thy  own  (v. 
16). 

10.  Repentance  is  a kind  of  self-reproof  for 
having  neglected  something  useful;  but  that 
which  is  good  must  be  something  useful,  and 
the  perfect  good  man  should  look  after  it.  But 
no  such  man  would  ever  repent  of  having  re- 
fused any  sensual  pleasure.  Pleasure  then  is 
neither  good  nor  useful. 

11.  This  thing,  what  is  it  in  itself,  in  its  own 
constitution  ? What  is  its  substance  and  mater- 
ial? And  what  its  causal  nature  [or  form]? 
And  what  is  it  doing  in  the  world?  And  how 
long  does  it  subsist? 

12.  When  thou  risest  from  sleep  with  reluct- 
ance, remember  that  it  is  according  to  thy  con- 
stitution and  according  to  human  nature  to  per- 
form social  acts,  but  sleeping  is  common  also 
to  irrational  animals.  But  that  which  is  ac 


2i8 


^Tbouflbta. 


[Book  Vin. 


cording  to  each  individual’s  nature  is  also  more 
peculiarly  its  own,  and  more  suitable  to  its 
nature,  and  indeed  also  more  agreeable  (v.  i). 

13.  Constantly,  and,  if  it  be  possible,  on  the 
occasion  of  every  impression  on  the  soul,  apply 
to  it  the  principles  of  Physic,  of  Ethic,  and  of 
Dialectic. 

14.  Whatever  man  thou  meetest  with,  im- 
mediately say  to  thyself:  What  opinions  has 
this  man  about  good  and  bad  ? For  if  with  re-  ' 
spect  to  pleasure  and  pain  and  the  causes  of 
each,  and  with  respect  to  fame  and  ignominy, 
death  and  life,  he  has  such  and  such  opinions, 
it  will  seem  nothing  wonderful  or  strange  ta 
me  if  he  does  such  and  such  things;  and  I shall 
bear  in  mind  that  he  is  compelled  to  do  so.* 

15.  Remember  that  as  it  is  a shame  to  be 
surprised  if  the  fig-tree  produces  figs,  so  it  is  to 
be  surprised  if  the  world  produces  such  and 
such  things  of  which  it  is  productive;  and  for 
the  physician  and  the  helmsman  it  is  a shame 
to  be  surprised  if  a man  has  a fever,  or  if  the 
wind  is  unfavorable. 

16.  Remember  that  to  change  thy  opinion 
and  to  follow  him  who  corrects  thy  error  is  as 
consistent  with  freedom  as  it  is  to  persist  in  thy 
error.  For  it  is  thy  own,  the  activity  which  is 
exerted  according  to  thy  own  movement  and 
judgment,  and  indeed  according  to  thy  own 
understanding  too. 

* Antoninus  v.  16.  Thucydides,  iii.  10;  tv  yap  tu 
6ia7CkaaacfVTi  rij^  yv(vpriq  Kal  al  Siacftopal  to>v  epyivv  KadiaTavrai. 


Book  ¥III.]  Marcus  Hurelius  antoninuB. 


219 


17.  If  a thing  is  in  thy  own  power,  why  dost 
thou  do  it?  but  if  it  is  in  the  power  of  another, 
whom  dost  thou  blame, — the  atoms  [chance]  or 
the  gods?  Both  are  foolish.  Thou  must 
blame  nobody.  For  if  thou  canst,  correct  [that 
which  is  the  cause];  but  if  thou  canst  not  do 
this,  correct  at  least  the  thing  itself;  but  if  thou 
canst  not  do  even  this,  of  what  use  is  it  to  thee 

^ to  find  fault  ? for  nothing  should  be  done  with* 
* out  a purpose. 

18.  That  which  has  died  falls  not  out  of  the 
universe.  If  it  stays  here,  it  also  changes  here, 
and  is  dissolved  into  its  proper  parts,  which  are 
elements  of  the  universe  and  of  thyself.  And 
these  too  change,  and  thej^  murmur  not. 

19.  Everything  exists  for  some  end, — a horse, 
a vine.  Why  dost  thou  wonder?  Even  the 
sun  will  say,  I am  for  some  purpose,  and  the 
rest  of  the  gods  will  say  the  same.  For  what 
purpose  then  art  thou, — to  enjoy  pleasure?’ 
See  if  common  sense  allows  this. 

20.  Nature  has  had  regard  in  everything  no 
less  to  the  end  than  to  the  beginning  and  the 
continuance,  just  like  the  man  who  throws  up 
a ball.  What  good  is  it  then  for  the  ball  to  be 
thrown  up,  or  harm  for  it  to  come  down,  or 
even  to  have  fallen  ? and  what  good  is  it  to  the 
bubble  while  it  holds  together,  or  what  harm 
when  it  is  burst  ? The  same  may  be  said  of  a 
light  also. 

21.  Turn  it  [the  body]  inside  out,  and  see 
what  kind  of  thing  it  is;  and  when  it  has 


220 


^Cbouflbts. 


[Book  Vin. 


grown  old,  what  kind  of  thing  it  becomes,  and 
when  it  is  diseased. 

Short  lived  are  both  the  praiser  and  the 
praised,  and  the  rememberer  and  the  remem- 
bered: and  all  this  in  a nook  of  this  part  of  the 
world;  and  not  even  here  do  all  agree,  no,  not 
any  one  with  himself : and  the  whole  earth  too 
is  a point. 

22.  Attend  to  the  matter  which  is  before  ^ 
thee,  whether  it  is  an  opinion  or  an  act  or  a 
word. 

Thou  sufferest  this  justly  : for  thou  choosest 
rather  to  become  good  to-morrow  than  to  be 
good  to-day. 

23.  Am  I doing  anything?  I do  it  with 
reference  to  the  good  of  mankind.  Does  any- 
thing happen  to  me  ? I receive  it  and  refer  it 
to  the  gods,  and  the  source  of  all  things,  from 
which  all  that  happens  is  derived. 

24.  Such  as  bathing  appears  to  thee, — oil, 
sweat,  dirt,  filthy  water,  all  things  disgusting, 
— so  is  every  part  of  life  and  everything. 

25.  Ducilla  saw  Verus  die,  and  then  Ducilla 
■died.  Secunda  saw  Maximus  die,  and  then 
Secunda  died.  Epitynchanus  saw  Diotimus 
die,  and  then  Epitynchanus  died.  Antoninus 
saw  Faustina  die,  and  then  Antoninus  died. 
Such  is  everything.  Celer  saw  Hadrianus  die, 
and  then  Celer  died.  And  those  sharp-witted 
men,  either  seers  or  men  inflated  with  pride, 
where  are  they, — for  instance  the  sharp-witted 
men,  Charax  and  Demetrius  the  Platonist,  and 


BookTiii.]  Marcus  Burelius  Hntoninue. 


221 


Eudaemon,  and  any  one  else  like  them  ? All 
ephemeral,  dead  long  ago.  Some  indeed  have 
not  been  remembered  even  for  a short  time, 
and  others  have  become  the  heroes  of  fables, 
and  again  others  have  disappeared  even  from 
fables.  Remember  this  then,  that  this  little 
compound,  thyself,  must  either  be  dissolved,  or 
thy  poor  breath  must  be  extinguished,  or  be 
removed  and  placed  elsewhere. 

26.  It  is  satisfaction  to  a man  to  do  the 
proper  works  of  a man.  Now  it  is  a proper 
work  of  a man  to  be  benevolent  to  his  own  kind, 
to  despise  the  movements  of  the  senses,  to  form 
a just  judgment  of  plausible  appearances,  and 
to  take  a survey  of  the  nature  of  the  universe 
and  of  the  things  which  happen  in  it. 

27.  There  are  three  relations  [between  thee 
and  other  things]  : the  one  to  the  bod}^*  which 
surrounds  thee  ; the  second  to  the  divine  cause 
from  which  all  things  come  to  all ; and  the 
third  to  those  who  live  with  thee. 

28.  Pain  is  either  an  evil  to  the  bod^’ — then 
let  the  body  say  what  it  thinks  of  it — or  to  the 
soul  ; but  it  is  in  the  power  of  the  soul  to  main- 
tain its  own  serenity  and  tranquillity,  and  not 
to  think  that  pain  is  an  evil.  For  ever}^  judg- 
ment and  movement  and  desire  and  aversion  is 
within,  and  no  evil  ascends  so  high. 

* The  text  has  ai-iov,  which  in  Antoninus  means 
“form,"  “formal.”  Accordingly  Schultz  recom- 
mends either  Valkenaer’s  emendation  ay-yeiov,  “body,” 
or  Corais’  aauariop.  Compare  xii.  13;  x.  38. 


222 


^Ebougbts. 


[Book  YIII. 


29.  Wipe  out  thy  imaginations  by  often 
saying  to  thyself : Now  it  is  in  my  power  to  let 
no  badness  be  in  this  soul,  nor  desire,  nor  any 
perturbation  at  all ; but  looking  at  all  things  I 
see  what  is  their  nature,  and  I use  each  accord- 
ing to  its  value. — Remember  this  power  which 
thou  hast  from  nature. 

30.  Speak  both  in  the  senate  and  to  every 
man,  whoever  he  may  be,  appropriately,  not 
with  any  affectation  : use  plain  discourse. 

31.  Augustus’  court,  wife,  daughter,  de- 
scendants, ancestors,  sister,  Agrippa,  kinsmen, 
intimates,  friends;  Areius,*  Maecenas,  physi- 
cians, and  sacrificing  priests, — the  whole  court 
is  dead.  Then  turn  to  the  rest,  not  consider- 
ing the  death  of  a single  man  [but  of  a whole 
race],  as  of  the  Pompeii  ; and  that  which  is  in- 
scribed on  the  tombs, — The  last  of  his  race. 
Then  consider  what  trouble  those  before  them 
have  had  that  they  might  leave  a successor  ; 
and  then,  that  of  necessity  some  one  must  be 
the  last.  Again,  here  consider  the  death  of  a 
whole  race. 

32.  It  is  thy  duty  to  order  thy  life  well  in 
every  single  act ; and  if  every  act  does  its  duty 
as  far  as  is  possible,  be  content ; and  no  one  is 
able  to  hinder  thee  so  that  each  act  shall  not 
do  its  duty. — But  something  external  will 
stand  in  the  way.  Nothing  will  stand  in 

*Areius  {"Apeiog)  was  a philosopher,  who  was  inti- 
mate with  Augustus;  Suetou.  Augustus,  c.  89;  Plu- 
tarch, Antoninus,  80;  Dion  Cassius,  51,  c.  16. 


Book  VIII.]  jfiRarcus  Burelius  Bntoninue. 


223 


the  way  of  thy  acting  justly  and  soberly 
and  considerately. — But  perhaps  some  other 
active  power  will  be  hindered.  Well,  but 
by  acquiescing  in  the  hindrance  and  by  be- 
ing content  to  transfer  thy  efforts  to  that  which 
is  allowed,  another  opportunity  of  action  is  im- 
mediately put  before  thee  in  place  of  that 
which  was  hindered,  and  one  which  will  adapt 
itself  to  this  ordering  of  which  w'e  are  speak- 
ing. 

33.  Receive  [wealth  or  prosperity]  without 
arrogance  ; and  be  ready  to  let  it  go. 

34.  If  thou  didst  ever  see  a hand  cut  off,  or 
a foot,  or  a head,  lying  anywhere  apart  from 
the  rest  of  the  body,  such  does  a man  make 
himself,  as  far  as  he  can,  who  is  not  content 
with  what  happens,  and  separates  himself 
from  others,  or  does  anything  unsocial.  Sup- 
pose that  thou  hast  detached  thyself  from  the 
natural  unity, — for  thou  wast  made  by  nature 
a part,  but  now  thou  hast  cut  thyself  off,- — }'et 
here  there  is  this  beautiful  provision,  that  it  is 
in  thy  power  again  to  unite  thyself.  God  has 
allowed  this  to  no  other  part,  after  it  has  been 
separated  and  cut  asunder,  to  come  together 
again.  But  consider  the  kindness  by  which 
he  has  distinguished  man,  for  he  has  put  it  in 
his  power  not  to  be  separated  at  all  from  the 
universal;  and  when  he  has  been  separated, 
he  has  allowed  him  to  return  and  to  be  united 
and  to  resume  his  place  as  a part. 

35.  As  the  nature  of  the  universal  has  given 


224 


^Tbougbtg. 


[Book  VIIL 


to  every  rational  being  all  the  other  powers 
that  it  has,  + so  we  have  received  from  it  this 
power  also.  For  as  the  universal  nature  con- 
verts and  fixes  in  its  predestined  place  every- 
thing which  stands  in  the  way  and  opposes  it, 
and  makes  such  things  a part  of  itself,  so  also 
the  rational  animal  is  able  to  make  every 
hindrance  its  own  material,  and  ^o  use  it  for 
such  purposes  as  it  maj"  have  designed.* 

36.  Do  not  disturb  thyself  by  thinking  of 
the  whole  of  thy  life.  Let  not  th}^  thoughts  at 
once  embrace  all  the  various  troubles  which 
thou  mayest  expect  to  befall  thee  : but  on 
every  occasion  ask  thyself.  What  is  there  in 
this  which  is  intolerable  and  past  bearing  ? for 
thou  wilt  be  ashamed  to  confess.  In  the  next 
place  remember  that  neither  the  future  nor  the 
past  pains  thee,  but  only  the  present.  But 
this  is  reduced  to  a very  little,  if  thou  only  cir- 
cumscribest  it,  and  chidest  thy  mind  if  it  is 
unable  to  hold  out  against  even  this. 

37.  Does  Panthea  or  Pergamus  now  sit  by 
the  tomb  of  Verus?t  Does  Chaurias  or  Dioti- 
mus  sit  by  the  tomb  of  Hadrianus?  That 
would  be  ridiculous.  Well,  suppose  they  did 

*The  text  is  corrupt  at  the  beginuiiig  of  the  .para- 
graph, hut  the  meaning  will  appear  if  the  second 
y^oyucuv  is  changed  into  oAwr:  though  this  change  alone 
will  not  establish  the  grammatical  completeness  of 
the  text. 

t“Verus”  is  a conjecture  of  Saumaise,  and  per- 
haps the  true  reading. 


Book  VIII.]  /iftarcua  :aurcliu6  Antoninus. 


225 


sit  there,  would  the  dead  be  conscious  of  it  ? 
and  if  the  dead  were  conscious,  would  they  be 
pleased  ? and  if  thc}^  were  pleased,  would  that 
make  them  immortal  ? Was  it  not  in  the  order 
of  destiny  that  these  persons  too  should  first 
become  old  women  and  old  men  and  then  die  ? 
What  then  would  those  do  after  these  were 
dead  ? All  this  is  foul  smell  and  blood  in  a 
bag. 

38.  If  thou  canst  see  sharp,  look  and  judge 
wisely,  4-  says  the  philosopher. 

39.  In  the  constitution  of  the  rational  animal 
I see  no  virtue  which  is  opposed  to  justice;  but 
I see  a virtue  which  is  opposed  to  love  of 
pleasure,  and  that  is  temperance. 

40.  If  thou  takest  away  thy  opinion  about 
that  which  appears  to  give  thee  pain,  thou  th^'- 
self  standest  in  perfect  securitj'. — -Who  is  this 
self? — The  reason. — But  I am  not  reason. — Be 
it  so.  Let  then  the  reason  itself  not  trouble 
itself.  But  if  any  other  part  of  thee  suffers, 
let  it  have  its  own  opinion  about  itself  (vii.  16). 

41.  Hindrance  to  the  perceptions  of  sense  is 
an  evil  to  the  animal  nature.  Hindrance  to 
the  movements  [desires]  is  equall}"  an  evil  to 
the  animal  nature.  And  something  else  also 
is  equally  an  impediment  and  an  evil  to  the 
constitution  of  plants.  So  then  that  which  is 
a hindrance  to  the  intelligence  is  an  evil  to  the 
intelligent  nature.  Apply  all  these  things 
then  to  thyself.  Does  pain  or  sensuous  pleas- 
ure affect  thee  ? The  senses  will  look  to  that* 

15 


226 


^Tbousbts. 


[Book  YIII. 


Has  any  obstacle  opposed  thee  in  thy  efforts 
towards  an  object  ? If  indeed  thou  wast  mak- 
ing this  effort  absolutely  [unconditionally,  or 
without  any  reservation],  certainly  this  obstacle 
is  an  evil  to  thee  considered  as  a rational  ani- 
mal. But  if  thou  takest  [into  consideration] 
the  usual  course  of  things,  thou  hast  not  yet 
been  injured  nor  even  impeded.  The  things 
however  which  are  proper  to  the  understanding 
no  other  man  is  u.sed  to  impede,  for  neither 
fire,  nor  iron,  nor  tyrant,  nor  abuse,  touches  it 
in  any  way.  When  it  has  been  made  a sphere, 
it  continues  a sphere  (xi.  12). 

42.  It  is  not  fit  that  I should  give  myself 
pain,  for  I have  never  intentionally  given  pain 
even  to  another. 

43.  Different  things  delight  different  people ; 
but  it  is  my  delight  to  keep  the  ruling  faculty 
sound  without  turning  away  either  from  any 
man  or  from  any  of  the  things  which  happen 
to  men,  but  looking  at  and  receiving  all  with 
welcome  eyes  and  using  everything  according 
to  its  value. 

44.  See  that  thou  secure  this  present  time  to 
thyself ; for  those  who  rather  pursue  posthum- 
ous fame  do  not  consider  that  the  men  of  after 
time  will  be  exactly  such  as  these  whom  they 
cannot  bear  now ; and  both  are  mortal.  And 
what  is  it  in  any  way  to  thee  if  these  men  of 
after  time  utter  this  or  that  sound,  or  have  this 
or  that  opinion  about  thee  ? 

45 . Take  me  and  cast  me  where  thou  wilt ; 


Book  VIII.]  Marcus  2lurcUu6  Bntoninue. 


227 


for  there  I shall  keep  my  divine  part  tranquil, 
that  is,  content,  if  it  can  feel  and  act  comform- 
ably  to  its  proper  constitution.  Is  this  [change 
of  place]  sufficient  reason  why  my  soul  should 
be  unhappy  and  worse  than  it  was,  depressed, 
expanded,  shrinking,  affrighted  ? and  what 
wilt  thou  find  which  -is  .sufficient  reason  for 
this 

46.  Nothing  can  happen  to  any  man  which 
is  not  a human  accident,  nor  to  an  ox  which  is 
not  according  to  the  nature  of  an  ox,  nor  to  a 
vine  which  is  not  according  to  the  nature  of  a 
vine,  nor  to  a stone  which  is  not  proper  to  a 
stone.  If  then  there  happens  to  each  thing 
both  what  is  usual  and  natural,  why  shouldst 
thou  complain  ? For  the  common  nature 
brings  nothing  which  may  not  be  borne  by 
thee. 

47.  If  thou  art  pained  by  any  external 
thing,  it  is  not  this  thing  that  disturbs  thee, 
but  thy  own  judgment  about  it.  And  it  is  in  thy 
power  to  wipe  out  this  judgment  now.  But  if 
anything  in  thy  own  disposition  gives  thee 
pain,  who  hinders  thee  from  correcting  thy 
opinion  ? And  even  if  thou  art  pained  be- 
cause thou  art  not  doing  some  particular  thing 
which  seems  to  thee  to  be  right,  why  dost 
thou  not  rather  act  than  complain  ? — But  some 

* bpeyonEvr)  in  this  passage  seems  to  have  a passive 
sense.  It  is  difficult  to  find  an  apt  expression  for  it 
and  some  of  the  other  M'ords.  A comparison  with  xi. 
12,  will  help  to  explain  the  meaning. 


228 


^Ebouflbts. 


[BookYnL 


insuperable  obstacle  is  in  the  way  ? — Do  not  be 
grieved  then,  for  the  cause  of  its  not  being 
done  depends  not  on  thee. — But  it  is  not  worth 
while  to  live,  if  this  cannot  be  done.^ — Take 
thy  departure  then  from  life  contentedly,  just 
as  he  dies  who  is  in  full  activity,  and  well 
pleased  too  with  the  things  which  are  ob- 
stacles. 

48.  Remember  that  the  ruling  faculty  is  in- 
vincible, when  self-collected  it  is  satisfied  with 
itself,  if  it  does  nothing  which  it  does  not 
choose  to  do,  even  if  it  resist  from  mere  obsti- 
nacy. What  then  will  it  be  when  it  forms  a 
judgment  about  anything  aided  by  reason  and 
deliberately  ? Therefore  the  mind  which  is 
free  from  passions  is  a citadel,  for  man  has  no- 
thing more  secure  to  which  he  can  fly  for 
refuge  and  for  the  future  be  inexpugnable. 
He  then  who  has  not  seen  this  is  an  ignorant 
man  ; but  he  who  has  seen  it  and  does  not  fly 
to  this  refuge  is  unhappy. 

49.  Say  nothing  more  to  thj^self  than  what 
the  first  appearances  report.  Suppose  that  it 
has  been  reported  to  thee  that  a certain  person 
speaks  ill  of  thee.  This  has  been  reported  ; 
but  that  thou  hast  been  injured,  that  has  not 
been  reported.  I see  that  my  child  is  sick.  I 
do  see  ; but  that  he  is  in  danger,  I do  not  see. 
Thus  then  always  abide  by  the  first  appear- 
ances, and  add  nothing  thyself  from  within, 
and  then  nothing  happens  to  thee.  Or  rather 
add  something  like  a man  who  knows  every- 
thing that  happens  in  the  -world. 


Book  Till.]  /iftarcue  Burellus  Bntontnus. 


229 


50.  A cucumber  is  bitter — Throw  it  away. — 
There  are  briers  in  the  road — Turn  aside  from 
them. — This  is  enough.  Do  not  add,  And 
wTy  were  such  things  made  in  the  world  ? 
For  thou  wilt  be  ridiculed  by  a man  who  is 
acquainted  with  nature,  as  thou  wouldst  be 
ridiculed  by  a carpenter  and  shoemaker  if  thou 
didst  find  fault  because  thou  seest  in  their 
workshop  shavings  and  cuttings  from  the 
things  which  they  make.  And  yet  they  have 
places  into  which  they  can  throw  these  shav- 
ings and  cuttings,  and  the  universal  nature  has 
no  external  space  ; but  the  wondrous  part  of 
her  art  is  that  though  she  has  circumscribed 
herself,  everything  within  her  which  appears 
to  decay  and  to  grow  old  and  to  be  useless  she 
changes  into  herself,  and  again  makes  other 
new  things  from  these  ver}'  same,  so  that  she 
requires  neither  substance  from  without  nor 
wants  a place  into  which  she  may  cast  that 
which  decays.  She  is  content  then  with  her 
own  space,  and  her  own  matter,  and  her  own 
art. 

51.  Neither  in  thj^  actions  be  sluggish  nor 
in  thy  conversation  without  method,  nor  wan- 
dering in  thy  thoughts,  nor  let  there  be  in  thy 
soul  inward  contention  nor  external  effusion, 
nor  in  life  be  so  busy  as  to  have  no  leisure. 

Suppose  that  men  kill  thee,  cut  thee  in 
pieces,  curse  thee.  What  then  can  these  things 
do  to  prevent  thy  mind  from  remaining  pure, 
wise,  sober,  ju.st?  For  instance,  if  a man 


230 


^Tbougbte. 


[Book  m 


should  stand  by  a limpid  pure  spring,  and 
curse  it,  the  spring  never  ceases  sending  up 
potable  water  ; and  if  he  should  cast  clay  into 
it  or  filth,  it  will  speedily  disperse  them  and 
wash  them  out,  and  will  not  be  at  all  polluted. 
How  then  shalt  thou  possess  a perpetual  fount- 
ain [and  not  a mere  well]?  By  forming  + thy- 
self hourly  to  freedom  conjoined  with  content- 
ment, simplicity,  and  modest}’. 

52.  He  who  does  not  know  what  the  world 
is,  does  not  know  where  he  is.  And  he  who 
does  not  know  for  what  purpose  the  world 
exists,  does  uot  know  who  he  is,  nor  what  the 
world  is.  But  he  who  has  failed  in  any  one 
of  these  things  could  not  even  say  for  what 
purpose  he  exists  himself.  What  then  dost 
thou  think  of  him  who  [avoids  or]  seeks  the 
praise  of  those  who  applaud,  of  men  who  know 
not  either  where  they  are  or  who  they  are  ? 

53.  Dost  thou  wish  to  be  praised  by  a man 
who  curses  himself  thrice  every  hour  ? wouldst 
thou  wish  to  please  a man  who  does  not  please 
himself?  Does  a man  please  himself  who  re- 
pents of  nearly  everything  that  he  does? 

54.  No  longer  let  thy  breathing  only  act  in 
concert  with  the  air  which  surrounds  thee,  but 
let  thy  intelligence  also  now  be  in  harmony 
with  the  intelligence  which  embraces  all 
things.  For  the  intelligent  power  is  no  less 
diffused  in  all  parts  and  pen^ades  all  things  for 
him  who  is  willing  to  draw  it  to  him  than  the 
aerial  power  for  him  who  is  able  to  respire  it. 


Book  VIII.]  /iftarcus  aurclius  :antomnu0. 


231 


55.  Generally,  wickedness  does  no  harm  at 
all  to  the  universe  ; and  particularly  the  wick- 
edness [of  one  man]  does  no  harm  to  another. 
It  is  only  harmful  to  him  who  has  it  in  his 
power  to  be  released  from  it  as  soon  as  he  shall 
choose. 

56.  To  m}^  own  free  will  the  free  v/ill  of  my 
neighbor  is  just  as  indifferent  as  his  poot 
breath  and  flesh.  For  though  we  are  made  es- 
pecially for  the  sake  of  one  another,  still  the 
ruling  power  of  each  of  us  has  its  own  office, 
for  otherwise  my  neighbor’s  wickedness  would 
be  my  harm,  which  God  has  not  willed,  in 
order  that  my  unhappiness  may  not  depend  on 
another. 

57.  The  sun  appears  to  be  poured  down,  and 
in  all  directions  indeed  it  is  diffused,  j^et  it  is 
not  effused.  For  this  diffusion  is  extension  : 
Accordingly  its  rays  are  called  Extensions 
[ami-Ef]  because  they  are  extended  [d-o  rov 
eKTdveadai^.^  But  one  may  judge  what  kind  of  a 
thing  a ra}^  is,  if  he  looks  at  the  sun’s  light 
passing  through  a narrow  opening  into  a dark- 
ened room,  for  it  is  extended  in  a right  line, 
and  as  it  were  is  divided  when  it  meets  with 
any  solid  body  which  stands  in  the  way  and 
intercepts  the  air  beyond  ; but  there  the  light 
remains  fixed  and  does  not  glide  or  fall  off. 
Such  then  ought  to  be  the  outpouring  and  dif- 
fusion of  the  understanding,  and  it  should  in 
no  way  be  an  effusion,  but  an  extension,  and 


* A piece  of  bad  et}'mology. 


232 


?Ebougbt0. 


[Book  YIIL 


it  should  make  no  violent  or  impetuous  col- 
lision with  the  obstacles  which  are  in  its  way  ; 
nor  yet  fall  down,  but  be  fixed,  and  enlighten 
that  which  receives  it.  For  a body  will  deprive 
itself  of  the  illumination,  if  it  does  not  admit  it. 

58.  He  who  fears  death  either  fears  the  loss 
of  sensation  or  a different  kind  of  sensation. 
But  if  thou  shalt  have  no  sensation,  neither 
wilt  thou  feel  any  harm  ; and  if  thou  shalt 
acquire  another  kind  of  sensation,  thou  wfilt  be 
a different  kind  of  living  being  and  thou  wilt 
not  cease  to  live. 

59.  Men  exist  for  the  sake  of  one  another. 
Teach  them  then,  or  bear  with  them. 

60.  In  one  way  an  arrow  moves,  in  another 
way  the  mind.  The  mind  indeed,  both  when 
it  exercises  caution  and  when  it  is  employed 
about  inquiry,  moves  straight  onward  not  the 
less,  and  to  its  object. 

61.  Enter  into  every  man’s  ruling  faculty; 
and  also  let  every  other  man  enter  into  thine.* 


* Compare  Epictetus,  iii.  9,  12. 


Book  IX.]  fliarcus  Burellus  Bntomnus. 


233 


IX. 

He  who  acts  unjustly  acts  impiously.  For 
since  the  universal  nature  has  made  ra- 
tional animals  for  the  sake  of  one  another,  to 
help  one  another  according  to  their  deserts, 
but  in  no  way  to  injure  one  another,  he  who 
transgresses  her  will  is  clearly  guilty  of  impi- 
ety towards  the  highest  divinity.  And  he  too 
who  lies  is  guilty  of  impiety  to  the  same  divin- 
ity; for  the  universal  nature  is  the  nature  of 
things  that  are;  and  things  that  are  have  a re- 
lation to  all  things  that  come  into  existence.* 

* “ As  there  is  not  any  action  or  natural  event,  which 
we  are  acquainted  with,  so  single  and  unconnected  as 
not  to  have  a respect  to  some  other  actions  and  events, 
so  possibly  each  of  them,  when  it  has  not  an  immedi- 
ate, may  yet  have  a remote,  natural  relation  to  other 
actions  and  events,  much  beyond  the  compass  of  this 
present  world. ” Again;  “ Things  seemingly  the  most 
insignificant  imaginable  are  perpetually  observ^ed  to 
be  necessary  conditions  to  other  things  of  the  greatest 
importance,  so  that  any  one  thing  whatever  may,  for 
aught  we  know  to  the  contrary,  be  a necessary  condi- 
tion to  any  other.” — Butler’s  Analogy,  Chap.  7.  See 
all  the  chapter.  Some  critics  take  rd  vndpxovTa  in  this 
passage  of  Antoninus  to  be  the  same  as  rd  ovra : but  if 
that  were  so  he  might  have  said  7rpd?  oXkrfAa  instead  of 
rrpdf  rd  vndpxovTa.  Perhaps  the  meaning  of  Trpdf  rd 
i'-apxovTa  may  be  “to  all  prior  things.”  If  so,  the 
translation  is  still  correct.  See  vi.  38. 


234 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  IX. 


And  further,  this  universal  nature  is  named 
truth,  and  is  the  prime  cause  of  all  things  that 
are  true.  He  then  who  lies  intentionally  is 
guilty  of  impiety,  inasmuch  as  he  acts  unjustly 
by  deceiving;  and  he  also  who  lies  uninten- 
tionally, inasmuch  as  he  is  at  variance  with  the 
universal  nature,  and  inasmuch  as  he  disturbs 
the  order  by  fighting  against  the  nature  of  the 
world;  for  he  fights  against  it,  who  is  moved 
of  himself  to  that  which  is  contrary  to  truth, 
for  he  had  received  powers  from  nature  through 
the  neglect  of  which  he  is  not  able  now  to  dis- 
tinguish falsehood  from  truth.  And  indeed  he 
who  pursues  pleasure  as  good,  and  avoids  pain 
as  evil,  is  guilty  of  impiety.  For  of  necessity 
such  a man  must  often  find  fault  with  the  uni- 
versal nature,  alleging  that  it  assigns  things  to 
the  bad  and  the  good  contrary  to  their  deserts, 
because  frequently  the  bad  are  in  the  enjoy- 
ment of  pleasure  and  possess  the  things  which 
procure  pleasure,  but  the  good  have  pain  for 
their  .share  and  the  things  which  cause  pain. 
And  further,  he  who  is  afraid  of  pain  will 
sometimes  also  be  afraid  of  some  of  the  things 
which  will  happen  in  the  world,  and  even  this 
is  impiety.  And  he  who  pursues  pleasure  will 
not  abstain  from  injustice,  and  this  is  plainly 
impiety.  Now  with  respect  to  the  things 
towards  which  the  universal  nature  is  equally 
affected — for  it  would  not  have  made  both , un- 
less it  was  equally  affected  towards  both — 
towards  these  they  who  wish  to  follow  nature 


Book  IX.]  flftarcus  Surellus  antonfnus. 


235 


should  be  of  the  same  mind  with  it,  and  equally 
affected.  With  respect  to  pain,  then,  and 
pleasure,  or  death  and  life,  or  honor  and  dis- 
honor, which  the  universal  nature  employs 
equally,  whoever  is  not  equall5^  affected  is 
manifestly  acting  impiously.  And  I sa}"  that 
the  universal  nature  employ's  them  equally, 
instead  of  saying  that  they  happen  alike  to 
those  who  are  produced  in  continuous  series 
and  to  those  who  come  after  them  by  virtue  of 
a certain  original  movement  of  Providence, 
according  to  which  it  moved  from  a certain 
beginning  to  this  ordering  of  things,  having 
conceived  certain  principles  of  the  things  which 
were  to  be,  and  having  determined  powers  pro- 
ductive of  beings  and  of  changes  and  of  such 
like  successions  (vii.  75). 

2.  It  would  be  a man’s  happiest  lot  to  depart 
from  mankind  without  having  had  any  taste 
of  lying  and  hypocrisy  and  luxur}-  and  pride. 
However,  to  breathe  out  one’s  life  when  a man 
has  had  enough  of  these  things  is  the  next  best 
voyage,  as  the  saying  is.  Hast  thou  deter- 
mined to  abide  with  vice,  and  hast  not  exper- 
ience yet  induced  thee  to  fly  from  this  pesti- 
lence ? For  the  destruction  of  the  understand- 
ing is  a pestilence,  much  more,  indeed,  than 
any  such  corruption  and  change  of  this  atmos- 
phere which  surrounds  us.  For  this  corruption 
is  a pestilence  of  animals  so  far  as  they  are 
animals  ; but  the  other  is  a pestilence  of  men 
so  far  as  they  are  men. 


236 


c:bougbts. 


[Book  IX. 


3.  Do  not  despise  death,  but  be  well  content 
with  it,  since  this  too  is  one  of  those  things 
which  nature  wills.  For  such  as  it  is  to  be 
young  and  to  grow  old,  and  to  increase  and 
to  reach  maturity,  and  to  have  teeth  and  beard 
and  gray  hairs,  and  to  beget  and  to  be  preg- 
nant and  to  bring  forth,  and  all  the  other 
natural  operations  which  the  seasons  of  thy 
life  bring,  such  also  is  dissolution.  This,  then, 
is  consistent  with  the  character  of  a reflecting 
man — to  be  neither  careless  nor  impatient  nor 
contemptuous  with  respect  to  death,  but  to 
wait  for  it  as  one  of  the  operations  of  nature. 
As  thou  now  waitest  for  the  time  when  the 
child  shall  come  out  of  thy  wife’s  womb,  so  be 
ready  for  the  time  when  thy  soul  shall  fall  out 
of  this  envelope.*  But  if  thou  requirest  also  a 
vulgar  kind  of  comfort  which  shall  reach  thy 
heart,  thou  wilt  be  made  best  reconciled  to 
death  by  observing  the  objects  from  which 
thou  art  going  to  be  removed,  and  the  morals 
of  those  with  whom  thy  soul  will  no  longer  be 
mingled.  For  it  is  no  way  right  to  be  offended 
with  men,  but  it  is  thy  duty  to  care  for  them 
and  to  bear  with  them  gently;  and  yet  to  re- 
member that  thy  departure  will  not  be  from 
men  who  have  the  same  principles  as  thyself. 
For  this  is  the  only  thing,  if  there  be  any, 
which  could  draw  us  the  contrary  way  and  at- 
tach us  to  life, — to  be  permitted  to  live  with 
those  who  have  the  same  principles  as  our- 
* Note  I of  the  Philosophy,  p.  76. 


Book  IX.]  /liiarcus  2lurcliu5  :antoninu6. 


237 


selves.  But  now  thou  seest  how  great  is  the 
trouble  arising  from  the  discordance  of  those 
who  live  together,  so  that  thou  niayst  say, 
Come  quick,  O death,  lest  perchance  I,  too, 
should  forget  myself 

4.  He  who  does  wrong  does  wrong  against 
himself  He  who  acts  unjustly  acts  unjustly  to 
himself  because  he  makes  himself  bad. 

5.  He  often  acts  unjustly  who  does  not  do  a 
certain  thing;  not  only  he  who  does  a certain 
thing. 

6.  Thy  present  opinion  founded  on  under- 
standing, and  thy  present  conduct  directed  to 
social  good,  and  thy  present  disposition  of  con- 
tentment with  everything  which  happens-f-  — 
that  is  enough. 

7.  Wipe  out  imagination;  check  desire:  ex- 
tinguish appetite:  keep  the  ruling  faculty  in  its 
own  power. 

8.  Among  the  animals  which  have  not  reason 
one  life  is  distributed;  but  among  reasonable 
animals  one  intelligent  soul  is  distributed:  just 
as  there  is  one  earth  of  all  things  which  are  of 
an  earthly  nature,  and  we  see  by  one  light,  and 
breathe  one  air,  all  of  us  that  have  the  faculty 
of  vision  and  all  that  have  life. 

9.  All  things  which  participate  in  anything 
which  is  common  to  them  all,  mor^e  towards 
that  which  is  of  the  same  kind  with  themselves. 
Everything  which  is  earthy  turns  towards  the 
earth,  evei^dhing  which  is  liquid  flows  to- 
gether, and  everything  which  is  of  an  aerial 


238 


^bougbtB. 


[Book  IX. 


kind  does  the  same,  so  that  they  require  some- 
thing to  keep  them  asunder,  and  the  applica- 
tion of  force.  Fire  indeed  moves  upwards  on 
account  of  the  elemental  fire,  but  it  is  so  ready 
to  be  kindled  together  with  all  the  fire  which 
is  here,  that  even  every  substance  which  is 
somewhat  dry  is  easily  ignited,  because  there 
is  less  mingled  with  it  of  that  which  is  a hin- 
drance to  ignition.  Accordingly,  then,  every- 
thing also  which  participates  in  the  common 
intelligent  nature  moves  in  like  manner  to- 
wards that  w'hich  is  of  the  same  kind  with 
itself,  or  moves  even  more.  For  so  much  as  it 
is  superior  in  comparison  with  all  other  things, 
in  the  same  degree  also  is  it  more  ready  to  min- 
gle with  and  to  be  fused  with  that  which  is 
akin  to  it.  Accordingly  among  animals  devoid 
of  reason  we  find  swarms  of  bees,  and  herds  of 
cattle,  and  the  nurture  of  young  birds,  and  in 
a manner,  loves;  for  even  in  animals  there  are 
souls,  and  that  power  which  brings  them  to- 
gether is  seen  to  exert  itself  in  a superior  de- 
gree, and  in  such  a way  as  never  has  been 
observed  in  plants  nor  in  stones  nor  in  trees. 
But  in  rational  animals  there  are  political  com- 
munities and  friendships,  and  families  and 
meetings  of  people;  and  in  wars,  treaties,  and 
armistices.  But  in  the  things  which  are  still 
superior,  even  though  they  are  separated  from 
one  another,  unity  in  a manner  exists,  as  in  the 
stars.  Thus  the  ascent  to  the  higher  degree  is 
able  to  produce  a sympathy  even  in  things 


Book  II.]  Marcus  :aureliu0  Antoninus. 


239 


which  are  separated.  See  then,  what  now 
takes  place;  for  only  intelligent  animals  have 
now  forgotten  this  mutual  desire  and  inclina- 
tion, and  in  them  alone  the  property  of  flowing 
together  is  not  seen.  But  still,  though  men 
strive  to  avoid  [this  union],  thej’  are  caught 
and  held  by  it,  for  their  nature  is  too  strong  for 
them;  and  thou  wilt  see  what  I say,  if  thou 
only  obsercest.  Sooner,  then,  will  one  find 
anything  earth}"  which  comes  in  contact  with 
no  earthy  thing,  than  a man  altogether  sepa- 
rated from  other  men. 

10.  Both  man  and  God  and  the  universe  pro- 
duce fruit ; at  the  proper  seasons  each  produces 
it.  But  and  if  usage  has  especially  fixed  these 
terms  to  the  vine  and  like  things,  this  is  noth- 
ing. Reason  produces  fruit  both  for  all  and  for 
itself,  and  there  are  produced  from  it  other 
things  of  the  same  kind  as  reason  itself 

11.  If  thou  art  able,  correct  by  teaching 
those  who  do  wrong ; but  if  thou  canst  not,  re- 
member that  indulgence  is  given  to  thee  for 
this  purpose.  And  the  gods,  too,  are  indulgent 
to  such  persons ; and  for  some  purposes  they 
even  help  them  to  get  health,  wealth,  reputa- 
tion; so  kind  they  are.  And  it  is  in  thy  power 
also;  or  say,  who  hinders  thee? 

12.  Labor  hot  as  one  who  is  wretched,  nor 
yet  as  one  who  would  be  pitied  or  admired  ; 
but  direct  thy  will  to  one  thing  only — to  put 
thyself  in  motion  and  to  check  thyself  as  the 
social  reason  requires. 


240 


ITbouflbts. 


[Book  IX. 


13.  To-day  I have  got  out  of  all  trouble,  or 
rather  I have  cast  out  all  trouble,  for  it  was  not 
outside,  but  within  and  in  my  opinions. 

14.  All  things  are  the  same,  familiar  in  ex- 
perience, and  ephemeral  in  time,  and  worthless 
in  the  matter.  Everything  now  is  just  as  it 
was  in  the  time  of  those  whom  we  have  buried. 

15.  Things  stand  outside  of  us,  themselves 
by  themselves,  neither  knowing  aught  of  them- 
selves, nor  expre.ssing  any  judgment.  What 
is  it,  then,  which  does  judge  about  them  ? 
The  ruling  faculty. 

16.  Not  in  passivity  but  in  activity  lie  the 
evil  and  the  good  of  the  rational  social  animal, 
just  as  his  virtue  and  his  vice  lie  not  in  pas- 
sivity but  in  activity.* 

17.  For  the  stone  which  has  been  thrown  up 
it  is  no  evil  to  come  down,  nor  indeed  any  good 
to  have  been  carried  up  (viii.  20). 

18.  Penetrate  inwards  into  men’s  leading 
principles,  and  thou  wilt  see  what  judges  thou 
art  afraid  of,  and  what  kind  of  judges  they  are 
of  themselves. 

19.  All  things  are  changing  : and  thou  thy- 
self art  in  continuous  mutation  and  in  a man- 
ner in  continuous  destruction,  and  the  whole 
universe  too. 

20.  It  is  thy  duty  to  leave  another  man’s 
wrongful  act  there  where  it  is  (vii.  29;  ix.  38). 

21.  Termination  of  activity,  cessation  from 

* Virtutis  omnis  laus  in  actione  consistit. — Cicero, 
De  Off.,  I 6. 


Book  IX.]  ^liarcus  Bureltus  Bntoninug. 


241 


movement  and  opinion,  and  in  a sense  their 
death,  is  no  evil.  Turn  thy  thoughts  now  to 
the  consideration  of  thy  life,  thy  life  as  a child, 
as  a youth,  thy  manhood,  thy  old  age,  for  in 
these  also  every  change  was  a death.  Is  this 
anything  to  fear?  Turn  thy  thoughts  now  to 
thy  life  under  thy  grandfather,  then  to  thy  life 
under  thy  mother,  then  to  th}^  life  under  thy 
father ; and  as  thou  findest  many  other  differ- 
ences and  changes  and  terminations,  ask  thy- 
self, Is  this  anything  to  fear?  In  like  manner, 
then,  neither  are  the  termination  and  cessation 
and  change  of  thy  whole  life  a thing  to  be 
afraid  of. 

22.  Hasten  [to  examine]  thy  own  ruling 
faculty  and  that  of  the  universe  and  that  of  thy 
neighbor : thy  own,  that  thou  ma5'-st  make  it 
just ; and  that  of  the  universe,  that  thou  mayst 
remember  of  what  thou  art  a part;  and  that  of 
thy  neighbor,  that  thou  mayst  know  whether 
he  has  acted  ignorantly  or  with  knowledge, 
and  thou  mayst  also  consider  that  his  ruling 
faculty  is  akin  to  thine. 

23.  As  thou  thyself  art  a component  part  of 
a social  system,  so  let  every  act  of  thine  be  a 
component  part  of  social  life.  Whatever  act 
of  thine  then  has  no  reference  either  immedi- 
ately or  remotely  to  a social  end,  this  tears 
asunder  thy  life,  and  does  not  allow  it  to  be 
one,  and  it  is  of  the  nature  of  a mutiny,  just  as 
when  in  a popular  assembly  a man  acting  by 
himself  stands  apart  from  the  general  agreement. 

16 


242 


^Tbougbte, 


[Book  IL 


24.  Quarrels  of  little  children  and  their 
sports,  and  poor  spirits  carrying  about  dead 
bodies  [such  is  everything];  and  so  what  is 
exhibited  in  the  representation  of  the  mansions 
of  the  dead  * strikes  our  eyes  more  clearly. 

25.  Examine  into  the  quality  of  the  form  of 
an  object,  and  detach  it  altogether  from  its 
material  part,  and  then  contemplate  it;  then 
determine  the  time,  the  longest  which  a thing 
of  this  peculiar  form  is  naturally  made  to  en- 
dure. 

26.  Thou  hast  endured  infinite  troubles 
through  not  being  contented  with  thy  ruling 
faculty  when  it  does  the  things  which  it  is  con- 
stituted by  nature  to  do.  But  enough -b  [of 
this]. 

27.  When  another  blames  thee  or  hates  thee, 
or  when  men  say  about  thee  anything  injurious, 
approach  their  poor  souls,  penetrate  within, 
and  see  what  kind  of  men  they  are.  Thou 
wilt  discover  that  there  is  no  reason  to  take 
any  trouble  that  these  men  may  have  this  or 
that  opinion  about  thee.  However,  thou  must 
be  well  disposed  towards  them,  for  by  nature 
they  are  friends.  And  the  gods  too  aid  them 
in  all  ways,  by  dreams,  by  signs,  towards  the 
attainment  of  those  things  on  which  they  set 
a value.  + 

* -6  rfjq  Ne/cw'af  may  be,  as  Gataker  conjectures,  a 
dramatic  representation  of  the  state  of  the  dead. 
Schultz  supposes  that  it  may  be  also  a reference  to  the 
'SeKv'ia  of  the  Odyssey  (lib.  xi. ). 


Book  IX.]  .®atcu6  2lutelfus  antonfnus. 


243 


28.  The  periodic  movements  of  the  universe 
are  the  same,  up  and  down  from  age  to  age. 
And  either  the  universal  intelligence  puts  it- 
self in  motion  for  every  separate  effect,  and  if 
this  is  so,  be  thou  content  with  that  which  is 
the  result  of  its  activity;  or  it  puts  itself  in 
motion  once,  and  everything  else  comes  by 
way  of  sequence*  in  a manner;  or  indivisible 
elements  are  the  origin  of  all  things. — In  a 
word,  if  there  is  a god,  all  is  well;  and  if 
chance  rules,  do  not  thou  also  be  governed  by 
it  (vi.  44;  yii.  75). 

Soon  will  the  earth  cover  us  all:  then  the 
earth,  too,  will  change,  and  the  things  also 
which  result  from  change  will  continue  to 
change  forever,  and  these  again  forever.  For 
if  a man  reflects  on  the  changes  and  transfor- 
mations which  follow  one  another  like  wave 
after  wave  and  their  rapidity,  he  will  despise 
everything  which  is  perishable  (xii.  21). 

29.  The  universal  cause  is  like  a winter 
torrent:  it  carries  everything  along  with  it. 
But  how  worthless  are  all  these  poor  people 
who  are  engaged  in  matters  political,  and,  as 
they  suppose,  are  playing  the  philosopher ! 
All  drivellers.  Well  then,  man:  do  what  na- 
ture now  requires.  Set  thyself  in  motion,  if  it 
is  in  thy  power,  and  do  not  look  about  thee  to 
see  if  any  one  will  observe  it;  nor  yet  expect 

* The  words  which  immediately  follow  /car’  iTzano- 
TMvdrjaLv  are  corrupt.  But  the  meaning  is  hardly 
doubtful.  (Compare  vii.  75.) 


244 


^Tbouflbte. 


[Book  IX, 


Plato’s  Republic:*  but  be  content  if  the  small- 
est thing  goes  on  well,  and  consider  such  an 
event  to  be  no  small  matter.  For  who  can 
change  men’s  opinions  ? and  without  a change 
of  opinions  what  else  is  there  than  the  slavery 
of  men  who  groan  while  they  pretend  to  obey  ? 
Come  now  and  tell  me  of  Alexander  and 
Philippus  and  Demetrius  of  Phalerum.  They 
themselves  shall  judge  whether  they  discovered 
what  the  common  nature  required,  and  trained 
themselves  accordingly.  But  if  they  acted  like 
tragedy  heroes,  no  one  has  condemned  me  to 
imitate  them.  Simple  and  modest  is  the  work 
of  philosophy.  Draw  me  not  aside  to  insolence 
and  pride. 

30.  Look  down  from  above  on  the  countless 
herds  of  men  and  their  countless  solemnities, 
and  the  infinitely  varied  voyagings  in  storms 
and  calms,  and  the  differences  among  those 
who  are  born,  who  live  together,  and  die. 
And  consider,  too,  the  life  lived  by  others  in 
olden  time,  and  the  life  of  those  who  will  live 
after  thee,  and  the  life  now  lived  among  bar- 
barous nations,  and  how  many  know  not  even 
thy  name,  and  how  many  will  soon  forget  it, 
and  how  they  who  perhaps  now  are  prais- 
ing thee  will  very  soon  blame  thee,  and  that 
neither  a posthumous  name  is  of  any  value, 
nor  reputation,  nor  anything  else. 

* Those  who  wish  to  know  what  Plato’s  Republic  is 
may  now  study  it  in  the  accurate  translation  of  Davies 
and  Vaughan. 


Book  IX.]  flfcarcus  autclius  Bntoninus. 


245 


31.  Let  there  be  freedom  from  perturbations 
with  respect  to  the  things  which  come  from  the 
external  cause;  and  let  there  be  justice  in  the 
things  done  by  virtue  of  the  internal  cause, 
that  is,  let  there  be  movement  and  action  ter- 
minating in  this,  in  social  acts,  for  this  is  ac- 
cording to  thy  nature. 

32.  Thou  canst  remove  out  of  the  way  many 
useless  things  among  those  which  disturb  thee, 
for  they  lie  entirely  in  thy  opinion;  and  thou 
wilt  then  gain  for  thyself  ample  space  by  com- 
prehending the  whole  universe  in  thy  mind, 
and  by  contemplating  the  eternity  of  time,  and 
observing  the  rapid  change  of  every  several 
thing,  how  short  is  the  time  from  birth  to  dis- 
solution, and  the  illimitable  time  before  birth 
as  well  as  the  equally  boundless  time  after  dis- 
solution ! 

33.  All  that  thou  seest  will  quickly  perish, 
and  those  who  have  been  spectators  of  its  dis- 
solution will  very  soon  perish  too.  And  he 
who  dies  at  the  extremest  old  age  will  be 
brought  into  the  same  condition  with  him  who 
died  prematurely. 

34.  What  are  these  men’s  leading  principles, 
and  about  what  kind  of  things  are  they  busy, 
and  for  what  kind  of  reasons  do  they  love  and 
honor?  Imagine  that  thou  seest  their  pool 
souls  laid  bare.  When  they  think  that  they 
do  harm  by  their  blame  or  good  by  their  praise, 
what  an  idea  ! 

35.  Loss  is  nothing  else  than  change.  But 


246 


^Cbouflbts. 


[Book  IX. 


the  universal  nature  delights  iu  change,  and  in 
obedience  to  her  all  things  are  now  done  well, 
and  from  eternity  have  been  in  like  form,  and 
will  be  such  to  time  without  end.  What,  then, 
dost  thou  say,- -that  all  things  have  been  and 
all  things  always  will  be  bad,  and  that  no  power 
has  ever  been  found  in  so  many  gods  to  rectify 
these  things,  but  the  world  has  been  condemned 
to  be  bound  in  never  ceasing  evil  (iv.  45,  vii. 
18)? 

36.  The  rottenness  of  the  matter  which  is 
the  foundation  of  everything  ! water,  dust, 
bones,  filth:  or  again,  marble  rocks,  the  callos- 
ities of  the  earth;  and  gold  and  silver,  the  sed- 
iments; and  garments,  only  bits  of  hair;  and 
purple  dye,  blood;  and  everything  else  is  of 
the  same  kind.  And  that  which  is  of  the  na- 
ture of  breath  is  also  another  thing  of  the  same 
kind,  changing  from  this  to  that. 

37.  Enough  of  this  wretched  life  and  mur- 
muring and  apish  tricks.  Why  art  thou  dis- 
turbed? What  is  there  new  in  this?  What 
unsettles  thee  ? Is  it  the  form  of  the  thing  ? 
Look  at  it.  Or  is  it  the  matter  ? Look  at  it. 
But  besides  these  there  is  nothing.  Towards 
the  gods  then,  now  become  at  last  more  simple 
and  better.  It  is  the  same  whether  we  exam- 
ine these  things  for  a hundred  years  or  three. 

38.  If  a man  has  done  wrong  the  harm  is  his 
own.  But  perhaps  he  has  not  done  wrong. 

39.  Either  all  things  proceed  from  one  intel- 
ligent source  and  come  together  as  in  one  body. 


Book  IX.]  ^Barcue  SureUus  Sntonlnus. 


247 


and  the  part  ought  not  to  find  fault  with  M'hat 
is  done  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  ; or  there 
are  only  atoms,  and  nothing  else  than  mixture 
and  dispersion.  Why,  then,  art  thou  disturbed  ? 
Say  to  the  ruling  faculty.  Art  thou  dead,  art 
thou  corrupted,  art  thou  playing  the  hypocrite, 
art  thou  become  a beast,  dost  thou  herd  and 
feed  with  the  rest  ?* 

40.  Either  the  gods  have  no  power  or  they 
have  power.  If,  then,  the}’  have  no  power, 
why  dost  thou  pray  to  them  ? But  if  the}’  have 
power,  why  dost  thou  not  pray  for  them  to  give 
thee  the  faculty  of  not  fearing  any  of  the  things 
which  thou  fearest,  or  of  not  desiring  any  of  the 
things  which  thou  desirest,  or  not  being 
pained  at  anything,  rather  than  pray  that  any 
of  these  things  should  not  happen  or  hap- 
pen ? for  certainly  if  they  can  co-operate  with 
men,  they  can  co-operate  for  these  purposes. 
But  perhaps  thou  wilt  say  the  gods  have  placed 
them  in  thy  power.  Well,  then,  is  it  not  bet- 
ter to  use  what  is  in  thy  power  like  a free  man 
than  to  desire  in  a slavish  and  abject  way  what 
is  not  in  thy  power  ? And  who  has  told  thee 
that  the  gods  do  not  aid  us,  even  in  the  things 
which  are  in  our  power?  Begin,  then,  to  pray 
for  such  things,  and  thou  wilt  see.  One  man 

* There  is  some  corruption  at  the  end  of  this  section, 
but  I think  that  the  translation  expresses  the  em- 
peror’s meaning.  Whether  intelligence  rules  all 
things  or  chance  rules,  a man  must  not  be  disturbed. 
He  must  use  the  power  that  he  has  and  be  tranquil. 


248 


^Tbouflbts. 


[Book  IX. 


prays  thus:  How  shall  I be  able  to  lie  with  that 
woman  ? Do  thou  pray  thus:  How  shall  I not 
desire  to  lie  with  her?  Another  prays  thus: 
How  shall  I be  released  from  this  ? Pray 
thou  : How  shall  I not  desire  to  be  released  ? 
Another  thus:  How  shall  I not  lose  my  little 
son  ? Thou  thus:  How  shall  I not  be  afraid  to 
lose  him  ? In  fine,  turn  thy  prayers  this  way, 
and  see  what  comes. 

41.  Epicurus  says.  In  my  sickness  my  con- 
versation was  not  about  my  bodily  sufferings, 
nor,  says  he,  did  I talk  on  such  subjects  to 
those  who  visited  me;  but  I continued  to  dis- 
course on  the  nature  of  things  as  before,  keep- 
ing to  this  main  point,  how  the  mind,  while 
participating  in  such  movements  as  go  on  in 
the  poor  fiesh,  shall  be  free  from  perturbations 
and  maintain  its  proper  good.  Nor  did  I,  he 
says,  give  the  physicians  an  opportunity  of  put- 
ting on  solemn  looks,  as  if  they  were  doing 
something  great,  but  my  life  went  on  well  and 
happily.  Do,  then,  the  same  that  he  did  both 
in  sickness,  if  thou  art  sick,  and  in  any  other 
circumstances;  for  never  to  desert  philosophy 
in  any  events  that  may  befall  us,  nor  to  hold 
trifling  talks  either  with  an  ignorant  man  or 
with  one  unacquainted  with  nature,  is  a prin- 
ciple of  all  schools  of  philosophy;  but  to  be 
intent  only  on  that  which  thou  art  now  doing 
and  on  the  instrument  by  which  thou  doest  it. 

42.  When  thou  art  offended  with  any  man’s 
shameless  conduct,  immediately  ask  thyself. 


Book  IX.]  .flBarcue  Sureliue  Bntonfnue. 


249 


Is  it  possible,  then,  that  shameless  men  should 
not  be  in  the  world  ? It  is  not  possible.  Do 
not,  then,  require  what  is  impossible.  For 
this  man  also  is  one  of  those  shameless  men 
who  must  of  necessity  be  in  the  world.  Let 
the  same  considerations  be  present  to  thy  mind 
in  the  case  of  the  knave,  and  the  faithless  man, 
and  of  every  man  who  does  wrong  in  any  way. 
For  at  the  same  time  that  thou  dost  remind 
thyself  that  it  is  impossible  that  such  kind  of 
men  should  not  exist,  thou  wilt  become  more 
kindly  disposed  towards  every  one  individually. 
It  is  useful  to  perceive  this,  too,  immediately 
when  the  occasion  arises,  what  virtue  nature 
has  given  to  man  to  oppose  to  every  wrongful 
act.  For  she  has  given  to  man,  as  an  antidote 
against  the  stupid  man,  mildness,  and  against 
another  kind  of  man  some  other  power.  And 
in  all  cases  it  is  possible  for  thee  to  correct  by 
teaching  the  man  who  is  gone  astray;  for  every 
man  who  errs  misses  his  object  and  is  gone 
astray.  Besides,  wherein  hast  thou  been  in- 
jured ? For  thou  wilt  find  that  no  one  among 
those  against  whom  thou  art  irritated  has  done 
anything  by  which  thy  mind  could  be  made 
worse;  but  that  which  is  evil  to  thee  and  harm- 
ful has  its  foundation  only  in  the  mind.  And 
what  harm  is  done  or  what  is  there  strange,  if 
the  man  who  has  not  been  instructed  does  the 
acts  of  an  uninstructed  man  ? Consider 
whether  thou  shouldst  not  rather  blame  thy- 
self, because  thou  didst  not  expect  such  a man 


250 


trbougbts. 


[Book  II. 


to  err  in  such  a way.  For  thou  hadst  means 
given  thee  by  thy  reason  to  suppose  that  it 
was  likely  that  he  would  commit  this  error, 
and  yet  thou  hast  forgotten  and  art  amazed 
that  he  has  erred.  But  most  of  all  when  thou 
blamest  a man  as  faithless  or  ungrateful,  turn 
to  thyself.  For  the  fault  is  manifestly  thy  own, 
whether  thou  didst  trust  that  a man  who  had 
such  a disposition  would  keep  his  promise,  or 
when  conferring  thy  kindness  thou  didst  not 
confer  it  absolutelJ^  nor  yet  in  such  way  as  to 
have  received  from  thy  very  act  all  the  profit. 
For  what  more  dost  thou  want  when  thou  hast 
done  a man  a service  ? art  thou  not  content  that 
thou  hast  done  something  conformable  to  thy 
nature,  and  dost  thou  seek  to  be  paid  for  it  ? 
just  as  if  the  eye  demanded  a recompense  for 
seeing,  or  the  feet  for  walking.  For  as  these 
members  are  formed  for  a particular  purpose, 
and  by  working  according  to  their  several  con- 
stitutions obtain  what  is  their  own;*  so  also  as 
man  is  formed  by  nature  to  acts  of  benevolence, 
when  he  has  done  anything  benevolent  or  in 
any  other  way  conducive  to  the  common  inter- 
est, he  has  acted  conformably  to  his  constitu- 
tion, and  he  gets  what  is  his  own. 

* ’knex^i-  TO  Wlov.  This  sense  of  anexeiv  occurs  in 
xi.  I,  and  iv.  49;  also  in  St.  Matthew,  vi.  2,  anexovat 
TQV  fuadov,  and  in  Epictetus. 


Book!.]  Marcus  Burelius  Bntoninue. 


251 


X. 

Wilt  thou,  then,  my  soul,  never  be  good 
and  simple  and  one  and  naked,  more 
manifest  than  the  body  which  surrounds  thee  ? 
Wilt  thou  never  enjoy  an  affectionate  and  con- 
tented disposition?  Wilt  thou  never  be  full 
and  without  a want  of  any  kind,<  longing  for 
nothing  more,  nor  desiring  anything,  either 
animate  or  inanimate,  for  the  enjoyment  of 
pleasures?  nor  yet  desiring  time  wherein  thou 
shalt  have  longer  enjoyment,  or  place,  or 
pleasant  climate,  or  society  of  men  with  whom 
thou  mayst  live  in  harmony  ? but  wilt  thou  be 
satisfied  with  thy  present  condition,  and 
pleased  with  all  that  is  about  thee,  and  wilt 
thou  convince  thyself  that  thou  hast  every- 
thing, and  that  it  comes  from  the  gods,  that 
everything  is  well  for  thee,  and  will  be  well 
whatever  shall  please  them,  and  whatever  they 
shall  give  for  the  conservation  of  the  perfect 
living  being,*  the  good  and  just  and  beautiful, 
which  generates  and  holds  together  all  things, 
and  contains  and  embraces  all  things  which 
are  dissolved  for  the  production  of  other  like 
things  ? Wilt  thou  never  be  such  that  thou 

* That  is,  God  (iv.  40),  as  he  is  defined  by  Zeno. 
But  the  confusion  between  gods  and  God  is  strange. 


252 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  X. 


shalt  so  dwell  in  community  with  gods  and 
men  as  neither  to  find  fault  with  them  at  all, 
nor  to  be  condemned  by  them  ? 

2.  Observe  what  thy  nature  requires,  so  far 
as  thou  art  governed  by  nature  only:  then  do 
it  and  accept  it,  if  thy  nature,  so  far  as  thou  art 
a living  being,  shall  not  be  made  worse  by  it. 
And  next  thou  must  observe  what  thy  nature 
requires  so  far  as  thou  art  a living  being.  And 
all  this  thou  mayst  allow  thyself,  if  thy  nature, 
so  far  as  thou  art  a rational  animal,  shall  not 
be  made  worse  by  it.  But  the  rational  animal 
is  consequently  also  a political  [social]  animal. 
Use  these  rules,  then,  and  trouble  thyself  about 
nothing  else. 

3.  Everything  which  happens  either  happens 
in  such  wise  as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to 
bear  it,  or  as  thou  art  not  formed  by  nature  to 
bear  it.  If,  then,  it  happens  to  thee  in  such 
way  as  thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  it,  do 
not  complain,  but  bear  it  as  thou  art  formed  by 
nature  to  bear  it.  But  if  it  happens  in  such 
wise  as  thou  art  not  formed  by  nature  to  bear 
it,  do  not  complain,  for  it  will  perish  after  it 
has  consumed  thee.  Remember,  however,  that 
thou  art  formed  by  nature  to  bear  everything, 
with  respect  to  which  it  depends  on  thy  own 
opinion  to  make  it  endurable  and  tolerable,  by 
thinking  that  it  is  either  thy  interest  or  thy 
duty  to  do  this. 

4.  If  a man  is  mistaken,  instruct  him  kindly 
and  show  him  his  error.  But  if  thou  art  not 
able,  blame  thyself,  or  blame  not  even  thyself. 


Book!.]  /ffi»arcus  aurclius  Antoninus. 


253 


5.  Whatever  may  happen  to  thee,  it  was  pre- 
pared for  thee  from  all  eternity;  and  the  impli- 
cation of  causes  was  from  eternity  spinning  the 
thread  of  thy  being,  and  of  that  which  is  inci- 
dent to  it  (hi.  II ; iv.  26). 

6.  Whether  the  universe  is  [a  concourse  of] 
atoms,  or  nature  [is  a system],  let  this  first  be 
established,  that  I am  a part  of  the  whole 
which  is  governed  by  nature;  next,  I am  in  a 
manner  intimately  related  to  the  parts  which 
are  of  the  same  kind  with  myself.  For  re- 
membering this,  inasmuch  as  I am  a part,  I 
shall  be  discontented  with  none  of  the  things 
which  are  assigned  to  me  out  of  the  whole;  for 
nothing  is  injurious  to  the  part  if  it  is  for  the 
advantage  of  the  whole.  For  the  whole  con- 
tains nothing  which  is  not  for  its  advantage; 
and  all  natures  indeed  have  this  common  prin- 
ciple, but  the  nature  of  the  universe  has  this 
principle  besides,  that  it  cannot  be  compelled 
even  by  any  external  cause  to  generate  any- 
thing harmful  to  itself.  By  remembering,  then, 
that  I am  a part  of  such  a whole,  I shall  be 
content  with  eveiy^thing  that  happens.  And 
inasmuch  as  I am  in  a manner  intimately  re- 
lated to  the  parts  which  are  of  the  same  kind 
with  myself,  I shall  do  nothing  unsocial,  but  I 
shall  rather  direct  myself  to  the  things  which 
are  of  the  same  kind  with  m3^self,  and  I shall 
turn  all  my  efforts  to  the  common  interest,  and 
divert  them  from  the  contrary.  Now,  if  these 
things  are  done  so,  life  must  flow  on  happily. 


254 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  I. 


just  as  thou  mayst  observe  that  the  life  of  a 
citizen  is  happy,  who  continues  a course  of 
action  which  is  advantageous  to  his  fellow- 
citizens,  and  is  content  with  whatever  the  state 
may  assign  to  him. 

7.  The  parts  of  the  whole,  everything,  I 
mean,  which  is  naturally  comprehended  in  the 
universe,  must  of  necessity  perish;  but  let  this 
be  understood  in  this  sense,  that  they  must  un- 
dergo change.  But  if  this  is  naturally  both  an 
evil  and  a necessity  for  the  parts,  the  whole 
would  not  continue  to  exist  in  a good  condi- 
tion, the  parts  being  subject  to  change  and 
constituted  so  as  to  perish  in  various  ways. 
For  whether  did  Nature  herself  design  to  do 
evil  to  the  things  which  are  parts  of  herself, 
and  to  make  them  subject  to  evil  and  of  neces- 
sity fall  into  evil,  or  have  such  results  happened 
without  her  knowing  it  ? Both  these  supposi- 
tions, indeed,  are  incredible.  But  if  a man 
should  even  drop  the  term  Nature  [as  an  effi- 
cient power],  and  should  speak  of  these  things 
as  natural,  even  then  it  would  be  ridiculous  to 
affirm  at  the  same  time  that  the  parts  of  the 
whole  are  in  their  nature  subject  to  change, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  be  surprised  or  vexed 
as  if  something  were  happening  contrary  to  na- 
ture, particularly  as  the  dissolution  of  things  is 
into  those  things  of  which  each  thing  is  com- 
posed. For  there  is  either  a dispersion  of  the 
elements  out  of  which  everything  has  been 
compounded,  or  a change  from  the  solid  to  the 


BookX.]  /iBarcue  Hurelius  Bntoninus. 


255 


earthy  and  from  the  airy  to  the  aerial,  so  that 
these  parts  are  taken  back  into  the  universal 
reason,  whether  this  at  certain  periods  is  con- 
sumed by  fire  or  renewed  by  eternal  changes. 
And  do  not  imagine  that  the  solid  and  the  airy 
part  belong  to  thee  from  the  time  of  generation. 
For  all  this  received  its  accretion  only  yester- 
day and  the  day  before,  as  one  may  say,  from 
the  food  and  the  air  which  is  inspired.  This, 
then,  which  has  received  [the  accretion], 
changes,  not  that  which  thy  mother  brought 
forth.  But  suppose  that  this  [which  thy  mother 
brought  forth]  implicates  thee  verj^  much  with 
that  other  part,  which  has  the  peculiar  quality 
[of  change],  this  is  nothing  in  fact  in  the  way 
of  objection  to  what  is  said.* 

8.  When  thou  hast  assumed  these  names, 
good,  modest,  true,  rational,  a man  of  equa- 
nimity, and  magnanimous,  take  care  that  thou 
dost  not  change  these  names;  and  if  thou 
shouldst  lose  them,  quickly  return  to  them. 
And  remember  that  the  term  Rational  was  in- 
tended to  signify  a discriminating  attention 

* The  end  of  this  section  is  perhaps  corrupt.  The 
meaning  is  very  obscure.  I have  given  that  meaning 
which  appears  to  be  consistent  with  the  whole  argu- 
ment. The  emperor  here  maintains  that  the  essential 
part  of  man  is  unchangeable,  and  that  the  other  parts, 
if  they  change  or  perish,  do  not  affect  that  which 
really  constitutes  the  man.  See  the  Philosophy  of 
Antoninus,  p.  56,  note  2.  Schultz  supposed  “thy 
mother”  to  mean  nature,  ?/  But  I doubt  about 

that. 


256 


^TbouQbts. 


[Book  X. 


to  every  several  tjbing,  and  freedom  from  neg- 
ligence; and  that  Equanimity  is  the  voluntary 
acceptance  of  the  things  which  are  assigned  to 
thee  by  the  common  nature;  and  that  Mag- 
nanimity is  the  elevation  of  the  intelligent  part 
above  the  pleasurable  or  painful  sensations  of 
the  flesh,  and  above  that  poor  thing  called  fame, 
and  death,  and  all  such  things.  If,  then,  thou 
maintainest  thyself  in  the  possession  of  these 
names,  without  desiring  to  be  called  by  these 
names  by  others,  thou  wilt  be  another  person 
and  wilt  enter  on  another  life.  For  to  continue 
to  be  such  as  thou  hast  hitherto  been,  and  to  be 
torn  in  pieces  and  defiled  in  such  a life,  is  the 
character  of  a very  stupid  man  and  one  over- 
fond  of  his  life,  and  like  those  half-devoured 
fighters  with  wild  beasts,  who  though  covered 
with  wounds  and  gore,  still  intreat  to  be  kept 
to  the  following  day,  though  they  will  be  ex- 
posed in  the  same  state  to  the  same  claws  and 
bites.*  Therefore  fix  thyself  in  the  possession 
of  these  few  names:  and  if  thou  art  able  to 
abide  in  them,  abide  as  if  thou  wast  removed  to 
certain  islands  of  the  Happy. f But  if  thou 

*See  Seneca,  Epp.  70,  on  these  exhibitions  which 
amused  the  people  of  those  days.  These  fighters  were 
the  Bestiarri,  some  of  whom  may  have  been  criminals; 
but  even  if  they  were,  the  exhibition  was  equally 
characteristic  of  the  depraved  habits  of  the  spectators. 

t The  islands  of  the  Happy,  or  the  Fortunatae  Insu- 
lae, are  spoken  of  by  the  Greek  and  Roman  writers. 
They  were  the  abode  of  Heroes,  like  Achilles  and 


Book  I.]  /iRarcus  Bureliue  Bntonfnus. 


257 


shalt  perceive  that  thou  fallest  out  of  them  and 
dost  not  maintain  thy  hold,  go  courageously 
into  some  nook  where  thou  shalt  maintain 
them,  or  even  depart  at  once  from  life,  not  in 
passion,  but  with  simplicity  and  freedom  and 
modesty,  after  doing  this  one  [laudable]  thing 
at  least  in  thy  life,  to  have  gone  out  of  it  thus. 
In  order,  however,  to  the  remembrance  of  these 
names,  it  will  greatly  help  thee  if  thou  remem- 
berest  the  gods,  and  that  they  wish  not  to  be 
flattered,  but  wish  all  reasonable  beings  to  be 
made  like  themselves;  and  if  thou  remember- 
est  that  what  does  the  work  of  a fig-tree  is  a 
fig-tree,  and  that  what  does  the  work  of  a dog 
is  a dog,  and  that  what  does  the  work  of  a bee 

Diomedes,  as  we  see  in  the  Scolion  of  Harmodius  and 
Aristogiton.  Sertorius  heard  of  the  islands  at  Cadiz 
from  some  sailors  who  had  been  there,  and  he  had  a 
wish  to  go  and  live  in  them  and  rest  from  his  troubles 
(Plutarch,  Sertorius,  c.  8).  In  the  Odyssey,  Proteus 
told  Menelaus  that  he  should  not  die  in  Argos,  but  be 
removed  to  a place  at  the  boundary  of  the  earth  where 
Rhadamanthus  dwelt  (Odyssey,  iv.  565): — 

“ For  there  in  sooth  man’s  life  is  easiest: 

Nor  snow  nor  raging  storm  nor  rain  is  there 
But  ever  gently  breathing  gales  of  Zephyr 
Oceanus  sends  up  to  gladden  man.” 

it  is  certain  that  the  writer  of  the  Odyssey  only  fol- 
lows some  old  legend,  without  having  any  knowledge 
of  any  place  which  corresponds  to  his  description. 
The  two  islands  which  Sertorius  heard  of  may  be  Ma- 
deira and  the  adjacent  island.  Compare  Pindar,  Ol. 
ii.  129. 


17 


258 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  X. 


is  a bee,  and  that  what  does  the  work  of  a man 
is  a man. 

9.  Mimi,*war,  astonishment,  torpor,  slavery, 
will  daily  wipe  out  those  holy  principles  of 
thine.  + How  many  things  without  studying 
nature  dost  thou  imagine,  and  how  many  dost 
thou  neglect  ? f But  it  is  thy  duty  so  to  look 
on  and  so  to  do  everything,  that  at  the  same 
time  the  power  of  dealing  with  circumstances 
is  perfected,  and  the  contemplative  faculty  is 
exercised,  and  the  confidence  which  conies 
from  the  knowledge  of  each  several  thing  is 
maintained  without  showing  it,  but  yet  not 
concealed.  For  when  wilt  thou  enjoy  sim- 
plicity, when  gravity,  and  when  the  knowledge 
of  every  several  thing,  both  what  it  is  in  sub- 
stance, and  what  place  it  has  in  the  universe, 
and  how  long  it  is  formed  to  exist,  and  of  what 
things  it  is  compounded,  and  to  whom  it  can 
belong,  and  who  are  able  both  to  give  it  and 
take  it  away  ? 

10.  A spider  is  proud  when  it  has  caught  a 
fly,  and  another  when  he  has  caught  a poor 
hare,  and  another  when  he  has  taken  a little 
fish  in  a net,  and  another  when  he  has  taken 
wild  boars,  and  another  when  he  has  taken 
bears,  and  another  when  he  has  taken  Sar- 

* Corais  conjectured  iilaog  “hatred”  in  place  of 
Mimi,  Roman  plays  in  which  action  and  gesticulation 
were  all  or  nearly  all. 

t This  is  corrupt.  See  the  addition  of  Schultz. 


Book  X.]  ifiibarcua  Surclius  Bntonfnus. 


259 


matians.  Are  not  these  robbers,  if  thou  ex- 
aminest  their  opinions  ? * 

1 1 . Acquire  the  contemplative  way  of  seeing 
how  all  things  change  into  one  another,  and 
constantly  attend  to  it,  and  exercise  thyself 
about  this  part  [of  philosophy].  For  nothing 
is  so  much  adapted  to  produce  magnanimity. 
Such  a man  has  put  off  the  body,  and  as  he 
sees  that  he  must,  no  one  knows  how  soon,  go 
away  from  among  men  and  leave  everything 
here,  he  gives  himself  up  entirely  to  just  doing 
in  all  his  actions,  and  in  everything  else  that 
happens  he  resigns  himself  to  the  universal 
nature.  But  as  to  what  any  man  shall  say  or 
think  about  him  or  do  against  him,  he  never 
even  thinks  of  it,  being  himself  contented  with 
these  two  things — with  acting  justly  in  what 
he  now  does,  and  being  satisfied  with  what  is 
now  assigned  to  him;  and  he  lays  aside  all  dis- 
tracting and  busy  pursuits,  and  desires  nothing 
else  than  to  accomplish  the  straight  course 
through  the  law,t  and  by  accomplishing  the 
straight  course  to  follow  God. 

12.  What  need  is  there  of  suspicious  fear, 
since  it  is  in  thy  power  to  inquire  what  ought 
to  be  done  ? And  if  thou  seest  clear,  go  by 

* Marcus  means  to  say  that  conquerors  are  robbers. 
He  himself  warred  against  Sarmatians,  and  was  a rob- 
ber, as  he  says,  like  the  rest  But  compare  the  life  of 
Avidius  Cassius,  c.  4,  by  Vulcatius. 

f By  the  law  he  means  the  divine  law,  obedience  to 
the  will  of  God. 


26o 


c:bou0bt6. 


[Book  X. 


this  way  content,  without  turning  back;  but 
if  thou  dost  not  see  clear,  stop  and  take  the 
best  advisers.  But  if  any  other  things  oppose 
thee,  go  on  according  to  thy  powers  with  due 
consideration,  keeping  to  that  which  appears 
to  be  just.  For  it  is  best  to  reach  this  object, 
and  if  thou  dost  fail,  let  thy  failure  be  in  at- 
tempting this.  He  who  follows  reason  in  all 
things  is  both  tranquil  and  active  at  the  same 
time,  and  also  cheerful  and  collected. 

13.  Inquire  of  thyself  as  soon  as  thou  wakest 
from  sleep  whether  it  will  make  any  difference 
to  thee  if  another  does  what  is  j ust  and  right. 
It  will  make  no  difference  (vi.  32;  viii.  55). 

Thou  hast  not  forgotten,  I suppose,  that 
those  who  assume  arrogant  airs  in  bestowing 
their  praise  or  blame  on  others  are  such  as 
they  are  at  bed  and  at  board,  and  thou  hast 
not  forgotten  what  they  do,  and  what  they 
avoid,  and  what  they  pursue,  and  how  they 
steal  and  how  they  rob,  not  with  hands  and 
feet,  but  with  their  most  valuable  part,  by 
means  of  which  there  is  produced,  when  a man 
chooses,  fidelity,  modesty,  truth,  law,  a good 
daemon  [happiness]  (vii.  17)? 

14.  To  her  who  gives  and  takes  back  all,  to 
nature,  the  man  who  is  instructed  and  modest 
says.  Give  what  thou  wilt;  take  back  what 
thou  wilt.  And  he  says  this  not  proudly,  but 
obediently,  and  well  pleased  with  her. 

15.  Short  is  the  little  which  remains  to  thee 
of  life.  Live  as  on  a mountain.  For  it  makes 


SookX.]  /iBarcus  aureliu6  Hntoninu0.  261 


no  difference  whether  a man  lives  there  or 
here,  if  he  lives  everywhere  in  the  world  as  in 
a state  [political  community].  Let  me  see,  let 
them  know  a real  man  who  lives  according  to 
nature.  If  they  cannot  endure  him,  let  them 
kill  him.  For  that  is  better  than  to  live  thus 
[as  men  do]. 

16.  No  longer  talk  at  all  about  the  kind  of 
man  that  a good  man  ought  to  be,  but  be  such. 

17.  Constantly  contemplate  the  whole  of  time 
and  the  whole  of  substance,  and  consider  that 
all  individual  things  as  to  substance  are  a grain 
of  a fig,  and  as  to  time  the  turning  of  a gimlet. 

18.  Look  at  ever^dhing  that  exists,  and  ob- 
serv’e  that  it  is  already  in  dissolution  and  in 
change,  and  as  it  were  putrefaction  or  dis- 
persion, or  that  everything  is  so  constituted  by 
nature  as  to  die. 

19.  Consider  what  men  are  when  they  are  eat- 
ing, sleeping,  generating,  easing  themselves, 
and  so  forth.  Then  what  kind  of  men  they  are 
when  they  are  imperious  + and  arrogant,  or 
angry  and  scolding  from  their  elevated  place. 
But  a short  time  ago  to  how  many  they  were 
slaves  and  for  what  things;  and  after  a little 
time  consider  in  what  a condition  they  will  be. 

20.  That  is  for  the  good  of  each  thing,  which 
the  universal  nature  brings  to  each.  And  it  is 
for  its  good  at  the  time  when  nature  brings  it. 

21.  “The  earth  loves  the  shower;’’  and 
“the  solemn  ether  loves;’’  and  the  universe 
loves  to  make  whatever  is  about  to  be.  I say 


262 


?Tbougbt0. 


[Book  X. 


then  to  the  universe,  that  I love  as  thou  lovest. 
And  is  not  this  too  said  that  ‘ ‘ this  or  that 
loves  [is  wont]  to  be  produced  ?”* 

22.  Either  thou  livest  here  and  hast  already 
accustomed  thyself  to  it,  or  thou  art  going 
away,  and  this  was  thy  own  will;  or  thou  art 
dying  and  hast  discharged  thy  duty.  But  be- 
sides these  things  there  is  nothing.  Be  of 
good  cheer,  then. 

23.  Let  this  always  be  plain  to  thee,  that 
this  piece  of  land  is  like  any  other ; and  that 
all  things  here  are  the  same  with  things  on  the 
top  of  a mountain,  or  on  the  sea-shore,  or 
wherever  thou  choosest  to  be.  For  thou  wilt 
find  just  what  Plato  says.  Dwelling  within  the 
walls  of  a city  as  in  a shepherd’s  fold  on  a 
mountain.  [The  three  last  words  are  omitted 
in  the  translation.]! 

* These  words  are  from  Euripides.  They  are  cited 
by  Aristotle,  Ethic.  Nicom.  viii.  i.  Athenaeus  (xiii. 
296)  and  Stobaeus  quote  seven  complete  lines  begin- 
ning ipa  piv  bpppov  yaXa.  There  is  a similar  fragment 
of  Aeschylus,  Danaides,  also  quoted  by  Athenaeus. 

It  was  the  fashion  of  the  Stoics  to  work  on  the 
meanings  of  words.  So  Antoninus  here  takes  the 
verb  “loves,”  which  has  also  the  sense  of  “is 
wont,”  “uses,”  and  the  like.  He  finds  in  the  com- 
mon language  of  mankind  a philosophical  truth,  and 
most  great  truths  are  expressed  in  the  common 
language  of  life;  some  understand  them,  but  most 
people  utter  them  without  knowing  how  much  they 
mean. 

t Plato,  Theaet.  174  D.  E.  But  compare  the  orig- 
inal with  the  use  that  Antoninus  has  made  of  it. 


Booi  X.]  ^Barcus  Aurelius  Bntotunus. 


263 


24.  What  is  my  ruling  faculty  now  to  me  ? 
and  of  what  nature  am  I now  making  it  ? and 
for  what  purpose  am  I now  using  it?  is  it  void 
of  understanding  ? is  it  loosed  and  rent  asun- 
der from  social  life  ? is  it  melted  into  and  mixed 
with  the  poor  flesh  so  as  to  move  together 
with  it  ? 

25.  He  who  flies  from  his  master  is  a runa- 
way; but  the  law  is  master,  and  he  who  breaks 
the  law  is  a runaway.  And  he  also  who  is 
grieved  or  angry  or  afraid,  + is  dissatisfied  be- 
cause something  has  been  or  is  or  shall  be  of 
the  things  which  are  appointed  b}"  him  who 
rules  all  things,  and  he  is  Law  and  assigns  to 
every  man  what  is  fit.  He  then  who  fears  or 
is  grieved  or  is  angry  is  a runaway.* 

26.  A man  deposits  seed  in  a womb  and  goes 
away,  and  then  another  cause  takes  it  and 
labors  on  it,  and  makes  a child.  What  a thing 
from  such  a material  ! Again,  the  child  passes 
food  down  through  the  throat,  and  then  an- 
other cause  takes  it  and  makes  perception  and 
motion,  and  in  fine,  life  and  strength  and  other 
things;  how  many  and  how  strange  ! Observ'e 
then  the  things  which  are  produced  in  such  a 
hidden  wa5^  and  see  the  power,  just  as  we  see 
the  power  which  carries  things  downwards  and 
upwards,  not  with  the  eyes,  but  still  no  less 
plainly  (vii.  85). 

* Antoninus  is  here  playing  on  the  etymology,  of 
vdfioc^  law,  assignment,  that  which  assigns  {vi/^ei)  to 
every  man  his  portion. 


264 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  X. 


27.  Constantly  consider  how  all  things  such 
as  they  now  are,  in  time  past  also  were;  and 
consider  that  they  will  be  the  same  again. 
And  place  before  thy  eyes  entire  dramas  and 
stages  of  the  same  form,  whatever  thou  hast 
learned  from  thy  experience  or  from  older 
history;  for  example,  the  whole  court  of 
Hadrianus,  and  the  whole  court  of  Antoninus, 
and  the  wdiole  court  of  Philippus,  Alexander, 
Croesus;  for  all  those  were  such  dramas  as  we 
see  now,  only  with  different  actors. 

28.  Imagine  every  man  who  is  grieved  at 
anything  or  discontented  to  be  like  a pig  which 
is  sacrificed  and  kicks  and  screams. 

Like  this  pig  also  is  he  who  on  his  bed  in 
silence  laments  the  bonds  in  which  we  are  held. 
And  consider  that  only  to  the  rational  animal 
is  it  given  to  follow  voluntarily  what  happens; 
but  simply  to  follow  is  a necessity  imposed  on 
all. 

29.  Severally  on  the  occasion  of  everything 
that  thou  dost,  pause  and  ask  thyself  if  death 
is  a dreadful  thing  because  it  deprives  thee  of 
this. 

30.  When  thou  art  offended  at  any  man’s 
fault,  forthwith  turn  to  thyself  and  reflect  in 
what  like  manner  thou  dost  err  thyself ; for 
example,  in  thinking  that  money  is  a good 
thing,  or  pleasure,  or  a bit  of  reputation,  and 
the  like.  For  by  attending  to  this  thou  wilt 
quickly  forget  thy  anger,  if  this  consideration 
i,lso  is  added,  that  the  man  is  compelled:  for 


Book  X.]  /iBarcus  Hurclius  Antoninus.  265 


-what  else  could  he  do  ? or,  if  thou  art  able, 
take  away  from  him  the  compulsion. 

31.  When  thou  hast  seen  Satyron*  the  So- 
cratic,+  think  of  either  Eutyches  or  Hymen, 
and  when  thou  hast  seen  Euphrates,  think  of 
Eutj^chion  or  Silvanus,  and  w’hen  thou  hast 
seen  Alciphron  think  of  Tropaeophorus,  and 
when  thou  hast  seen  Xenophon,  think  of 
Critof  or  Severus,  and  when  thou  hast  looked 
on  thyself,  think  of  any  other  Caesar,  and  in 
the  case  of  every  one  do  in  like  manner.  Then 
let  this  thought  be  in  thy  mind.  Where  then 
are  those  men?  Now'here,  or  nobody  knows 
where.  For  thus  continuously  thou  wilt  look 
at  human  things  as  smoke  and  nothing  at  all; 
especially  if  thou  reflectest  at  the  same  time 
that  what  has  once  changed  will  never  exist 
again  in  the  infinite  duration  of  time.  But 
thou,  in  what  a brief  space  of  time  is  thy  ex- 
istence? And  w’hy  art  thou  not  content  to 
pass  through  this  short  time  in  an  orderly  way  ? 
What  matter  and  opportunity  [for  thy  activity] 

* Nothing  is  known  of  Sat}’ron  or  Satyrion;  nor,  I 
helieve,  of  Eutyches  or  Hymen.  Euphrates  is  honor- 
ablj’  mentioned  by  Epictetus  (iii.  15,  8;  iv.  8,  17). 
Pliny  (Epp.  i.  10)  speaks  very  highly  of  him.  He  ob- 
tained the  permission  of  the  Emperor  Hadrian  to 
drink  poison,  because  he  was  old  and  in  bad  health 
(Dion  Cassius,  69,  c.  8). 

t Crito  is  the  friend  of  Socrates  ; and  he  was,  it  ap- 
pears, also  a friend  of  Xenophon.  When  the  em- 
peror says  “seen  ” {Iduv),  he  does  not  mean  with  the 
eyes. 


266 


^bougbts. 


[Book  X. 


art  thou  avoiding  ? For  what  else  are  all  these 
things,  except  exercises  for  the  reason,  when  it 
has  viewed  carefully  and  by  examination  into 
their  nature  the  things  which  happen  in  life  ? 
Persevere  then  until  thou  shalt  have  made 
these  things  thy  own,  as  the  stomach  which  is 
strengthened  makes  all  things  its  own,  as  the 
blazing  lire  makes  flame  and  brightness  out 
of  everything  that  is  thrown  into  it. 

32.  Let  it  not  be  in  an}"  man’s  power  to  say 
truly  of  thee  that  thou  are  not  simple  or  that 
thou  art  not  good;  but  let  him  be  a liar  who- 
ever shall  think  anything  of  this  kind  about 
thee;  and  this  is  altogether  in  thy  power.  For 
who  is  he  that  shall  hinder  thee  from  being 
good  and  simple  ? Do  thou  only  determine 
to  live  no  longer  unless  thou  shalt  be  such. 
For  neither  does  reason  allow  [thee  to  live],  if 
thou  art  not  such.* 

33.  What  is  that  which  as  to  this  material 
[our  life]  can  be  done  or  said  in  the  wa}'  most 
conformable  to  reason  ? For  whatever  this 
may  be,  it  is  in  thy  power  to  do  it  or  to  say  it, 
and  do  not  make  excuses  that  thou  art  hindered. 
Thou  wilt  not  cease  to  lament  till  thj"  mind  is 
in  such  a condition  that  what  luxury  is  to 
those  who  enjoy  pleasure,  such  shall  be  to 
thee,  in  the  matter  which  is  subjected  and  pre- 
sented to  thee,  the  doing  of  the  things  which 
are  conformable  to  man’s  constitution  ; for  a 


* Compare  Epictetus,  i.  29,  28. 


Book  X.]  /iRarcue  Burclius  Bntonlnus. 


267 


man  ought  to  consider  as  an  enjoyment  every- 
thing which  it  is  in  his  power  to  do  according  to 
his  own  nature.  And  it  is  in  his  power  every- 
where. Now,  it  is  not  given  to  a cylinder  to 
move  everywhere  by  its  own  motion,  nor  }’et  to 
water  nor  to  fire,  nor  to  anything  else  which  is 
governed  by  nature  or  an  irrational  soul,  for 
the  things  which  check  them  and  stand  in  the 
way  are  many.  But  intelligence  and  reason 
are  able  to  go  through  everything  that  opposes 
them,  and  in  such  manner  as  they  are  formed 
b}^  nature  and  as  they  choose.  Place  before 
thy  e3^es  this  facility  with  which  the  reason 
will  be  carried  through  all  things,  as  fire  up- 
wards, as  a stone  downwards,  as  a cjdinder 
down  an  inclined  surface,- and  seek  for  nothing 
further.  For  all  other  obstacles  either  affect 
the  body  only,  which  is  a dead  thing;  or,  ex- 
cept through  opinion  and  the  yielding  of  the 
reason  itself,  they  do  not  crush  nor  do  any 
harm  of  any  kind;  for  if  they  did,  he  who  felt 
it  would  immediately  become  bad.  Now,  in 
the  case  of  all  things  which  have  a certain  con- 
stitution, whatever  harm  may  happen  to  any 
of  them,  that  which  is  so  affected  becomes  con- 
sequently worse;  but  in  the  like  case,  a man 
becomes  both  better,  if  one  may  say  so,  and 
more  worthy  of  praise  by  making  a right  use 
of  these  accidents.  And  finally  remember  that 
nothing  harms  him  who  is  really  a citizen, 
which  does  not  harm  the  state;  nor  yet  does 
anything  harm  the  state,  which  does  not 


268 


tTbougbts. 


[Book  X. 


harm  law  [order];  and  of  these  things  which 
are  called  misfortunes  not  one  harms  law. 
What  then  does  not  harm  law  does  not  harm 
either  state  or  citizen. 

34.  To  him  who  is  penetrated  by  true  prin- 
ciples even  the  briefest  precept  is  sufficient,  and 
any  common  precept,  to  remind  him  that  he 
should  be  free  from  grief  and  fear.  For  ex- 
ample:— 

“ Leaves,  some  the  wind  scatters  on  the  ground — 
So  is  the  race  of  men.”* 

Leaves,  also,  are  thy  children;  and  leaves,  too, 
are  they  who  cry  out  as  if  they  were  worthy  of 
credit  and  bestow  their  praise,  or  on  the  con- 
trary curse,  or  secretly  blame  and  sneer;  and 
leaves,  in  like  manner,  are  those  who  shall  re- 
ceive and  transmit  a man’s  fame  to  after-times. 
For  all  such  things  as  these  “are  produced  in 
the  season  of  spring,’’  as  the  poet  says;  then 
the  wind  casts  them  down;  then  the  forest 
produces  other  leaves  in  their  places.  But  a 
brief  existence  is  common  to  all  things,  and  yet 
thou  avoidest  and  pursuest  all  things  as  if  they 
would  be  eternal.  A little  time,  and  thou 
shalt  close  thy  eyes;  and  him  who  has  attended 
thee  to  thy  grave  another  soon  will  lament. 

35.  The  healthy  eye  ought  to  see  all  visible 
things  and  not  to  say,  I wish  for  green  things; 
for  this  is  the  condition  of  a diseased  eye. 


* Homer,  II.,  vi.  146. 


Book  X.]  /lBarcu0  Burelius  Bntoninus. 


269 


And  the  healthy  hearing  and  smelling  ought 
to  be  ready  to  perceive  all  that  can  be  heard 
and  smelled.  And  the  healthy  stomach  ought 
to  be  with  respect  to  all  food  just  as  the  mill 
with  respect  to  all  things  which  it  is  formed  to 
grind.  And  accordingly  the  healthy  under- 
standing ought  to  be  prepared  for  everything 
which  happens:  but  that  which  says,  Let  my 
dear  children  live,  and  let  all  men  praise  what- 
ever I may  do,  is  an  eye  which  seeks  for  green 
things,  or  teeth  which  seek  for  soft  things. 

36.  There  is  no  man  so  fortunate  that  there 
shall  not  be  by  him  when  he  is  dying  some 
who  are  pleased  with  what  is  going  to  happen.* 
Suppose  that  he  was  a good  and  wise  man,  will 
there  not  be  at  least  some  one  to  say  to  him- 
self, Let  us  at  last  breathe  freely,  being  relieved 
from  this  schoolmaster  ? It  is  true  that  he  was 
harsh  to  none  of  us,  but  I perceived  that  he 
tacitly  condemns  us. — This  is  what  is  said  of  a 
good  man.  But  in  our  own  case  how  many 
other  things  are  there  for  which  there  are  many 
who  wish  to  get  rid  of  us?  Thou  wilt  con- 
sider this,  then,  when  thou  art  dying,  and  thou 
wilt  depart  more  contentedly  by  reflecting  thus: 
I am  going  away  from  such  a life,  in  which 
even  my  associates  in  behalf  of  whom  I have 
striven  so  much,  prayed,  and  cared,  themselves 

* He  says  kukSv,  but  as  he  affirms  in  other  places 
that  death  is  no  evil,  he  must  mean  what  others  may 
call  an  evil,  and  he  means  only  “what  is  going  to 
happen.” 


270 


tTbougbts. 


[Book  X. 


wish  me  to  depart,  hoping  perchance  to  get 
some  little  advantage  by  it.  Why  then  should 
a man  cling  to  a longer  stay  here?  Do  not, 
however,  for  this  reason  go  away  less  kindly 
disposed  to  them,  but  preserving  thy  own 
character,  and  friendly  and  benevolent  and 
mild,  and  on  the  other  hand  not  as  if  thou  wast 
torn  away;  but  as  when  a man  dies  a quiet 
death,  the  poor  soul  is  easily  separated  from 
the  body,  such  also  ought  thy  departure  from 
men  to  be,  for  nature  united  thee  to  them  and 
associated  thee.  But  does  she  now  dissolve  the 
union  ? Well,  I am  separated  as  from  kins- 
men, not  however  dragged  resisting,  but  with- 
out compulsion  ; for  this,  too,  is  one  of  the 
things  according  to  nature. 

37.  Accustom  thyself  as  much  as  possible  on 
the  occasion  of  anything  being  done  by  any 
person  to  inquire  with  thyself.  For  what  ob- 
ject is  this  man  doing  this?  But  begin  with 
thyself,  and  examine  thyself  first. 

38.  Remember  that  this  which  pulls  the 
strings  is  the  thing  which  is  hidden  within  : 
this  is  the  power  of  persuasion,  this  is  life,  this, 
if  one  may  so  say,  is  man.  In  contemplating 
thyself  never  include  the  vessel  which  sur- 
rounds thee  and  these  instruments  which  are 
attached  about  it.  For  they  are  like  to  an 
axe,  differing  only  in  this,  that  they  grow  to 
the  body.  For  indeed  there  is  no  more  use  in 
these  parts  without  the  cause  which  moves 
and  checks  them  than  in  the  weaver’s  shut- 


Book!.]  iiBarcus  Hureltue  Hntonfnus.  271 

tie,  and  the  writer’s  pen,  and  the  driver’s 
whip.* * 

* See  the  Philosophy  of  Antoninus,  p.  72,  note. 


272 


c:bougbt0. 


[Book  XL 


XI. 

These  are  the  properties  of  the  rational 
soul:  it  sees  itself,  analyzes  itself,  and 
makes  itself  such  as  it  chooses;  the  fruit  which 
it  bears  itself  enjoys— for  the  fruits  of  plants 
and  that  in  animals  which  corresponds  to  fruits 
others  enjoy — -it  obtains  its  own  end,  wherever 
the  limit  of  life  may  be  fixed.  Not  as  in  a 
dance  and  in  a play  and  in  such  like  things, 
where  the  whole  action  is  incomplete  if  any- 
thing cuts  it  short;  but  in  every  part,  and 
wherever  it  may  be  stopped,  it  makes  what 
has  been  set  before  it  full  and  complete,  so  that 
it  can  say,  I have  what  is  my  own.  And  fur- 
ther it  traverses  the  whole  universe,  and  the 
surrounding  vacuum,  and  surveys  its  form,  and 
it  extends  itself  into  the  infinity  of  time,  and 
embraces  and  comprehends  the*  periodical 
renovation  of  all  things,  and  it  comprehends 
that  those  who  come  after  us  will  see  nothing 
new,  nor  have  those  before  us  seen  anything 
more,  but  in  a manner  he  who  is  forty  years 
old,  if  he  has  any  understanding  at  all,  has 
seen  by  virtue  of  the  uniformity  that  prevails 
all  things  which  have  been  and  all  that  will  be. 
This  too  is  a property  of  the  rational  soul,  love 


* TItJv  nepioSiKrjv  ‘Kokiyyeveaiav.  See  v.  13,  32  ; x.  7. 


Book  XI.]  /Bbarcue  HurelUis  :antonlnus. 


273 


of  one’s  neighbor,  and  truth  and  modesty,  and 
to  value  nothing  more  than  itself,  which  is  also 
the  property  of  Law.*  Thus  the  right  reason 
differs  not  at  all  from  the  reason  of  justice. 

2.  Thou  wilt  set  little  value  on  pleasing 
song  and  dancing  and  the  pancratium,  if  thou 
wilt  distribute  the  melody  of  the  voice  into  its 
several  sounds,  and  ask  thyself  as  to  each,  if 
thou  art  mastered  by  this;  for  thou  wilt  be 
prevented  b}'  shame  from  confessing  it : and  in 
the  matter  of  dancing,  if  at  each  movement 
and  attitude  thou  wilt  do  the  same;  and  the 
like  also  in  the  matter  of  the  pancratium.  In 
all  things,  then,  except  virtue  and  the  acts  of 
virtue,  remember  to  apply  thyself  to  their  sev- 
eral parts,  and  by  this  division  to  come  to 
value  them  little:  and  apply  this  rule  also  to 
thy  whole  life. 

3.  What  a soul  that  is  which  is  ready,  if  at 
any  moment  it  must  be  separated  from  the 
body,  and  ready  either  to  be  extinguished  or 
dispersed  or  continue  to  exist ; but  so  that  this 
readiness  comes  from  a man’s  owm  judgment, 
not  from  mere  obstinacj",  as  with  the  Chris- 
tians, t but  considerately  and  with  dignity  and 
in  a way  to  persuade  another;  without  tragic 
show. 

4.  Have  I done  something  for  the  general 

* Law  is  the  order  by  which  all  things  are  governed. 

t See  the  Life  of  Antoninus.  This  is  the  only  pas- 
sage in  which  the  emperor  speaks  of  the  Christians. 
Epictetus  (iv.  7,  6)  names  them  Galilaei. 

18 


274 


n:bougbts. 


[Book  XL 


interest  ? Well  then,  I have  had  my  reward. 
Let  this  always  be  present  to  thy  mind,  and 
never  stop  [doing  such  good], 

5.  What  is  thy  art  ? To  be  good.  And 
how  is  this  accomplished  well  except  by  gen- 
eral principles,  some  about  the  nature  of  the 
universe,  and  others  about  the  proper  constitu- 
tion of  man  ? 

6.  At  first  tragedies  were  brought  on  the 
stage  as  means  of  reminding  men  of  the  things 
which  happen  to  them,  and  that  it  is  according 
to  nature  for  things  to  happen  so,  and  that,  if 
you  are  delighted  with  what  is  shown  on  the 
stage,  you  should  not  be  troubled  with  that 
which  takes  place  on  the  larger  stage.  For 
you  see  that  these  things  must  be  accom- 
plished thus,  and  that  even  they  bear  them 
who  cry  out,*  ‘ O Cithaeron.”  And,  indeed, 
some  things  are  said  well  by  the  dramatic 
writers,  of  which  kind  is  the  following  es- 
pecially:— 

“ Me  and  my  children  if  the  gods  neglect. 

This  has  its  reason  too.”f 

And  again, — 

“ We  must  not  chafe  and  fret  at  that  which  happens.’' 

And, — 

“ Life's  harvest  reap  like  the  wheat’s  fruitful  ear.” 
And  other  things  of  the  same  kind. 


* Sophocles,  Oedipus  Rex.  f See  vii.  41,  38,  40. 


Book  XL]  /iftarcus  Jlureliue  Antoninus. 


275 


After  tragedy  the  old  comedy  was  intro- 
duced, which  had  a magisterial  freedom  of 
speech,  and  by  its  very  plainness  of  speaking 
w'as  useful  in  reminding  men  to  beware  of  in- 
solence; and  for  this  purpose  too  Diogenes  used 
to  take  from  these  writers. 

But  as  to  the  middle  comedy,  which  came 
next,  observe  what  it  was,  and  again,  for  what 
object  the  new  comedy  was  introduced,  which 
gradually  sank  down  into  a mere  mimic  arti- 
fice. That  some  good  things  are  said  even  by 
these  writers,  everybody  knows:  but  the  whole 
plan  of  such  poetr}^  and  dramaturgy,  to  what 
end  does  it  look  ? 

7.  How  plain  does  it  appear  that  there  is  not 
another  condition  of  life  so  well  suited  for  phil- 
osophizing as  this  in  which  thou  now  happen- 
est  to  be. 

8.  A branch  cut  off  from  the  adjacent  branch 
must  of  necessity  be  cut  off  from  the  whole 
tree  also.  So  too  a man  when  he  is  separated 
from  another  man  has  fallen  off  from  the  whole 
social  community.  Now  as  to  a branch,  an- 
other cuts  it  off;  but  a man  by  his  own  act  sep- 
arates himself  from  his  neighbor  when  he  hates 
him  and  turns  away  from  him,  and  he  does 
not  know  that  he  has  at  the  same  time  cut 
himself  off  from  the  whole  social  system.  Yet 
he  has  this  privilege  certainly  from  Zeus,  who 
framed  society,  for  it  is  in  our  power  to  grow 
again  to  that  which  is  near  to  us,  and  again  to 
become  a part  which  helps  to  make  up  the 


276 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  XL 


whole.  However,  if  it  often  happens,  this  kind 
of  separation,  it  makes  it  difficult  for  that 
which  detaches  itself  to  be  brought  to  unity 
and  to  be  restored  to  its  former  condition.  Fi- 
nally, the  branch,  which  from  the  first  grew 
together  with  the  tree,  and  has  continued  to 
have  one  life  with  it,  is  not  like  that  which 
after  being  cut  off  is  then  ingrafted,  for  this  is 
something  like  what  the  gardeners  mean  when 
they  say  that  it  grows  with  the  rest  of  the  tree, 
but+  that  it  has  not  the  same  mind  with  it. 

9..  As  those  who  try  to  stand  in  thy  way 
when  thou  art  proceeding  according  to  right 
reason  will  not  be  able  to  turn  thee  aside  from 
thy  proper  action,  so  neither  let  them  drive 
thee  from  thy  benevolent  feelings  toward  them, 
but  be  on  th}^  guard  equally  in  both  matters, 
lot  only  in  the  matter  of  steady  judgment  and 
action,  but  also  in  the  matter  of  gentleness  to 
those  who  try  to  hinder  or  otherwise  trouble 
thee.  For  this  also  is  a weakness,  to  be  vexed 
at  them,  as  well  as  to  be  diverted  from  thy 
course  of  action  and  to  give  way  through  fear  ; 
for  both  are  equally  deserters  from  their  post, — 
the  man  who  does  it  through  fear,  and  the  man 
who  is  alienated  from  him  who  is  by  nature  a 
kinsman  and  a friend. 

10.  There  is  no  nature  which  is  inferior  to 
art,  for  the  arts  imitate  the  natures  of  things. 
But  if  this  is  so,  that  nature  which  is  the  most 
perfect  and  the  most  comprehensive  of  all 
natures,  cannot  fall  short  of  the  skill  of  art. 


Book  XL]  /iRatcus  Hutelius  Hntonlnu6. 


277 


Now  all  arts  do  the  inferior  things  for  the  sake 
of  the  superior;  therefore  the  universal  nature 
does  so  too.  And,  indeed,  hence  is  the  origin 
of  justice,  and  injustice  the  other  virtues  have 
their  foundation:  for  justice  will  not  be  ob- 
served, if  we  either  care  for  middle  things 
[things  indifferent],  or  are  easily  deceived  and 
careless  and  changeable  (v.  16.  30;  vii.  55). 

11.  If  the  things  do  not  come  to  thee,  the 
pursuits  and  avoidances  of  which  disturb  thee, 
still  m a manner  thou  goest  to  them.  Let  then 
thy  judgment  about  them  be  at  rest,  and  they 
will  remain  quiet,  and  thou  wilt  not  be  seen 
either  pursuing  or  avoiding. 

12.  The  spherical  form  of  the  soul  maintains 
its  figure  when  it  is  neither  extended  towards 
any  object,  nor  contracted  inwards,  nor  dis- 
persed, nor  sinks  down,  but  is  illuminated  by 
light,  by  which  it  sees  the  truth, — the  truth  of 
all  things  and  the  truth  that  is  in  itself  (viii. 
41,  45;  xii.  3). 

13.  Suppose  any  man  shall  despise  me.  Let 
him  look  to  that  himself.  But  I will  look  to 
this,  that  I be  not  discovered  doing  or  saying 
anjdhing  deserving  of  contempt.  Shall  any 
man  hate  me  ? Let  him  look  to  it.  But  I will 
be  mild  and  benevolent  towards  every  man, 
and  ready  to  show  even  him  his  mistake,  not 
reproachfully,  nor  yet  as  making  a display  of 
my  endurance,  but  nobly  and  honestly,  like  the 
great  Phocion,  unless  indeed  he  only  assumed 
it.  For  the  interior  [parts]  ought  to  be  such, 


278 


JCbougbts. 


[Book  XL 


and  a man  ought  to  be  seen  by  the  gods  neither 
dissatisfied  with  anything  nor  complaining. 
For  what  evil  is  it  to  thee,  if  thou  art  now  doing 
what  is  agreeable  to  thy  own  nature,  and  art 
satisfied  with  that  which  at  this  moment  is  suit- 
able to  the  nature  of  the  universe,  since  thou 
art  a human  being  placed  at  thy  post  in  order 
that  what  is  for  the  common  advantage  may  be 
done  in  some  way  ? 

14.  Men  despise  one  another  and  flatter  one 
another;  and  men  wish  to  raise  themselves 
above  one  another,  and  crouch  before  one  an- 
other. 

15.  How  unsound  and  insincere  is  he  who- 
says,  I have  determined  to  deal  with  thee  in  a 
fair  way! — What  are  thou  doing,  man?  There 
is  no  occasion  to  give  this  notice.  It  will  soon 
show  itself  by  acts.  The  voice  ought  to  be 
plainly  written  on  the  forehead.  Such  as  a 
man’s  character  is,+  he  immediately  shows  it 
in  his  eyes,  just  as  he  who  is  beloved  forthwith 
reads  everything  in  the  eyes  of  lovers.  The 
man  who  is  honest  and  good  ought  to  be  ex- 
actly like  a man  who  smells  strong,  so  that  the 
bystander  as  soon  as  he  comes  near  him  must 
smell  whether  he  choose  of  not.  But  the  af- 
fectation of  simplicity  is  like  a crooked  stick. 

* Instead  of  aKokjiri  Saumaise  reads  There  is 

a Greek  proverb,  anafipov  ^v^ov  ovdsnoT’  bp66v  : “ You 
cannot  make  a crooked  stick  straight.  ’ ’ 

The  wolfish  friendship  is  an  allusion  to  the  fable  of 
the  sheep  and  the  wolves. 


Book  XI.]  Jftarcus  Surelius  Sntoninus. 


279 


Nothing  is  more  disgraceful  than  a wolfish 
friendship  [false  friendship].  Avoid  this  most 
of  all.  The  good  and  simple  and  benevolent 
show  all  these  things  in  the  eyes,  and  there  is 
no  mistaking. 

16.  As  to  living  in  the  best  waj",  this  power 
is  in  the  soul,  if  it  be  indifferent  to  things 
which  are  indifferent.  And  it  will  be  indiffer- 
ent, if  it  looks  on  each  of  these  things  sepa- 
rately and  all  together,  and  if  it  remembers 
that  not  one  of  them  produces  in  us  an  opinion 
about  itself,  nor  comes  to  us;  but  these  things 
remain  immovable,  and  it  is  we  ourselves  who 
produce  the  judgments  about  them,  and,  as  we 
may  say,  write  them  in  ourselves,  it  being  in 
our  power  not  to  write  them,  and  it  being  in 
our  power,  if  perchance  these  judgments  have 
imperceptibly  got  admission  to  our  minds,  to 
wipe  them  out;  and  if  we  remember  also  that 
such  attention  will  only  be  for  a short  time, 
and  then  life  will  be  at  an  end.  Besides,  what 
trouble  is  there  at  all  in  doing  this?  For  if 
these  things  are  according  to  nature,  rejoice  in 
them  and  they  will  be  easy  to  thee:  but  if  con- 
trary to  nature,  seek  what  is  conformable  to 
th}^  own  nature,  and  strive  towards  this,  even 
if  it  bring  no  reputation;  for  every  man  is 
allowed  to  seek  his  own  good. 

17.  Consider  whence  each  thing  is  come, 
and  of  what  it  consists,-}-  and  into  what  it 
changes,  and  what  kind  of  a thing  it  will  be 
when  it  has  changed,  and  that  it  will  sustain 
no  harm. 


28o 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  XI 


1 8.  [If  any  have  offended  against  thee,  con- 
sider first]:  What  is  my  relation  to  men,  and 
that  we  are  made  for  one  another;  and  in  an- 
other respect  I was  made  to  be  set  over  them, 
as  a ram  over  the  flock  or  a bull  over  the  herd. 
But  examine  the  matter  from  first  principles, 
from  this.  If  all  things  are  not  mere  atoms,  it 
is  nature  which  orders  all  things:  if  this  is  so, 
the  inferior  things  exist  for  the  sake  of  the 
superior,  and  these  for  the  sake  of  one  another 
(ii.  i;  ix.  39;  V.  16;  iii.  4). 

Second,  consider  what  kind  of  men  they  are 
at  table,  in  bed,  and  so  forth;  and  particularly, 
under  what  compulsions  in  respect  of  opinions 
thc3^  are;  and  as  to  their  acts,  consider  with 
what  pride  they  do  what  they  do  (viii.  14; 
ix.  34). 

Third,  that  if  men  do  rightly  what  they  do, 
we  ought  not  to  be  displeased:  but  if  they  do 
not  right,  it  is  plain  that  they  do  so  involunta- 
rily and  in  ignorance.  For  as  every  soul  is 
unwillingly  deprived  of  the  truth,  so  also  is  it 
unwillingly  deprived  of  the  power  of  behaving 
to  each  man  according  to  his  deserts.  Accord- 
ingly men  are  pained  when  they  are  called  un- 
just, ungrateful,  and  greedy,  and  in  a word 
wrong-doers  to  their  neighbors  (vii.  62,  63;  ii. 
i;  vii.  26;  viii.  29). 

Fourth,  consider  that  thou  also  doest  man}" 
things  wrong,  and  that  thou  art  a man  like 
others;  and  even  if  thou  dost  abstain  from  cer- 
tain faults,  still  thou  hast  the  disposition  to 


Book  XI.]  /iftarcus  Burelius  Bntoninue. 


281 


commit  them,  though  either  through  coward- 
ice, or  concern  about  reputation,  or  some  such 
mean  motive,  thou  dost  abstain  from  such 
faults  (i.  17). 

Fifth,  consider  that  thou  dost  not  even 
understand  whether  men  are  doing  wrong  or 
not,  for  many  things  are  done  with  a certain 
reference  to  circumstances.  And  in  short,  a 
man  must  learn  a great  deal  to  enable  him  to 
pass  a correct  judgment  on  another  man’s  acts 
(ix.  38;  iv.  51). 

Sixth,  consider  when  thou  art  much  vexed 
or  grieved,  that  man’s  life  is  only  a moment, 
and  after  a short  time  we  are  all  laid  out  dead 
(vii.  58;  iv.  48). 

Seventh,  that  it  is  not  men’s  acts  which 
disturb  us,  for  those  acts  have  their  foundation 
in  men’s  ruling  principles,  but  it  is  our  own 
opinions  which  disturb  us.  Take  away  these 
opinions  then,  and  resolve  to  dismiss  thy  judg- 
ment about  an  act  as  if  it  were  something 
grievous,  and  thy  anger  is  gone.  How  then 
shall  I take  away  these  opinions  ? By  reflect- 
ing that  no  wrongful  act  of  another  brings 
shame  on  thee:  for  unless  that  which  is  shame- 
ful is  alone  bad,  thou  also  must  of  necessit}^  do 
many  things  wrong,  and  become  a robber  and 
everything  else  (v.  25;  vii.  16). 

Eighth,  consider  how  much  more  pain  is 
brought  on  us  by  the  anger  and  vexation 
caused  by  such  acts  than  by  the  acts  them- 
selves, at  which  we  are  angry  and  vexed  (iv. 
39,  49;  \di.  24). 


282 


^Tbougbts. 


[Book  XL 


Ninth,  consider  that  a good  disposition  is 
invincible  if  it  be  genuine,  and  not  an  affected 
smile  and  acting  a part.  For  what  will  the 
most  violent  man  do  to  thee,  if  thou  continuest 
to  be  of  a kind  disposition  towards  him,  and  if, 
as  opportunity  offers,  thou  gently  admonishest 
him  and  calmly  correctest  his  errors  at  the 
very  time  when  he  is  trying  to  do  thee  harm, 
sa5ung.  Not  so,  my  child:  we  are  constituted 
by  nature  for  something  else:  I shall  certainly 
not  be  injured,  but  thou  art  injuring  thyself, 
ni5'  child. — And  show  him  with  gentle  tact  and 
by  general  principles  that  this  is  so,  and  that 
even  bees  do  not  do  as  he  does,  nor  any  ani- 
mals- which  are  formed  by  nature  to  be  gre- 
garious. And  thou  must  do  this  neither  with 
any  double  meaning  nor  in  the  way  of  re- 
proach, but  affectionately  and  without  any 
rancor  in  thy  soul;  and  not  as  if  thou  wert 
lecturing  him,  nor  yet  that  any  bystander  may 
admire,  but  either  when  he  is  alone,  and  if 
others  are  present  ...  * 

Remember  these  nine  rules,  as  if  thou  hadst 
received  them  as  a gift  from  the  Muses,  and 
begin  at  last  to  be  a man  while  thou  livest. 
But  thou  must  equally  avoid  flattering  men 
and  being  vexed  at  them,  for  both  are  un- 
social and  lead  to  harm.  And  let  this  truth 
be  present  to  thee  in  the  excitement  of 
anger,  that  to  be  moved  by  passion  is  not 
manly,  but  that  mildness  and  gentleness,  as 
* It  appears  that  there  is  a defect  in  the  text  here. 


Book  XL]  ilBarcus  Zlurelius  Bntonfnus. 


283 


they  are  more  agreeable  to  human  nature,  so 
also  are  they  more  manly;  and  he  who  pos- 
sesses these  qualities  possesses  strength,  nerves, 
and  courage,  and  not  the  man  who  is  subject  to 
fits  of  passion  and  discontent.  For  in  thie  same 
degree  in  which  a man’s  mind  is  nearer  to  free- 
dom from  all  passion,  in  the  same  degree  also 
is  it  nearer  to  strength:  and  as  the  sense  of  pain 
is  a characteristic  of  weakness,  so  also  is  anger. 
For  he  who  yields  to  pain  and  he  who  yields 
to  anger,  both  are  wounded  and  both  submit. 

But  if  thou  wilt,  receive  also  a tenth  present 
from  the  leader  of  the  Muses  [Apollo],  and  it 
is  this, — that  to  expect  bad  men  not  to  do 
wrong  is  madness,  for  he  who  expects  this  de- 
sires an  impossibility.  But  to  allow  men  to  be- 
have so  to  others,  and  to  expect  them  not  to  do 
thee  any  wrong,  is  irrational  and  tyrannical. 

19.  There  are  four  principal  aberrations  of 
the  superior  faculty  against  which  thou  shouldst 
be  constantly  on  thy  guard,  and  when  thou 
hast  detected  them,  thou  shouldst  wipe  them 
out  and  say  on  each  occasion  thus:  This 
thought  is  not  necessary:  this  tends  to  destroy 
social  union:  this  which  thou  art  going  to  say 
comes  not  from  the  real  thoughts;  for  thou 
shouldst  consider  it  among  the  most  absurd  of 
things  for  a man  not  to  speak  from  his  real 
thoughts.  But  the  fourth  is  when  thou  shalt 
reproach  thyself  for  anything,  for  this  is  an  evi- 
dence of  the  diviner  part  within  thee  being 
overpowered  and  yielding  to  the  less  honorable 


284 


O:bougbt0. 


[Book  XI. 


and  to  the  perishable  part,  the  body,  and  to  its 
gross  pleasures  (iv.  24;  ii.  16). 

20.  Thy  aerial  part  and  all  the  fiery  parts 
which  are  mingled  in  thee,  though  by  nature 
the}^  ha've  an  upward  tendency,  still  in  obe- 
dience to  the  disposition  of  the  universe  they  are 
overpowered  here  in  the  compound  mass  [the 
bod}^].  And  also  the  whole  of  the  earthy  part 
in  thee  and  the  watery,  though  their  tendency 
is  downward,  still  are  raised  up  and  occupy  a 
position  which  is  not  their  natural  one.  In  this 
manner  then  the  elemental  parts  obey  the  uni- 
versal; for  when  they  have  been  fixed  in  any 
place,  perforce  they  remain  there  until  again 
the  universal  shall  .sound  the  signal  for  dissolu- 
tion. Is  it  not  then  strange  that  thy  intelli- 
gent part  only  should  be  disobedient  and  dis- 
contented with  its  own  place?  And  yet  no 
force  is  imposed  on  it,  but  only  those  things 
which  are  conformable  to  its  nature:  still  it 
does  not  submit,  but  is  carried  in  the  opposite 
direction.  For  the  movement  towards  injustice 
and  intemperance  and  to  anger  and  grief  and 
fear  is  nothing  else  than  the  act  of  one  who  de- 
viates from  nature.  And  also  when  the  ruling 
faculty  is  discontented  with  anything  that  hap- 
pens, then  too  it  deserts  its  post:  for  it  is  con- 
stituted for  piety  and  reverence  towards  the 
gods  no  less  than  for  justice.  For  these  qual- 
ities also  are  comprehended  under  the  generic 
term  of  contentment  with  the  constitution  of 


Book  XL]  iHbarcue  Burclius  2lntonlnu9. 


285 


things,  and  indeed  they  are  prior*  to  acts  of 
j ustice. 

21.  He  who  has  not  one  and  always  the 
same  object  in  life,  cannot  be  one  and  the  same 
all  through  his  life.  But  what  I ha\ns  said  is 
not  enough,  unless  this  also  is  added,  what 
this  object  ought  to  be.  For  as  there  is  not  the 
same  opinion  about  all  the  things  which  in 
some  way  or  other  are  considered  by  the  ma- 
jority to  be  good,  but  only  about  some  certain 
things,  that  is,  things  which  concern  the  com- 
mon interest,  so  also  ought  we  to  propose  to 

* The  word  npea^vrepa,  which  is  here  translated 
“ prior,”  may  also  mean  “superior  but  Antoninus 
seems  to  say  that  piety  and  reverence  of  the  gods  pre- 
cede all  virtues,  and  that  other  virtues  are  derived 
from  them,  even  justice,  which  in  another  passage 
(xi.  10)  he  makes  the  foundation  of  all  virtues.  The 
ancient  notion  of  justice  is  that  of  giving  to  every  one 
his  due.  It  is  not  a legal  definition,  as  some  have 
supposed,  but  a moral  rule  which  law  cannot  in  all 
cases  enforce.  Besides,  law  has  its  own  rules,  which 
are  sometimes  moral  and  sometimes  immoral;  but  it 
enforces  them  all  simply  because  they  are  general 
rules,  and  if  it  did  not  or  could  not  enforce  them,  so 
far  Law  would  not  be  Law.  Justice,  or  the  doing 
what  is  just,  implies  a universal  rule  and  obedience  ta 
it ; and  as  we  all  live  under  universal  Law,  which 
commands  both  our  body  and  our  intelligence,  and  is 
the  law  of  our  nature,  that  is,  the  law  of  the  whole 
constitution  of  a man,  we  must  endeavor  to  discover 
what  this  supreme  Law  is.  It  is  the  will  of  the  power 
that  rules  all.  By  acting  in  obedience  to  this  will,  we 
do  justice,  and  by  consequence  everything  else  that 
we  ought  to  do. 


286 


^Cbougbte. 


[Book  XI. 


ourselves  an  object  which  shall  be  of  a common 
kind  [social]  and  political.  For  he  who  directs 
all  his  own  efforts  to  this  object,  will  make  all 
his  acts  alike,  and  thus  will  always  be  the 
same. 

22.  Think  of  the  country  mou.se  and  of  the 
town  mouse,  and  of  the  alarm  and  trepidation 
of  the  town  mouse.* 

23.  Socrates  used  to  call  the  opinions  of  the 
many  by  the  name  of  Lamiae, — bugbears  to 
frighten  children. 

24.  The  Lacedaemonians  at  their  public 
spectacles  used  to  set  seats  in  the  shade  for 
strangers,  but  themselves  sat  down  anywhere. 

25.  Socrates  excused  himself  to  Perdiccasf 
for  not  going  to  him,  saying.  It  is  because  I 
would  not  perish  by  the  worst  of  all  ends;  that 
is,  I would  not  receive  a favor  and  then  be  un- 
able to  return  it. 

26.  In  the  writings  of  the  [Ephesians] J there 
was  this  precept,  constantly  to  think  of  some 
one  of  the  men  of  former  times  who  practiced 
virtue. 

27.  The  Pythagoreans  bid  us  in  the  morning 
look  to  the  heavens  that  we  may  be  reminded 

* The  story  is  told  by  Horace  in  his  Satires  (ii.  6), 
and  by  others  since  but  not  better. 

t Perhaps*  the  emperor  made  a mistake  here,  for 
other  writers  say  that  it  was  Archelaus,  the  son  of 
Perdiccas,  who  invited  Socrates  to  Macedonia. 

f Gataker  suggested  ’EmKovpe'iuv  for 


Book  XI.]  /iRarcus  aucellu6  Bntoninu6.  287 

of  those  bodies  which  continually  do  the 
same  things  and  in  the  same  manner  perform 
their  work,  and  also  be  reminded  of  their  pur- 
ity and  nudity.  For  there  is  no  veil  over  a 
star. 

28.  Consider  what  a man  Socrates  was  when 
•he  dressed  himself  in  a skin,  after  Xanthippe 
had  taken  his  cloak  and  gone  out,  and  what 
Socrates  said  to  his  friends  who  were  ashamed 
of  him  and  drew  back  from  him  when  they 
saw  him  dressed  thus. 

29.  Neither  in  writing  nor  in  reading  wilt 
thou  be  able  to  lay  down  rules  for  others  before 
thou  shalt  have  first  learned  to  obey  rules  thy- 
self. Much  more  is  this  so  in  life. 

30.  A slave  thou  art : free  speech  is  not  for  thee. 

31.  And  my  heart  laughed  within. 

Odyssey,  ix.  413. 

32.  And  virtue  they  will  curse,  speaking  harsh 

•words.  Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  184. 

33.  To  look  for  the  fig  in  winter  is  a mad- 
man’s act;  such  is  he  who  looks  for  his  child 
w^hen  it  is  no  longer  allowed  (Epictetus,  iii. 
24,  87). 

34.  When  a man  kisses  his  child,  said 
Epictetus,  he  should  whisper  to  himself,  ‘ ‘ To- 
morrow perchance  thou  wilt  die.” — But  those 
are  words  of  bad  omen. — ‘‘No  word  is  a word 
of  bad  omen,”  said  Epictetus,  ‘‘which  ex- 
presses any  work  of  nature;  or  if  it  is  so,  it  is 


288 


(Tbouflbts. 


[Book  XI. 


also  a word  of  bad  omen  to  speak  of  the  ears 
of  corn  being  reaped”  (Epictetus,  iii.  24,  88). 

35.  The  unripe  grape,  the  ripe  bunch,  the 
dried  grape,  are  all  changes,  not  into  nothing, 
but  into  something  which  exists  not  3'et 
(Epictetus,  iii.  24). 

36.  No  man  can  rob  us  of  our  free  will* 
(Epictetus,  iii.  22,  105). 

37.  Epictetus  also  said,  a man  must  discover 
an  art  [or  rules]  with  respect  to  giving  his  as- 
sent; and  in  respect  to  his  movements  he  must 
be  careful  that  they  be  made  with  regard  to 
circumstances,  that  they  be  con.sistent  with 
social  interests,  that  they  have  regard  to  the 
value  of  the  object;  and  as  to  sensual  desire, 
he  should  altogether  keep  away  from  it;  and 
as  to  avoidance  [aversion],  he  should  not  show 
it  with  respect  to  any  of  the  things  which  are 
not  in  our  power. 

38.  The  dispute  then,  he  .said,  is  not  about 
any  common  matter,  but  about  being  mad  or 
not. 

39.  Socrates  u.sed  to  say.  What  do  you  want, 
souls  of  rational  men  or  irrational  ? — Souls  of 
rational  men. — Of  what  rational  men,  sound 
or  unsound? — Sound. — Why  then  do  you  not 
seek  for  them  ? — Because  we  have  them. — Why 
then  do  you  fight  and  quarrel  ? 


Book  XII.]  flibarcus  Burelius  Antoninus. 


289 


XII. 

AL,L  those  things  at  which  thou  wishest  to 
arrive  by  a circuitous  road  thou  canst  have 
now,  if  thou  dost  not  refuse  them  to  thyself. 
And  this  means,  if  thou  wilt  take  no  notice  of 
all  the  past,  and  trust  the  future  to  providence, 
and  direct  the  present  only  conformably  to 
piety  and  justice.  Conformably  to  piety  that 
thou  mayest  be  content  with  the  lot  which 
is  assigned  to  thee,  for  nature  designed  it 
for  thee  and  thee  for  it.  Conformably  to 
justice,  that  thou  mayst  always  speak  the 
truth  freely  and  without  disguise,  and  do 
the  things  which  are  agreeable  to  law  and  ac- 
cording to  the  worth  of  each.  And  let  neither 
another  man’s  wickedness  hinder  thee,  nor 
opinion  nor  voice,  nor  yet  the  sensations  of  the 
poor  flesh  which  has  grown  about  thee;  for  the 
passive  part  will  look  to  this.  If,  then,  what- 
ever the  time  may  be  when  thou  shalt  be  near 
to  thy  departure,  neglecting  everything  else 
thou  shalt  respect  only  thy  ruling  faculty  and 
the  divinity  within  thee,  and  if  thou  shalt  be 
afraid  not  because  thou  must  some  time  cease 
to  live,  but  if  thou  shalt  fear  never  to  have  be- 
gun to  live  according  to  nature — then  thou 
wilt  be  a man  worthy  of  the  universe  which 
has  produced  thee,  and  thou  wilt  cease  to  be  a 

19 


290 


^Tbouflbts. 


[Book  XII. 


stranger  in  thy  native  land,  and  to  wonder  at 
things  which  happen  daily  as  if  they  were 
something  unexpected,  and  to  be  dependent  on 
this  or  that. 

2.  God  sees  the  minds  [ruling  principles]  of 
all  men  bared  of  the  material  vesture  and  rind 
and  impurities.  For  with  his  intellectual  part 
alone  he  touches  the  intelligence  only  which 
has  flowed  and  been  derived  from  himself  into 
these  bodies.  And  if  thou  also  usest  thyself  to 
do  this,  thou  wilt  rid  thyself  of  thy  much 
trouble.  For  he  who  regards  not  the  poor  flesh 
which  envelops  him,  surely  will  not  trouble 
himself  by  looking  after  raiment  and  dwelling 
and  fame  and  such  like  externals  and  show. 

3.  The  things  are  three  of  which  thou  art 
composed;  a little  body,  a little  breath  [life], 
intelligence.  Of  these  the  first  two  are  thine, 
so  far  as  it  is  thy  duty  to  take  care  of  them; 
but  the  third  alone  is  properly  thine.  There- 
fore if  thou  shalt  separate  from  thyself,  that 
is,  from  thy  understanding,  whatever  others  do 
or  say,  and  whatever  thou  hast  done  or  said 
thyself,  and  whatever  future  things  trouble 
thee  because  they  may  happen,  and  whatever 
in  the  body  which  envelops  thee  or  in  the 
breath  [life],  which  is  by  nature  associated 
with  the  body,  is  attached  to  thee  independent 
of  thy  will,  and  whatever  the  external  circum- 
fluent vortex  whirls  round,  so  that  the  intel- 
lectual power  exempt  from  the  things  of  fate 
can  live  pure  and  free  by  itself,  doing  what  is 


Book  XII.]  ^ibarcus  ZlurcHus  Sntoninue. 


291 

just  and  accepting  what  happens  and  saying 
the  truth:  if  thou  wilt  separate,  I say,  from 
this  ruling  faculty  the  things  which  are  at- 
tached to  it  by  the  impressions  of  sense,  and  the 
things  of  time  to  come  and  of  time  that  is  past, 
and  wilt  make  thyself  like  Empedocles’  sphere, 

“ All  round  and  in  its  joyous  rest  reposing * 

and  if  thou  shalt  strive  to  live  only  what 
is  really  thy  life,  that  is,  the  present, — 
then  thou  wilt  be  able  to  pass  that  portion  of 
life  which  remains  for  thee  up  to  the  time  of 
thy  death  free  from  perturbations,  nobly,  ani 
obedient  to  thy  own  daemon  [to  the  god  that 
is  within  thee]  (ii.  13,  17;  iii.  5,  6;  xi.  12). 

4.  I have  often  wondered  how  it  is  that 
every  man  loves  himself  more  than  all  the  rest 
of  men,  but  yet  sets  less  value  on  his  own 
opinion  of  himself  than  on  the  opinion  of 
others.  If  then  a god  or  a wise  teacher  should 
present  himself  to  a man  and  bid  him  to  think 
of  nothing  and  to  design  nothing  which  he 
would  not  express  as  soon  as  he  conceived  it, 
he  could  not  endure  it  even  for  a single  day.f 
So  much  more  respect  have  we  to  what  our 
neighbors  shall  think  of  us  than  to  what  we 
shall  think  of  ourselves. 

* The  verse  of  Empedocles  is  corrupt  in  Antoninus. 
It  has  been  restored  by  Peyron  from  a Turin  manu- 
script, thus : — 

20aZpof  KVK^OTcpf/g  fioviy  TTBpcyr/dii  ya'iuv. 

t iii.  4. 


2Q2 


JTbougbts. 


[Book  XIL 


5.  How  can  it  be  that  the  gods,  after  having 
arranged  all  things  well  and  benevolently  for 
mankind,  have  overlooked  this  alone,  that 
some  men,  and  very  good  men,  and  men  who, 
as  we  may  say,  have  had  most  communion 
with  the  divinity,  and  through  pious  acts  and 
religious  observances  have  been  most  intimate 
with  the  divinity,  when  they  have  once  died 
should  never  exist  again,  but  should  be  com- 
pletely extinguished  ? 

But  if  this  is  so,  be  assured  that  if  it  ought 
to  have  been  otherwise,  the  gods  would  have 
done  it.  For  if  it  were  just,  it  would  also  be 
possible;  and  if  it  were  according  to  nature, 
nature  would  have  had  it  so.  But  because  it 
is  not  so,  if  in  fact  it  is  not  so,  be  thou  con- 
vinced that  it  ought  not  to  have  been  so:  for 
thou  seest  even  of  thyself  that  in  this  inquiry 
thou  art  disputing  with  the  Deity;  and  we 
should  not  thus  dispute  with  the  gods,  unless 
they  were  most  excellent  and  most  just;  but  if 
this  is  so,  they  would  not  have  allowed  any- 
thing in  the  ordering  of  the  universe  to  be  ne- 
glected unjustly  and  irrationally. 

6.  Practise  thyself  even  in  the  things  which 
thou  despairest  of  accomplishing.  For  even 
the  left  hand,  which  is  ineffectual  for  all  other 
things  for  want  of  practice,  holds  the  bridle 
more  vigorously  than  the  right  hand;  for  it 
has  been  practised  in  this. 

7.  Consider  in  what  condition  both  in  body 
and  soul  a man  should  be  when  he  is  overtaken 


Book  XII.]  jflRarcue  aureliue  antoninus. 


293 


by  death;  and  consider  the  shortness  of  life, 
the  boundless  abyss  of  time  past  and  future, 
the  feebleness  of  all  matter. 

8.  Contemplate  the  formative  principles 
[forms]  of  things  bare  of  their  coverings;  the 
purposes  of  actions;  consider  what  pain  is,  what 
pleasure  is,  and  death,  and  fame;  who  is  to  him- 
self the  cause  of  his  uneasiness;  how  no  man  is 
hindered  by  another:  that  everything  is  opinion. 

9.  In  the  application  of  thy  principles  thou 
must  be  like  the  pancratiast,  not  like  the  gladi- 
ator; for  the  gladiator  lets  fall  the  sword  which  he 
uses  and  is  killed;  but  the  other  always  has  his 
hand,  and  needs  to  do  nothing  else  than  use  it. 

10.  See  what  things  are  in  themselves, 
dividing  them  into  matter,  form,  and  purpose. 

11.  What  a power  man  has  to  do  nothing 
except  what  God  will  approve,  and  to  accept 
all  that  God  may  give  him. 

12.  With  respect  to  that  which  happens  con- 
formably to  nature,  we  ought  to  blame  neither 
gods,  for  they  do  nothing  wrong  either  volun- 
tarily or  involuntarily,  nor  men,  for  they  do 
nothing  wrong  except  involuntarily.  Conse- 
quently we  should  blame  nobody  (ii.  ii,  12,  13; 
vii.  62;  18  viii.  17). 

13.  Hov/  ridiculous  and  what  a stranger  he 
is  who  is  surprised  at  anything  which  happens 
in  life. 

14.  Either  there  is  a fatal  necessity  and  in- 
vincible order,  or  a kind  providence,  or  a con- 
fusion without  a purpose  and  without  a direc- 


294 


^bouflbte. 


[Book  XII. 


tor  (iv.  27).  If  then  there  is  an  invincible  ne- 
cessity, why  dost  thou  resist?  But  if  there  is 
a providence  which  allows  itself  to  be  propiti- 
ated, make  thyself  worthy  of  the  help  of  the 
divinity.  But  if  there  is  a confusion  without 
a governor,  be  content  that  in  such  a tempest 
thou  hast  in  thyself  a certain  ruling  intelli- 
gence. And  even  if  the  tempest  carry  thee 
away,  let  it  carry  away  the  poor  flesh,  the  poor 
breath,  everything  else;  for  the  intelligence  at 
least  it  will  not  carry  away. 

15.  Does  the  light  of  the  lamp  shine  without 
losing  its  splendor  until  it  is  extinguished?  and 
shall  the  truth  which  is  in  thee  and  justice  and 
temperance  be  extinguished  [before  thy  death]  ? 

16.  When  a man  has  presented  the  appear- 
ance of  having  done  wrong  [say].  How  then 
do  I know  if  this  is  a wrongful  act  ? And  even 
if  he  has  done  wrong,  how  do  I know  that  he 
has  not  condemned  himself?  And  so  this  is 
like  tearing  his  own  face.  Consider  that  he 
who  would  not  have  the  bad  man  do  wrong,  is 
like  the  man  who  would  not  have  the  fig-tree 
to  bear  juice  in  the  figs,  and  infants  to  cry,  and 
the  horse  to  neigh,  and  whatever  else  must  of 
necessity  be.  For  what  must  a man  do  who 
has  such  a character?  If  then  thou  art  irri- 
table,+  cure  this  man’s  disposition.* 

* The  interpreters  translate  yopydc  by  the  words 
“ acer,  validusque,”  and  “skilful.”  Butin  Epictetus 
(ii.  16,  20;  iii.  12,  10)  yopy6g  means  “vehement,” 
“prone  to  anger,”  “irritable.” 


Book  XII.]  /iiiarcus  2lurcUu0  Zlntonlnus. 


295 


17.  If  it  is  not  right,  do  not  do  it:  if  it  is  not 
true,  do  not  say  it.  [For  let  thy  efforts  be — ]* 

18.  In  everything  always  obser\’e  what  the 
thing  is  which  produces  for  thee  an  appear- 
ance, and  resolve  it  by  dividing  it  into  the 
formal,  the  material,  the  purpose,  and  the  time 
within  which  it  must  end. 

19.  Perceive  at  last  that  thou  hast  in  thee 
something  better  and  more  divine  than  the 
things  which  cause  the  various  affects,  and  as 
it  were  pull  thee  by  the  strings.  What  is 
there  now  in  my  mind, — is  it  fear,  or  suspicion, 
or  desire,  or  anything  of  the  kind  (v.  ii)? 

20.  First,  do  nothing  inconsiderate!}',  nor 
without  a purpose.  Second,  make  thy  acts 
refer  to  nothing  else  than  to  a social  end. 

21.  Consider  that  before  long  thou  wilt  be 
nobody  and  nowhere,  nor  will  any  of  the 
things  exist  which  thou  now  seest,  nor  any  of 
those  who  are  now  living.  For  all  things  are 
formed  by  nature  to  change  and  be  turned  and 
to  perish,  in  order  that  other  things  in  contin- 
uous succession  may  exist  (ix.  28). 

22.  Consider  that  everything  is  opinion,  and 
opinion  is  in  thy  power.  Take  away  then, 
when  thou  choosest,  thy  opinion,  and  like  a 
mariner  who  has  doubled  the  promontory, 
thou  wilt  find  calm,  everything  stable,  and  a 
waveless  bay. 

23.  Any  one  activity,  whatever  it  may  be, 
when  it  has  ceased  at  its  proper  time,  suffers 

* There  is  something  wrong  here,  or  incomplete. 


2g6 


ITbougbts. 


[Book  XII. 


no  evil  because  it  has  ceased;  nor  he  who  has 
done  this  act,  does  he  suffer  any  evil  for  this 
reason,  that  the  act  has  ceased.  In  like  man- 
ner then  the  whole,  which  consists  of  all 
the  acts,  which  is  our  life,  if  it  cease  at  its 
proper  time,  suffers  no  evil  for  this  reason,  that 
it  has  ceased;  nor  he  who  has  terminated  this 
series  at  the  proper  time,  has  he  been  ill  dealt 
with.  But  the  proper  time  and  the  limit  na- 
ture fixes,  sometimes  as  in  old  age  the  peculiar 
nature  of  man,  but  always  the  universal  nature, 
by  the  change  of  whose  parts  the  whole  uni- 
verse continues  ever  young  and  perfect.*  And 
everything  which  is  useful  to  the  universal  is 
always  good  and  in  season.  Therefore  the 
termination  of  life  for  every  man  is  no  evil,  be- 
cause neither  is  it  shameful,  since  it  is  both 
independent  of  the  will  and  not  opposed  to  the 
general  interest,  but  it  is  good,  since  it  is  sea- 
sonable, and  profitable  to  and  congruent  with 
the  universal.  For  thus  too  he  is  moved  by 
the  Deity  who  is  moved  in  the  same  manner 
with  the  Deity,  and  moved  towards  the  same 
thing  in  his  mind. 

24.  These  three  principles  thou  must  have  in 
readiness:  In  the  things  which  thou  doest,  do 

nothing  either  inconsiderately  or  otherwise 
than  as  justice  herself  would  act;  but  with  re- 
spect to  what  may  happen  to  thee  from  with- 
out, consider  that  it  happens  either  by  chance 
or  according  to  providence,  and,  thou  must 
*vii.  25. 


Book  XII.]  fliatcue  Butelius  antoninus. 


297 


neither  blame  chance  nor  accuse  providence. 
Second,  consider  what  every  being  is  from  the 
seed  to  the  time  of  its  receiving  a soul,  and 
from  the  reception  of  a soul  to  the  giving  back 
of  the  same,  and  of  what  things  every  being 
is  compounded,  and  into  what  things  it  is 
resolved.  Third,  if  thou  shouldst  suddenly 
be  raised  up  above  the  earth,  and  shouldst 
look  down  on  human  things,  and  observe 
the  variety  of  them  how  great  it  is,  and  at 
the  same  time  also  shouldst  see  at  a glance 
how  great  is  the  number  of  beings  who  dwell 
all  around  in  the  air  and  the  ether,  consider 
that  as  often  as  thou  shouldst  be  raised  up, 
thou  wouldst  see  the  same  things,  sameness 
of  form  and  shortness  of  duration.  Are  these 
things  to  be  proud  of? 

25.  Cast  away  opinion;  thou  art  saved. 
Who  then  hinders  thee  from  casting  it  away  ? 

26.  When  thou  art  troubled  about  an5’thing, 
thou  hast  forgotten  this,  that  all  things  happen 
according  to  the  universal  nature;  and  forgotten 
this,  that  a man’s  wrongful  act  is  nothing  to 
thee;  and  further  thou  hast  forgotten  this,  that 
everything  which  happens,  always  happened 
so  and  will  happen  so,  and  now  happens  so 
everywhere;  forgotten  this  too,  how  close  is  the 
kinship  between  a man  and  the  whole  human 
race,  for  it  is  a community,  not  of  a little  blood 
or  seed,  but  of  intelligence.  And  thou  hast 
forgotten  this  too,  that  every  man’s  intelli- 
gence is  a god  and  is  an  efflux  of  the  Deity;* 

* See  Epictetus,  ii.  8,  9,  etc. 


298 


tCbougbts. 


[Book  XII 


and  forgotten  this,  that  nothing  is  a man’s 
own,  but  that  his  child  and  his  body  and  his 
very  soul  came  from  the  Deity;  forgotten  this, 
that  everything  is  opinion;  and  lastly  thou 
hast  forgotten  that  every  man  lives  the  present 
time  only,  and  loses  only  this. 

27.  Constantly  bring  to  thy  recollection 
those  who  have  complained  greatly  about  any- 
thing, those  who  have  been  most  conspicuous 
by  the  greatest  fame  or  misfortunes  or  enmities 
or  fortunes  of  any  kind:  then  think  where  are 
they  all  now  ? Smoke  and  ash  and  a tale,  or 
not  even  a tale.  And  let  there  be  present  to 
thy  mind  also  everything  of  this  sort,  how 
Fabius  Catellinus  lived  in  the  country,  and 
Lucius  Lupus  in  his  gardens,  and  Stertinius  at 
Briae,  and  Tiberius  at  Capreae,  and  Velius 
Rufus  [or  Rufus  at  Velia];  and  in  fine  think  of 
the  eager  pursuit  of  anything  conjoined  with 
pride;*  and  how  worthless  everything  is  after 
which  men  violently  strain;  and  how  much 
more  philosophical  it  is  for  a man  in  the  op- 
portunities presented  to  him  to  show  himself 
just,  temperate,  obedient  to  the  gods,  and  to 
do  this  with  all  simplicity:  for  the  pride  which 
is  proud  of  its  want  of  pride  is  the  most  intol- 
erable of  all. 

28.  To  those  who  ask.  Where  hast  thou  seen 
the  gods,  or  how  dost  thou  comprehend  that 
they  exist  and  so  worshippest  them,  I answer,  ■ 
in  the  first  place,  they  may  be  seen  even  with 

ol-^aeug.  OlTjcng  KaiTvfoc,  Lpict.  i.  8,  6. 


Book  XII.]  Marcus  Bureltus  Bntontnus. 


299 


the  eyes;*  in  the  second  place,  neither  have  I 
seen  even  my  own  soul,  and  yet  I honor  it. 
Thus  then  with  respect  to  the  gods,  from  what 
I constantly  experience  of  their  power,  from 
this  I comprehend  that  they  exist,  and  I vene- 
rate them. 

29.  The  safety  of  life  is  this,  to  examine 
everything  all  through,  what  it  is  itself,  that  is 
its  material,  what  the  formal  part;  with  all  thy 
soul  to  do  justice  and  to  say  the  truth.  What 

*“Seen  even  with  the  eyes.”  It  is  supposed  that 
this  may  be  explained  by  the  Stoic  doctrine,  that  the 
universe  is  a god  or  living  being  (iv.  40),  and  that  the 
celestial  bodies  are  gods  (viii.  19).  But  the  emperor 
may  mean  that  we  know  that  the  gods  exist,  as  he 
afterwards  states  it,  because  we  see  what  they  do  ; as 
we  know  that  man  has  intellectual  powers,  because  we 
see  what  he  does,  and  in  no  other  way  do  we  know  it. 
This  passage  then  will  agree  with  the  passage  in  the 
Epistle  to  the  Romans  (i.  v.  20),  and  with  the  Epistle 
to  the  Colossians  (i.  v.  15),  in  which  Jesus  Christ  is 
named  “the  image  of  the  invisible  god  and  with 
the  passage  in  the  Gospel  of  St.  John  (xiv.  v.  9). 

Gataker,  whose  notes  are  a wonderful  collection  of 
learning,  and  all  of  it  sound  and  good,  quotes  a pas- 
sage of  Calvin  which  is  founded  on  St.  Paul’s  language 
(Rom.  i.  V.  20):  “God  by  creating  the  universe  [or 
world,  mundum],  being  himself  invisible,  has  pre- 
sented himself  to  our  eyes  conspicuously  in  a certain 
visible  form.”  He  also  quotes  Seneca  (De  Benef.  iv. 
c.  8):  “ Quocunque  te  flexeris,  ibi  ilium  videbis  occur- 
rentem  tibi : nihil  ab  illo  vacat,  opus  suum  ipse  im- 
plet.”  Compare  also  Cicero,  De  Senectute  (c.  22), 
Xenophon’s  Cyropaedia  (viii.  7),  and  Mem.  iv.  3 ; 
also  Epictetus,  i.  6,  de  Providentia.  I think  that  my 
interpretation  of  Antoninus  is  right. 


300 


ITbougbts, 


[Book  XII. 


remains,  except  to  enjoy  life  by  joining  one 
good  thing  to  another  so  as  not  to  leave  even 
the  smallest  intervals  between  ? 

30.  There  is  one  light  of  the  sun,  though  it 
is  interrupted  by  walls,  mountains,  and  other 
things  infinite.  There  is  one  common  sub- 
stance,* though  it  is  distributed  among  count- 
less bodies  which  have  their  .several  qualities. 
There  is  one  soul,  though  it  is  distributed 
among  infinite  natures  and  individual  circum- 
scriptions [or  individuals].  There  is  one  intel- 
ligent soul,  though  it  seems  to  be  divided. 
Now  in  the  things  which  have  been  mentioned, 
all  the  other  parts,  such  as  those  which  are  air 
and  matter,  are  without  sensation  and  have  no 
fellowship:  and  yet  even  these  parts  the  intelli- 
gent principle  holds  together  and  the  gravita- 
tion towards  the  same.  But  intellect  in  a pecu- 
liar manner  tends  to  that  which  is  of  the  same 
kin,  and  combines  with  it,  and  the  feeling  for 
communion  is  not  interrupted. 

31.  What  dost  thou  wish — to  continue  to 
exist?  Well,  dost  thou  wish  to  have  sensa- 
tion, movement,  growth,  and  then  again  to 
cease  to  grow,  to  use  thy  speech,  to  think  ? 
What  is  there  of  all  these  things  which  seems 
to  thee  worth  desiring  ? But  if  it  is  easy  to  set 
little  value  on  all  these  things,  turn  to  that 
which  remains,  which  is  to  follow  reason  and 
God.  But  it  is  inconsistent  with  honoring 
reason  and  God  to  be  troubled  because  by  death 
a man  will  be  deprived  of  the  other  things. 

* iv.  40. 


Book  XII.]  /Dbarcus  Sucellus  Antoninus. 


301 


32.  How  small  a part  of  the  boundless  and 
unfathomable  time  is  assigned  to  every  man, 
for  it  is  very  soon  swallowed  up  in  the  eternal ! 
And  how  small  a part  of  the  whole  substance; 
and  how  small  a part  of  the  universal  soul; 
and  on  what  a small  clod  of  the  whole  earth 
thou  creepest!  Reflecting  on  all  this,  consider 
nothing  to  be  great,  except  to  act  as  thy  na- 
ture leads  thee,  and  to  endure  that  which  the 
common  nature  brings. 

33.  How  does  the  ruling  faculty  make  use 
of  itself?  for  all  lies  in  this.  But  everything 
else,  whether  it  is  in  the  power  of  thy  will  or 
not,  is  only  lifeless  ashes  and  smoke. 

34.  This  reflection  is  most  adapted  to  move 
us  to  contempt  of  death,  that  even  those  who 
think  pleasure  to  be  a good  and  pain  an  evil 
still  have  despised  it. 

35.  The  man  to  whom  that  only  is  good 
which  comes  in  due  season,  and  to  whom  it  is 
the  same  thing  whether  he  has  done  more  or 
fewer  acts  conformable  to  right  reason,  and  to 
whom  it  makes  no  difference  whether  he  con- 
templates the  world  for  a longer  or  a shorter 
time — for  this  man  neither  is  death  a terrible 
thing  (hi.  7;  vi.  23;  x.  20;  xii.  23). 

36.  Man,  thou  hast  been  a citizen  in  this 
great  state  [the  world]  ;*  what  difference  does 
it  make  to  thee  whether  for  five  years  [or 
three]  ? for  that  which  is  conformable  to  the 
laws  is  just  for  all.  Where  is  the  hardship 

*ii.  16  ; iii.  ii  ; iv.  29. 


302 


Ebougbte. 


[Book  XII. 


then,  if  no  tyrant  nor  yet  an  unjust  judge  sends 
thee  away  from  the  state,  but  nature,  who 
brought  thee  into  it  ? the  same  as  if  a praetor 
who  has  employed  an  actor  dismisses  him  from 
the  stage.* — “ But  I have  not  finished  the  five 
acts,  but  only  three  of  them.” — Thou  sayest 
well,  but  in  life  the  three  acts  are  the  whole 
drama;  for  what  shall  be  a complete  drama  is 
determined  by  him  who  was  once  the  cause  of 
its  composition,  and  now  of  its  dissolution  : 
but  thou  art  the  cause  of  neither.  Depart 
then  satisfied,  for  he  also  who  releases  thee  is 
satisfied. 

* iii.  8 ; xi.  i. 


INDEXES. 


5 


5 


'5 


"■X 

)■ 


INDEX  OF  TERMS. 


a6idd>opa  (indifferentia,  Cicero,  Seneca,  Epp.  82) ; 
things  indifferent,  neither  good  nor  bad ; the  same 
as  piaa. 

aiaxpdc  (turpis,  Cic.),  ugly  ; morally  ugly. 
alr'ia,  cause. 

aiTiUdeg,  alriov,  t6,  the  formal  or  formative  principle, 
the  cause. 

aKoivavr/Tog.  unsocial. 

dvatfiopd,  reference,  relation  to  a purpose. 
dvvTie^aiptTUQ,  unconditionally. 
aiToppoia^  efflux. 

aTTpoaipera,  rd,  the  things  which  are  not  in  our  will  or 
power. 

dpx^,  a first  principle. 
aropoL  (corpora  individua,  Cic.),  atoms. 
avrdpK.ua  est  quae  parvo  contenta  omne  id  respuit  quod 
abundat  (Cic.)  ; contentment. 
avrdpKTig,  sufficient  in  itself ; contented. 
dfoppai,  means,  principles.  The  word  has  also  other 
significations  in  Epictetus.  Index  ed.  Schweig. 
yiyvdpeva,  rd,  things  which  are  produced,  come  into 
existence. 

daipuv,  god,  god  in  man,  man’s  intelligent  principle. 
6/ddeciic,  disposition,  affection  of  the  mind. 
dtaipEcng,  division  of  things  into  their  parts,  dissection, 
resolution,  analysis. 

6ia?[£KTiKp,  ars  bene  disserendi  et  vera  ac  falsa  dijudic- 
andi  (Cic.). 

didXvm^,  dissolution,  the  opposite  of  avyKpiaiQ. 

(305) 


20 


3o6 


UnOcE. 


<'iiavoia,  understanding ; sometimes,  the  mind  generally, 
the  whole  intellectual  power. 

^o'/fiara  (decreta,  Cic.),  principles. 

6'vvafu^  voepd,  intellectual  faculty. 
iyKpnreia,  temperance,  self-restraint. 
fMof  in  divisione  formae  sunt,  quas  Graeci  eldr/  vocant ; 
nostri,  si  qui  haec  forte  tractant,  species  appellant 
{ Cic. ).  But  sldoc  is  used  by  Epictetus  and  Antoninus 
less  exactly  and  as  a general  term,  like  genus. 
Index  Epict.  ed.  Schweig. — 6i  ye  ai  Trpurac  ovaiai 
Tipbg  rd  ciXAa  exovaiv,  ovt(j  Kal  rb  elSog  Trpdf  to  yevog  exei' 
v7TOK.elTai  yap  to  elSog  ro  yevei.  (Aristot.  Cat.  c.  5.) 
elpappevrj  (fatalis  necessitas,  fatum,  Cic.),  destiny, 
necessity. 

cKKAiaeig,  aversions,  avoidance,  the  turning  away  from 
things  ; the  opposite  of  bpe^ecg. 
ipTpvxa.,  Ta,  things  which  have  life. 
hepyeia,  action,  activity. 

evvoia,  evvotai,  notio,  notiones  (Cic.),  or  “notitiae 
rerum  notions  of  things.  (Notionem  appello 
quam  Graeci  turn  hvoiav,  turn  npoAjjfiv,  Cic.). 
ivoxn^,  r),  the  unity. 
iKWTpof^,  attention  to  an  object. 
evdvfi'ia,  animi  tranquillitas  (Cic.). 

evpeveg,  t6,  evpeveia,  benevolence ; evfievric  sometimes 
means  well-contented. 
evvoia,  benevolence. 
i^ovcia,  power,  faculty. 
enaKoXovO'/jaiv,  Kara,  by  way  of  sequence. 

TjyepovLKdv,  to,  the  ruling  faculty  or  part ; principatus 
(Cic.). 

6eap?/paTa,  percepta  (Cic.),  things  perceived,  general 
principles. 

KaOr/KEiv,  t6,  duty,  “officium.” 

KaMg,  beautiful. 

KaTalrjipig,  comprehension  ; cognitio,  perceptio,  com- 
prehensio  (Cic.). 
naTaanevri,  constitution. 


ITn&ej. 


307 


Karopduasic,  Karopdo/iara ; recta,  recte  facta  (Cic.)  ; right 
acts,  those  acts  to  which  we  proceed  by  the  right  or 
straight  road. 

Koapoc,  order,  world,  universe. 

Kdapoc,  6 blog,  the  universe,  that  which  is  the  One  and 
the  all  (vi.  25). 

Kp'ipa,  a judgment. 

KvpiEvov,  TO  iviov,  that  which  rules  within  (iv.  i),  the 
same  as  rb  pyepovindv.  Diogenes  Daertius  vii.,  Zeno. 
7/yEpovtKov  6e  Elvai  to  avpiurarov  Tijg  'tpvxpg. 
loyiKo,  -a,  the  things  which  have  reason. 
loyiKog,  rational. 
loyog,  reason. 

?Myog  a-nEppariKbg,  seminal  principle. 
pEca,  TO,  things  indifferent,  viewed  with  respect  to 
virtue. 

voEpbg,  intellectual. 
vdpog,  law. 

vovg,  intelligence,  understanding. 

olrjcng,  arrogance,  pride.  It  sometimes  means  in  An- 
toninus the  same  as  rv^og  ; but  it  also  means  “ opin- 
ion.” 

oiKovopia  (dispositio,  ordo,  Cic.)  has  sometimes  the 
peculiar  setjse  of  artifice,  or  doing  something  with 
an  apparent  purpose  different  from  the  real  purpose. 
blav,  TO,  the  universe,  the  whole  : p tC>v  bluv  (pvcng. 
bvTa,  TO.,  things  which  exist ; existence,  being. 
bpE^ig,  desire  of  a thing,  which  is  opposed  to  SKulwig, 
aversion. 

bpprj,  movement  towards  an  object,  appetite ; appetitio, 
naturalis  appetitus,  appetitus  animi  (Cic.). 
ovaia,  substance  (vi.  49).  Modern  writers  sometimes 
incorrectly  translate  it  “ essentia.”  It  is  often  used 
by  Epictetus  in  the  same  sense  as  vlp.  Aristotle 
(Cat.  c.  5)  defines  ovaia,  and  it  is  properly  translated 
“substantia”  (ed.  Jul.  Pacius).  Porphyrins  (Isa^. 
C.  2)  p ovaia  avuTaTO)  ovaa  Tip  ppdiv  irpb  avTfjg  yivog  rp> 
rb  yeviKoiTaTov. 


3o8 


1In5ej. 


■jrapaKo^vdTjTtK^  6vva/uc,  7/,  the  power  which  enables  us 
to  observe  and  understand. 
irelcHi,  passivity,  opposed  to  evlpyeta  : also,  affect. 
Treptardaeig,  circumstances,  the  things  which  surround 
us  ; troubles,  difficulties. 

TeTTpupivrij  7},  destiny. 

iTpoaipemg,  purpose,  free  will  (Aristot.  Rhet.  i.  13). 
■Kpoa'iptra,  to.,  things  which  are  within  our  will  or  power. 
irpoaipETiKdv,  rd,  free  will. 

TTpddtcng,  a purpose,  proposition. 

■rrpdvoia  (providentia,  Cic.),  providence. 

OKondg,  object,  purpose. 
aroixtlov,  element. 

avyKarddeaig  (asseusio,  approbatio,  Cic.),  assent;  avyKara- 
Seaeig  (probationes,  Gellius,  xix.  i). 
avyKpipara,  things  compounded  (ii.  3). 
avyKpiaig,  the  act  of  combining  elements  out  of  which 
a body  is  produced,  combination. 
cvvdeaig,  ordering,  arrangement  (compositio). 
avGTripa,  system,  a thing  compounded  of  parts  which 
have  a certain  relation  to  one  another. 
vlr/,  matter,  material. 
vXck6v,  t6,  the  material  principle. 

vne^aipEGLg,  exception,  reservation  ; ped'  vne^aipkaeug, 
conditionally. 

vnodeaig,  material  to  work  on  ; thing  to  employ  the 
reason  on  ; proposition,  thing  assumed  as  matter  for 
argument  and  to  lead  to  conclusions.  (Quaestionum 
duo  sunt  genera ; alterum  iufiuitum,  definitum 
alterum.  Definitum  est,  quod  imddeaiv  Graeci,  nos 
causam : infinitum,  quod  diciv  illi  appellant,  nos 
propositum  possumus  nominare.  Cic.  See  Aristot. 
Anal.  Post.  i.  c.  2). 

vTTOKe'tpem,  rd,  things  present  or  existing,  vi.  4 ; or 
things  which  are  a basis  or  foundation. 
vTiS'krjptg,  opinion. 

v-KoGTaaig,  basis,  substance,  being,  foundation  (x.  5). 
Epictetus  has  to  inroaraTiKov  koX  ovaiCideg.  (Justin us 
ad  Diogn.  c.  2.) 


•ffnDcs. 


309 


{xpiaraadai,  to  subsist,  to  be. 

<pavramai  (visus,  Cic.)  ; appearances,  thoughts,  impres- 
sions (visa  animi,  Gellius,  xix.  i)  : (pavraaia  tarl 
TvituaiQ  iv  ipvxy. 

<j)dvTaana,  seems  to  be  used  by  Antoninus  in  the  same 
sense  as  <pavTaa'ia,  Epictetus  uses  only  (pavraaia. 
(pavraarov,  that  which  produces  a (jiavraaia  : davraarov  rd 
TeTrai7)Kdc  rrjv  (pavraaiav  alaOrirdv. 

(pvai^,  nature. 

(pvaic  ij  rav  6?lov,  the  nature  of  the  universe, 
soul,  life,  living  principle. 

XoyiK^,  voepd,  a rational  soul,  an  intelligent  soul 


A' 

s 


J 

% 

• j 

■•V 

4-: 


GENERAL  INDEX. 


***  The  paragraphs  (par.)  and  lines  (1.)  are  those  of  the  sections. 


Active,  man  is  by  nature,  ix.  i6. 

Advice  from  the  good  to  be  taken,  vii.  21;  viii.  16. 
Affectation,  vii.  60;  viii.  30;  xi.  18  (par.  9),  19. 

Anger  discouraged,  vi.  26,  27;  xi.  18. 

Anger,  offenses  of,  ii.  10. 

Auger,  uselessness  of,  v.  28;  viii.  4. 

Appearances  not  to  be  regarded,  v.  36;  vi.  3,  13. 
Astonishment  should  not  be  felt  at  anything  that  hap- 
pens, viii.  15;  xii.  i (sub  fine),  13. 

Attainment,  what  is  within  every  one’s,  vii.  67;  viii.  8. 
Attention  to  what  is  said  or  done,  vi.  53;  vii.  4,  30; 
viii.  22. 

Bad,  the,  ii.  i. 

Beautiful,  the,  ii.  i. 

Casual.  See  Formal. 

Change  keeps  the  world  ever  new,  vii.  25;  viii.  50  (1. 
13);  xii.  23  (1.  10). 

Change,  law  of,  iv.  3 (sub  f.),  36,  v.  13,  23;  vi.  4,  15, 
36;  vii.  18;  viii  6;  ix.  19,  28  (par.  2),  35;  x.  7,  18; 
xii.  21. 

Change,  no  evil  in,  iv.  42. 

Christians,  the  xi.  3. 

Circle,  things  come  round  in  a,  ii.  14. 

Comedy,  new,  xi.  6. 

(311) 


312 


©encral  1Tn5cj. 


Comedy,  Old,  xi.  6. 

Complaining,  uselessness  of,  viii.  17,  50. 

Connection.  See  Universe. 

Conquerers  are  robbers,  x.  10. 

Contentment.  See  Resignation. 

Co-operation.  See  Mankind  and  Universe. 

Daemon,  the,  ii.  13,  17;  iii.  6 (1.  8),  7,  16  (1.  18);  v.  10 
(sub  f.)  27;  xii.  3 (sub.  f.). 

Death,  ii.  Ji,  12,  17;  iii.  3,  7;  iv.  5;  v.  33;  vi.  2,  24,  28; 

vii.  32;  viii.  20,  58;  ix.  3,  21;  x.  36;  xii.  23,  34,  35. 
Death  inevitable,  iii.  3;  iv.  3 (l.  22),  6,  32,  48,  50;  v. 

33;  vi.  47;  viii.  25,  31. 

Desire,  offenses  of,  ii.  10. 

Destiny,  iii.  ir  (1.  19);  iv.  26;  v.  8 (1.  13,  etc.),  24; 
vii.  57;  X.  5. 

Discontent.  See  Resignation. 

Doubts  discussed,  vi.  10;  vii.  75;  ix.  28,  39;  xii.  5,  14. 
Duty,  all-importance  of,  vi.  2,  22;  x.  22. 

Earth,  insignificance  of  the,  iii.  10;  iv.  3 (par.  i,  sub 
f.);  vi.  36;  viii.  21;  xii.  32. 

Earthly  things,  transitory  nature  of,  ii.  12,  17;  iv.  32, 
33.  35.  48;  V.  23;  vi.  15,  36;  vii.  21,  34;  viii.  21,  25; 
X.  18,  31;  xii.  27, 

Earthly  things,  worthlessness  of,  ii.  12;  v.  10,  33;  vi. 

15;  vii.  3;  ix.  24,  36;  xi.  2;  xii.  27. 

Equanimity,  x.  8. 

Example,  we  should  not  follow  bad,  vi.  6;  vii.  65. 
Existence,  meanness  of,  viii.  24. 

Existence,  the  object  of,  v.  i;  viii.  19. 

External  things  cannot  really  harm  a man,  or  affect 
the  soul,  ii,  ii  (1.  22);  iv.  3 (par.  2,  sub  f.);  8,  39,  49 
(par.  2);  V.  35;  vii.  64;  viii.  i (sub  f.);  32,  51  (par. 
2j;  ix.  31;  X.  33. 

Failure,  x.  12. 

Fame,  worthlessness  of,  iii.  10;  iv.  3 (1.  45),  19,  33  (1. 
10);  V.  33;  vi.  16,  18;  vii.  34;  viii.  i,  44;  ix.  30. 


©eneral  ITnOcj. 


313 


Fear,  what  we  ought  to,  xii.  i (1.  18). 

Fellowship.  See  Mankind. 

Few  things  necessar}'  for  a virtuous  and  happy  life, 
ii.  5;  iii.  10;  vii.  67;  x.  8 (1.  22). 

Flattery,  xi.  18  (par.  10). 

Formal,  the,  and  the  material,  iv.  21  (par.  2);  v.  13; 

vii.  10,  29:  viii.  ii;  ix.  25;  xii.  8,  10,  18. 

Future,  we  should  not  be  anxious  about  the,  vii.  8; 

viii.  ii;  ix.  25;  xii.  i. 

Gods,  perfect  justice  of  the,  xii.  5 (par.  2). 

Gods,  the,  vi.  44s  xii.  28. 

Gods,  the,  cannot  be  evil,  ii.  ii;  vi.  44. 

Good,  the,  ii.  i. 

Habit  of  thought,  v.  16. 

Happiness,  what  is  true,  v.  9 (sub  f.),  34;  viii.  i;  x. 
33- 

Help  to  be  accepted  from  others,  xii.  7. 

Heroism,  true,  xi.  18  (par.  10). 

Ignorance.  See  Wrong-doing. 

Independence.  See  Self-reliance. 

Indiferent  things,  ii.  ii  (sub  f.l;  ix.  39;  vi.  32;  ix.  i; 
(1-  30). 

Individual,  the.  Interests. 

Infinity.  See  Time. 

Ingratitude.  See  Mankind. 

Injustice,  ix.  i. 

Intelligent  soul,  rational  beings  participate  in  the 
same,  iv.  40;  ix.  8,  9;  x.  i (1.  15);  xii.  26,  30. 
Interests  of  the  whole  and  the  individual  identical,  iv. 
23;  V.  8 (1.  34);  vi.  45,  54;  X.  6,  20,  33  (sub  f.);  xii. 
23  (1.  12). 

Justice,  V.  34;  X.  ii;  xi.  10. 

Justice  and  reason  identical,  xi.  i (sub  f.). 

Justice  prevails  everywhere,  iv.  10. 


314 


Ocneral  ITnDcj. 


Leisure,  we  ought  to  have  some,  viii.  51. 

Life,  a good,  everywhere  possible,  v.  16. 

Life  can  only  be  lived  once,  ii.  14;  x.  31  (1.  ii). 

Life,  shortness  of,  ii.  4,  17;  iii.  10,  14;  iv.  17,  48  (sub 
f.),  50;  vi.  15,  36,  56;  X.  31,  34. 

Life  to  be  made  a proper  use  of,  without  delay,  ii.  4; 

iii.  I,  14;  iv.  17,  37;  vii.  56;  viii.  22;  x.  31  (1.  14); 
xli  I (1.  18). 

Life,  whether  long  or  short,  matters  not,  vi.  49;  ix.  33; 
xii.  36. 

Magnanimity,  x.  8. 

Mankind,  co-operation  and  fellowship  of,  one  with 
another;  ii.  i (1.  ii),  16;  iii.  4 (sub  f.);  ii  (sub  f.k 

iv.  4,  33  (sub  f.);  V.  16  (1.  ii),  20;  vi.  7,  14  (sub  f.), 
23.  39;  vii.  5,  13.  22,  55;  viii.  12,  26,  34,  43,  59;  ix.  i, 
9 (sub  f.),  23,  31,  42  (sub.  f.);  X.  36,(1.  16);  xi.  8,  21; 
xii.  20. 

Mankind,  folly  and  baseness  of,  v.  lO  (1.  9);  ix.  2,  3 
(1.  13),  29;  X.  15,  19. 

Mankind,  ingratitude  of,  x.  36. 

Material,  the.  See  Formal. 

Nature,  after  products  of,  iii.  2;  vi.  36. 

Nature,  bounds  fixed  by,  v.  i. 

Nature,  man  formed  by,  to  bear  all  that  happens  to 
him,  V.  18;  viii.  46. 

Nature,  nothing  evil,  which  is  according  to,  ii.  17  (sub 
f );  vi.  33. 

Nature  of  the  universe.  See  Universe,  nothing  that 
happens  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  the. 

Nature,  perfect  beauty  of,  iii.  2;  vi.  36.  _ 

Nature,  we  should  live  according  to,  iv.  48  (sub.  f.),5i; 

V.  3,  25;  vi.  16  (1.  12);  vii.  15,  55;  viii.  i,  54;  x.  33.^ 
New,  nothing,  under  the  sun,  ii.  14  (1.  ii);  iv.  44;  vi. 
37,  46;  vii.  I,  49;  viii.  6;  ix.  14;  x.  27;  xi.  i. 

Object,  we  should  always  act  with  a view  to  some,  iL 
7,  16  (1.  12) ; iii.  4 ; iv-  2 ; viii.  17  ; x.  37  ; xi.  21  i 
xii.  20. 


General  ITnDej. 


31 


Obsolete,  all  things  become,  iv.  33. 

Omissions,  sins  of,  ix.  5. 

Opinion,  iv.  3 (par.  2)  (sub  f.),  7,  12,  39;  vi.  52,  57; 
vii.  2,  14,  16,  26,  68 ; viii.  14,  29,  40,  47,  49 ; ix.  13, 
29  (1.  12),  32,  42  (1.  21);  X.  3 ; xi.  16,  18  ; xii.  22,  25. 
Others’  conduct  not  to  be  inquired  into,  iii.  4 ; iv.  18 ; 
V.  25. 

Others,  opinion  of,  to  be  disregarded,  viii.  i (1.  12);  x. 
8 (1.  12),  II  ; xi.  13  ; xii.  4. 

Others,  we  should  be  lenient  towards,  ii.  13  (sub  f.) ; 

iii.  II  (sub  f.)  ; iv.  3 (1.  16)  ; v.  33  (1.  17) ; vi.  20,  27  ; 
vii.  26,  62,  63,  70;  ix.  II,  27 ; X.  4;  xi.  9,  13,  18; 
xii.  16. 

Others,  we  should  examine  the  ruling  principles  of. 

iv.  38 ; ix.  18,  22,  27,  34. 

Ourselves  often  to  blame  for  expecting  men  to  act 
contrary  to  their  nature,  ix.  42  (1.  31). 

Ourselves,  reformation  .should  begin  with,  xi.  29. 
Ourselves,  we  should  judge,  x.  30  ; xi.  18  (par.  4). 

Pain,  vii.  33,  64  ; viii.  28. 

Perfection  not  to  be  expected  in  this  world,  ix.  29 
(1-  7)- 

Perseverance,  v.  9 ; x.  12. 

Persuasion,  to  be  used,  vi.  50. 

Perturbation,  vi.  16  (sub  f.) ; viii.  58 ; ix.  31. 
Pessimism,  ix.  35. 

Philosophy,  v.  9 ; vi.  12  ; ix.  41  (1.  15). 

Pleasure,  he  who  pursues,  is  guilty  of  impiety,  ix.  i 
(1.  24). 

Pleasures  are  enjoyed  by  the  bad,  vi.  34 ; ix.  i (1.  30). 
Power,  things  in  our  own,  v.  5,  10  (sub  f. ) ; vi.  32.  41, 
52,  58 ; vii.  2,  14,  54,  68  ; x.  32,  33. 

Power,  things  not  in  our  own,  v.  33  (sub  f.) ; vi.  41. 
Practice  is  good,  even  in  things  which  we  despair  of 
accomplishing,  xii.  6. 

Praise,  worthlessness  of,  iii.  4 (sub  f.)  ; iv.  20 ; vi.  16, 
59  ; vii.  62  ; viii.  52.  53  • ix.  34- 


I 


General  IlnDcE. 


316 


Present  time  the  only  thing  a man  really  possesses,  ii. 

14;  iii.  10;  viii.  44;  xii.  3 (sub  f. ). 

Procrastination.  See  Life  to  be  made  a proper  use  of, 
etc. 

Puppet  pulled  by  strings  of  desire,  ii.  3 ; iii.  16 ; vi. 
16,  28 ; vii.  3,  29 ; xii.  19. 

Rational  soul.  See  Ruling  part. 

Rational  soul,  spherical  form  of  the,  viii.  41  (sub  f.); 

xi.  12  ; xii.  3 (and  see  Ruling  part). 

Reason,  all-prevailing,  v.  32;  vi.  i,  40. 

Reason  and  nature  identical,  vii.  ii. 

Reason  the,  can  adapt  everything  that  happens  to  its 
own  use,  v.  20 ; vi.  8 ; vii.  68  (1.  16) ; viii.  35  ; x.  31 
(sub  f ). 

Reason,  we  should  live  according  to.  See  Nature. 
Repentance  does  not  follow  renouncement  of  pleas- 
ure, viii.  10. 

Resignation  and  contentment,  iii.  4 (1.  27,  etc.),  16  (1. 
10,  etc.) ; iv.  23,  31,  33  (sub  f.),  34 ; v.  8 (sub  f.),  33 
(1.  16);  vi.  16  (sub  f.),  44,  49 : vii.  27,  57  ; ix.  37  ; x. 
I,  II,  14,  25,  28,  35. 

Revenge,  best  kind  of,  vi.  6. 

Rising  from  bed,  v.  i;  viii.  ii. 

Ruling  part,  the,  ii.  2;  iv.  ii,  19,  21,  26;  vi.  14,  35; 
vii.  16,  55  (par.  2);  viii.  45,  48,  56,  57,  60,  61 ; ix.  15, 
26;  X.  24,  33  (1.  21),  38;  xi.  I,  19,  20;  xii.  3,  14. 

Self-reliance  and  steadfastness  of  soul,  iii.  5 (sub  f.), 
12  ; iv.  14,  29  (1.  5),  49  (par.  i)  ; v.  3,  34  (1.  5);  vi. 
44  (1.  15);  vii.  12,  15;  ix.  28  (1.  8),  29  (sub  f.);  xii.  14. 
Self-restraint,  v.  33  (sub  f.). 

Self,  we  should  retire  into,  iv.  3 (1.  4 and  par.  2) ; 
vii.  28,  33,  59  ; viii.  48. 

Senses,  movements  of  the,  to  be  disregarded,  v.  31  (1. 
10)  ; vii.  55  (par.  2) ; viii.  26,  39 ; x.  8 (1.  13) ; xi. 
19;  xii.  I (1.  18). 

Sickness,  behavior  in,  ix.  41. 

Social.  See  Mankind. 


(Bencval  1fnC»ej. 


317 


Steadfastness  of  soul.  See  Self-reliance. 

Substance,  the  universal,  iv.  40 ; v.  24 ; vii.  19,  23 ; 
xii.  30. 

Suicide,  v.  29 ; viii.  47  (sub  f.)  ; x.  8 (1.  35). 

Time  compared  to  a river,  iv.  43. 

Time,  infinity  of,  iv.  3 (1.  35),  50  (sub  f.) ; v.  24 ; ix. 

32  ; xii.  7,  32. 

Tragedy,  xi.  6. 

Tranquillity  of  soul,  iv.  3 ; vi.  ii  ; vii.  68 ; viii.  28. 

Ugly,  the,  ii.  i. 

Unintelligible  things,  v.  10. 

Universe,  harmony  of  the,  iv.  27,  45  ; v.  8 (1.  14). 
Universe,  intimate  connection  and  co-operation  of  all 
things  in  the,  one  with  another,  ii.  3,  9 ; iv.  29 ; v. 
8 30 : vi.  38,  42,  43  ; vii.  9,  19,  68  (sub  f.)  ; viii.  7 y 
ix.  I ; X.  I. 

Universe,  nothing  that  dies  falls  out  of  the,  viii,  18, 
50  (1.  13) : X.  7 (1.  25). 

Universe,  nothing  that  happens  is  contrary  to  the 
nature  of  the,  v.  8,  10  (sub  f.)  ; vi.  9,  58;  viii.  5;, 
xii.  26. 

Unnecessary  things,  v.  45. 

Unnecessary  thoughts,  words,  and  actions,  iii.  4 ; iv. 
24. 

Vain  professions,  x.  16 ; xi.  15. 

Virtue,  vi.  17. 

Virtue  its  own  reward,  v.  6 ; vii.  73  ; ix.  42  (1.  47)  * 
xi.  4. 

Virtue,  omnipotence  of,  iv.  16. 

Virtue,  pleasure  in  contemplating,  vi.  48. 

Whole,  integrity  of  the,  to  be  preserved,  v.  8 (sub  f. ). 
Whole,  the.  See  Interests. 

Wickedness  has  always  existed,  rii.  i. 

Wickedness  must  exist  in  the  world,  viii.  15,  50 ; ix. 
42 ; xi.  18  (par.  iij ; xii.  16. 


©eneral  1In^eE. 


318 


Worst  evil,  the,  ix.  2 (1.  9.) 

Worth  and  importance,  things  of  real,  iv.  33  (sub  f.l  ; 
V.  10  (1.  16) ; vi.  16,  30  (1.  7),  47  (sub  f.) ; vii.  20,  44, 
46,  58,  66;  viii.  2,  3,  5;  ix.  6,  12;  x.  8 (1.  27),  ii;  xii 
I-  27,  31,  33. 

Wrong-doiug  cannot  really  harm  any  one,  vii.  22  ; 

viii.  55;  ix.  42  (1.  25);  X.  13  (par.  i);  xi.  18  (par.  7). 
Wrong-doing  injures  the  wrong-doer,  iv.  26;  ix.  4,  38,; 
xi.  18  (par.  3). 

Wrong-doing  owing  to  ignorance,  ii.  i,  13;  vi.  27; 

vii.  22,  26,  62,  63  ; xi.  18  (par.  3);  xii.  22. 
Wrong-doing  to  be  left  where  it  is,  vii.  29 ; ix.  20. 


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5.  A .Selection  from  the  Discourses  of  Epictetus,  with 

the  Encheridion.  Translated  by  George  Long. 

6.  Essays,  First  Series.  Py  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson. 

7.  Second  Series . By  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson. 

8.  Cranford.  By  Mrs  Gaskell. 

9.  Of  the  Imitation  of  Christ.  Four  books  com- 

plete in  one  volume.  By  Thomas  A’Kempis. 

10.  The  Vicar  of  Wakefield.  By  Oliver  Goldsmith. 

11.  Letters,  Sentences  and  Maxims.  By  Lord  Ches- 

terfield. “ Masterpieces  of  good  taste,  good 
writing,  and  good  sense.” 

12.  The  Idle  Tl  oughts  of  an  Idle  Fellow.  A book 

for  an  Idle  Holiday.  By  Jerome  K.  Jerome. 

13.  Tales  from  Sliake.speare.  By  Charles  and  Mary 

Lamb,  with  an  introduction  by  Rev.  Alfred 
Ainger,  M.  A. 


(375) 


Ubc  aitemuB  X{!;rar^. 


X4.  Natural  Law  in  the  Spiritual  World.  Hy  Henry 
Drummond,  F.  R.  S.  K.,  F.  G.  S.  The  rela- 
tions of  Science  aud  Religion  clearly  expounded. 

15.  Addresses.  By  Henry  Drummond,  F.  R.  S.  E., 

F.  G.  S.  The  Greatest  Thing  in  the  World  ; 
Pax  Vobiscum;  The  Changed  Life;  How  to 
Learn  How;  Dealing  with  Doubt;  Prepara- 
tion for  1-earning ; What  is  a Christian  ? '1  he 
Study  of  the  Bible;  A Talk  on  Books. 

16.  “My  Point  of  View.”  Representative  selections 

from  the  works  of  Professor  Drummond.  By 
William  Shepard, 

17.  The  Scarlet  Letter.  By  Nathaniel  Hawthorne. 

18.  Representative  Men.  Seven  lectures.  By  Ralph 

Waldo  Emerson. 

19.  My  King  and  His  Service.  By  Frances  Ridley 

Havergal.  Containing — My  King;  Royal 

Commandments ; Royal  Bounty ; Royal  Invi- 
tation ; Loyal  Responses. 

20.  Reveries  of  a Bachelor.  By  Ik  Marvel.  A Book 

of  the  Heart. 

21.  The  House  of  the  Seven  Gables.  By  Nathaniel 

Hawthorne. 

22.  Dream  Life.  By  Ik  Marvel.  A Companion 

volume  to  Reveries  of  a Bachelor. 

23.  Rab  and  His  Friends,  Marjorie  Fleming,  etc. 

By  John  Brown. 

24.  Essays  of  Elia.  By  Charles  Lamb. 

25.  Sartor  Resartus.  By  Thomas  Carlyle. 

26.  Heroes  and  Hero  Worship.  By  Thomas  Carlyle. 


5 


OCT  2-  1905 


Duke  University  Libraries 


D00525375R 


TRANS.  FROWP'-' 


1993 


1S8.8  A92;7 


2,5^6' 


‘♦V 

Vo*£ 


